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Abstract 
 
While short-term and working memory deficits in individuals with dyslexia are well 
documented, the effects of dyslexia on prospective memory (PM) have been neglected. A range 
of PM measures were administered to different samples of university students with and without 
dyslexia (typically N = 50, 25 per group, matched for age and IQ, and differing on reading and 
spelling measures). Questionnaire data indicated that individuals with dyslexia perceived 
themselves as significantly worse on everyday PM activities than non-dyslexics. These data 
were corroborated by ratings taken from close friends/relatives of the participants. Naturalistic 
data revealed that adults with dyslexia performed more poorly on a time-based task involving a 
delay of 40 minutes and 24 hours and an event-based PM task involving a one week delay. 
There were no event-based PM deficits in dyslexia in the experimental tasks. However, adults 
with dyslexia were significantly worse at time-based tasks. Difficulties with PM would, 
therefore, seem to be evident in adults with dyslexia and tend to manifest themselves in time-
based PM tasks. This interpretation is consistent with executive functioning problems associated 
with dyslexia and theories that take a broader view of dyslexia than phonological processing 
alone. 
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Chapter 1: Prospective memory 
 
1.1. Definition of prospective memory 
 
Prospective Memory (PM) is remembering to remember (Winograd, 1988) or remembering to 
perform an intended action (planned action) at an appropriate time in the future (McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2007). To successfully complete a PM task one needs to first form an intention to 
perform the task in the future, and then execute this task at the required time. Hence, some 
researchers refer to this type of process as realising delayed intentions (Ellis, 1996; Ellis & 
Milne, 1996). For instance, one needs to first form an intention to take out the rubbish later, 
when leaving for work, in order to be able to then perform this intended action when the 
appropriate time comes. Thus, a PM task always involves a time interval (also called a retention 
interval) between intention formation and intention execution, and this time interval can vary 
from short to long e.g. from two minutes to seven days.  
  
There are two sub-components which constitute the performance of a PM task. These are the 
prospective and retrospective sub-components (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; 1996). The 
retrospective component is known as the “what” and “when” of the PM task. The prospective 
component is the appearance of the thought in the cognizer’s mind regarding the PM response at 
the appropriate time (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996). For instance, in the example where one 
forms an intention to take out the rubbish later, when leaving for work, the retrospective sub-
component is that it is the rubbish that one is intending to take out later, when leaving for work. 
The prospective sub-component in this example is to actually remember to recall this previously 
formed intention at the time when this action needs to be performed (Ellis, 1996; Graf & Uttl, 
2001). After an intention to act in the future is formed, people usually engage in other tasks in 
the meantime (filled delay) before there is a need recall the intention. The lack of the recall of 
the prospective memory intention after a filled delay is one of the key reasons why prospective 
remembering fails. There are some processes which can help to improve PM performance e.g. 
rehearsal of the intention in tasks involving very short delays (West, Krompinger & Bowry, 
2005). 
 
1.2. Event-based vs. time-based prospective memory 
  
There are two main types of PM tasks; time-based and event-based PM tasks (Einstein & 
McDaniel, 1990; Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel & Einstein, 2001). A time-based PM task involves 
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performing the intended action at a certain time (called pulse intentions, see Ellis, 1988) or after 
a particular period of time has elapsed (called step intentions; see Ellis, 1988). The time-based 
PM tasks require participants to provide PM response after a certain amount of time has 
elapsed, usually involving a window of time where the response is required. The performance of 
an event-based PM task involves performing the intended action at the occurrence of a specific 
target event also called a PM cue (McDaniel & Einstein, 1993). This target event triggers 
associated PM activity regardless of an individual’s engagement in other concurrent tasks 
(Einstein & McDaniel, 1996). The previous example of taking out the rubbish can be modified 
slightly to demonstrate these two types of PM. A time-based task would involve forming an 
intention to take out the rubbish at 7am tomorrow (involving a specific time), whereas an event-
based task would involve forming an intention to take out the rubbish when one’s spouse places 
it next to the front door (involving a specific event which acts as a cue). Generally 
experimenters mostly follow the aforementioned paradigms of event-based and time-based PM 
in controlled laboratory tasks (e.g. Einstein, McDaniel, Richardson, Guynn and Cunfer, 1995; 
Sellen, Louise, Harris & Wilkins, 1997). However, a PM task can also be activity-based, such as 
asking participants in advance to undertake another task after a particular experimental activity 
has finished (Kliegel, McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). In everyday life an example of an activity-
based PM task could include intending to take out the rubbish after vacuuming one’s home. 
 
Einstein and McDaniel (1990) investigated event-based PM experimentally. This study aimed to 
investigate if there were any differences in the PM of younger and older adults and whether 
factors such as the availability of external aids and familiarity of the target event influenced 
performance. The results did not reveal any age-related deficits in PM regardless of the 
familiarity of the target cue and availability of external cues, with all participants remembering 
prospectively on average 61% of time. They argued that not all PM tasks are high in terms of 
the reliance on self-initiated retrieval (relying on oneself to retrieve a memory), but instead that 
PM tasks vary in the degree to which they rely on self-initiated retrieval. Time-based 
prospective memory tasks are argued to be generally harder to remember than event- based 
tasks, as time-based PM is self-initiated and requires the passage of time to be monitored 
(Einstein et al., 1995). In event-based PM, the tasks are automatically triggered by an external 
PM cue. This division enabled Einstein and McDaniel to argue that the tasks which they used 
(i.e. event-based) may not produce large age-related effects, as these tasks employ external cues 
which can serve as a guide for retrieval. On the contrary Einstein and McDaniel suggested that 
time-based PM tasks might be more likely to result in large age-related deficits, due to their 
greater reliance on self-initiated retrieval relative to event-based PM tasks. This was argued to 
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be due to time-based PM tasks requiring participants to remember to monitor and initiate the 
PM response on their own. 
 
Einstein et al. (1995) investigated whether there are any age-related differences between time- 
and event-based PM tasks i.e. PM tasks relying on self-initiation (time-based) or PM tasks 
relying less on these processes (event-based). Participants were engaged in an ongoing task, 
requiring them to answer general-knowledge questions. Before the ongoing task, participants 
were instructed to remember to press the F8 key every time the word president appeared within 
the question (implementing event-based PM). This experiment also involved some time-based 
PM tasks, where participants were asked to remember to press the F8 key after 5-minute periods 
had elapsed, with this task concurrently running alongside the presentation of the general-
knowledge questions. In addition, both tasks included a distracter activity in the form of a 
vocabulary task. This distracter activity was presented after the instructions to remember to 
press the F8 key on the required occasions and before beginning the general-knowledge-
question task. The event-based and time-based PM tasks used by Einstein et al. (1995) both 
included an equal number of targets (the word “president” appeared six times and there were six 
five-minute segments). Age differences were found in time-based PM tasks only i.e. older 
adults performed worse on tasks involving more self-initiation in comparison to younger adults. 
This study provided empirical evidence suggesting that event-based PM tasks differ from time-
based PM tasks, supporting claims that these two types of tasks involve different levels of self-
initiated retrieval.  
 
Other investigations of PM have also indicated that there are substantial and reliable differences 
between event- and time-based PM tasks. For example two experiments conducted by Park, 
Hertzog, Kidder, Morrell and Mayhorn (1997) employed a working memory (WM) task as their 
ongoing task. Working memory is a multi-component, limited-capacity system responsible for 
the temporary storage and processing of information (i.e. manipulation, integration and 
maintenance; Baddeley, 1997; see section 1.5.2.1. for more information). Park et al. (1997) 
asked participants to perform either an event- or time-based PM activity in addition to the WM 
ongoing task. Control participants were also employed to perform either the WM or PM task 
only. Results showed age-related differences on both types of tasks (time- and event-based), but 
these differences were greater on the time-based PM task. However, the event-based PM task 
was found to have a higher cost to performance on the ongoing WM task compared to the time-
based PM task. The authors argued that this might be because event-based PM tasks have a 
substantial attentional requirement related to continuous monitoring for PM cues. 
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Please note that majority of research has concentrated on event-based PM, although it is 
recognised that time-based PM performance has been extensively explored using the Virtual 
Week task which is a board game (or computerised task) simulating common everyday life PM 
tasks (Rendell & Craik, 2000). According to Hicks, Marsh and Cook (2005) it is unclear why 
only a handful of articles have appeared on time-based PM.  
 
1.3. Paradigms used for investigation of prospective memory 
 
1.3.1. Experimental paradigms 
 
Laboratory based enquiries into PM can either involve dual-task paradigm or task-switch 
procedures (Bisiacchi, Schiff, Ciccola & Kliegel, 2009). Both of these paradigms comprise of 
an ongoing activity (a task performed during the time intervals between intention formation and 
execution; Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000) and the PM task itself in order to mirror the real-world 
nature of PM. Namely, remembering prospectively in real life involves other secondary tasks in 
which one is engaged e.g. having to remember to take out the rubbish when leaving home needs 
to be held in memory while getting ready for work. The dual-task paradigm requires participants 
to perform both the PM and ongoing tasks simultaneously (e.g. Hicks et al., 2005). However, 
PM tasks employing dual-task paradigm could be argued to be different than a typical dual-task 
design in which one has two clearly cued activities to interweave. In PM tasks, only the ongoing 
task is clearly cued, but not the PM task which needs to be recalled. The task-switch procedure 
involves breaking out of ongoing activity in order to perform the PM activity i.e. participants 
are not required to respond to the ongoing task when they encounter a PM event (e.g. Burgess, 
Scott & Frith, 2003).  
  
Experimental paradigms involving time-based and event-based PM tasks, in order to be in line 
with real life demands, use a cover task (also known as an ongoing activity) which may involve 
a number of different activities between the formation and execution of the intentions. These 
tasks do not involve explicit instructions regarding the intention, at the time of required 
remembering. In prospective memory experiments researchers (e.g. Gordon, Shelton, Bugg, 
McDaniel & Head, 2011) usually measure the accuracy and reaction time (RT) of responses to 
PM and ongoing trials. The measurement of the accuracy and RT of the ongoing task enables 
the investigation of possible costs to the ongoing task caused by having to perform PM tasks. 
16 
 
There have been a number of studies conducted under laboratory controlled conditions where 
PM tasks were embedded in ongoing activities, and performance of the ongoing activities have 
been required to be interrupted or suspended to allow execution of the PM tasks (e.g. Einstein & 
McDaniel, 1990; Einstein, McDaniel, Thomas, Mayfield, Shank, Morrisette & Breneiser, 2005; 
Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 1996).  
 
1.3.2. Naturalistic paradigms 
 
Prospective memory can be also investigated using naturalistic paradigms (e.g. Moscovich, 
1982; Mecham & Leiman, 1982; Rendell & Henry, 2008; Rendell & Thomson, 1999). 
Naturalistic paradigms relating to daily life protocols are described by Bolger, Davis and Rafaeli 
(2003, p.580) as intended to “capture life as it is lived’. Therefore, daily life investigations aim 
to describe phenomena in their usual and natural settings. According to Reis (2012), the daily 
life approach is an important method of studying psychology, since psychological phenomena 
are more or less (depending on the phenomenon) influenced by the context in which they occur. 
The use of a naturalistic investigation allows the capture of the psychological phenomenon as a 
whole, including its contextual factors. Furthermore, Reis (2012) claims that in order to 
understand a behavioural process properly, it is necessary to take into account its contextual 
factors. Naturalistic measures have been also valued for their elimination of retrospective biases 
where one is self-reporting events by looking back at them with a predetermined and inaccurate 
perspective (Reis, 2012). For example, it is likely for a participant who generally believes that 
his or her memory is bad to rate his or her own memory failures within the last six months to be 
high, regardless of whether this is true or not (see section 1.4.4. of Chapter 1 for a consideration 
of this in relation to PM). The study of daily life has a very strong ecological validity and this 
makes its findings more applicable to practitioners e.g. as a basis for possible interventions 
(Hektner, 2012). Finally, Reis (2012) concludes that naturalistic methods to study daily life 
acquire a completely new level of information, which is more holistic compared to traditional 
methods and that these methods are increasingly important to researchers. 
 
Naturalistic and semi-naturalistic research methods have been applied to study PM in order to 
provide a more ecologically valid and integrative approach. The use of naturalistic research 
methods is also necessary to investigate longer delays between intention formation and 
execution, which are too long for laboratory-based investigations (McDaniel and Einstein, 
2007). The daily life study of PM enables a PM cue to appear as a natural part of another task or 
situation as well as involving the interruption of a daily routine or activity i.e. breaking out of an 
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ongoing activity (necessary characteristics of PM tasks; Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 1996). 
Naturalistic and semi-naturalistic techniques have been used to investigate PM in a wide range 
of different populations e.g. pregnant women (Rendell & Henry, 2008); elderly adults 
(Masumoto, Nishimura & Tabuchi, 2011; Rendell & Thomson, 1999); individuals with 
amnestic mild cognitive impairment (Delprado, Kinsella, Ong & Pike, 2013); mild cognitive 
impairment (Schmitter–Edgecombe, Woo & Greeley, 2009) and autism spectrum disorder 
(Altgassen, Koban & Kliegel, 2012). 
 
Early work using naturalistic PM tasks, for instance, involved participants being instructed 
before leaving the laboratory to call the laboratory at a certain time several days later 
(Moscovitch, 1982), or giving them a pack of postcards to be mailed on certain days (Mecham 
& Leiman, 1982). Such studies require participants to interrupt their daily routine in order to 
perform the PM tasks and thus breaking out from the ongoing task is achieved naturally, as 
tasks performed in real life conditions appear as a natural part of another task or situation. 
However, these studies have been criticised for a lack of accuracy and low precision in the 
measurement of PM, since the precise time of performing the prospective activity was not 
recorded. In more recent research on PM, this problem has been mitigated by the use of more 
advanced technology. For instance, mobile phones (e.g. Masumoto, Nishimura & Tabuchi, 
2011) or answering machines (e.g. Delprado, Kinsella, Ong & Pike, 2013) have been used in a 
number of investigations. The advantage of using such technologies allowed the date and time 
of calls placed to be recorded. Other studies have used portable time-logging devices where 
participants were required to log the time at prescribed times over a number of days (Rendell & 
Henry, 2008; Rendell & Thomson, 1999).  
 
Sellen et al. (1997) also compared performance of adults on naturalistic event- and time-based 
PM tasks conducted within the workplace of participants. Electronic badges recorded the PM 
responses over a two week period. Participants were required to press a button on the budges 
every two hours for the time-based PM task and every time they entered a particular room for 
the event-based PM task. Participants also pressed different numbers and pattern of buttons on 
the badge to record the amount of times that participants though about the PM tasks. The results 
showed enhanced performance on the event-based task in comparison to the time-based task. 
Sellen et al. proposed that event-based cues are external and therefore are a better trigger for the 
intended action compared to time-based cues, which are internal. In this study participants 
tended to think about the time-based PM task more frequently compared to event-based PM 
task. 
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Another type of naturalistic inquiry into PM involved a self-generated PM task. Delprado, 
Kinsella, Ong and Pike (2013) asked participants to identify their own PM tasks for the coming 
week and after that week had elapsed they were asked whether or not they had remembered to 
do the tasks. This study investigated participants with amnesic mild cognitive impairment and 
found this group to be impaired on PM tasks compared to healthy controls. All participants were 
found to use strategies (e.g. a written note) that aided memory in around 50% of the time, when 
engaging in their own tasks. Prospective memory investigations using participants’ own self-
generated PM tasks have been argued to be more ecologically valid. Nevertheless, this type of 
naturalistic design still relies solely on self-reports provided by participants. This issue of using 
self-reported data lowers the validity of a study, as there is no way of investigating whether 
participants actually performed the tasks.  
 
To improve the validity of tasks which rely on self-reports researchers have used semi-
naturalistic PM tasks which require participants to do everyday life activities, while present in 
the laboratory or similar experimenter-generated environment. For instance, Craik and Bialystok 
(2006) employed a Dresden Breakfast task where participants had to remember to prepare a 
breakfast by remembering when to start and stop cooking five foods, so that all the foods would 
be ready at the same time. Participants also engaged in an ongoing distractor task (i.e. setting 
the table in a particular way). This study found age related decrements in most measures. 
However, the ecological validity of semi-naturalistic tasks can be lower than that of naturalistic 
tasks. This may be because participants are more aware that they are being watched, as the tasks 
do not take place in real life settings (i.e. in the participants’ own homes). Nevertheless, semi-
naturalistic tasks are more ecologically valid than traditional lab-based measures, because they 
take place under real life conditions.  
 
1.4. Theories of prospective memory 
 
The most prominent theories regarding PM are related to the mechanisms which allow the 
retrieval of PM; these are mainly relevant to event-based PM. Less research has been conducted 
with regards to time-based PM (Hicks, Marsh Cook, 2005) and there are no major theories 
specifically concerning time-based PM. Nevertheless, some of the PM event-based theories are 
also relevant to time-based theories. According to McFarland and Glisky (2009) time- and 
event-based PM tasks require many of the same processes e.g. recalling an association between 
PM intention and cue, as well as dividing attention between ongoing and PM tasks. Thus, some 
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theories would be relevant to both PM task types, such as theories of event-based PM which are 
not cue-focused e.g. the reflexive-associative theory (e.g. Einstein & McDaniel, 1996). Some of 
the cue-focussed theories (e.g. The Preparatory Attentional and Memory; PAM theory; Smith, 
2003) may be also relevant to time-based PM, as time-based tasks may also require recalling an 
association between PM intention and cue (McFarland & Glisky, 2009). For example, the time 
or a clock can act as a cue in time-based tasks. This type of cue could be argued to be more 
general compared to event-based cues as a specific time could remind one about many activities 
whereas a specific event is more likely to remind one about a specific PM intention. However, 
in some time-based tasks there may be no time cues available, such as a clock which may help 
activate the time-based PM activity. This reasoning is in line with the researchers (e.g. Craik, 
1986; Einstein et al., 1995) who claimed that time-based PM tasks require more self-initiated 
processing compared to event-based tasks. Since time-based PM requires participants to 
remember to monitor and initiate the PM response on their own, whereas in event-based PM 
tasks cues act as reminders i.e. as event-based PM cues remind participants about the PM 
activity. Even if participants were not monitoring at the beginning of a task, it is possible that 
after the first event-based PM cue appeared they were reminded about the PM task and as a 
result started monitoring. McFarland and Glisky (2009) have also suggested that time-based PM 
tasks may require more monitoring processes (time monitoring) as there are no external cues to 
direct responding and thus one needs to monitor frequently for an appropriate time to perform 
the intended action. Thus, time monitoring was argued to involve continual interruption of 
ongoing activities and was suggested to be mainly self-initiated. Some event-based PM tasks 
were argued to only involve interruption and inhibition of the ongoing task once the PM target 
was recognised, whereas other event-based PM tasks were argued to involve monitoring 
processes. Thus, there are two main theories which concern mechanisms that allow the retrieval 
of event-based PM. The first is the monitoring theory (Einstein et al., 2005). The second theory 
is named the spontaneous retrieval theory (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; Guynn, McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2001; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; McDaniel, Guynn, Einstein & Breneiser, 2004). 
McDaniel and Einstein (2000) have tried to incorporate the former two major theories and given 
this theory the name of the multiprocess framework. These theories of PM retrieval will be 
discussed in this section. 
 
1.4.1. Prospective memory considered from the perspective of memory-based models 
 
Prospective memory can be understood from the perspective of memory-based models. 
Considering PM in this way, the PM intention is stored in memory as declarative knowledge 
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(conscious recall of memories related to facts and events) and plays a causal role in action. The 
probability of the intention being retrieved is reliant on the level of activation of the 
representation and the presence of appropriate retrieval cues. Memory representation which is 
fully activated will result in recall and in turn successful performance of the intended activity, as 
long as the activity was correctly encoded. Intention has been described by Reason (1983) as a 
collection of critically active cognitive schemata. In order for the cognitive schemata to be 
activated, they need to be refreshed by periodic reviews of intention, and failure to do this will 
result in these cognitive schemata decaying spontaneously (Reason, 1983), and ultimately one 
would fail to perform the PM activity. 
 
In contrast to Reason (1983), Goschke and Kuhl (1993; 1996) argued that cognitive schemas 
related to PM intentions have a special dynamic status in memory. They proposed the intention-
superiority effect on the basis of experiments in which participants recognised words which 
were related to an intended action faster and more accurately than neutral words. On the basis of 
this evidence the authors argued that an intention is represented at a higher level of activation. 
This effect has been argued to provide unintentional enhancement of the activation level of 
intention-related concepts. The subsequent research in the area of intention-superiority effect 
was most notably conducted by Marsh and colleagues (e.g. Marsh, Hicks & Bryan; 1999), but 
also by Freeman and Ellis (2003). 
 
Tobias (2009) argues that PM memories decay at the same rate as retrospective memories 
(recollection of episodes that occurred in the past, including semantic, episodic, 
autobiographical and declarative memory). Tobias argues that reminders to perform PM tasks 
coupled with an individual’s level of commitment to undertake the task can assist in keeping the 
accessibility of the intention to mind. The habitual repeating of a PM task is argued to 
ultimately replace the need for memory aids. 
 
1.4.2. The monitoring theory of prospective memory 
 
The monitoring theory (Einstein et al., 2005) states that for a PM intention to be retrieved at the 
appropriate moment the cognitive system has to monitor the environment for target events. The 
monitoring process refers to holding the PM intention in mind and searching the environment 
for cues indicating that the PM intention should be executed (Scullin, McDaniel & Shelton, 
2013). This monitoring requires attentional resources which are resource-demanding as the 
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environment is searched for a signal confirming that the previously formed intention can be 
appropriately executed.  
 
The PAM theory (Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004) has been proposed as a more specified 
and stronger view of the monitoring theory. It assumes that event-based PM tasks continuously 
engage monitoring processes for successful completion and argues for a strategic, non-
automatic preparatory process which monitors events for possible PM cues (Smith, 2003). This 
attentional process also plays a part in deciding between targets and non-target events as well as 
in recollection of the PM intention once encountered. According to Smith and Bayen (2004) 
preparatory processes are also involved in the rehearsal of the PM cue to which a PM response 
needs to be made. The PAM theory takes a strong view which argues that a PM task cannot be 
completed without preparatory monitoring processes. Moreover, Smith (2003) has stated that 
the retrieval of a PM intention cannot be automatic as it depends on non-automatic, strategic 
preparatory processes taking place during the retention interval between intention formation and 
execution. The PAM theory suggested that the preparatory attentional processes can either take 
the form of conscious strategic monitoring or may involve subtle attentional processing which 
still requires capacity, but might be outside of awareness (Smith, Hunt, McVay & McConnell, 
2007). 
 
Background evidence indirectly supporting the PAM theory comes from studies which found 
that dividing attention during retrieval has a negative impact on PM performance (e.g. Einstein, 
Smith, McDaniel & Shaw, 1997; Marsh & Hicks, 1998; McDaniel et al., 1998; Park et al., 
1997). Smith (2003) argued that the decrease of PM performance found under such conditions 
can be understood to be due to dividing attention which hinders the executive monitoring 
processes required for recognition of PM cues. Smith (2003) showed empirical support for her 
claim in an experimental study investigating PM. One group of participants was asked to 
complete an ongoing task involving making lexical decisions as quickly as possible. The other 
group of participants not only had to respond to the ongoing task but also had to remember to 
respond to six event-based PM cues by pressing a key on the computer keyboard. Smith found 
that participants performing the dual-paradigm task (in the ongoing and PM tasks running 
concurrently) had significantly slower RTs when making lexical decisions (in the ongoing task), 
in comparison to responses of participants who were only engaged in the ongoing task. The 
increased RT to the ongoing task in the dual-paradigm condition was argued to be due to 
insufficient resources left over for this task, as the resources were engaged in monitoring for PM 
cues. This was further supported by participants whose increased RTs on the ongoing task were 
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paired with PM performance above the mean. Therefore, monitoring for PM cues was shown to 
be associated with costs in the form of slower RTs on the ongoing task. Furthermore, because 
monitoring is resource-consuming, there also could be a cost of PM related monitoring shown in 
the form of errors in the ongoing task. On the basis of this, the PAM theory argued that 
preparatory attentional processes consuming limited cognitive resources result in cost to the 
ongoing task.  
 
Smith (2003) conducted a series of three experiments which investigated the impact of 
performing PM tasks on ongoing activity. The first experiment involving two participant groups 
employed a lexical decision task as an ongoing activity (deciding whether a letter string is a 
word or non-word). Only one of the participant groups was asked to respond to six PM target 
words embedded in the ongoing trials. The other group was told that they did not need to 
respond to the PM cues until after the ongoing task had been completed. Smith (2003) argued 
that this design enabled an investigation of whether adding a PM task would have a cost to the 
performance on the ongoing trials, caused by the involvement of preparatory attentional 
resources required for PM retrieval. Smith reasoned that any cost visible on the ongoing trials of 
a task (which also includes PM trials) could simply be caused by the need to make a PM 
response in addition to, or instead of, engaging in the processes needed for the ongoing task 
performance. Therefore, this may not be indicative of engagement of preparatory attentional 
processes during the time interval between intention formation and its execution. Smith 
proposed that it is better to compare it to a task which does not require PM responses in order to 
investigate if preparatory attentional processes are engaged during the ongoing trials of a task 
which also incorporates a PM task, as it does not require preparatory attentional resources. The 
expected cost to the ongoing trials during the intention retention period was based on the PAM 
theory which stated that attentional preparatory processes draw on one’s limited resources. 
 
The results showed no significant differences in terms of PM accuracy between the two 
participant groups. However, it was found that the addition of the PM task resulted in a slowing 
on the ongoing task. This was argued to support the assumption of PAM that PM tasks require 
functional attentional resources even when the PM cues are not present (during the performance 
of the ongoing trials). The results from this experiment also showed that participants who were 
more accurate on the PM component of the task had slower responses to the ongoing trials 
compared to participants with poorer PM performance. This was argued to be due to a reduction 
of the attentional resources available, with participants who scored higher on the PM component 
having to direct capacity away from the ongoing task, in order to successfully perform the PM 
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task. This supported the PAM theory, that the attentional preparatory processes are involved in 
successful event-based PM performance. 
 
The second experiment conducted by Smith (2003) was aimed at providing further support for 
the PAM theory by replication of the main finding from the first experiment. The results 
supported the findings of the first experiment, in that the performance of a PM task had a 
negative impact on the ongoing task and therefore, it was argued that preparatory attentional 
processes are needed for successful performance of an event-based PM task. However, it was 
still unclear whether it was the initiation of PM intention that required capacity or other 
processes such as rehearsal of PM cues or action. In order to investigate this experiment three 
employed manipulation of the PM cue discriminability by the means of orthographic 
distinctiveness. Participants were also given a measure of WM to investigate if capacity is 
needed for retrieval of PM intentions. On the basis of the claim that orthographically distinct 
cues require more capacity to be processed as these cues have been found to be more difficult to 
process at the lexical level (Hunt & Toth, 1990), Smith argued that capacity would be involved 
in PM intention retrieval if participants with high WM span perform better on the PM task 
(especially in tasks with orthographically distinct PM cues) compared to participants with low 
WM spans. Smith argued that participants with high WM span would have enough resources to 
perform the ongoing task whilst maintaining the preparatory processes. She also stated that 
participants with high WM spans would be expected to make use of the increased memorability 
of the distinct cues, unlike participants with low WM spans who would not be able to take 
advantage of the orthographically distinct PM cue, as their limited WM capacity would be fully 
engaged on the PM tasks. 
 
The results from experiment three confirmed that unlike common PM cues, participants with 
high WM spans were more likely to respond correctly to distinct PM targets compared to 
participants with low WM spans. It was also found that only participants with high WM spans 
improved significantly on the PM performance in the distinct PM cue condition compared to the 
common PM cue condition. The difference in the impact of the cues with different 
distinctiveness on the two participant groups (low and high WM spans) was argued to confirm 
that it is not only the retrospective recall of the PM action or its performance that requires 
capacity, but also the retrieval of the PM intention. Thus, the author claimed that the interaction 
of WM span and orthography supported the claim of the PAM theory, in that PM tasks involve 
capacity and therefore are non-automatic. The data were also reanalysed in order to see if they 
produced similar results to experiments one and two, in terms of PM performance and cost to 
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ongoing task. This reanalysis showed the same pattern of results i.e. participants who were 
better at the PM task had slower RTs on the ongoing trials. The results of experiment three also 
showed that PM performance is dependent on how much resources are directed towards the PM 
task in comparison to the ongoing activity. 
 
In general Smith's (2003) results provided support for the PAM theory and the proposition that 
preparatory processes as well as retrospective memory processes contribute to PM performance. 
It also supported the claims that event-based PM tasks are capacity-consuming and this is not 
just caused by the retrospective elements of the PM task or its performance, but by preparatory 
attentional processes. It showed that attentional resources are required before an event-based 
PM cue appears and that these resources are needed for the retrieval of the PM intention. Thus, 
the retrieval of event-based PM intention has been argued to be non-automatic. Smith argued 
that the engagement of attentional resources in PM task not only results in better PM 
performance but also creates costs visible on the ongoing activity.  
 
The need for non-automatic processes for successful PM retrieval was further supported by the 
multinomial model of PM (Smith & Bayen, 2004). In this model the authors argued that a PM 
intention cannot be retrieved at all without engagement of preparatory attentional monitoring 
processes. The Smith and Bayen multinomial model of event-based PM is a formal 
mathematical model which enabled an estimation and validation of the extent to which the 
preparatory attentional processes and memory processes (responsible for recognising and 
distinguishing PM cues from non-cues) are involved in PM performance. Smith and Bayen used 
two separate and independent parameters for their multinomial model of PM. These were the 
preparatory attentional processes and retrospective memory processes.  
 
They validated their multinomial model of PM in four experiments (Smith & Bayen, 2004) 
which manipulated the instructions in such a way as to place importance either on the PM or the 
ongoing task, distinctiveness of PM cues and the difficulty of PM cue encoding (based on the 
amount of time given for encoding). This model estimated that placing importance on PM task 
would lead to increased engagement in preparatory attentional processes (monitoring). On the 
other hand, this model estimated that placing more importance on the PM tasks would only have 
a little effect on the memory processes i.e. recognition of the PM cue. These effects occurred 
regardless of PM cue distinctiveness. Furthermore, Smith and Bayen argued that the effects of 
task importance which were found in relation to PM performance are mediated through varying 
levels of engagement in the preparatory attentional processes. This study also showed that when 
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importance was placed on the PM task (in comparison to the ongoing task) there was a greater 
cost visible on the non-target ongoing trials. The manipulation of the amount of time 
participants have been given to encode PM cues showed that when participants were given more 
time, their PM performance increased. The multinomial modelling estimated that this 
manipulation of time available for encoding of PM cues affected the memory processes only. 
The Smith and Bayens’ (2004) multinomial model of PM has been also validated successfully 
in a study conducted by Horn, Bayen, Smith and Boywitt (2011). 
 
Later studies have also supported the claims of PAM theory that event-based PM tasks are 
capacity-consuming and involve non-automatic processes. For instance a study conducted by 
Smith, Hunt, McVay and McConnell (2007) has shown that performance of an event-based PM 
task results in cost to the ongoing activity. Salient PM cues were used in this study, as according 
to multiprocess theory of PM (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; for more details see section 1.4.4.) 
they are likely to result in automatic retrieval of the PM intention. Smith et al. (2007) argued 
that if PM tasks with salient PM cues are automatic, no cost to the ongoing task performance 
will be visible. The results supported the hypothesis that PM tasks with salient PM targets 
interfered with the ongoing task performance and thus supported the argument that the retrieval 
of an event-based PM intention is not an automatic process. Similar task interference was found 
in time-based designs (e.g. Marsh, Hicks & Cook, 2006). 
 
1.4.2.1. Criticisms of monitoring theory 
 
The extreme version of the monitoring theory (i.e. PAM theory; Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 
2004) brings about possible criticisms. According to McDaniel and Einstein (2007) it may be 
too costly for attentional and supervisory resources to be involved in every event-based PM 
activity, especially when taking into consideration the number of potential ongoing intentions at 
any given time. Scullin, McDaniel, Shelton and Lee (2010) have also argued that monitoring is 
unlikely to be sustained over longer periods of time (see section 1.4.4.2. for more details). 
According to Bargh and Chartrand (1999) individuals have a limited capacity for conscious 
control over behaviours and this limited resource is likely to be quickly drained. Research has 
shown a negative effect of using up conscious effort in one domain on another domain in which 
participants were also required to sustain conscious effort (e.g. Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven & Tice, 1998; Muraven, Tice & Baumeister, 1998). Therefore, Einstein et al. (2005) 
argued that it is rational to assume that individuals have a system allowing spontaneous retrieval 
in tasks with substantial time intervals between intention formation and its execution in order to 
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not compromise performance of ongoing activities. Indeed, Einstein et al. (2005) have shown 
that monitoring for a PM cue is a controlled process which is hard to sustain over long periods. 
They argued that it is unlikely that individuals normally rely on constant and capacity-
consuming monitoring processes in PM tasks involving longer time intervals and thus, 
investigated further the involvement of spontaneous retrieval processes in PM. 
 
1.4.3. Spontaneous retrieval theory 
 
The second main theory describing mechanisms of event-based PM is spontaneous retrieval 
theory (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; Guynn et al., 2001; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; McDaniel 
et al., 2004). Originally, Einstein and McDaniel (1996) proposed the noticing plus search 
model, where noticing the PM cue can spontaneously activate the PM intention. This model 
describes two stages on which event-based PM retrieval is dependent. Einstein and McDaniel 
claimed that a PM cue does not only need to be perceived, but it also needs to produce some 
internal response e.g. a feeling of general familiarity. The feeling of familiarity will be greater if 
the PM cue itself was used during the intention formation phase rather than just described in 
categorical terms. The second stage of the noticing plus search model proposed by Einstein and 
McDaniel (1996) relates to memory search (the meaning of event) which occurs after the event 
is noticed. This is similar to passing by someone who looks familiar but you do not recognise 
this person in the first instance. Upon searching your mind in an attempt to identify them, you 
realise that it is the postman. This theory suggests that the noticing phase is an automatic 
process, but the memory search is dependent on cognitive resources. The noticing and the 
memory search components have been seen as necessary stages for memory retrieval and have 
been argued to operate sequentially and separately (McDaniel, Guynn, Einstein & Breneiser, 
2004). This point of view has been supported by West and colleagues (e.g. West, Herndon & 
Ross-Munroe, 2000; West, Herndon & Crewdson, 2001) who, using event-related brain 
potentials (ERPs) studies suggested that there are two different neural processes; one supporting 
the noticing of a PM cue and the other being memory search (i.e. retrieval of the intention from 
memory). On the basis of this noticing plus search model it can be argued that event-based PM 
forgetting can arise from either failure to notice the PM cue or a failure to search memory in 
order to establish what the cue signifies. 
 
The noticing plus search model was further developed and was encompassed by the 
spontaneous retrieval theory (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; Guynn et al., 2000; McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2000; McDaniel et al., 2004). This theory proposes that the retrieval of intentions 
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occurring when PM cues are encountered relies on spontaneous memory-based and/or 
attentional processes. This process of retrieving PM intentions is thought to be much more 
automatic than the retrieval processes argued by monitoring theory (e.g. McDaniel & Einstein, 
2007). The spontaneous retrieval theory proposes that one does not need to monitor the 
environment for PM cues; instead the PM intention retrieval occurs upon encountering a target 
event. In other words a previously formed intention can “pop” into ones mind when 
encountering a target event, and there is no requirement for these intentions to be kept 
conscious. It is argued that it is the target event that triggers remembering and that this process 
does not incur a cost on the ongoing task. Namely, the retrieval of a previously formed intention 
can take place without executive resources being dedicated to it when the PM cue first occurs. 
McDaniel, LaMontagne, Beck, Scullin and Braver (2013) using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) methods have shown that spontaneous retrieval does not require the preparatory 
activation of the prefrontal cortex (PFC, an area of the brain to which executive processes have 
been mapped). The spontaneous retrieval theory, however, suggests that one may think about 
the intended action during the time interval between action formation and execution.  
 
The spontaneous retrieval theory is supported by a study using self-reports conducted by Reese 
and Cherry (2002). In this investigation participants were asked at different points during a PM 
experiment to tell the experimenter what they were thinking about in these given moments. The 
results from this investigation showed that participants seldom mentioned the PM task while 
performing the PM experiment. It was found that participants mentioned thinking about the PM 
task during the experiment less than 5% of the time compared to 69% of the time in the case of 
the ongoing task. These results were found despite the adults participating in this study having 
relatively high PM accuracy (on average about 60%). Einstein et al. (2005) argued that if there 
was in fact, a strategic monitoring process involved for monitoring during the ongoing activity 
for PM cues, then thoughts about the PM task should be much more frequent. Alternatively, 
considering that participants reported thinking about the PM task seldomly, and did not rely on 
strategic monitoring processes, there should be overall poor PM performance. This however 
was not the case as participants had a respectable PM performance. Further support for the 
spontaneous retrieval theory comes from post-experimental self-reports in Einstein and 
McDaniel’s (1990) study. These introspective reports revealed that the PM action “popped” into 
the minds of participants while they were engaged in the ongoing task. 
 
Nowinski and Dismukes (2005) found a contextual effect which also supports the spontaneous 
retrieval theory. In their experiment, participants were presented with several diverse ongoing 
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tasks but PM instructions were given only in the context of one of these tasks. In tasks where 
the contexts were given, the instructions about the PM task (PM intention was encoded, so that 
the task encountered at retrieval was the same as the ongoing task during encoding) resulted in 
better PM performance. It was argued that the restrained context at retrieval played the role of a 
facilitating agent in retrieval of the association between the PM cue and the target.  
 
Einstein et al. (2005) conducted a series of experiments showing that spontaneous retrieval 
processes on their own can result in successful PM retrieval. They found that there was no cost 
to the ongoing activity associated with the performance of the PM task. This evidence opposes 
the findings of Smith and her colleagues regarding cost (e.g. Smith, 2003; Smith et al., 2007; 
2010). More importantly, experiment five of Einstein et al. (2005) showed that spontaneous 
retrieval took place even in a task that did not require participants to perform a PM task (in 
which the PM intention was suspended). This was based on a claim that a spontaneous process 
should occur even without intention. To investigate this Einstein and colleagues gave their 
participants PM instructions, but before the PM task began they asked participants to perform a 
lexical decision task. This enabled the researchers to implement a design in which the PM 
intention was suspended during the lexical decision task. In this lexical decision task presented 
to participants between the PM instruction and the actual PM task, there were PM cues, but 
participants were instructed to ignore them. In addition, some of the other items in the lexical 
decision task were items that participants had previously encountered as the experimenters 
presented these in a previous task. The rest of the items in the lexical decision task were neutral 
items. This study also included a control condition which involved a retrospective memory 
(RM; memory of items/events encountered or experienced in the past; Baddeley, Eysenck & 
Anderson, 2009) demand instead of the PM demand. Einstein et al. (2005) assumed that 
participants would not monitor for the PM cues as there were instructed to ignore PM cues in 
the intervening lexical decision task. The results confirmed this, as almost the same RTs were 
found to the neutral items in the PM and RM control conditions. There were also no significant 
RT differences between the PM and RM tasks on the previously presented words. In addition, 
no significant differences in RTs between the PM and RM conditions were found when 
combining the two types of words (neutral and previously presented). The authors argued that 
this showed that no monitoring was employed in the PM condition. This was established on the 
basis that there was no reason to monitor in the RM condition, and the RT comparison of RM 
and PM conditions showed similar RTs in both of these conditions. Previous experiments which 
supported PAM theory (e.g. Smith, 2003) showed that when participants employed preparatory 
attentional processes, slowing was visible on the ongoing trials of the PM condition compared 
29 
 
to the ongoing trials in the control condition and this was not the case in the Einstein et al. 
study. 
 
Once the experimenters established that there was no involvement of monitoring processes 
during the lexical decision task, they were able to investigate whether spontaneous retrieval 
processes took place. To do this, the authors compared the RTs of the trials including PM cues 
to the trials with previously presented items (control items). This was the most appropriate 
comparison considering that both of these item types were encountered by the participants 
previously. Thus, this comparison enabled the researchers to equate the levels of repetition 
priming between the two stimuli types. The experimenters also compared the two memory type 
conditions (PM and RM). The results showed that participants’ RTs were slower under the PM 
condition compared to the RM condition and, the RTs from the target items were significantly 
longer compared to RTs from the previously presented items i.e. participants were slower 
responding to the target items. This result supported the claim that spontaneous retrieval 
occurred in response to target events. There was also a significant interaction between the two 
factors (memory and item types) which showed that there was greater slowing (relative to 
previously presented items) for the PM targets compared to RM targets. This showed that there 
was a greater involvement of spontaneous retrieval when PM targets were processed compared 
to RM targets, ultimately indicating some involvement of spontaneous retrieval when RT targets 
were processed. This was argued to be due to participants noticing the familiar target in case of 
the RM targets. In the case of PM targets there could have been an additional slowing caused by 
retrieval of the intended action. The authors maintained that these results are very difficult to 
explain in the light of the PAM theory (Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004) which claims that 
monitoring is always required in PM retrieval. Their results appeared to show the opposite i.e. 
that no monitoring was needed for event-based PM retrieval. 
 
Einstein et al. (2005) proposed that the slowing might have occurred due to spontaneous 
noticing that these words in target trials are the targets during both conditions (PM and RM). 
This was argued to demonstrate the existence of spontaneous retrieval processes in a task where 
the PM demands were suspended. However, according to Marsh, Hicks and Cook (2008) the 
slowing in this experiment was related to the verification stage (where checking occurs to see if 
the cue meets the criteria) of the microstructure of an event-based response after cue detection 
rather than the noticing itself. This could mean that the spontaneous retrieval itself is an 
automatic process and that cognitive resources (as found by the slowing on the target trials) are 
needed for verification rather than for PM retrieval. This way of reasoning is consistent with 
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Einstein et al. (2005), who proposed that an associative mechanism (Moscovitch, 1994) is 
responsible for spontaneous retrieval (in both contexts, PM and RM). According to Moscovitch 
(1994) reflective retrieval is dependent on a strong association between a cue and action as well 
as full processing of the cue at retrieval. Furthermore, this is in line with Bargh and Chartrand 
(1999) who reasoned that the majority of human behaviours are automatically triggered as a 
response to some environmental stimulus rather than initiated by conscious will. The argument 
that spontaneous retrieval is an automatic process can be supported by studies suggesting that 
dividing attention in tasks which rely on spontaneous retrieval does not reduce PM performance 
(e.g. Guynn & McDaniel, 2007; McDaniel et al., 2004, Experiments 2 and 3). Considering that 
spontaneous retrieval is an automatic process, one would not expect dividing attention to have 
an effect on PM performance. 
 
A more specific example of the spontaneous retrieval theory is explained by the reflexive-
associative theory (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; Guynn et al., 2001; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; 
McDaniel et al., 1998, 2004). This theory attempts to explain the mechanics behind the 
spontaneous retrieval processes; stating that at the intention formation (stage one) an association 
is formed between the target event and the action to be executed. Once the target event is 
encountered the formed intention is brought to consciousness by an automatic associative-
memory system (e.g. the hippocampal system has been suggested by Moscovitch, 1994), the 
previously formed association will initiate the retrieval of the PM action. This is said to happen 
regardless of whether the intention is present in consciousness or not. This automatic process of 
spontaneous retrieval has been claimed by Moscovitch (1994) to require few cognitive 
resources, to be obligatory and rapid. Nevertheless, this process is dependent on the quality of 
the formed association between the target event and the intended action, as well as on whether 
the target event is fully processed when encountered. The target event needs to be processed 
well enough to produce an interaction with a memory trace for the information that is associated 
with the target event to be brought into awareness. McDaniel et al. (2004) further stated that in 
the reflexive-associative theory the target event does not need to be necessarily recognised as a 
PM cue, as was proposed in the cue-focused theories covered so far in this chapter (e.g. PAM 
theory; Smith, 2003). The reflexive-associative theory has also claimed that it is not essential 
for the target event to be identified as significant in the first place in order for it to prompt a 
memory search later on. According to this theory the target event either triggers or does not 
trigger the intended action bringing it to consciousness via the reflexive-associative process. 
Therefore, it can be reasoned that a failure to form the requisite association could lead to PM 
errors. 
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Support for this theory comes from a study conducted by McDaniel et al. (2004) where pre-
experimental associations were used to vary the associative interaction between the intended 
response and the target event. The PM task involved writing down associated words in response 
to each of two target words. The ongoing task involved rating words on different dimensions. 
There were two types of PM conditions in this experiment, the strong-association PM condition 
and the weak-association PM condition. In the strong-association PM condition participants had 
to write down words that were highly associated with the target words e.g. write down the word 
spaghetti to the target word sauce. On the contrary in the weak association PM condition, the 
word pairs were weakly associated e.g. staple-sauce. Even though the same words were used in 
both conditions, the strong-association condition resulted in 85% PM accuracy compared to 
56% PM accuracy in the weak-association. Guynn, McDaniel and Einstein (1998) produced 
similar results in a study focusing on the association between the intended action and target 
event, finding higher PM scores when participants were reminded of both the PM cue and the 
intended action (associative link) in comparison to just being reminded about target events only 
(no associative link). 
 
This theory does not refute the evidence supporting PAM, stating that dividing attention during 
the retrieval has a negative effect on PM performance e.g. Einstein et al. (1997); Marsh and 
Hicks (1998); McDaniel et al. (1998); Park et al. (1997). On the contrary, Einstein et al. (2005) 
claim that the findings obtained from these studies can also be explained through using the 
reflexive-associative theory. Namely, the claim is that dividing attention does not allow the full 
processing of the target event and in turn this makes it more difficult for the associative retrieval 
processes to recognise the target event and ultimately results in poor PM performance. 
Furthermore, Einstein et al. (1997) suggested that the deterioration of PM performance may not 
be due to dividing attention on the retrieval of intention stage but as a result of increased WM 
demands. Working memory capacity is a limited resource and therefore it may be demanding 
for one to hold the intended action at the same time as selecting the retrieved intention and 
scheduling the intended action. 
 
1.4.4. Multiprocess theory of prospective memory 
 
The multiprocess theory proposed that retrieval of PM can be dependent on multiple variables 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). This view further argues that some PM tasks may be performed 
automatically by relying on environmental cues/conditions, but others require controlled 
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monitoring of the environment on the basis of which switching of attention from the ongoing 
activity to the intended action occurs. Thus, this view argues that both strategic monitoring and 
spontaneous retrieval can underpin PM retrieval. The multiprocess view argues that it is not 
necessary that one has to monitor the environment for successful PM retrieval as suggested by 
PAM theory (Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004), since retrieval can occur spontaneously. 
However, the multiprocess view accepts that monitoring can also underpin PM retrieval in 
contrast to the spontaneous retrieval theory presented previously. 
 
According to Einstein and McDaniel (2000), the characteristics of the PM task, target cues (e.g. 
focality), ongoing task and individual differences can determine whether one is more or less 
likely to rely on spontaneous retrieval or monitoring process. Namely, it is the relation of the 
PM cue to PM activity and the nature of the ongoing task that plays an important role in 
establishing which process will be used (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). Also the importance 
placed on the PM task can result in different processes being used for PM retrieval i.e. 
monitoring is likely if the importance of the PM task is emphasised. On the other hand, 
individuals may rely on the spontaneous retrieval processes when there is a focal PM cue 
(processing of the PM cue is encouraged by the ongoing task) and are more likely to rely on 
monitoring processes when the PM cue is non-focal (the ongoing task does not encourage its 
processing; see section 1.4.4.2. for more details about cue focality). In addition, salient PM cues 
are more likely to result in more automatic cue detection and less salient PM cues may require 
more monitoring. Another factor affecting the use of different processes is related to the 
strength of the cue-target association. A strong cue-target association encourages spontaneous 
retrieval compared to a weak cue-target association which is more likely to result in a 
monitoring approach. In addition, stretched WM resources (in the case of demanding or 
absorbing tasks) could result in the spontaneous retrieval approach to PM compared to high 
WM resources (in the case of non-demanding and non-absorbing tasks) resulting in individuals 
taking the monitoring route to performance of PM tasks (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007).  
 
The multiprocess view also states that there is a general tendency for individuals to be more 
reliant on spontaneous retrieval processes compared to strategic monitoring. Due to the high 
volume of PM tasks that need to be accomplished in day-to-day life, one often needs to hold 
those intentions in memory simultaneously and for prolonged periods of time. Therefore, 
relying largely on monitoring processes to accomplish these PM tasks would be very taxing on 
limited WM resources. Moreover, the multiprocess theory, in line with contextualistic views of 
memory (e.g. Jenkins, 1979), proposes that the particular process that an individual relies on 
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when performing a PM task is dependent on how the task was perceived. If an individual 
perceives the task to require spontaneous retrieval, he or she will be less likely to engage in 
monitoring processes. On the contrary, if an individual predicts that spontaneous retrieval is 
unlikely, they will be more likely to monitor. 
 
The element of the multiprocess theory which takes into consideration the perception of task 
difficulty is similar to the attentional allocation view (Marsh, Cook & Hicks, 2006). The 
attentional allocation view states that after becoming aware of the difficulty of the task, 
participants develop an allocation policy based on the perceived difficulty of performing the 
ongoing and PM tasks. For instance, if an individual believes that the PM task is easy to 
perform, he or she will not allocate substantial attentional resources to it, whereas if a task is 
perceived as a difficult they are more likely to allocate additional attentional resources to such a 
task. The greater allocation of attentional resources could indicate employment of conscious 
monitoring strategies to accomplish a PM task, versus the reliance on spontaneous retrieval 
processes in tasks where fewer attentional resources have been allocated (McDaniel & Einstein, 
2007). Marsh, Cook and Hicks (2006) argued that it is the changing belief about the difficulty of 
PM and ongoing task that plays a crucial part in the process of calibrating the allocation policy.  
 
The effect of the changing belief about the difficulty of PM task has been demonstrated in a 
study conducted by Marsh, Hicks, Cook, Hansen and Pallos (2003). This experiment employed 
a lexical decision task as an ongoing task, with two conditions employing different versions of 
PM tasks. The first condition involved a PM task where participants pressed a key every time 
the word “dog” appeared (single cue word condition), whereas in the second condition 
participants were required to press a key every time a word representing an animal appeared 
(category condition). It was found that in the category condition there was a significant cost and 
interference effect on the reaction time of the ongoing task related to performing the PM task, 
where in the single cue word condition this effect was not significant (relevant to the control 
condition involving ongoing task only). The results have been argued to demonstrate that when 
the PM cue (“dog”) is clearly associated with the intention, it is likely that participants are more 
likely to engage in spontaneous retrieval processes as they will expect the target item to “pop 
out” at them (McDaniel &Einstein 2007). Thus, no cost related effects were found on the 
ongoing task performance. Conversely, in the category condition participants were more likely 
to believe that a monitoring approach would be more efficient in this task, as it may be 
insufficient to rely on spontaneous retrieval processes in order to successfully complete this PM 
task. This view has been reflected in the cost/interference effect found in the performance on the 
34 
 
ongoing tasks in this condition. This study in turn supports the multiprocess theory of PM in 
that a variety of processes can be used when remembering prospectively. 
 
The multiprocess view allows also the explanation of mixed findings regarding dividing 
attention i.e. some studies found that dividing attention has an effect on PM performance (e.g. 
Einstein, Smith, McDaniel & Shaw, 1997; Marsh & Hicks, 1998; McDaniel et al., 1998; Park, 
Hertzog, Kidder, Morrell & Mayhorn, 1997), whereas other studies found that it did not (e.g. 
Guynn & McDaniel, 2007; McDaniel et al., 2004, Experiments 2 and 3). Namely, in tasks 
which require or encourage monitoring, dividing attention can have an effect on PM 
performance that is different to performance on tasks which rely on spontaneous retrieval, 
where this negative effect is more likely to occur. 
 
1.4.4.1. The dynamic multiprocess framework  
 
The dynamic multiprocess framework proposed by Scullin, McDaniel and Shelton (2013) was 
developed as a result of a number of naturalistic studies which argued that levels of monitoring 
increase and decrease throughout the performance of an ongoing task (e.g. DeWitt, Hicks, Ball 
& Knight, 2012; Scullin, McDaniel & Einstein, 2010). Another important notion which 
contributed to the development of the dynamic multiprocess framework was that when 
monitoring is not reinforced (i.e. there is a lack of PM cues), monitoring processes are often 
terminated (e.g. McBride, Becker & Abney, 2011; Morgan, Weber, Rooney, Grant, Woods et 
al., 2012). These studies provided evidence that monitoring processes are not constant. Studies 
found that when participants were told that they can expect a PM cue during a specific context 
they monitored during that context, but they did not monitor for a PM cue under contexts where 
they did not expect the PM cue to appear (e.g. Marsh, Hicks & Cook, 2006; Scullin & Bugg, 
2013). The dynamic mulitiprocess framework assumed that individuals selectively engage in 
monitoring when they enter into a context where the PM cue is expected (Scullin et al., 2013). 
According to Scullin et al. (2013) the dynamic monitoring theory is underpinned by a dynamic 
interplay between spontaneous processes and monitoring processes with selective remembering 
of when to monitor and when to not monitor. The authors of this framework argued that the 
process of spontaneous retrieval plays a key part when remembering when to monitor. The 
spontaneous retrieval can be either prompted by the onset of a particular context or other 
environmental cue. 
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In Scullin et al. (2013), participants in the experimental group were told that PM cue can occur 
in any context. Scullin et al. used 20 minutes and 12 hour time intervals in their investigation. 
The 12 hours interval included two conditions (nocturnal sleep and daytime awake). Participants 
were asked to complete a number of different tasks, some of which included PM cues. The 
series of tasks included three ongoing tasks during which two PM cues appeared. This study 
investigated monitoring patterns. The monitoring patterns were measured as ongoing task cost 
relative to a between-subjects control condition. The findings of this study supported the 
assumptions of the authors in that participants who remembered to perform the PM task 
monitored for the task, but not before the PM cue appeared. This study supported the dynamic 
interplay between spontaneous retrieval and active monitoring processes and claimed that if a 
participant spontaneously retrieves a PM intention when encountering a PM cue, monitoring is 
likely to occur following the successful retrieval, as one realises that a PM task can occur within 
this context. This indicated that monitoring is likely to occur if an individual suspects that a PM 
cue is likely to appear. However, when PM cues are not expected individuals will disengage 
from monitoring but are still able to respond to PM cues due to spontaneous retrieval processes. 
This point of view differs largely from the monitoring-only PAM theory (Smith, 2003) which 
claimed that sustained preparatory monitoring is necessary for successful PM performance. It 
supports the notion that a PM cue can bring about the intended action into one’s memory 
spontaneously without the necessity of monitoring in a situation where the PM cue is associated 
with the PM action (e.g. Cona, Bisiacchi & Moscovitch, 2013; Rummel & Meiser, 2013). 
 
1.4.4.2. Focality of cues in event-based prospective memory tasks 
 
There are two types of PM cues which can be used in event-based PM tasks. The first type is 
focal. In a focal task there is an overlap between the information related to the ongoing task and 
the features of encoded PM cue so that the ongoing task encourages the processing of the PM 
task (Gordon et al., 2011). This means that the primary ongoing task and the PM task both 
involve the same type of processing (e.g. semantic). For instance a study conducted by Rendell, 
McDaniel, Forbes and Einstein (2007) illustrates a focal PM task where both of the tasks 
(ongoing and PM) involve the same type of processing. The ongoing task was to provide the 
names of famous people while viewing their pictures on a computer screen. The PM task in this 
experiment involved responding to a face of a famous person whose first name was John. Thus, 
in order to perform the ongoing task participants had to name the famous people shown to them 
and this encouraged the same type of processing of the stimuli as was required for the PM task. 
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Tasks where the processing of the ongoing task does not trigger the processing of PM cue 
features is termed non-focal. In this type of task, decisions made in the ongoing task involve a 
different kind of processing, which does not directly trigger the processing of the PM cue. 
Rendell et al. (2007) also employed a non-focal PM paradigm in their study of age related 
effects in PM. This task involved the same ongoing task in which participants had to provide 
names of famous people presented to them on a computer screen. The PM task involved 
responding to pictures of famous individuals who wore eyeglasses. In this way the ongoing 
tasks did not encourage the same type of processing of the pictures as was required for the PM 
task. This study compared the performance of younger adults to older adults across focal and 
non-focal PM, finding that older adults performed substantially less well on tasks involving 
non-focal PM targets compared to focal PM tasks, relative to younger adults. This indicated that 
these two types of event-based tasks may involve different processes. 
 
The notion of focality itself is grounded in the transfer-appropriate processing theory of 
retrospective memory (see e.g. Roediger, 1996). This argues that when processing at retrieval 
matches processing at encoding, there is a greater chance of successful retrieval. The 
phenomenon was first demonstrated by Morris, Bransford and Franks (1977). In this study some 
participants encoded features of words phonologically whilst others encoded semantic features 
of given items. In comparison to participants who encoded semantically, participants who 
encoded phonologically were better on a subsequent rhyme recognition test where the earlier 
encoded words had to be checked for rhyme, against given words. Conversely, those who 
encoded the semantic features of items had better scores on a standard recognition test which 
was thought to depend on semantic information. This study found that memory improved when 
processing executed at encoding stage was the same as the processing preformed at the retrieval 
phase. This notion was then used in PM framework by Maylor, Darby, Logie, Della Sala and 
Smith (2002) who named it task-appropriate processing. Their study evidenced that when the 
ongoing task encouraged the same processing type at encoding and retrieval of PM cue (non-
semantic-non-semantic or semantic-semantic), there were no age-related differences in the PM 
compared to when it did not encourage the same type of processing (non-semantic-semantic or 
semantic-non-semantic). 
 
The task-appropriate processing concept was further extended by the multiprocess theory of PM 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). The multiprocess view suggested that it is the overlap between 
the information about the PM cue that is considered during encoding and the information 
extracted from the PM cue at retrieval that makes spontaneous retrieval highly probable. This 
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theory claims that if the ongoing activity supports processing features of the PM cue which are 
similar to these which were processed during intention formation, then it is very likely that 
spontaneous retrieval processes will occur. The multiprocess theory for the first time, pointed to 
the relationship between processing overlap and spontaneous retrieval processes. It also argued 
explicitly that there is no extensive need for engagement in monitoring processes for successful 
retrieval of PM under focal conditions. 
 
The multiprocess view argued that it is not only important that the ongoing task encourages the 
same type of PM cue processing at the retrieval and encoding stages. This point of view 
represented by the task-appropriate processing concept has been extended in that the ongoing 
task needs to also encourage processing of the same features as those processed at the intention 
formation stage. Namely, it is not enough for the ongoing task to just encourage the same type 
of processing of PM cue at encoding and retrieval (e.g. nonsemantic-nonsemantic or semantic-
semantic), but it also needs to encourage the processing of the features of the PM cue 
(McDaniel, Robinson-Riegler & Einstein, 1998). This can be demonstrated using an example of 
the word bank acting as a PM cue. Thus, if the PM cue bank is used in an ongoing task where, 
for instance, decisions need to be made about different kinds of services (e.g. bank or post office 
etc.), the PM cue bank, in order to be focal, would need to be encoded as an establishment that 
deals with money rather than bank as in the land alongside a river. This example demonstrates 
the claim of the multiprocess theory that it may not be enough for the PM cue bank to be 
processed semantically at the encoding stage and for the ongoing task to simply encourage 
semantic processing of PM target, but that it also needs to encourage processing of the same 
features of this PM cue as at the encoding phase. In other words, the ongoing task encourages 
the processing of specific features of PM cue and these features need to overlap with the 
features of the PM cue at encoding in addition to the overlap in processing type (nonsemantic or 
semantic) for the PM target to be focal. Another aspect related to the focality of a PM cue that 
extends the task-appropriate processing theory is that the multiprocess view also takes into 
consideration the extent to which the ongoing task points to the PM cue or focuses attention on 
it (Einstein & McDaniel, 2005). Moreover, the focality aspect described within the multiprocess 
framework has been stated by Altgassen, Vetter, Phillips, Akgun and Kliegel (2014) to enable 
manipulation of executive load in PM tasks. Namely, focal tasks require fewer executive 
attentional and WM resources then non-focal tasks in order to monitor for the PM cue. 
 
In summary, the multiprocess view distinguished further the dichotomy between focal and non-
focal PM cues. According to this theory focal PM cues overlap with the information 
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constellation relevant to performing the ongoing task whereas the non-focal PM cues are not 
part of the information being considered by the participant, but PM cues are still present in the 
environment/visual field (McDaniel, Einstein & Rendell, 2008). 
 
Cue focality has been established to have an effect on PM performance in typical populations 
(Roediger, 1996). Marsh, Hicks, Cook, Hansen and Pallos (2003) conducted a study exploring 
the effects of cue focality by employing focal and non-focal types of PM cues. In this study the 
ongoing task was a lexical decision task where participants had to decide as quickly and as 
accurately as possible whether the letter string presented on the screen was a word or a non-
word. The PM task in this study was to press the “/” key every time the word dog (focal 
condition) or a word from the animal category (non-focal condition) appeared. This study 
effectively demonstrated the distinctiveness of the task-appropriate processing concept and 
focality concept established under the multiprocess view. The non-focal condition in this study 
included an ongoing task and a PM cue which were both based on semantic processing. 
However, to make a decision whether a letter string is a word or non-word participants did not 
need to process semantic features of the letter string, as it was not necessary when deciding 
whether the word belonged to animal category. This PM task is in line with task-appropriate 
principles (semantic-semantic type of processing at encoding and retrieval), but it does not 
portray a focal PM cue according to the multiprocess framework. This non-focal PM cue 
produced results expected for this type of task in comparison with a task with focal PM cue. The 
results of this study also showed that a focal PM cue (dog) resulted in better PM performance 
(93%) compared to a non-focal PM cue (animal category) which resulted in worse PM 
performance (78%). 
 
A study conducted by Einstein et al. (2005, Experiments 1 and 2) investigated the effects of 
focal and non-focal PM cues on a sample of university students. In this study a category 
judgment task was used as an ongoing task where participants were shown two words, one in 
lowercase and one in uppercase. Participants had to make a decision on whether the lowercase 
word (e.g. tiger) was a member of a category presented by the use of uppercase word (e.g. 
ANIMAL). There were two types of PM tasks, one focal and the other non-focal. The focal 
ongoing task involved responding with a button press on the appearance of a single word 
(tortoise) whereas the non-focal condition required participants to press a key every time the 
syllable ‘tor” appeared. In this example, the category judgment task does not foster awareness of 
the syllables present within each word, but instead encourages processing of the whole word. 
Therefore, it does not support focal processing of the target “tor’, but it does encourage the 
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processing of the target “tortoise’. The results of this study provided empirical evidence that 
focal PM cues result in a better response rate (91%) than non-focal PM cues (61%), with the 
focal condition proving to be easier to remember than the non-focal one. This study also found 
that the non-focal condition produced a significant cost to the ongoing task (task interference) 
whereas the focal condition did not and that participants were not monitoring for the PM cues in 
the focal condition. The authors claimed that focal cues are retrieved relatively spontaneously, 
which results in good PM performance with no or minimal cost to the ongoing activity.  
 
Scullin et al. (2010) argued that it was possible that the differences in PM performance under 
focal and non-focal conditions found by Einstein at al. (2005), were caused by a greater 
difficulty to monitor for syllable targets compared to word targets rather than by cue focality 
itself. Scullin et al. (2010) conducted a series of experiments in order to investigate this further. 
In their first experiment the authors confirmed the alternative explanation of Einstein et al.’s 
(2005) results with the authors finding that syllables are more difficult to monitor for in 
comparison to words. In experiments 2a and 2b the researchers identified cues which were fairly 
equivalent in terms of the monitoring difficulty. Experiments 3 and 4 were designed in order to 
allow an investigation of the impact of focal and non-focal PM task condition on PM and 
ongoing task performance. This was achieved with the use of an initial-letter cue acting as a 
non-focal cue and a word cue serving the function of a focal cue. The ongoing task used was a 
lexical decision task which was argued to direct attention towards focal processing of the word 
cue but not the initial-letter cue. The results from these investigations showed that despite 
matching cues on monitoring difficulty, the non-focal condition resulted in a significant cost to 
the ongoing task compared to the focal condition which did not.  
 
Scullin et al.’s (2010) study provided support for the multiprocess theory (McDaniel & Einstein, 
2000) in that the focality of the PM cue determines the degree to which monitoring is needed for 
PM retrieval. The multiprocess theory proposed that focal and non-focal tasks rely on 
qualitatively different retrieval processes. Specifically, the PM retrieval in non-focal PM tasks 
requires monitoring in contrast to focal tasks, which are not dependent on monitoring. The 
authors argued this on the basis of significant task interference (in terms of cost to the ongoing 
task) in the non-focal condition and its absence in the focal condition. Scullin et al. argued that 
in the non-focal task participants required resources for monitoring purposes and this resulted in 
the task interference whereas, in the focal task there was no task interference indicating that no 
monitoring was engaged. According to Scullin et al., if the focal task engaged monitoring 
processes then task interference should be also found, similar to the non-focal condition. In 
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addition, PM performance in this focal task did not differ significantly from the PM 
performance in the non-focal task indicating little or no monitoring needed for successful PM 
retrieval. This supports the multiprocess view that focal PM tasks rely on spontaneous retrieval 
processes and that non-focal tasks require monitoring processes. These results oppose the claims 
of the PAM theory of PM (Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004) which claims that monitoring or 
other preparatory processes are always needed for successful PM retrieval. Furthermore, Smith 
et al. (2007) argued that resource demanding preparatory attentional processes are necessary for 
focal event-based PM tasks.  
 
1.5. Involvement of executive functions in prospective memory 
 
This section is concerned with behavioural and neuropsychological evidence supporting the 
relationship between PM and executive functioning processes (e.g. WM, inhibition, switching). 
There are also some links indicating that the supervisory attentional system (SAS), which is a 
part of Norman and Shallice’s (1986) theory of action control, also plays a part in PM 
performance. Broadly speaking, EF processes as well as PM have both been associated with 
frontal cortical brain regions (e.g. Welsh, Pennington & Groisser, 1991; Burgess, Quayle & 
Frith, 2001). A brief description of EF, WM and the action control theory which includes SAS 
is provided before presenting the evidence supporting their involvement in PM. 
 
1.5.1. Executive functioning 
 
1.5.1.1. Executive functioning definition 
 
Executive functioning refers to goal-directed (Anderson, 1998), organisational/control-based 
(e.g. Ardila, Pineda & Rosselli, 2000; Carlson, 2005) and regulatory cognitive processes. 
Executive functioning includes many cognitive abilities: the withholding of pre-potent 
behavioural responses (inhibition), recall of information and concurrent processing (executive-
loaded WM), the monitoring and updating of WM representations in response to constantly 
changing stimuli (updating), the generation of novel verbal or non-verbal examples 
(verbal/design fluency), attending to specific stimuli while ignoring distracters (selective 
attention), moving between representational sets and/or task goals (switching/set-shifting) and 
planning (see Miyake et al., 2000; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996; Singer & Bashir, 1999). 
Furthermore, Hayes, Gifford and Ruckstuhl (1996) suggested that EF abilities are important for 
novel task performance (tasks to which there are no learned automatic response patterns). 
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Executive function (EF) has been associated with frontal cortical brain regions (e.g. Welsh, 
Pennington & Groisser, 1991). 
 
1.5.1.2. Frontal lobes / executive functions and prospective memory 
 
The frontal lobes have been suggested to support the self-initiated processing that is required for 
PM tasks (McFarland and Glisky, 2009). For example, forming a strong association between a 
PM cue and the intention, retaining the intention during the time interval between intention 
formation and its execution, dividing attention over ongoing and PM task demands, monitoring 
for cues, and interrupting and inhibiting ongoing activities have all been found to be impaired in 
frontal lobe patients (Fuster, 1997; Stuss & Benson, 1984). In addition, prospective memory 
tasks require participants to switch between the ongoing task and PM activity. Departing from 
the ongoing activity which is required in PM tasks has also been argued to require executive 
processes i.e. breaking out from an ongoing activity (Van den Berg, Aarts, Midden & 
Verplanken, 2004). Moreover, McDaniel and Einstein (2000) stated that executive resources 
need to be allocated to a PM task in order to bring the intended action to mind periodically. 
 
Studies employing electrophysiological and functional imaging measures have shown that PM 
task performance involves frontal lobe activation. For instance, Burgess et al. (2001) 
administered four event-based PM tasks to eight healthy adult participants in order to 
investigate the involvement and roles of brain structures in PM tasks. The four tasks employed a 
variety of ongoing and PM tasks requiring decisions to be made on the basis of shapes, colours, 
semantic categories and numbers of letters. Each of these tasks was administered under three 
conditions. The first condition was a baseline condition where no PM trials were included. In 
the second condition called the “expectation” condition, participants were told that there would 
be PM trials but no PM trials were actually shown to participants. In the third condition 
participants were told that PM trials might occur, and they did. This condition involved the 
actual execution of the PM tasks. A positron emission tomography (PET) and MRI scanning 
methods were used in order to investigate regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) in order to 
distinguish between brain activity related to maintaining a PM intention and the manifestation 
or realisation of it. The results from the comparison of the baseline condition and two other 
conditions where PM trials were expected, showed an increase in the rCBF in the frontal pole 
bilaterally (especially Brodmann’s area; BA 10), right lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), the right 
parietal lobe, and the precuneus bilaterally. These increases in rCBF in these areas were argued 
by Burgess at al. (2001) to be related to the maintenance of the prospective intention in ones 
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mind. The authors of this study argued that it is the process of monitoring which supports the 
retrieval of PM that is dependent on the PFC. 
 
Burgess, Veitch, de Lacy Costello and Shallice (2000) investigated multitasking abilities which 
included RM, PM and planning in a sample of 60 patients with focal cerebral lesions. On the 
basis of the results the authors argued that PM and planning rely strongly on processes 
supported by left Brodmann’s areas 8, 9 and 10 and the right dorsal prefrontal cortex. Rule-
breaking and task-switching was found to be related to medial and more polar parts of 
Brodmann’s areas 8, 9 and especially 10. 
 
A study conducted by Okuda (2007) used PET to investigate activation of the brain regions 
while performing time-based and event-based PM activities. The rostral prefrontal region of the 
brain was shown to be activated while participants were performing prospective memory tasks. 
More specifically, the medial frontal lobe among two other regions of the rostral prefrontal area 
(the right superior frontal gyrus and anterior cingulate gyrus) has been found to be more active 
while participants were performing time-based PM tasks compared to event-based PM tasks. 
Okuda (2007) concluded that these findings suggest that there are different processing demands 
produced by time-based and event-based PM tasks. This is in line with Einstein and McDaniel 
(2007) who stated that time-based tasks encourage monitoring processes, as there are no PM 
cues and one needs to self-initiate checking of time. This was compared to event-based PM 
tasks where spontaneous retrieval processes are more likely to be employed, as there are PM 
cues embedded in the PM task. 
 
Little is known about the cognitive functions of the rostral prefrontal region also known as Area 
10 of the brain (Burgess, Gilbert & Dumontheil, 2007; Burgess, Gilbert, Dumontheil & Simons, 
2001). This large area of the brain is known to be involved in cognitive processes supporting 
attending self-generated/-maintained thought (stimulus-independent attending) or stimulus-
orientated attending (Burgess at al., 2001; 2007). Both of these cognitive processes are very 
important and relevant to PM memory as stimulus-independent attending is crucial for time-
based PM whereas the stimulus-orientated attending for event-based PM. Namely, time-based 
PM tasks rely more on self- initiation and thus are more stimulus-independent whereas the 
event-based PM relies more on environmental cues and thus is more relevant to stimulus-
orientated attending. 
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A number of behavioural measures also revealed relationships between frontal functioning and 
PM. McDaniel, Glisky, Rubin, Guynn and Routhieaux (1999) investigated the relationship 
between PM and frontal functioning. They administered an event-based PM task to two groups 
of older adults. One group was characterised by high frontal function and the other by low on 
the basis of a battery of neuropsychological tests (Glisky, Polster & Routhieaux, 1995). The PM 
task in this study involved responding to the word president by pressing a specific key on a 
keyboard. The ongoing task involved a general knowledge test. Participants with high frontal 
functioning were found to be significantly better than participants with low frontal functioning 
on the event-based PM task. The authors argued that this provided evidence for frontal lobes 
involvement in event-based PM. 
 
Martin, Kliegel and McDaniel (2003) investigated the involvement of processes which are 
mediated by prefrontal executive systems in different PM tasks varying in the amount of 
involvement of executive functions during intention formation and intention execution stages.  
They argued for the possibility that the amount of EF required for a PM task is dependent on the 
extent to which the PM task focuses on the intention formation and/or intention execution 
stages, as opposed to the intention retention. Namely, the more relative weight is directed 
towards intention formation and intention execution stages, the greater the involvement of 
executive processes. Unlike event-based PM tasks (which are believed to involve relatively few 
strategic retrieval processes), time-based PM tasks have been hypothesised to involve greater 
amounts of EF. Since these tasks involve self-initiated monitoring in the intention execution 
stage and monitoring has been reported to be controlled by prefrontal function (Shallice & 
Burgess, 1991, Shimamura, Janowsky & Squire, 1991).   
 
Martin et al. (2003) used a standard clinical PM measure of event-based PM named the 
Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT; Wilson, Cockburn & Baddeley, 1985), in which 
participants needed to remember to request a return of an item at the end of the testing session. 
This task was not expected to involve any strategic executive control processes in the intention 
execution phase, as it only involved a single event-based task which focussed on the retention 
and reinstantiation stages in a less demanding setting. Researchers also used standard laboratory 
event- and time-based PM measures (e.g. Einstein et al., 1997; Kliegel et al., 2001), as they 
would likely involve moderate involvement of EF, as these paradigms focus on the intention 
execution in a demanding task setting. The last PM task was a complex PM task developed on 
the basis of a task used by Kliegel et al. (2000) and focused on intention formation and intention 
execution stages in a demanding task setting. This multitask PM paradigm (MTPM) involved a 
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mixture of six time- and event-based PM activities, which required planning during the 
intention formation phase and was argued by the researchers to rely on the greatest amount of 
prefrontal functioning. 
 
Three standard neuropsychological tests were used to measure EF, these were the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay & Curtiss, 1993), a colour-word 
version of the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), and the Tower of London (TOL; Morris, Evenden, 
Shakian & Robbins, 1987). These EF measures allowed the researchers to measure specific 
aspects of frontal functioning which are theoretically related to PM performance e.g. planning, 
inhibition, cognitive and response flexibility, and monitoring. The results from the principal 
components analysis with z-scores from all EF tests showed that there was a single executive 
factor which represented common variance of the three tests.  
 
Martin et al.’s (2003) first goal was to investigate further the extent of the involvement of 
prefrontal executive processes in the four standard PM tasks employed in this study. They were 
also interested in investigating whether age related differences in different PM tasks can be 
explained by individual differences in EF. They employed forty young and 40 old adults, as 
frontal functioning has been argued to decline with age (e.g. Schretlen, Pearlson, Anthony, 
Aylward, Augustine, Davis & Barta, 2000; Wecker, Kramer, Wisniewski, Delis & Kaplan, 
2000). The results showed age related performance differences on the experimental time- and 
event-based PM tasks, and on the complex PM measure only. On the three frontal/EF measures, 
age related differences were evidenced, with age related differences increasing as the 
involvement of frontal/executive functions in the four different PM tasks increased. Also a 
series of corrections employing the four PM measures and EF factor scores for young and old 
adults computed separately, indicated that the laboratory time- and event-based PM tasks as 
well as the MTPM task correlated significantly with EF in older adults, but not in younger 
adults.  
 
Additional analysis involving a stepwise regression revealed that individual differences in EF 
explain a large amount of variance of PM performance on the majority of the PM tasks used by 
Martin et al. (2003), with the exception of the RBMT task. After addition of age into the 
regression, the researchers found that there was no significant increase in explained variance in 
performance in the laboratory event- and time-based PM tasks. Interestingly, in the MTPM task 
it was not only the EF measures that explained variance in PM, but also age and nonexecutive 
measures such as RM and health. These results showed no significant effects of group 
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membership on any of the four PM tasks. Also post hoc tests showed no significant mean 
differences in the RBMT, but there were similar performances in the young adults and old 
adults with high EF compared to old participants with low EF in the event- and time-based 
experimental measures. There were also significant differences between all three groups in the 
MTPM task. The authors argued that the results demonstrated a clear relationship between the 
extent to which frontal/executive functions are involved in PM task performance, with EF 
predicting the PM performance on the experimental time- and event-based PM tasks. In the 
most complex measure of PM (MTPM), both EF and age were good predictors of PM 
performance. In general, it was argued that frontal/executive functions are related to PM 
performance in a range of PM paradigms. 
 
McFarland and Glisky (2009) further supported the claim that the frontal lobe is involved in PM 
task performance. They used a laboratory time-based PM task on a group of 32 younger and 32 
older adults. They divided their older participants ortoganally into four groups based on 
composite measures of frontal lobe and medial temporal lobe function. In addition, this study 
also investigated age effects with each of the four groups of older adults being compared to a 
control group of younger adults. The results showed that older participants who were in the high 
frontal lobe group performed significantly better on the time-based PM task compared to low 
frontal lobe group. It was also found that older adults from the high medial temporal lobe group 
were better than participants from the low medial temporal lobe group when it came to PM 
performance, but only if they were also high in frontal lobe functioning. In addition, frontal lobe 
functioning was found to predict the quality of plans which participants generated in order to 
assist PM performance, patterns of time monitoring and accuracy of time estimation. Medial 
temporal lobe was not found to predict any of these. Similarly to the PM performance results, 
the results from older adults with high frontal lobe function across all of these measures were 
similar to these of younger adults. The authors concluded that it is frontal functioning which 
determined PM performance rather than age alone. 
 
1.5.2. Working memory 
 
1.5.2.1. Working memory definition 
 
Working memory has been conceptualised as the updating component of EF (e.g. Miyake, 
Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter &Wager, 2000). It is a multi-component, limited-
capacity system responsible for the temporary storage and processing (i.e. manipulation, 
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integration and maintenance) of limited amounts of information (Baddeley, 1997). Working 
memory consists of two modality-specific slave systems, namely, the phonological loop which 
is involved in the storage and manipulation of phonologically-based information and the visuo-
spatial sketchpad involved in the storage and manipulation of visual and spatial information 
(Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). There is also the central executive (CE) which is a 
controlling attentional system playing a supervisory role over the slave systems. The function of 
the CE is related to how, where and when to allocate resources, bind information, shift between 
tasks or retrieval strategies and inhibit responses. The CE has been thus claimed to be involved 
in the allocation of resources needed to manage and maintain information while temporal 
performance of other activities takes place (Baddeley, 1986; 2002). There is also one modality-
free slave system constituting a part of WM, the episodic buffer which is a multi-dimensional 
storage, integrating information from different components of WM (Baddeley, 2000; 2007). 
 
1.5.2.2. Working memory and prospective memory 
 
Prospective memory has been suggested to be heavily dependent on WM (Einstein, McDaniel, 
Manzi, Cochran & Baker, 2000). This, as Einstein et al. (2000) explained, is because PM tasks 
require active or nonstrategic maintenance of the intended action in WM over the time interval 
between formation and execution of the intention, while also performing an ongoing task. 
Furthermore, Smith, Persyn and Butler (2011) found a positive relationship between WM span 
and PM. This experiment with a large sample of participants (n = 413) used a symmetry span 
task as a measure of WM span. The PM task employed an ongoing lexical decision task and an 
event-based PM task, where participants were required to press the F1 key when syllables “per” 
and “low” appeared. High and low WM span groups were created on the basis of span scores 
(top and bottom 25% of performers). The results showed that participants in the high WM span 
group were more likely to perform well on the PM task whereas, the low WM group performed 
more poorly.  
 
It has been claimed by various researchers that the ongoing task can negatively affect PM 
performance as it draws on the same limited WM central executive resources (Einstein et al., 
1997; Kliegel, McDaniel & Einstein, 2008; Marsh & Hicks, 1998). It is possible that the 
ongoing task draws away WM resources needed for PM task performance, causing interference 
effects. The interaction between ongoing tasks, which require WM, and PM tasks have been 
investigated by Basso, Ferrari and Palladino (2010). They investigated whether PM and WM 
share resources or whether they are distinct processes. To achieve this, the authors conducted 
47 
 
three experiments employing a verbal task which allowed a manipulation of cognitive demand, 
related to event-based PM and WM tasks. This manipulation effectively varied the amounts of 
resources available for each of the memory processes (PM and WM). They also used 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in order to investigate the involvement of frontal areas 
of the brain in the performance of PM and WM tasks. The event-based PM task involved 
responding to cue words. The number of cue words was manipulated in order to vary the level 
of PM difficulty. There were two ongoing tasks employed in this study, one involved an 
updating WM task (Palladino & Jarrold, 2008), which created either high or medium WM 
demands and the other involved a lexical decision task which created low WM demands. The 
results of both experiments showed that higher PM demand impacted negatively on WM 
performance but only when the WM ongoing task involved higher loads. However, the PM load 
had an effect on PM performance regardless of WM load differences. The last experiment 
applied a single pulse TMS to right and left dorsal frontal cortices while participants were 
engaged in the PM/WM tasks. The results showed that regardless of whether the stimulation 
was applied to right or left dorsal frontal cortices, it resulted in more PM failures. However, the 
TMS simulation affected the WM task only marginally. On the basis of their results Basso et al. 
(2010) argued that even though it seems that PM and WM are different processes, they are 
likely to share resources but only in tasks involving high demands. Namely, PM tasks have been 
argued to be dependent on WM resources at high demand. It was also shown that dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex was activated bilaterally during PM tasks. 
 
Van den Berg, Aarts, Midden and Verplanken (2004) have stated that tasks which are difficult 
are more likely to be affected by executive load compared to tasks that are easy and well 
supported by the environment. This is in line with the multiprocess theory of PM (McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2000) which states that more difficult PM tasks (e.g. with non-focal PM targets) may 
require more monitoring processes compared to easier PM tasks (focal) and is likely to rely on 
spontaneous retrieval. More difficult PM tasks relying on monitoring processes are more taxing 
on WM in comparison to tasks that encourage spontaneous retrieval, and may result in worse 
PM performance compared to easier PM tasks. 
 
Marsh, Hancock and Hicks (2002) conducted a series of experiments manipulating the WM 
load of the ongoing task and found that the PM performance was reduced when the ongoing 
task engaged more WM resources. They concluded that PM tasks are affected by WM load 
because PM tasks involve the coordination of both the ongoing task and the PM task and that 
this process involves executive control (at least to certain degree). There are a number of studies 
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which have demonstrated the negative effect of high WM load on PM performance especially if 
the CE is affected (e.g. Einstein et al., 1997; Marsh & Hicks, 1998).  
 
Khan, Narendra and Dixit (2008) investigated what effect low and high cognitive load has on 
time-based PM tasks. The results showed that PM performance was significantly lower in the 
high cognitive load condition compared to the low cognitive condition. The authors proposed 
that this occurred due to dividing attentional resources between the ongoing task, monitoring 
time and self-initiating the PM response at the required times. They suggested that monitoring 
of time is dependent on the limited resource of attentional capacity and thus, cognitively 
demanding tasks will have a negative effect on PM performance. 
 
1.5.3. Theory of action control including the supervisory attentional system 
 
1.5.3.1. Definition of theory of action control including the supervisory attentional system 
 
The Norman and Shallice (1986) theory of action control is a general theory which explains 
how action is controlled. It proposes that willed and automatic actions are controlled at different 
levels and the extent to which these actions are controlled depends on the degree of task 
difficulty and complexity. Actions are controlled by two mechanisms, contention scheduling 
and a supervisory attentional system. Only novel or complex tasks (also these involving 
planning) require cognitive resources and these resources are provided by the supervisory 
attentional system (SAS), which enables selection of the desired response. The SAS mediates 
attention, which in turn can control the activation or inhibition of values of behavioural 
schemas. In other words the SAS organises, coordinates and monitors schemas, which enable 
the achievement of novel and complex tasks. This is achieved with attention and awareness 
through a general-purpose planning component which is able to adapt to novel domains. Tasks 
which are habitual, well-learned or involving automatic response can be performed by the 
means of a contention scheduling mechanism alone, without involvement of the SAS. During 
this low level of control mechanism, an appropriate response is selected by lateral inhibition of 
competing response sequences (schemas). Only in situations where a deviation from routine is 
needed, the SAS will influence behaviour by biasing the contention scheduling process. 
 
The SAS component of the theory of action control has been proposed by Baddeley (1986) to be 
a candidate for the CE component of WM model and similar to the CE, it controls attention. In 
addition, the SAS may also be related to EF as it has been claimed by Hayes et al. (1996) that 
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EF abilities are important for novel tasks and SAS has been identified to be responsible for 
novel tasks. The next section describes the relevance of SAS to PM. 
 
1.5.3.2. Theory of action control and prospective memory 
 
Norman and Shallice’s (1986) theory of action control can be used to explain why high 
cognitive load impacts negatively on PM performance (e.g. Khan et al., 2008). Monitoring 
theories of PM (e.g. the preparatory attentional and memory theory (PAM; Smith, 2003) and 
multinomial theory (Smith & Bayen, 2004) claim that PM memory is dependent on monitoring 
processes. Moreover, as Smith (2003) stated monitoring processes improve PM performance. 
Monitoring processes have been argued to be controlled by an executive attentional system such 
as the SAS, which directs attentional resources. Indeed, Burgess and Shallice (1997) proposed 
that PM performance is mediated by the SAS and that this form of memory is a voluntary 
strategic process. They argued that the SAS is involved in monitoring for PM cues and 
executive resources are necessary for this process. Thus, the involvement of the SAS is 
especially crucial in PM tasks, which rely strongly on monitoring. In addition, because 
executive resources are necessary for monitoring processes, ongoing tasks involving high 
cognitive load may draw on the same limited resources resulting in decrease of PM 
performance. Since, as previously stated, it has been proposed that the SAS component is 
similar to the CE component of WM model (Baddeley, 1986). Therefore, as the monitoring of 
PM performance requires SAS; tasks that involve high a cognitive load will reduce PM 
performance, especially when these tasks also involve CE (e.g. Marsh and Hicks, 1998). 
 
The contention scheduling system described in the theory of action control could also be related 
to automatic processes involved in PM. The spontaneous retrieval theory of PM claimed that 
spontaneous retrieval of PM is relatively non-demanding on attentional and processing 
resources and does not require monitoring (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; Guynn, McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2001; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; McDaniel et al., 2004). In addition, this theory 
states that the process of retrieving of PM intentions is much more automatic. The contention 
scheduling mechanism identified by the SAS model (Norman and Shallice, 1986) has been 
claimed to be responsible for automatic responses by selection among well-learnt competing 
schemas. Thus, contention scheduling could be argued to be responsible for PM tasks that rely 
on spontaneous retrieval processes as well as habitual PM. However, the SAS is still likely to be 
required for breaking out of the ongoing task. 
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Finally, the SAS executive system is also responsible for interruption to the ongoing activity 
and shifting attention to the intended action at the appropriate moment (i.e. when the PM cue 
appears; Einstein et al., 2005). This feature of the SAS will have an influence on PM tasks, as 
inhibition and switching have been found to be closely related to PM performance (e.g. 
Altgassen et al., 2014; Gonneaud, Kalpouzos, Bon, Viader, Eustache & Desgranges, 2011; 
Schnitzspan, Stahl, Zeintl, Kaller & Kliegel, 2013). Furthermore, as the SAS deals with task 
novelty by regulating the mechanism of contention scheduling by additional activation or 
inhibition of specific schemas, it is highly relevant to inhibition and switching processes. 
 
1.5.4. Inhibition, switching and prospective memory 
 
Prospective memory tasks require one to inhibit performance on the ongoing task in order to 
switch to the performance of PM task. There have been a number of studies which have showed 
that PM performance can be predicted on the basis of EF/WM measures in children. For 
instance, Mahy and Moses (2011) used digit span task to measure WM and found that it 
predicted event-based PM performance of children between the ages of four and six, even 
though they controlled for age and inhibition measured by the day/night task. Ward, Shum, 
McKinlay, Baker-Tweney and Wallace (2005) also found that PM performance in tasks which 
employed high ongoing task demands (presenting items in a lexical decision task for a shorter 
amount of time), correlated with WM and inhibition. Mahy, Moses and Kliegel (2014) found 
that on the basis of inhibition abilities, it was possible to explain differences on event-based PM 
tasks employing salient and non-salient cues in four and five year olds. This study has also 
shown that individual differences in inhibition were responsible for age related difference in PM 
performance. Moreover, differences in event-based PM performance of a group of children who 
were between the ages of 8 and 9 and a group of children between the ages of 12 and 13 were 
accounted for by performance on a range of executive control measures in a study conducted by 
Shum, Cross, Ford and Ownsworth (2008).  
 
Altgassen et al. (2014) conducted a study as a part of which they investigated whether updating, 
inhibition, and switching processes can predict PM performance of adolescents and young 
adults. They employed 42 adolescents between the ages of 13 and 14 years old and 41 young 
adults with age range of 19-20. The ongoing task involved making a comparison between the 
number of vowels contained in pairs words that were made up of nouns. The PM task used in 
this study had an event-based PM nature, employing a non-focal PM cue in order to create 
stronger demands on executive control processes. Altgassen et al. measured updating abilities in 
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WM using the letter memory task, similar to that used by Miyake et al. (2000). Likewise, the 
inhibition and switching were also assessed in a similar way to that of Miyake and colleagues 
(2000). Inhibition was assessed using the antisaccade task whereas switching abilities were 
measured on the basis of the colour-shape task. This study found that adolescents performed 
significantly less well when compared to young adults on the PM and ongoing tasks as well as 
measures of switching, inhibition and updating. However, only switching significantly predicted 
the PM performance of adolescents even when ongoing task performance, verbal and nonverbal 
abilities were controlled for. None of the executive control measures predicted PM performance 
in adults. Altgassen and colleagues interpreted the findings in terms of the development of self-
regulation in adolescents, but they argued that the specific pattern of processes underpinning 
PM performance may not be only dependent on specific age group but also on the use of a 
specific PM task and its reliance on different control processes (Kliegel et al., 2011 cited in 
Altgassen et al., 2014). 
 
In line with Altgassen et al.’s (2014) opinion that the type of PM task will affect the 
involvement of different control processes, Bisiacchi et al. (2009) found that different PM 
paradigms (i.e. dual-task and task-switching) resulted in different processing and 
neurophysiological dynamics, related to attentional resources and cognitive control. They tested 
seventeen young adults (between the ages of 18 and 29) on a standard experimental event-based 
PM task. The ongoing task required participants to decide whether the second and fourth letters 
of a letter string were the same. The PM task involved responding to the letter “B” appearing in 
either of these positions. There were also distracter trials which included the letter “B” but in 
other positions (e.g. first) in order to avoid PM decisions being made on the basis of perceptual 
characteristics of letter strings. In the task-switching condition participants were told to respond 
to the PM cue when it appeared, without a response being required in the ongoing task. This 
first condition include two production rules, which stopped the performance of the ongoing task 
in order to respond to the PM task or the other way round (i.e. do not respond to the ongoing 
task - respond to the PM task). In the dual-task condition participants first responded to the 
ongoing task when they saw the PM cue and then switched to the PM task when they saw a PM 
cue. Bisiacchi and colleagues recorded accuracy, RT and electroencephalogram (EEG) data. 
The results showed that participants in the task-switching condition took longer to respond to 
the PM cues compared to participants in the dual-task condition. The authors argued that the 
shorter RTs of PM responses in the dual-tasks condition could be due to loading of “response 
programs” related to both the ongoing and PM tasks at the same time (once the PM cue was 
encountered). However, in the task-switching condition participants had to suppress the 
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tendency to respond to the ongoing task demands. This was also argued to explain higher PM 
accuracy in the dual-task condition in comparison to the task-switching condition. They argued 
that the results supported earlier claims that task-switching involves additional cognitive control 
and response tendency suppression (Dreher & Grafman, 2003; cited in Bisiacchi et al., 2009). 
Cognitive control has been claimed to be especially necessary in circumstances requiring rapid 
change of response associations and when dominant response tendencies need to be suppressed 
immediately. This was suggested to be caused by the conflict between the ongoing and PM 
tasks. 
 
On the basis of the results Bisiacchi and colleagues reasoned that these two PM task paradigms 
involved different cognitive processes. It was argued that task-switching involves inhibition 
whereas it is not necessary for the dual-task paradigm. The results from EEG were argued to 
show that both dual-task and task-switching PM conditions supported studies showing 
activation of rostral prefrontal cortex (e.g. Okuda, Fujii, Ohtake, Tsukiura, Yamadori, Frith, 
2007) and more generally the involvement of frontal networks during PM task performance 
(e.g. Dreher & Grafman, 2003; cited in Bisiacchi et al., 2009). The results were also argued to 
possibly support the task inhibition process found using the behavioural data in the task-
switching condition. The authors theorised that the two paradigms used did not create any 
differences in terms of cue detection and retrieval of PM action from long-term memory. 
However, they suggested that the task-switching paradigm may resemble a real life PM task 
where one needs to press the brakes at a passenger crossing when the traffic light changes to 
red. On the other hand, they suggested that the dual-task paradigm is more related to a real life 
task involving calling the doctor after 11am which is less constrained. 
 
Another study arguing for involvement of inhibition in PM is a case study of J.B. conducted by 
Cockburn (1995). J.B.’s frontal lobe was infracted bilaterally which resulted in impairments in 
planning, initiation and inhibition of ongoing behaviour. Nevertheless, J.B.’s RM was intact. 
This study used nine time-based (three were follow-up re-assessment PM measures) and five 
event-based PM tasks which could all be categorised as every-day PM tasks. Overall, J.B. 
performed correctly on all event-based PM tasks and on five out of nine time-based PM tasks 
(although one of the time-based PM tasks could be argued to be an event-based task). It seemed 
that J.B.’s difficulties with PM tasks were specific, failing on PM tasks which involved high 
levels of self-initiated interruption of the ongoing activity. J.B.’s performance was only 
impaired on time-based tasks which involved stopping the ongoing tasks completely or 
switching to another ongoing task, without finishing the first ongoing task. J.B. was able to 
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recall that she was supposed to stop performing the ongoing tasks after certain numbers of 
minutes at the end of the tasks, indicating intact RM. She was also reported to check the clock 
which eliminated the possibility that she was unaware of the time. 
 
J.B. was able to break out from the ongoing activity in one time-based activity, by inhibiting 
further filler task responses even though the items of this filler tasks did not finish. In this task 
J.B. was instructed (before the task began) that she would need to stop performing the ongoing 
task after one minute, when the experimenter tells her that the one minute has elapsed. Whilst 
this task was classed as a time-based PM task, it could be argued to be an event-based PM task, 
as interruption of the ongoing task needed to be performed when the experimenter informed the 
participant that the time was up, which itself was an event. Successful completion of this task 
could be as a result of there being no or minimal involvement of self-initiated processes which 
in turn means little EF involvement.  
 
On the basis of these results, Cockburn argued that there may be two types of time-based PM 
tasks, one which requires interruption of the ongoing task and another which complements the 
ongoing task. Furthermore, Cockburn suggested that these time-based PM tasks which require 
interruption of an ongoing task may require the highest levels of self-initiation. Errors 
performed by J.B. were argued to be caused by failure of initiation, which was suggested by 
Cockburn to be related to problems with attentional control rather than problems with memory. 
Cockburn argued that J.B.’s performance on the PM tasks resembled deficiencies related to the 
SAS model (Norman & Shallice, 1986). Namely, Shallice (1982; cited in Cockburn, 1995) 
proposed that SAS is responsible for prioritisation and control of action schemas which compete 
for attentional resources. Thus, it was claimed that problems with SAS will resemble problems 
with formation, initiation and modification of plans. In addition, Shallice reasoned that the 
stronger the environmental trigger, the more likely that the action will be selected. Cockburn 
showed that the selective PM problems found in J.B. (whose frontal lobe was infracted 
bilaterally) supported the claims presented by Shallice. Namely, J.B.’s PM problems were 
evident in tasks which involved ongoing activities that delivered a stronger triggering compared 
to the PM tasks. On the contrary, J.B. performed successfully PM tasks in which target context 
was provided by an external event where she needed to recognise it when it occurred rather than 
search for it. These types of tasks were argued by Cockburn to require less attentional control as 
responses could be driven by the data. 
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The results from this study were argued to indicate that J.B.’s PM failures were related to 
problems with activation of target context as a trigger for activation of PM intention. Cockburn 
explained that ongoing tasks which are more influential than the encoded intended action result 
in problems with recognition of context related to retrieval. In tasks where interruption of the 
ongoing task requires its termination, the target context is not activated enough in order to 
override the level generated by the ongoing task. On the contrary, in tasks involving PM 
activities that can be performed in parallel to the ongoing task, the target context is activated 
leading to triggering and execution of the PM intention. 
 
Cockburn suggested that because time- and event-based PM tasks involve self-initiation and 
prioritising of the suitable response, it is possible that J.B.’s PM failures were also based on 
problems with prioritisation and not just self-initiation. The author argued that it is possible that 
J.B.’s inadequate prioritisation was unable to override the strong draw to complete the ongoing 
task. It was also suggested by the researcher that even though J.B.’s PM problems appear to be 
related to self-initiation problems, it is possible that these problems are related to difficulties 
with interruption of the ongoing activities. This reasoning was argued to be in line with J.B.’s 
inhibition errors found on a modified version of the WCST (Nelson, 1976; a task sensitive to 
frontal lobe deficits) which required continuous attention, monitoring of performance and 
periodic inhibition of previously established pattern of action. Finally, Cockburn concluded that 
J.B.’s performance on the PM tasks is related to impaired executive functioning rather than to 
memory problems per se. 
 
Recent studies also showed that PM tasks involve strongly EF such as inhibition or shifting. For 
instance a study conducted by Schnitzspan et al. (2013) investigated PM and EF in 175 young 
and 110 older adults. They used measures of PM, shifting, inhibition, WM, updating, and speed 
and found that inhibition and shifting strongly predicted PM. They also found age related 
differences in PM, shifting, inhibition and updating. Shifting and inhibition abilities also 
accounted for age differences in PM. However, updating was not found to be related to PM 
performance in either of the participant groups. Overall, EF was shown to increase the extent to 
which the variance in PM was explained and decreased the effect of speed. Nevertheless, this 
study suggests that WM was not a good predictor of PM performance. However, there is more 
evidence which argues for the dependence of PM on WM (e.g. Smith, 2003; Einstein et al, 
2000; Smith et al, 2011). Schnitzspan and colleagues argued that controlled attention 
differences can explain age related differences in PM and that inhibition and shifting are 
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important mechanisms underpinning PM of adults, beyond WM and speed. The differences in 
controlled attention could again be related to SAS as it is responsible for attention allocation. 
 
Gonneaud et al. (2011) investigated the relationships between event- and time-based PM 
measures and a wide range of cognitive functions, including executive functions, processing 
speed, sustained attention, retrospective episodic memory, metamemory, and binding in healthy 
adults. This study found that regardless of the conditions, PM was linked to inhibition and 
processing speed. Furthermore, it was found that event-based PM was strongly reliant on 
binding and retrospective episodic memory and, to a lesser extent, on shifting, while time-based 
PM depended largely on inhibition.  
 
1.6. Summary 
 
There are two main types of PM which can be distinguished, namely, time- and event-based PM 
types. Even though both of these types of PM involve prospective remembering, the memory 
retrieval involved in each PM type is underpinned by different types of cues. In the time-based 
PM, it is the time which acts as a cue reminding individuals to perform the intended action. In 
the event-based PM the cue is not related to time but takes the form of a distinct feature in the 
environment which brings about the PM activity associated with it e.g. when seeing a pharmacy 
sign an individual remembers to pick up medication for his/her grandmother. 
 
There are many theories of PM, but the main debate in the field of PM is related to the cognitive 
processes underpinning successful retrieval of PM. The major theories of PM debate whether 
PM is based on automatic spontaneous retrieval processes (e.g. Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; 
Guynn et al., 2001; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; McDaniel et al., 2004) or whether monitoring / 
preparatory attentional processes are required for successful PM retrieval (McDaniel & Einstein, 
2007). Even though the debate initially started off with an argument about which of these two 
processes underpin PM, it has been developed further by the multiprocess theory (McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2010) which assumes that it is possible that both of these processes can underpin PM 
under different circumstances. Additionally, the multiprocess theory tries to identify conditions 
under which each type of processing occurs. A number of factors have been identified to have 
an effect on the type of processing which is likely to underpin PM tasks. One factor is related to 
the perceived difficulty of the PM task. It has been argued that tasks which are perceived as 
more difficult lead to greater engagement in monitoring processes. Another factor is related to 
the type of PM cue and its relationship to the ongoing task. Namely, focal PM tasks have been 
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argued to be more likely to encourage automatic spontaneous retrieval and non-focal PM tasks 
to be more likely to trigger monitoring processes. 
 
Prospective memory has been shown to be strongly dependent on frontal functioning. Studies 
have shown that EF as a general concept has a strong influence on PM performance. In addition, 
studies have shown that high cognitive load impacts negatively on PM performance. It was 
argued that this could be due to problems with the allocation of attention (SAS; Norman & 
Shallice, 1986), insufficient executive resources for monitoring processes or self-initiation. 
Evidence has been also provided that WM abilities are related to PM performance. Likewise, 
inhibition and switching have been shown to predict PM performance. It is also evident 
throughout this chapter that the theory of action control and especially its SAS component is 
involved in PM and can be used to explain results from PM tasks.  
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Chapter 2: Dyslexia 
 
Despite the many scientific theories to explain dyslexia, the causes of developmental dyslexia 
are yet unknown (see Snowling, 2000). The difficulty in establishing the causes of dyslexia may 
be related to the difficulty in establishing a clear cut account of deficits that constitute dyslexia 
(Ramus, 2004). The most predominant theories and deficits related to dyslexia are summarised 
in this chapter in order to provide a comprehensive summary of the dyslexia literature. These 
include the body of evidence suggesting problems with phonological processing in dyslexia 
(e.g. Vellutino, 1979; Frith, 1985; Stanovich, 1988a; Snowling, 1995), naming speed deficit 
(e.g. Denckla & Rudel, 1976; Bowers & Wolf, 1993), double-deficit hypothesis (Wolf & 
Bowers, 1999), magnocellular theory (Stein & Walsh, 1997), temporal processing theory (e.g. 
Tallal & Piercy, 1973), dyslexia automatisation deficit (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990), cerebellar 
deficit theory (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990; Nicolson et al., 2001) and EF deficits in dyslexia 
including WM, CE, SAS, inhibition and switching (e.g. Smith-Spark et al., 2003; Smith-Spark 
& Fisk, Varvara et al., 2014). Nevertheless, only some of these deficits and theories 
characterising dyslexia are pertinent to processes and theories of PM when establishing the 
rationale for PM deficits in dyslexia, but these are described in the next chapter (Chapter 3) 
which provides a synthesis of the two bodies of evidence (PM and dyslexia). 
 
2.1. Definition 
 
Developmental dyslexia has been recognised for over a hundred years. In 1896 the term 
developmental dyslexia began to gain its shape in relation to word blindness from a medical 
account (Morgan, 1896). Snowling (2000) states that the worldwide population affected by 
dyslexia is large and varies somewhere between 3 and 17.5% (Pennington, Gilger, Pauls, Smith, 
Smith & DeFries, 1991; Lyon, 1996; Shaywitz, 1998). However, many argue for the lower end 
of the estimate. For example, Rutter and Yule (1975) analysed a cohort of UK children whose 
school achievements were poor and found that about 4 % of these children showed delay in 
development of reading skills. Traditionally, developmental dyslexia is defined as a discrepancy 
between an individual's reading ability and intelligence despite normal opportunities to learn to 
read (Demonet, Taylor & Chaix, 2004; Ramus, 2003; Snowling, 2000; Vellutino, 1979). 
Therefore, the common denominator for all individuals with dyslexia is the problem with 
reading (Doyle, 1996). The diagnosis of dyslexia is usually based on a battery of standardised 
psychometric tests which allow one to check whether there is a discrepancy between an 
individual's actual literacy skills and the literacy abilities expected for his/her chronological age 
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and IQ. Individuals with IQ within the normal range (85-115) and whose literacy skills do not 
match the abilities expected for their chronological age would be considered to have dyslexia. 
However, individuals with poor literacy skills accompanied by low IQ (lower than one SD from 
the mean; lower than 80) would be considered to be “generally backward readers” (Snowling, 
2000). 
 
2.2. Deficits and theories 
 
2.2.1. Phonological deficits 
 
A number of early studies investigated phonological processing symptoms that characterise 
developmental dyslexia in children. For example, a study investigating differences in boys with 
and without dyslexia found that those with dyslexia started to speak later than those without 
dyslexia, and displayed problems with articulation and spelling (Naidoo, 1972). Vellutino 
(1979) suggested that dyslexia is a language disorder and proposed the verbal deficit hypothesis 
which claimed that individuals with dyslexia have verbal coding deficits. A wide body of 
research has strongly suggested that individuals with dyslexia display deficits when it comes to 
speech processing in relation to written language (Thambirajah, 2010; Snowling, 1995; Wagner 
& Torgensen, 1987; Snowling, 2000). In other words this is a problem at the level of 
phonological representation. The ability to read fluently is based upon the ability to store 
appropriate representations related to the spelling of those words (Vellutino, Fletcher, Snowling 
& Scanlon, 2004). Reading involves phonological coding and tasks such as processing 
information in WM, storing printed words and retrieving words as distinct representations 
(Stanovich & Siegel, 1994; Wagner & Torgesen, 1987; Torgesen, Wagner, Rashotte, Burgess & 
Hecht, 1997); these are argued to be sensitive to deficits in phonological coding.  
 
In addition, in order to develop reading and spelling skills a child needs strong phonological 
awareness. Phonological awareness requires individuals to have a good knowledge of the 
sounds that are used to form the structure of language (Stanovich, 1988a, 1988b; Catts, Adlof, 
Hogan & Weismer, 2005). Children need phonological awareness in order to be able to 
recognize and use rhyme (i.e. bike rhymes with like), break words into syllables, blend 
phonemes into syllables and words (i.e. blending /c/ - /u/ - /p/ to make cup), identify the 
beginning and ending sounds in a syllable and see smaller words within larger words (i.e. 
“child” in “children”). They should also be able to identify and manipulate phonemes (i.e. 
change rug to mug). Phonological awareness can be further broken down into different skills 
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that are argued to be on a gradient of difficulty (McBride-Chang, 2004). The easiest skill is 
syllabic skills, which consists of isolating words or syllables. This is followed by the harder skill 
of recognising intermediate units of words (onset and rimes). This requires individuals to be 
able to split words of one syllable into onsets (initial consonant or cluster of consonants in the 
word) and rime (the vowel and consonant that follows the onset). An example is the word ball, 
where /b/ is the onset and /all/is the rime.  The hardest skill to acquire is phonemic knowledge, 
which is the ability to recognise that words are made up of the smallest units of sound (e.g. that 
the word frog is made up of; /f/ /r/ /o/ /g/).  
 
Reduced phonological awareness in children has been found to be related to poor reading and 
spelling skills (Snowling, 1981, 1995; Stanovich, 1988a, 1988b; Stanovich & Siegel, 1994; 
Lervåg, Bråten & Hulme, 2009). It is also widely recognised that individuals whose 
phonological awareness is poor at the phonemic level, will be at a disadvantage in the 
acquisition of the alphabetic principle (an understanding that letters and letter patterns represent 
the sounds of spoken language) and this is central to the phonological deficit hypothesis (Frith, 
1985; Snowling, 1995).  
 
2.2.1.1. Phonological deficit hypothesis 
 
The phonological deficit hypothesis suggested that individuals with dyslexia have a limited 
awareness (poorly coded or degraded phonological representation) of the different sound 
structures of language that can be used to build or manipulate words (Szenkovits & Ramus, 
2005; Goswami, 2002). This theory derived from the verbal deficit hypothesis (Vellutino, 1979) 
and led to the traditional definition of developmental dyslexia which claims that developmental 
dyslexia is underlined by problems with phonology (Frith, 1985; Snowling, 1995). The 
phonological deficit hypothesis has been also the principal framework for explaining many of 
the deficits and has provided the foundations for many of the positive interventions developed 
for individuals with dyslexia (e.g. Stanovich, 1988b; Bradley & Bryant, 1978; Vellutino, 1979; 
Wager & Torgesen, 1987; Vellutino & Scanlon, 1987; Vellutino et al., 2004).  
 
The phonological deficit hypothesis is based on a number of studies which found that children 
with dyslexia perform worse compared to children without dyslexia on tasks involving 
phonological awareness, verbal learning, rapid naming and coding of letters and sounds (e.g. 
Vellutino & Scanlon, 1987; Wagner & Torgesen, 1987). This theory has been widely 
recognised and researched (e.g. Ramus et al., 2003; Ackerman & Dykman, 1993; Wolf & 
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Bowers, 2000). In addition, Foy and Mann (2003) investigated reading ability development in 
pre-school children and showed that phoneme awareness (which is the ability to hear, identify 
and manipulate the smallest units of sound / phonemes) was the best predictor of reading skill 
development. Strong support evidence for the phonological deficit hypothesis playing a key role 
in reading and spelling has emerged from intervention studies. An example of one such 
intervention study was a study conducted by Castle, Riach and Nicholson (1994). They revealed 
that providing specific phonemic awareness training twice a week for the course of ten weeks 
resulted in significantly better reading and spelling scores of five years old children, when 
compared to children who did not participate in the training. There is also extensive evidence 
that alphabetic knowledge in pre-readers’ is a good predictor of later reading success (e.g. Ehri, 
1987; Roberts & McDougall, 2003). Roberts and McDougall (2003) found that in the first year 
of school, there was a significant correlation between understanding the sound structure of 
words and letter knowledge. 
 
Gathercole and Baddeley (1990) found deficits in the phonological storage component of WM, 
in children with disordered language development. They found that children with disordered 
language development performed more poorly in the repetition of abstract words, single words 
and concrete words. Gathercole and Baddeley also found deficits in the ability to recall a list of 
spoken words. Their study ruled out any possible difficulties with producing verbal output, by 
asking participants to respond to the task, by pointing to pictures. In addition, Mann (1984) 
found that the phonological memory scores of children who are starting school are significantly 
related to reading abilities attained (when measured at regular intervals) during the following 
year. 
 
There is a large body of research and intervention studies which supports the phonological 
deficit hypothesis as the main causal agent of dyslexia (e.g. Stanovich & Siegel, 1994) and that 
these deficits continue into adulthood (e.g. Bruck, 1992). However, there have been divergent 
views that have disagreed with this traditional point of view, with many postulating that 
phonological processing is not the primary cause of reading difficulties (e.g. Castles & 
Coltheart, 2004). The phonological deficit hypothesis was argued to be too general, as it did not 
account for dyslexic individuals who were highly articulate, but still displayed specific reading 
difficulties. Research has also highlighted that some dyslexic individuals appear to have no 
deficits on phonological tasks (e.g. De Luca, Burani, Paizi, Spinelli & Zoccolotti, 2010). 
Furthermore, according to Snowling (2000), findings of deficits in some, but not all verbal 
domains are not in line with the phonological deficit hypothesis. Nevertheless, the phonological 
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deficit hypothesis argues that dyslexia is domain-specific to phonological encoding and as such, 
does not involve wider cognitive domains.  
 
2.2.2. Naming speed deficit 
 
Further deficits in developmental dyslexia have been found in relation to the speed of 
processing for all types of stimuli, even for those which are unlikely to be caused by sensory 
delay (slow processing of sensory information). Denckla and Rudel (1976) used the Rapid 
Automatised Naming (RAN task) to assess rapid naming of pictures, colours or alpha-numeric 
stimuli. This study demonstrated that children with dyslexia had speed deficits when naming 
these stimuli. Wolf (e.g. Bowers & Wolf, 1993; Wolf & Bowers, 1999) stated that the RAN task 
investigates the repeated and speeded access to visual-phonological associations needed for 
reading. In addition, Wolf reasoned that rapid naming and fluent reading are both based on 
attention and perceptual processes which have to be well timed. These processes allow matching 
of visual representations to phonological codes, and Wolf argued that rapid naming is only 
partly a phonological process. Other researchers would strongly argue that rapid naming is a 
phonological process (e.g. Wagner & Torgeson, 1987). According to Wolf naming speed 
deficits can be thought to be underpinned by a general problem in dyslexia relating to the 
processing sequences of brief and rapid information. Studies showing naming speed deficits in 
individuals with dyslexia (e.g. Denckla & Rudel, 1976; Bowers & Wolf, 1993) were the 
foundation for the double deficit hypothesis.   
 
2.2.2.1. Double-deficit hypothesis 
 
A large body of dyslexia research has identified a deficit in the speed of processing of visual 
stimuli (e.g. Denckla & Rudel, 1976; Wagner, Torgesen, Laughon, Simmons & Rashotte, 1993; 
McBride-Chang & Manis, 1996; Wolf & Bowers, 1999). This evidence, related to a visual 
stimuli processing speed deficit, combined with the phonological deficit theory was the 
foundation for Wolf and Bowers’ (1999) hypothesis of a double-deficit, that they believed 
accounted for problems in reading in individuals with dyslexia. Wolf and Bowers suggested that 
an individual with dyslexia can either have a problem with phonological processing (in line with 
phonological deficit hypothesis) or a processing speed deficit (e.g. slow naming speed). They 
have also suggested that these two distinct deficits can coexist; that a person with dyslexia can 
have both phonological and processing speed deficits at the same time (hence the double-deficit 
hypothesis). 
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Van den Bos (1998) found that dyslexic children have a deficit of both phonological awareness 
and processing speed, helping to pave the way for the double-deficit hypothesis. There is also a 
large body of evidence showing that dyslexic children are slower in naming letters and digits 
compared to children without dyslexia (e.g. Denckla & Rudel, 1976; Bowers & Wolf, 1993; and 
Snyder & Downey, 1995). This “slowness” in naming speed was found, even in a task which 
did not involve phonological components and this has led researchers to believe that processing 
speed deficits are independent from phonological deficits (Denckla & Rudel, 1976). Nicolson 
and Fawcett (1994) provided evidence showing that the two deficits identified in the double-
deficit hypothesis (speed of processing and phonological) are in fact separate deficits 
independent of each other. The authors found a processing speed deficit even after removal of 
the phonological component of the task. This was achieved by the use of auditory tones and 
visual flashes as stimuli to which participants had to respond. These findings show that deficits 
in dyslexia are not, as was originally thought, limited to phonological processing.  McCrory, 
Mechelli, Frith and Price (2005) found naming deficits for both word reading and picture 
naming in children with dyslexia in comparison to controls.  Using PET they found reduced 
activation in a left occipitotemporal area during both tasks. They argued that underlying deficits 
in dyslexia may not be limited to orthographic decoding but may instead constitute a wider 
general impairment with difficulty in the integration of phonology and visual information. 
 
2.2.3. Wider cognitive impairments and theories 
 
There is an extensive body of research indicating a large range of wider cognitive impairments 
in dyslexia. These include the temporal processing (e.g. Tallal & Piercy, 1973), or the Dyslexic 
Automatisation Deficit (DAD) hypothesis (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990), the magnocellular 
theory (Stein & Walsh, 1997), cerebellar deficit hypothesis (Nicolson, Fawcett & Dean, 2001), 
and executive functioning deficits (e.g. Varvara, Varuzza, Sorrentino, Vicari & Menghini, 
2014), which can explain some of the wider, non-phonological range of deficits found in 
dyslexia. 
 
2.2.3.1. The magnocellular theory 
 
The magnocellular theory (Stein & Walsh, 1997) argued that there are visual and auditory 
deficits in developmental dyslexia. The central idea in the magnocellular theory of 
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developmental dyslexia is that there is a processing deficit in the magnocellular pathway 
through which auditory and visual signal is carried to the sensory nerves. 
 
2.2.3.1.1. Visual 
 
Visual information from the retina is passed via parasol and midget ganglion cells (Darcy 1992) 
to specific pathways which have a specialised function in visual sensory perception; these are 
the magnocelluar (parasol ganglion cells) and parvocellular (midget ganglion cells) neural 
pathways. The midget and parasol ganglion cells meet at the back of the retina to form the optic 
nerve. Visual information is processed through the optic nerve to the lateral geniculate nucleus 
(LGN), which is comprised of six layers. Two layers receive information for larger ganglion 
cells forming the magnocellular route (known as the dorsal stream) and two layers receive 
information from smaller ganglion cells to form the parvocellular (known as the ventral stream) 
route (Schiller, Logothetis & Charles, 1990). Visual information is projected through the 
primary visual cortex to the inferotemporal cortex, known as the “what” pathway (mainly 
parvocellular) and parietal cortices known as the “where” (mainly magnocellular) pathway 
(Kaplan & Shapley, 1986; Goodale & Miller, 1992; Merrigan & Maunsell, 1993; Shapley & 
Perry, 1986). After extensive primate and human research, it is widely accepted that 
magnocellular and parvocellular neurons are tuned to respond optimally to different temporal 
and spatial frequencies (De Monasterio & Gouras, 1975; Derrington, Krauskopf & Lennie, 
1984). The magnocellular system, while insensitive to isoluminant changes in colour polarity, 
responds optimally to low contrast and low spatial frequencies (i.e., coarse patterns) (Kaplan, 
Lee & Shapely, 1990; Lee, Pokorny, Smith, Martin & Valberg, 1990). The magnocellular 
system has a very high temporal resolution and is sensitive to extremely rapid changes in visual 
input (Nowak & Bullier, 1997; Schiller, Logothetis & Charles, 1990a, 1990b). The 
parvocellular system conversely has relatively lower temporal resolution but is sensitive to 
changes in colour and has superior sensitivity to high spatial frequencies (i.e., fine detail) 
(Kaplan et al., 1990; Kaplan & Shapley, 1986). The parvocellular pathway is relevant to fine 
detail information i.e. colour and high spatial frequencies, whereas the magnocellular pathway 
is relevant to visual information related to movement, low contrast and low spatial frequencies 
(McLean, Stuart, Coltheart & Castles, 2011; Eysenck & Keane, 2005; Kalat, 2007; Derrington, 
Krauskopf & Lennie, 1984). 
 
The magnocellular theory of developmental dyslexia is based on a suspected deficit in the 
processing of information in the magnocellular pathway. This is argued to be the underlying 
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cause of impairments in reading (Stein & Walsh, 1997; Stein, 2001; Stein & Talcott, 1999). The 
evidence supporting this claim comes from Lovegrove (1993) who found that children with 
dyslexia have slightly reduced sensitivity to low spatial frequencies and low luminance levels. 
The reduced sensitivity to low spatial frequency and low luminance levels, particularly during 
flicker, are related to the magnocellular pathway, whereas the higher spatial frequencies which 
were found to be intact in dyslexic children studied by Lovegrove (1993), are related to the 
parvocellular system. 
 
Deficits identified in global motion perception/processing and low flicker fusion, in individuals 
with dyslexia, have been found to correlate with reading and spelling problems (Talcott, 
Hansen, Assoku & Stein, 2000). The magnocellular theory of dyslexia has also been supported 
by post mortem research conducted on brains of individuals with dyslexia. Galaburda and 
Livingstone (1993) found that the magnocellular layers of neurons in the lateral geniculate 
nucleus were 30% smaller in individuals with developmental dyslexia compared to controls. On 
the other hand, the parvocellular layers were found to be as normal (Livingstone, Rosen, 
Drislane, & Galaburda, 1991). The assumption made within the magnocellular deficit theory 
can be explained on the basis of the fact, that during reading there is a greater need for eye 
movement control and visual movement perception, which is mainly based on magnocells and 
the dorsal pathway. Difficulties in processing visual information via the magnocellular/dorsal 
pathway at both the retinal and higher pathway levels are argued to result in deficits in detection 
of global motion. This in turn can predict reading ability (Talcott et al., 2000).  
 
McLean, Stuart, Coltheart and Castles (2011) argue that their research refutes a specific deficit 
in magnocellular temporal resolution, instead supporting the existence of an underlying 
pervasive deficit in low-level perceptual speed in some children with developmental dyslexia. 
McLean and collegues used a chromatic flicker perception task (where participants see a 
red/green LED light flicker at increased intervals until the separate lights appear to merge into a 
single orange light at around a flicker rate of 15 to 25 Hz), to investigate the functioning of both 
magnocellular and parvocellular visual temporal processing. A range of reading and 
phonological tests were conducted, as well as a test to find the fastest flicker threshold that 
could be used in the magnocellular system. The tasks used to test for an association between 
magnocellular temporal resolution and visual temporal processing were rapid naming (naming 
as fast as possible a series of different colour patches and a series of familiar pictures of objects 
such as a chair), inspection time (identifying the longer of two lines presented), go/no-go 
reaction time (series of traffic light colours where the light colour determined if a button should 
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be pushed or not and reaction time and response inhibition and false alarm recorded), rapid 
serial visual presentation (RSVP) and the attentional blink (where a sequence of visual stimuli is 
presented in rapid succession, in the same spatial location and individuals are asked to detect a 
target which is presented twice). To measure sustained attention and response inhibition, a 
continuous performance task was incorporated, where participants had to press a button when 
they saw a particular shape (e.g. triangle), form a continual visual presentation of shapes, and 
then refrain from reacting when the shape was preceded (two shapes before the target shape) by 
another specific shape (e.g. square).  
 
McLean et al. found that the dyslexic group had significant differences in magnocellular 
temporal resolution thresholds. They argued that even with these differences, several factors 
suggest that there is not a specific magnocellular temporal resolution deficit. Firstly, they argued 
that they did not find significant differences in the high-contrast condition, as would be 
expected in the magnocellular deficit theory. They also point out that correlation between 
reading ability and magnocellular temporal thresholds account for only 9% of variance in the 
reading measures (far less than that explained by language-based measures, phonological 
processing and rapid naming). Finally they also highlight that with a number of participants 
showing deficits in both parvocellular and magnocellular temporal thresholds, this did not bode 
well for the theory of a specific magnocellular system deficit (with only 10% showing a sole 
and specific magnocellular deficit). McLean et al. argued that individuals with dyslexia appear 
to show an overall deficit in low-level temporal processing. Using factor analysis McLean and 
colleagues found that a perceptual speed factor (made up of single-target RSVP performance, 
inspection time, go/no-go reaction time and magnocellular temporal threshold) was also a 
significant predictor of reading ability. They found that this predictor was independent of 
phonological processing, rapid naming and other general performance skills. Even though there 
is limited evidence showing that low-level visual magnocellular processing impairments 
contribute to reading difficulties in dyslexia independently of the deficit in phonological skills, 
the magnocellular theory shows that there are other, non-phonological deficits in dyslexia. 
Moreover, Iles, Walsh and Richardson (2000) found that dyslexic individuals are significantly 
worse in their performance on serial visual search tasks and this type of task has been also found 
to be dependent on magnocellular layers (Cheng, Eysel & Vidyasagar, 2004). In addition, 
Facoetti et al. (2001) found that individuals with dyslexia are vulnerable to distractors. These 
studies provide further evidence that deficits in dyslexia are not limited to linguistic processes. 
 
66 
 
2.2.3.1.2. Auditory 
 
There has also been research that has found abnormalities in auditory magnocellular layers of 
the dyslexic brain e.g. Galaburda, Menard and Rosen (1994); Stein and Walsh (1997); Eden, 
VanMeter, Rumsey, Maisog, Woods and Zeffiro (1996). These findings in conjunction with the 
temporal auditory processing deficits present in dyslexia (Tallal & Piercy, 1973; Tallal, 1980) 
have constituted the basis of the auditory version of the magnocellular deficit theory of 
developmental dyslexia. This theory claims that the magnocellular temporal processing deficit 
results in a basic auditory processing impairment that is found in individuals with dyslexia. This 
impairment was argued to be found in low level auditory transient processing, which caused 
severe difficulties for individuals with dyslexia in distinguishing between similar phonemes 
when they occurred sequentially after each other, in short intervals. 
 
2.2.3.2. Temporal processing theory 
 
The temporal processing theory of dyslexia (e.g. Tallal & Piercy, 1973) argued for broader 
deficits in dyslexia, beyond difficulties with phonological processing suggesting that individuals 
with dyslexia have a deficit related to low-level auditory perception which is evidenced in the 
processing of rapid or brief sounds (Tallal & Piercy, 1973; Tallal, 1980). This general non-
linguistic auditory temporal deficit theory is based on research which showed that dyslexic 
children have problems with the processing of brief and rapidly changing acoustic information 
(Tallal, 1980; Tallal et al., 1993; 1996). These studies used auditory temporal order perception 
tasks and found that individuals with dyslexia were worse on these tasks compared to normal 
readers. It is argued that for functions such as speech, learning and movement, the ability to 
discriminate between different sounds or visual material presented in rapid stimulus sequences, 
are vital (Hari and Renvall, 2001). Therefore, deficits found in rapid stimulus sequences were 
argued to be a contributory factor in some of the phonological processing difficulties found in 
children with dyslexia (Tallal et al., 1993).  
 
Attentional processes and attention shifting have also been investigated, with Hari and Renvall 
(2001) postulating that individuals with dyslexia have difficulty in switching between tasks, 
labelling this as, “sluggish attentional shifting”. They propose that sluggish attentional shifting 
is the pathophysiological link between the magnocellular deficit and the impaired rapid stimulus 
sequence processing in dyslexia. In their review of research into the processing speed of rapid 
stimulus sequence tasks they found that in comparison to controls, the dyslexic participants took 
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longer to switch attention between a variety of tasks. These included an auditory saltation 
illusion, a pitch streaming, and visual temporal-order judgment task (outlined below). 
 
Hari and Kiesilä (1996) investigated rapid auditory stimulus sequences in an auditory saltation 
illusion task where four binaural clicks are presented in each ear at interstimulus intervals of 
500ms. Participants were able to recognise that the first four clicks were first presented in one 
ear, while the next four clicks were presented in the other ear. The interstimulus intervals were 
gradually reduced to 30ms, which created a saltatory percept; causing the sounds to appear 
further apart when the sounds changed between ears in comparison to when they were heard in 
the same ear. Adding another binaural click in the right ear (4 left, 5 right), appears to the 
listener, to make the whole stimulus sequence jump. Dyslexics perceived the stimulus sequence 
jump effect at significantly longer intersound intervals than controls (typical readers). It was 
argued that the longer intersound intervals required for this effect may explain some of the 
deficits in dyslexia, with longer sound intervals being likely to result in interference on rapidly 
presented auditory stimuli, in individuals with dyslexia (Hari and Kiesilä, 1996; Hari and 
Renvall, 2001). 
 
This finding was later supported by Helenius, Uutela and Hari (1999) in a “pitch streaming” 
task, where they found attentional deficits in the dyslexic group. High and low tones were 
presented alternately to participants and they were perceived as separate tones (i.e. high tone 
followed by a low tone, then another high and low tone and so on). When the interval between 
the sounds (tones) is shortened, listeners should perceive two separate continuous streams of 
high and low tones. Helenius et al. (1999) found that in order for participants with dyslexia to 
perceive the tones to form two separate streams of sounds (one continuous high tone and one 
continuous low tone), they needed twice as long an intertone interval compared to controls. This 
finding suggested dyslexic individuals have difficulties in processing rapid stimulus sequences. 
Helenius et al. (1999) also provided further support suggesting that sluggish attentional shifting 
deficits may account for problems seen in phonological processing in individuals with dyslexia. 
They looked at correlations between stream segregation and a series of tasks including; working 
memory, naming speed, reading speed and timing of lexical decisions using words and pseudo-
words. The pseudo-words were recognised more slowly by the dyslexic group and the naming 
speed was slower than controls. These findings also correlated with results on the pitch 
streaming task and were argued to support the view of sluggish attentional shifting, with the 
dyslexic group appearing to have a longer time window between recognising two sequentially 
presented sounds, thus creating the possibility of sound interference between the two stimuli.  
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Hari, Valti and Uutela (1999) used an attentional blink task to measure the dwell time between 
identifying one letter stimulus and then the requirement to detect if the letter “x” followed it or 
not. When disengaging from one stimulus and engaging in another stimulus, the dwell time is 
expected to be around 400-600ms and it is generally argued that this dwell time is likely to be 
caused by a limitation in capacity (Duncan, Martens & Ward, 1994; cited in Hari and Renvall, 
2001). It was found that dyslexics had a mean response time of 700ms in comparison to 540ms 
(at 75% performance level) for controls. This finding provide strong evidence that individuals 
with dyslexia have deficits in disengaging from one item in order to engage in the processing of 
the next item, when faced with rapid stimulus sequences (Hari et al.,1999; Hari and Renvall, 
2001). Hari et al. (1999) postulated that the extended dwell time before identifying a new target 
stimulus in the dyslexic group extends the use of additional capacity by around 30% in 
comparison to control. 
 
Hari, Renvall and Tanskanen (2001) investigated the underlying mechanisms that may account 
for the observed deficits in dyslexia. Hari et al. (2001) argued that the attentional blink task 
relies heavily on automatic attention (Hari et al.,1999), with brain imaging showing the 
magnocellular pathway (visual neural pathway) being involved in the efficient use of capacity-
limited attention processing by sending information to the right parietal lobe. Therefore, any 
deficit in the magnocellular pathway or right parietal lobe may explain deficits in dyslexia. The 
dyslexic group demonstrated a right visual field advantage in comparison to controls in a visual 
temporal-order judgment task, requiring participants to indicate verbally whether a visual bar in 
the left (or right) hemisphere preceded a similar bar on the right (or left) two sequentially 
presented stimuli. The same advantage was also demonstrated by the dyslexic group in a line 
motion illusion task, where individuals had to state if a line (that appeared to grow from a 
specific cued point on a computer screen) moved from left to right of the screen. They argued 
that the parietal lobe is important in learning to read as it has an important function in 
attentional shifting and that reading requires extensive use of attentional shifting (Hari et al., 
2001; Hari and Renvall, 2001) to read a sequence of letters that make up words; and that deficits 
in attentional shifting may account for many of the reading deficits witnessed in dyslexia.  
 
Other research in visual, auditory, tactile unimodal and crossmodal perception have also 
supported the deficits found in children and adults with dyslexia in rapid temporal processing  
(e.g. Laasonen, Tomma-Halme, Lahti-Nuuttila, Service & Virsu, 2000; Laasonen, Service & 
Virsu, 2001; Hari,1995; Hari et al., 2001; Helenius et al.,1999). Support for Hari and Renvall's 
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(2001) belief that sluggish attentional shifting deficits could account for phonological 
impairments seen in dyslexia came from Lallier, Tainturier, Dering, Donnadieu, Valdois and 
Thierry (2010). They investigated automatic attentional shifting in both auditory and visual 
modalities using behavioural and ERP measures, finding deficits in both modalities in relation 
to speed of processing and argued that sluggish attentional shifting could account for the 
phonological impairment in developmental dyslexia. Conversely, Moores, Nicolson and 
Fawcett (2002) attributed deficits in rapid switching to a lack of automatisation of basic skills in 
individuals with dyslexia.  
 
2.2.3.3. Dyslexic Automatisation Deficit 
 
The Dyslexic Automatisation Deficit (DAD) hypothesis was proposed by Nicolson and Fawcett 
(1990). Nicolson and Fawcett argued that dyslexia is not just limited to reading difficulty but 
rather that the reading difficulty is just a symptom of a more general and pervasive deficit in the 
acquisition of skill. According to the DAD hypothesis, children with dyslexia find it abnormally 
difficult to automatise skills, even when they have practised them extensively. This problem 
with automatisation has been argued to be relevant to both cognitive and motor skill acquisition. 
Moreover, the DAD hypothesis claimed that this deficit can be masked by situational factors or 
coping strategies enabling individuals with dyslexia to mask this deficit in tasks which are not 
demanding. Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) based these assumptions on the results from the 
British National Cohort Study (e.g. Haslum, 1987), in which close observation of children with 
dyslexia and discussions with their parents indicated frequent problems with basic skills, which 
could be masked if children actively allocated additional attentional resources to the task. 
 
This reasoning led Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) to the development of the Conscious 
Compensation (CC) hypothesis, which argued that children are consciously concentrating (i.e. 
using or engaging controlled processing) on performance, in order to consciously compensate 
for deficits in phonological skill, naming speed, motor skill and balance, which result from 
deficits in skill automatisation. This conscious compensation enables children with dyslexia to 
perform at apparently normal levels during tasks that should usually be automatic. In other 
words, the CC hypothesis argued that children with dyslexia can achieve performance on a wide 
range of tasks which is comparable to the performance of normally developing children, but this 
requires children with dyslexia to “work harder” in order to achieve this (i.e. by consciously 
allocating attentional resources). Furthermore, the CC hypothesis argues for three well-known 
features of performance deficits in individuals with dyslexia, namely that performance drops in 
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resource-intensive tasks; performance is especially likely to be influenced by stress; and that 
performance can be maintained only over relatively short periods. 
 
Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) chose the gross motor skill of balance to investigate a non-
phonological skill in children with dyslexia and test the DAD/CC hypothesis. In addition, 
Nicolson and Fawcett wanted to make sure that the skill to be used to test the DAD/CC 
hypothesis was fully automatic in children. The reason for choosing balance was that children 
would have very extensive practice in this skill. Furthermore, balancing is probably the most 
practiced skill of all skills and therefore it is very likely that it is fully automatised.  
 
An advantage of choosing a skill which is fully automatised is that it does not require conscious 
effortful monitoring (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990). Thus, the authors argued that fully 
automatised skills, even in the presence of other task demands that draw on conscious 
processing capacity, will not result in major decrements in performance. This will enable any 
deficits in automatisation to become visible in tasks where conscious monitoring is harder to 
perform. Therefore, Nicolson and Fawcett argued that, if there is an automatisation deficit in 
dyslexic children, it should be visible under conditions that make conscious monitoring more 
difficult. This led Nicolson and Fawcett to use a dual-task paradigm in order to investigate 
whether there was an automatisation deficit in children with dyslexia. Their use of a secondary 
task to take away attentional resources from the primary task (balancing) made conscious 
compensation more difficult. Therefore, if the DAD/CC hypothesis is true, a deficit in 
automatisation should become visible. 
 
Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) tested 23 children with dyslexia (around 13 years old) of normal 
or above normal IQ (IQ over 90), and eight non-dyslexic children matched for age and IQ. This 
study included three tasks: standing on both feet on a block (with one foot being placed directly 
in front of the other); walking; and standing on one foot. Participants had to perform these 
balance tasks under single and dual-task balance conditions. In the single-task balance condition 
participants were required just to balance and in the dual-task balance condition they had to 
perform an additional task. Thus, participants were required to balance and perform a secondary 
task at the same time. There were two versions of the secondary task in the dual-task balance 
condition. One secondary task involved counting and the other was a choice reaction task. 
 
The results of this study showed that under single-task balance conditions (one foot, beam 
walking and balance) there were no significant differences in balancing ability between the 
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children with and without dyslexia. However, the dual-task balance condition revealed a strong 
reduction in balancing performance for individuals with dyslexia when compared to the single-
task condition; with this decrease in performance not being present in the control participants. 
Nicolson and Fawcett suggested that individuals with dyslexia used conscious compensation to 
mask their automatisation deficit when performing this task. In addition, children with dyslexia 
showed decrements in the secondary task which involved counting. This decrement in the 
performance on the secondary task was not present in the performance of control children. This 
finding suggested that there is a problem with fully automatising skills in children with dyslexia 
in the presence of a secondary task. The authors argued that the results of this study supported 
the DAD and CC hypotheses. However, as acknowledged by Nicolson and Fawcett, the 
impaired performance on the secondary counting task could be argued to be related to the nature 
of the task. Namely, counting involves a range of phonological skills and therefore it is possible 
that the dyslexic children performed worse on this task due to their phonological deficit.  
 
Nonetheless, the second experiment conducted by Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) employed a 
different secondary task, an auditory choice reaction task, which did not involve phonological 
skills. This task required participants to indicate (by pressing a left or right button) as quickly as 
possible whether they heard a high or low tone. The results showed that children with dyslexia 
were significantly slower and less accurate on this non-phonologically based task. This, in 
addition to finding no significant differences in balancing under the single-task condition, again 
supported the hypothesis that dyslexics use conscious compensation in easier tasks and are 
unable to compensate under more demanding task conditions. 
 
However, auditory processing has been also found to be affected in dyslexics (as stated by the 
magnocellular hypothesis; Stein & Walsh, 1997) and it may be argued that this created the 
difference in performance on the secondary tasks used in the second experiment. Nonetheless, it 
can be still argued that performing this secondary task has drawn away resources from the 
primary task, not allowing individuals with dyslexia to consciously compensate for their 
automatisation deficit. Thus, this could have resulted in impaired performance on both tasks (the 
balancing and the auditory choice reaction tasks).  
 
Alternatively, it could be argued that the dual-task paradigm in general created cognitively 
demanding conditions, which were too demanding for children with dyslexia and resulted in 
worse general performance (on both tasks). Since dyslexic children did not show any deficit 
under single-task conditions (involving balance), but there were deficits visible under the dual-
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task conditions. Moreover, Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) provided an additional interpretation of 
the results apart from the DAD hypothesis. Namely, they suggested that it is possible that 
children with dyslexia also have a general problem with the allocation of attention leading to 
impaired performance under dual-task conditions. Additional evidence also indicated attentional 
problems in children with dyslexia (e.g. Dykman, Ackerman & Holcomb, 1985). 
 
Further support for the DAD/CC hypothesis was shown by Fawcett and Nicolson’s (1992) study 
in which they tried to establish whether the dual-task difficulties in dyslexia were due to the 
prevention of conscious compensation, or due to a broader attentional deficit occurring in 
situations requiring performance of two tasks simultaneously. In this study Nicolson and 
Fawcett blindfolded their participants in order to stop them trying to consciously compensate. 
This study did not manipulate the difficulty of a secondary task. The dyslexic children showed 
an impaired automatisation of balancing skill compared to controls under blindfolded balance 
conditions. Thus, in this study individuals with dyslexia performed worse than controls, as they 
were not able to employ conscious compensation.  
 
In summary, the DAD hypothesis stated that children and adults with dyslexia have difficulties 
in automating skills and as a result they need to employ conscious compensation in order to 
perform at normal levels. Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) argued that skills which non-dyslexic 
individuals can perform well can eventually be performed well by dyslexics. However, 
Nicolson and Fawcett argued that these skills will require participants with dyslexia to 
consciously attend to aspects of performance that come without the use of additional cognitive 
resources for non-dyslexic children. 
 
2.2.3.3.1. Cerebellar deficit theory 
 
The cerebellar deficit theory of dyslexia (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990; Nicolson et al., 2001) was 
developed from an accumulation of evidence of automatisation problems found in the DAD 
studies. The cerebellar deficit theory of dyslexia is based on the claim that underlying deficits in 
the functioning of the cerebellum in individuals with dyslexia, can explain the problems with 
automatisation of skills (neural correlate of DAD theory) and more broadly in cognitive deficits 
in dyslexia. Recent functional neuroimaging and neurophysiological research have suggested 
that the cerebellum is involved in not only motor skills but also in wider cognitive functions and 
that deficits in the distribution of activity in the cerebellar can provide an explanation for the 
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underlying deficits found in dyslexia (Baillieux, Vandervliet, Manto, Parizel, De Deyn & 
Mariën, 2009; Nicolson, Fawcett, Berry, Jenkins, Dean & Brooks, 1999). 
 
The cerebellum is a very densely packed and deeply folded subcortical structure that is situated 
in the hindbrain (Holmes, 1939). This large area of the brain contains a large proportion of the 
brain’s neurons (Brodal, 1981). The cerebellum is argued to be responsible for the coordination 
of motor control (Kalat, 2007; Lacourse, Orr, Cramer & Cohen, 2005) and other cognitive 
deficits such as language production (e.g. Baillieux, Vandervliet, Manto, Parizel, De Deyn and 
Mariën, 2009). Levisohn, Cronin-Golomb, Schmahmann (2000) found that the cerebellum as 
part of a distributed neural network, is particularly important in higher order cognitive 
functioning (e.g. planning and sequencing, visual–spatial function, expressive language). Time 
estimation deficits have also been linked to the cerebellum (Nicolson, Fawcett and Dean, 1995), 
with children who have dyslexia showing difficulties in estimating the time difference between 
auditory tones but not on detection of how loud the sounds were. This finding supported Ivry 
and Keele’s (1989; cited in Nicolson & Fawcett, 2010) study involving individuals who had 
cerebellar lesions and patients with other neuropsychological disorders. They suggested that 
time estimation was linked to the cerebellum as the patients who had cerebellar lesions had 
specific deficits in estimating the duration of time between auditory tones. 
 
A number of brain imaging studies have supported the metabolic and anatomical activation 
differences of the cerebellum in dyslexic individuals e.g. Rae, Lee, Dixon, Blamire, Tompson, 
Styles et al. (1998); Nicolson, Fawcett, Berry, Jenkins, Dean and Brooks (1999); Brown, Eliez, 
Menon, Rumsey, White and Reiss (2001); Leonard, Eckert, Lombardino, Oakland, Kranzler, 
Mohr et al. (2001). Another study supporting cerebellar differences in individuals with dyslexia 
was conducted by Finch et al. (2002) who re-analysed brain specimens of dyslexic individuals 
originally studied by Galaburda et al. (1994). This re-analysis found that the small and large 
cerebellar neurons of non-dyslexic and dyslexic individuals differed significantly in numbers. 
 
The mild impairment of the cerebellum in individuals with dyslexia is related to poor 
performance on a wide range of motor tasks (Fawcett, Nicolson & Dean, 1996) e.g. poor 
balance, late crawling and walking and exceptional clumsiness (Reid et al., 2008). These 
problems with motor control affect also the motor side of speech production which is essential 
for accurate discrimination between different sounds. Moretti, Bava, Torre, Antonello and 
Gazzato (2002) found that individuals with cerebellar lesions had problems with language 
compared to controls. A number of neuroimaging studies have indicated that the cerebellum is 
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involved in language production e.g. Baillieux et al. (2009); Finch, Nicolson and Fawcett 
(2002); Rae et al. (2002). Baillieux, et al.(2009) used a semantic association test, where they 
presented participants with ten different nouns (3 seconds apart from each other), asking them to 
silently generate semantically related verbs. Using MRI technologies they found that children 
with dyslexia demonstrated a more diffuse network activation which was spread across the left 
hemisphere (incorporating the frontal, temporal, parietal and occipital regions). In comparison 
to controls, who showed activation in anterior regions of the right hemispheric, dyslexics 
activated the precentral gyrus and in the posterior parts of the occipital lobe. Baillieux et al. 
(2009) therefore argued that widespread activations on the cerebral and cerebellar level, 
suggests that the processing of information in the cerebellar cortex was disordered. Baillieux et 
al (2009) argues that their findings support research by Milne, Syngeniotis, Jackson and 
Corballis (2002), Seki et al. (2001) and Shaywitz et al. (2002) on a variety of linguistic tasks 
(e.g. sentence reading, lexical decision and verb generation), where similar patterns of activation 
were found across the left hemisphere and the right posterior hemisphere.  Nicolson, Fawcett, 
Berry, Jenkins, Dean and Brooks (1999) have argued that a deficit in the ability to automate 
basic articulatory skills and auditory skills coupled with difficulties in fine motor control (eye 
movement and letter recognition), can help explain many of the difficulties seen in dyslexia in 
relation to learning to read and write.   
 
The cerebellum has been hypothesised to be not only involved in motor skill, but also in skill 
automatisation and in adaptive learning control e.g. Ito (1990); Jenkins, Brooks, Nixon, 
Frackowiak and Passingham (1994); Krupa, Tompson and Tompson (1993). Furthermore, the 
cerebellum has been proposed to be crucial not only in the automatisation of motor skill, but 
also in the automatisation of cognitive skill (Leiner, Leiner & Dow, 1991; 1993). The skills 
arguably affected by the deficit in automatisation caused by dysfunction of the cerebellum 
include overlearned tasks such as learning to ride a bicycle or reading (Ramus et al., 2003). 
 
The involvement of the cerebellum in WM and attention has been now established by the means 
of studies investigating patients with cerebellar damage who showed deficits in these cognitive 
areas (Malm, Kristensen, Karlsson, Carlberg, Fagerlund & Olsson, 1998; Ravizza, McCormick, 
Schlerf, Justus, Ivry & Fiez, 2006). Furthermore, Nicolson, Fawcett, Moss, Nicolson and 
Reason (1999) found that cerebellar activation was only 10 to 20 % of the expected level in 
adults with dyslexia performing motor learning tasks. This study employing PET technology 
provided further evidence of cerebellum deficit in dyslexia.   
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2.2.3.4. Working memory in dyslexia 
 
There is a large body of literature concerning problems with WM in dyslexia (e.g. Chiappe, 
Hascher & Siegel, 2000; Griffiths and Snowling, 2002; McDougall & Donohoe, 2002; Plaza, 
Cohen & Chevrie-Muller, 2002; Roodenrys & Stokes, 2001). McLoughlin, Fitzgibbon and 
Young (1994) have argued that deficient WM is one of the central characteristics of dyslexia 
and that it affects dyslexic individuals throughout their life. There is an extensive body of 
research supporting the phonological deficit hypothesis, with poorer storage capacity of the 
phonological loop component of WM (e.g. Helland & Asbjørnsen, 2004; Jorm, 1983; Palmer, 
2000; Frith, 1985; Stanovich, 1988; Vellutino et al., 2004). There is also some evidence 
showing a visuo-spatial deficit related to storage capacity in dyslexics (e.g. Olson & Datta, 
2002), although other papers argue against this deficit (e.g. Smith-Spark et al., 2003; Smith-
Spark & Fisk, 2007). In reviewing the visuo-spatial sketchpad, Swanson (1978) asked poor 
readers and controls to remember nonsense shapes. Half of the participants for each group were 
given names for the shapes (phonological loop component) whilst the other half had to 
remember the physical shape in memory, using the visuo-spatial sketchpad. Visuo-spatial 
deficits were not identified, with no significant differences between the groups in the condition 
where the shapes were not named. However, when the shapes were named the controls 
performed better than the dyslexic group; demonstrating deficits in the phonological loop but 
not the visuo-spatial sketchpad. 
 
Researchers have begun to consider if individuals with dyslexia are limited to a domain specific 
deficit within the phonological component of WM or if wider domain general deficits exist in 
the CE processing function of WM. Swanson (1994) looked at phonological, visuo-spatial 
processing (short-term memory) and CE function (storage and manipulation of information) in 
relation to literacy in children and adults with dyslexia. He found deficits in the phonological 
short-term memory component and the CE, but not the visuo-spatial component. Pickering and 
Gathercole (2004) findings supported that of Swanson (1994); on two tests of CE (backward 
digit span and counting recall), the dyslexic group showed deficits in relation to controls 
matched for reading age. In an attempt to tease apart the nature of WM deficits in dyslexia, 
Smith-Spark et al. (2003) conducted several experiments using Baddeley’s (1986) WM model.  
 
In an attempt to understand the involvement of the phonological loop and CE in reading deficits 
found in dyslexia, Smith-Spark et al. (2003) administered two short-term memory tests (digit 
and word span), as well as a letter updating task that was expected to draw upon the central 
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executive component of WM and the phonological loop. The letter updating task required 
participants to remember (in the order presented) the last six consonants from a varied sequence 
containing 6, 8, 10 and 12 consonants. If more than six consonants were presented, participants 
needed to update the contents of WM by deleting redundant information and repositioning items 
in serial order (Postle et al., 2001). To demonstrate CE involvement, participants would need to 
hold the information in memory (phonological loop) and then update the items (in serial order) 
as they received more stimuli. However, whilst Smith-Spark and colleagues also found that the 
dyslexic group performed significantly worse than controls on the letter updating task; the 
deficits showed a recency effect with participants being able to better recall the most recently 
presented of the six letters in comparison to the first few letters (with more errors occurring in 
the first few letters of the last 6 to be recalled). With the failure occurring so early on, this 
pointed to a deficit in the phonological loop processing stage. Thus, for the dyslexic group they 
appeared to be using a recency effect process and there was little or no evidence of involvement 
of the CE. For the digit and word span, participants were presented with digits or words and 
asked to recall the list. As expected, the results confirmed deficits on the phonological (verbal) 
component of WM with deficits evident in the digit span and word span tasks. 
 
With the letter updating task being argued to tap into phonological processing rather than being 
a reliable test of the CE, Smith-Spark et al. (2003) opted to utilise a visuo-spatial measure to test 
the CE, independently of phonological impairments associated with dyslexia. Visuo-spatial WM 
can make both "static" (short-term memory of location of simultaneously presented stimuli) and 
"dynamic" demands on resources (recall of both order and location of stimuli). Smith-Spark et 
al. (2003) administered a static memory task (in which participants had to recall visuo-spatial 
location of seven simultaneously highlighted cells in a 5x5 grid matrix), and to test the CE 
component of WM, they used a dynamic task (in a 5x5 grid matrix, several cells are highlighted 
sequentially and participants have to recall both the location and order of presentation). An 
additional spatial updating task was administered. This task required participants to remember 
the last four locations and order of presentation of highlighted cells from a varied sequence 
containing 4, 6, 8 and 10 highlighted cells. With the static and dynamic tasks being visuo-spatial 
in nature, any deficits found could be argued to be independent of the phonological loop.  
Whilst results indicated that there were no significant differences between groups on their 
ability to recall static or dynamic spatial memory tasks, there were specific differences in the 
updating task. Smith-Spark et al. (2003) found that individuals with dyslexia were significantly 
worse, but only when the updating task employed a high cognitive load. Thus, the dyslexic 
group made more errors when recalling the last 4 positions in the updating task when they were 
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given higher sequences (10 different locations) of highlighted spatial locations. Similar to their 
first experiment dyslexic participants demonstrated a recency effect, having difficulty 
remembering the serial order position of the first two highlighted cells when required to store 
the location and serial order of 10 sequentially presented cells. The researchers argued that these 
deficits were additional to, and cannot be accounted for, by the phonological deficit theory of 
dyslexia. With the pattern of results it was argued that a domain-general CE deficit was the most 
likely factor, as differences between groups were only apparent when cognitive demands during 
the updating task in the visuo-spatial component were high.  
 
As discussed in section 2.2.3.3., adults with dyslexia have been argued to be able to compensate 
for many of the difficulties associated with dyslexia. Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) demonstrated 
that children with dyslexia were able to mask their impairments on a range of tasks by the 
means of conscious compensation (CC). Smith-Spark et al. (2003) argued that their finding of 
group differences under most cognitively taxing condition is in line with Nicolson and 
Fawcett’s (1990) DAD/CC hypothesis. Smith-Spark et al. (2003) reasoned that the deficit 
visible in adults with dyslexia, in the most complex task may be linked to their inability to 
consciously compensate. Under low task complexity, dyslexic and control groups performed 
comparably. However, when  task complexity was high, the CE or SAS (Norman & Shallice, 
1986) of dyslexic individuals has been argued by Smith-Spark et al. (2003) and Smith-Spark 
and Fisk (2007) to be unable to allocate extra resources to the task, resulting in poorer 
performance (compared to controls). The pattern of results in Smith-Spark et al. (2003) supports 
this position, with the performance of individuals with dyslexia differing significantly from the 
performance of controls, only when the task complexity increased. That is, when there were a 
greater number of updates required there was a drop in performance observed in dyslexics 
relative to controls. This reasoning was supported using Swanson, Ashbaker and Lee’s (1996; 
cited in Smith-Spark et al., 2003) argument, that higher processing demands result in verbal and 
visuo-spatial WM deficits in individuals with reading disability. Smith-Spark et al. (2003) 
purported that their findings indicate a deficit in EF in individuals with dyslexia; which is 
evidenced in phonological and visuo-spatial processing. When tasks placing high demands on 
executive resources are administered, deficits in CE are evident, with it being argued that 
dyslexic individuals are unable to allocate resources in order to consciously compensate for this 
deficit (Smith-Spark et al., 2003; Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007), as available resources are fully 
allocated to the task in hand.  
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Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007) extended their research on CE deficits by comparing dyslexic and 
non-dyslexic performance across phonological and visuo-spatial domains of WM. They 
compared tasks that required short-term storage of digit, letter, word and spatial span (in the 
form of a Corsi block task), against tasks that measured complex verbal and visuo-spatial WM 
span (requiring storage and processing of information). These tasks included a computation and 
word span (working out a series of arithmetic or sentence problems, whilst remembering the last 
digit or word from each problem), and a spatial WM span. The spatial WM task consisted of a 
split screen displaying a range of boxes with only five being highlighted (four are filled with 
“X’s” and one with “O”). Participants were required to select which half of the screen contained 
more highlighted boxes, whilst remembering the position of the highlighted box filled with “O”. 
Sequences of trials were used with participants having to report the location of each of the boxes 
filled with “O’s” in the order presented. Finally, two updating tasks (consonant and spatial span) 
which required additional CE resources were administered. The consonant span task is 
explained above in Smith-Spark et al.’s (2003) study description. The updating spatial span task 
used an adapted Corsi block design, where participants were presented with a screen of blank 
boxes with some of the boxes (randomised selection of up to 12 boxes) highlighted (one at a 
time), and asked to recall the last four boxes highlighted (in serial order presented), at the end of 
the trial.  
 
Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007) found significant deficits in dyslexic participants compared to 
controls on both the simple and complex span tasks, as well as in the updating tasks. Their 
findings not only support the phonological deficits found in WM (e.g. Smith-Spark et al., 2003) 
in dyslexia, but also suggest visuo-spatial WM deficits. After controlling statistically for simple 
span tasks, Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007) postulate that deficits are still found on the complex 
span tasks, therefore suggesting a CE impairment in dyslexia which is independent of the 
phonological loop or visuo-spatial sketchpad components of WM.  Upon analysing the 
difference in performance between the first half and second half of the spatial updating task, 
Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007) found that dyslexic individuals showed a significant disadvantage 
during the first half of the WM task, but not during the second half. This showed that 
individuals with dyslexia found the task significantly more difficult compared to controls, when 
first encountering the spatial updating task. However, the dyslexic group were eventually able to 
catch up with controls on the task, after adapting to task demands. This led Smith-Spark and 
Fisk (2007) to claim that in dyslexia, the problem is with the novelty of the task and that once 
schemas are in place to recognise what is required, this deficit diminishes. Novel tasks have 
been argued to strongly involve executive control processes (e.g. Rabbitt, 1997; Shallice & 
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Burgess, 1993). Thus, Smith-Spark and Fisk concluded that there is a problem with executive 
control processes for individuals with dyslexia. 
 
Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007) explained the executive dysfunction present in dyslexia in terms of 
the model of the attentional control of action proposed by Norman and Shallice (1986). 
Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) stated that action can be either conscious or automatic. Automatic 
processing is relatively non-demanding on attentional and processing resources whereas 
controlled processing draws on these resources. Because automatic processing does not require 
attentional and processing resources, it leaves these resources relatively free for higher-level 
processing. Controlled action on the other hand is mediated through the SAS which regulates 
behaviour via the control of attention. Deficits in the first half of the spatial updating task appear 
to happen when the task is still novel, therefore the deficits found could be argued to be due to 
the additional, conscious attentional resources (SAS involvement) required to create schemas, in 
order to automate many of the processes (Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). 
 
Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007) linked the deficit in performing novel tasks to a deficit in SAS. 
They argued that the SAS is responsible for controlling non-automatic actions which are not 
well-learned or simple in nature. In addition, the SAS which controls, coordinates and integrates 
information can be affected negatively by distraction (e.g. high task demands; Norman & 
Shallice, 1986). As described earlier in this chapter, Fawcett and Nicolson (1994) argued that 
complex skills which require fluency in component sub-skills, multi-modality skills involving 
the monitoring of various modalities/sources of information, skills which depend on time which 
require fast speed of processing and vigilance tasks which require concentration over time, are 
all vulnerable to disruption in individuals with dyslexia. The tasks involving these skills create 
demands which prevent the use of CC to direct performance. These conditions in which the 
performance of dyslexics is vulnerable are similar to the task conditions which call upon the 
SAS. This suggests a deficit in SAS of individuals with dyslexia (Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007), 
which is visible in complex tasks where individuals are not able to consciously compensate for 
their automaticity deficit. The automatisation/CC theory (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990) claims that 
it is the failure to fully automatise skills that is responsible for a poorer performance in 
individuals with dyslexia (compared to controls) under cognitively demanding dual-task 
conditions. The authors stated that children were able to mask their automatisation deficit on 
easier tasks. Children with dyslexia were unable to mask their deficit, as their coping strategies 
were not great enough to cover the deficit present on the cognitively demanding dual-paradigm 
tasks.  
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In addition, Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007) have argued that the problem with performance of 
novel sequences in dyslexia was in line with the cerebellar deficit hypothesis of Nicolson et al. 
(1995; 2001). This has been argued in light of evidence that learning new skills and the 
execution of learned skills and WM and executive attentional control processes have been found 
to be dependent on the cerebellum (e.g. Ito, 1990; Justus & Ivry, 2001; Malm, Kristensen, 
Karlsson, Carlberg, Fagerlund & Olsson, 1998).  
 
It can be concluded that WM deficits in dyslexia have been found in relation to the storing 
capacity of the phonological loop but there is mixed evidence on deficits in the visuo-spatial 
sketchpad. Smith-Spark et al. (2003) found a processing deficit in the phonological domain. 
Similarly Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007) found a processing deficit in the visuo-spatial domain of 
WM. This evidence appears to support CE impairments in individuals with dyslexia. Working 
memory in dyslexia will be discussed further in Chapter 7. 
 
2.2.3.4.1. Dyslexia and executive functioning 
 
Baddeley (1986; 2000) has claimed that the CE is involved in the allocation of resources, 
binding of information, shifting between tasks or retrieval strategies and inhibition of responses 
as well as in managing information, whilst performing other temporal activities. Support for CE 
deficits in dyslexia has come from a range of research in the areas listed above (e.g. Smith-
Spark & Fisk, 2007). Swanson (2006) argued that executive system deficits extend beyond 
phonological processing in children with reading disabilities. He stated that children with 
reading difficulties have problems in different executive functions i.e. inhibition of irrelevant 
information, accessing material in long-term memory, and maintenance of relevant information 
in WM.  
Palladino, Cornoldi, De Beni and Pazzaglia (2001) have argued that there are problems with 
updating information and inhibition of distractors in individuals with reading disabilities. 
Borella, Carretti, & Pelegrina, (2010) supported these findings in research that investigated 
inhibition in good and poor reading comprehension in relation to WM. They specifically 
examined resistance to proactive interference (to reduce the activation of stimulus that is no 
longer relevant to reduce intrusion errors), response to distracters (concentration on relevant 
stimulus whilst ignoring distracters) and prepotent response inhibition (inhibiting automatic 
cognitive or motor response to stimuli). Borella et al. (2010) found that poor comprehenders (in 
comparison to good comprehenders) were specifically susceptible to intrusion errors, as they 
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found it difficult to eradicate stimulus that were no longer relevant. This deficit was found in 
both words and numbers and Borella and colleagues argued that this demonstrates that proactive 
interference occurs even when information is not processed semantically. They also postulated 
that WM deficits are a specific trait of poor comprehenders thus, when poor comprehenders 
continue to hold information that is no longer required in memory this overloads WM, causing 
poorer performance in the form of intrusion errors. Research has indicated a range of EF 
problems in children with dyslexia e.g. difficulties with problem solving (McLeskey, 1980), 
planning abilities (Weyandt, Rice, Linterman, Mitzlaff, & Emert, 1998) and both set shifting 
and organisation (Narhi, Rasanen, Metsapelto, & Ahonen, 1997). Moreover, according to a 
meta-analysis conducted by Booth, Boyle and Kelly (2010) on a total of 48 studies investigating 
EF in children with reading difficulties, there are a range of EF impairments in reading disabled 
children.  
Varvara, Varuzza, Sorrentino, Vicari and Menghini (2014) found a wide range of EF deficits in 
children with developmental dyslexia employing a sample of 60 dyslexic children and 65 
control children and a number of EF tasks. Namely, they found deficits in verbal phonological 
and categorical fluency, spoonerism, verbal and visual short-term memory, visual-spatial and 
auditory attention and verbal WM deficits. Varvara et al. (2014) findings supported the 
argument that a number of EF deficits found in dyslexia (to some degree) involve phonological 
processes. For instance, this study supported previous findings related to a deficit in verbal 
categorical fluency (e.g. Snowling, 2000; Ramus et al., 2003) and phonological fluency (e.g. 
Snowling, 2000). These two abilities have been argued to involve complex cognitive processes 
e.g. self-monitoring and flexible thinking (Schwartz, Baldo, Graves & Brugger, 2003). In 
addition, Varvara and colleagues found a deficit in dyslexia in the spoonerism task which 
assesses phonological awareness. However, the authors of this research argued that the 
spoonerism task also creates other extra task demands involving various skills e.g. blending 
skills, close monitoring of phonological manipulation and inhibition. Poorer performance of 
individuals with dyslexia on the spoonerism task has been reported in the literature previously 
(e.g. Jeffries & Everatt, 2004). Varvara et al. argued that the complexity of the spoonerism task 
could be responsible for the deficiency in the performance found on this task, for individuals 
with dyslexia. The results of the Varvara et al. (2014) study supported the already established 
problem in auditory attention in individuals with dyslexia (e.g. Ramus et al., 2013), within the 
EF literature. Furthermore, this study found a verbal short-term memory and WM deficits in 
dyslexia. All of these executive functions involve some degree of phonological processes. 
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However, Varvara et al. (2014) argued that the results from their study showing EF problems in 
children with dyslexia have also shown that the deficits in dyslexia are not only related to 
phonological processing, but also to non-phonological processes. For instance, this study found 
deficits in visual-spatial attention in children with developmental dyslexia. The authors 
postulated that the visual attention deficit found in their study, is in line with a deficit in 
automatic control of visual attention, (Facoetti, Lorusso, Paganoni, Cattaneo, Galli & Mascetti, 
2003; Facoetti, Paganoni, Turatto, Marzola & Mascetti, 2000; Facoetti et al., 2001; cited in 
Varvara et al., 2014) and a deficit in rapid focussing of visual attention (e.g. Brannan & 
Williams, 1987; cited in Varvara et al., 2014), which were previously identified in dyslexia. The 
authors interpreted the findings as showing a WM deficit, in the context of a deficient 
functioning of the CE component of WM or the SAS (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Shallice, 
1988). Varvara et al. (2014) suggested that, as EF tasks used by them may involve a large 
number of processes, which draw on visual and auditory domains (e.g. inhibition, short-term 
storage, attention, updating and integration of information), it is possible that the deficits found 
in dyslexia are underpinned by a more global CE/SAS deficit. Moreover, they claimed that there 
is a more global deficit in higher-order cognitive processes in developmental dyslexia. These 
suggestions of CE/SAS and EF deficits in developmental dyslexia are in line with findings from 
Smith-Spark et al. (2003) and Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007). 
 
Reiter, Tucha and Lange (2005) investigated WM as well as a variety of executive functions in 
dyslexia. They identified WM deficits in children with dyslexia, with this group having poorer 
performance compared to controls on a backward digit span task. This task required participants 
to not only temporarily store information (numbers) but manipulate them and then repeat them 
in backwards order (e.g. “1,2,3” is repeated as “3,2,1”). They also found that children with 
dyslexia were impaired on a range of EF’s including inhibition, verbal and figural fluency and 
problem solving. Individuals with dyslexia showed deficits in inhibition but only when the tests 
were more cognitively demanding. Process time was also identified as an issue in inhibition 
deficits with the dyslexic group displaying longer processing time in some inhibition tasks. 
Planning and problem solving using a Tower of London problem solving task (Shallice, 1982) 
also showed deficits, these were related to the time taken to solve the problem (planning time) 
and not in the overall number of moves taken to solve the problem. They argued that in the 
deficits seen in EF, planning and problem solving tasks may be due to the dyslexic group 
needing additional processing time. Figural fluency tests identified that children with dyslexia 
created fewer designs (creating as many different designs by connecting 5 fixed dots using 
straight lines in 2 minutes) than controls. Deficits were also found in both semantic and formal 
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verbal fluency in the dyslexic group, with controls naming more correct words in both 
categories. 
 
Brosnan, Demetre, Hamill, Robson, Shepherd and Cody (2002) investigated the executive 
functions of organisation, planning, inhibition and sequencing in both adult and children with 
dyslexia, that are associated with the prefrontal cortex (e.g. Godfroy & Rousseaux, 1996; 
Shallice 1992; Goel & Grafman, 1995). Their adult sample of dyslexic participants consisted of 
individuals who were able to “compensate” for their deficits in reading and gain entry to higher 
education, whilst still having the underlying deficits of dyslexia. They used the group-embedded 
figures test (requiring participants to find a simple shape within a complex visual array shapes 
that are slightly different) to investigate the use of inhibitory processes. Brosnan et al. argue that 
the results suggested that the dyslexic group was significantly poorer at inhibiting the 
processing of contextual information. Thus, when the task demands were high they were not 
able to effectively inhibit the processing of the similar shapes to find the target shape from the 
distractor shapes. They also tested inhibition in children, finding that the dyslexic individuals 
were poorer on a digit span task that included verbal distractors in the form of background 
voices. This finding was argued to support a deficit in inhibiting the processing of contextual 
information; in this case the background voices. Brosnan et al. also found EF deficits in the 
executive functions of temporal order and verbal fluency. Individuals with dyslexia were 
significantly poorer than controls in a temporal order processing task involving identifying 
which picture was presented first from a series of 10 pictures originally shown to them. In the 
verbal fluency task the dyslexic group, in comparison to controls, showed deficits in generating 
as many words as possible that began with the letter “F” or “S” in one minute (excluding plurals 
and proper nouns). Brosnan et al. interpreted these finding as supporting a deficit in EF that is 
linked to the left prefrontal cortex. They argued that individuals use the right hemisphere to 
process stimuli in a global fashion whereas; the left hemisphere is more attuned to processing at 
a local level. In dyslexia Brosnan et al. argued that individuals with dyslexia are unable to 
inhibit distractors thus, they process globally instead of processing locally. This was reasoned to 
also account for the deficits seen in reading as they argue that individuals with dyslexia fail to 
inhibit distractors by using logographic processing (processing whole words) instead of 
processing the letters that are required for reading.  
 
Research has also highlighted that individuals with dyslexia have reported a propensity to be 
disorganised which can be related to problems with EF in dyslexia (i.e. insufficient resources 
for planning or attentional processes/concentration). Smith-Spark, Fawcett, Nicolson and Fisk 
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(2004) administered the Cognitive Failures Questionnaires (CFQ; Broadbent, Cooper, 
Fitzgerald & Parkes, 1982) to dyslexics and controls. The CFQ investigated cognitive failures in 
questions such as item 2 “Do you find you forget why you went from one part of the house to 
the other?”, item 21 “Do you start doing one thing at home and get distracted into doing 
something else?” and item 22 “Do you find you can't quite remember something although it's on 
the tip of your tongue?”. In answering the self-report questionnaire, dyslexic participants rated 
themselves as having more cognitive failures in regards to slips of attention, language skills, 
planning and absent mindedness.  
 
Smith-Spark et al. (2004) also corroborated these findings, by asking close friends or relatives 
to also report on the participant’s cognitive failures. They asked questions such as, if they found 
their friend/relative/housemate to be “disorganised, that is, getting into a muddle when doing 
something because of lack of planning or concentration”.  The results found that the evidence of 
close friends or relatives supported the participant’s responses on the CFQ questionnaire, adding 
to the validity of the self-report questionnaire findings. This finding was supported by Leather, 
Hogh, Seiss and Everatt (2011) who were able to replicate Smith-Spark et al.’s (2004) findings, 
with the dyslexic individuals in their study demonstrating similar cognitive failures profiles. 
Levin (1990) undertook a study on 20 dyslexic children and 20 controls and found that children 
with dyslexia appeared to use less organised strategies in conceptual problem solving and in 
solving mazes, in comparison to controls. In looking at this issue from a different angle Kirby, 
Silvestri, Allingham and Parrila (2008) investigated the use of time management and study aids 
in post-secondary level education students. They found that students with dyslexia self-reported 
using more time management and study aids in comparison to controls. The authors have 
surmised several possible underlining reasons for these findings. They argued that use of these 
aids may be a result of specific word-level difficulties, a particular focus on support strategies 
that were devised as part of typical dyslexia support programmes or that it may be due to 
deficits in automating many of the processes utilised in the study and time management aids. 
McLoughlin, Leather & Stringer (2002) reviewed the characteristics of dyslexia and identified 
organisation and timekeeping inabilities as one of several primary features of dyslexia. Others 
have also supported these findings (e.g. Augur, 1985; McLoughlin, Fitzgibbon & Young, 1994; 
Tallal, 1985; Torgeson, 1977; Gilroy & Miles, 1996). 
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2.3. Summary  
 
Traditionally, dyslexia has been thought to be underpinned by phonological deficits, however 
later research has revealed a range of deficits which are not linked to phonology. This chapter 
has shown that problems in dyslexia are not only related to difficulties in the acquisition of 
reading, writing or phonological skills (e.g. Snowling, 2000; Stanovich, 1988; Vellutino, 1979), 
but also to non-phonological processes such as allocation of attention (e.g. Nicolson & Fawcett, 
1990; Fawcett & Nicolson, 1992) and executive functioning (e.g. Brosnan, Demetre, Hamill, 
Robson, Shepherd & Cody, 2002; Booth et al., 2010; Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). This chapter 
also outlined the broad range of cognitive deficits in dyslexia e.g. attention deficits, information 
processing, WM and EF impairments. 
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Chapter 3: Synthesis of prospective memory and dyslexia literature (rationale for 
prospective memory deficits in dyslexia) 
 
This chapter is set out to synthesise the theories and processes relevant to both, prospective 
memory and dyslexia. The theories within both of these areas are discussed in relation to each 
other, pointing out areas that impact on PM that are also relevant in dyslexia. This establishes a 
clear rationale for the hypothesised deficits of PM in dyslexia and helps to understand the 
possible outcomes of different PM paradigms when given to participants with dyslexia 
compared to controls. This chapter explores also any possible overlaps between the processes 
involved in dyslexia and PM which may indicate PM deficits in dyslexia. Overall, this chapter 
provides a rationale for the hypothesised PM deficits in dyslexia. 
 
3.1. Event-based prospective memory and dyslexia 
 
3.1.1. Spontaneous retrieval vs. monitoring theories 
 
Insufficient cognitive resources have previously been argued to be the underlying cause of 
worse task performance of individuals with dyslexia in comparison to typical population (e.g. 
Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). This was argued to be due to the inability to consciously 
compensate (CC) for task performance related deficits in difficult tasks (e.g. Nicolson and 
Fawcett, 1990). The spontaneous retrieval theory (Guynn, McDaniel & Einstein, 2001; 
McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; McDaniel et al., 2004) claimed that PM cues can trigger PM 
retrieval with no need for cognitive resources. This spontaneous retrieval of PM has been 
argued to be an automatic process, which does not rely on monitoring and does not produce cost 
to the ongoing activity. In line with this reasoning it is possible that event-based PM tasks may 
not result in event-based PM deficits in dyslexia, as they may be not difficult enough. Since 
event-based PM retrieval does not require cognitive resources, event-based PM tasks may not 
require cognitive resources to an extent that would exceed cognitive capacity available to 
individuals with dyslexia. This argument is in line with Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) who found 
that individuals with dyslexia are able to CC for performance deficits in less cognitively 
demanding (easier) tasks. 
 
The claim that the retrieval of event-based PM intentions does not require additional cognitive 
resources is related to the argued lack of involvement of monitoring processes (Einstein et al., 
2005), which have been reasoned to require cognitive resources (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). The 
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point of view that no additional cognitive resources are required for event-based PM tasks as no 
monitoring is involved opposes the PAM theory (Smith, 2003) which claimed that event-based 
PM tasks always involve monitoring, thus utilising cognitive resources. On the basis of PAM 
theory it could be argued that all event-based PM tasks could produce difficult tasks conditions 
that draw on cognitive resources and this could result in event-based PM deficits in dyslexia. 
This is based on the reasoning that monitoring involved in event-based PM tasks together with 
the ongoing task demands would create cognitively demanding task conditions preventing 
individuals with dyslexia from CC and thus, result in PM deficit in dyslexia when compared to 
age and IQ matched controls. Even if the spontaneous retrieval theory is correct in assuming 
that no cognitive resources needed for retrieval of event-based PM, Marsh et al. (2008) argued 
that cognitive resources are needed for verification of PM cue (as shown by the slowing on the 
target trials). Following this logic one may support the reasoning that there may be event-based 
PM deficits dyslexia. 
 
The reflexive-associative theory (e.g. Guynn et al., 2001) argued that whether the PM retrieval 
process will be automatic or not is depended on the quality of association formed between the 
PM cue and the intended action. Furthermore, the noticing plus search model (Einstein & 
McDaniel, 1996) reasoned that the spontaneous activation of retrieval of PM intention requires 
one to perceive the PM cue, which will in turn produce some internal response. The internal 
response was proposed to be the feeling of general familiarity with PM cue and this was 
claimed to be greater if the PM cue itself was used during the intention formation phase rather 
than just described in categorical terms. Thus, one could argue that if an event-based PM task 
shows participants the actual PM cues, it will produce greater internal response which could be 
argued to lead to an automatic spontaneous retrieval of the PM intention. On the contrary, a PM 
task which describes the PM cues without showing them to participants prior to the task, could 
be argued to rely on monitoring processes. This reasoning is similar to that of the multiprocess 
theory of PM (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) which argued that focal event-based PM tasks are 
more likely to rely on spontaneous retrieval processes whereas the non-focal PM tasks will 
require monitoring processes. 
 
3.1.1.1. Multiprocess theory of prospective memory and dyslexia 
 
The multiprocess theory of PM (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) claimed that focal event-based PM 
tasks involve automatic retrieval of the PM intention (spontaneous retrieval); whereas non-focal 
PM task are more likely to require conscious monitoring. This is linked to the debate concerning 
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the involvement of cognitive resources in event-based PM tasks, with non-focal event-based PM 
tasks argued to involve more additional resources (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) for monitoring in 
comparison to focal PM tasks. Thus, on the basis of the multiprocess theory, it can be argued 
that it is more likely that event-based PM deficits will be found in non-focal PM tasks as 
opposed to focal designs, as non-focal PM designs are argued to involve additional cognitive 
resources. Non-focal event-based PM tasks could prove more demanding for individuals with 
dyslexia due to the involvement of monitoring processes that draw on limited cognitive 
resources. Therefore, on the basis of the multiprocess theory, one could argue for non-focal PM 
deficits in dyslexia due to the inability to consciously compensate for task related performance 
deficits. Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) found that individuals with dyslexia had task performance 
comparable to controls when easy tasks were employed and the same could be argued about 
focal PM tasks. Namely, that individuals with dyslexia will perform comparably to controls on a 
focal PM task. Nevertheless, if PAM theory (Smith, 2003) is correct and all event-based tasks 
require preparatory attentional processes, one could expect individuals with dyslexia to have 
problems on both focal and non-focal PM tasks.  
 
It is also possible, that if all event-based PM tasks involve monitoring as reasoned by the PAM 
theory, both focal and non-focal PM tasks could result in slower responses to ongoing trials. 
Smith (2003) found that participants who were more accurate on the event-based PM 
component of the task were slower at responding to the ongoing trials compared to participants 
with poorer PM performance. The author suggested that this is related to a reduction of 
available attentional resources. Thus, if non-dyslexic individuals take longer to respond to 
ongoing trials when performing well on the PM trials due to insufficient attentional resources; it 
could be argued that individuals with dyslexia could experience even greater slowing on the 
ongoing trials in comparison to controls. If individuals with dyslexia are found to have 
significantly slower responses to the ongoing trials but still intact PM performance, this could 
be indicative of cognitive capacity deficits in dyslexia (e.g. Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990; Smith-
Spark & Fisk, 2007). This supports Smith’s (2003) argument that the slowing on the ongoing 
trials was a result of having to direct attentional capacity away from the ongoing task in order to 
successfully perform the event-based PM task. 
 
3.1.1.1.1. Multiprocess theory, supervisory attentional system and dyslexia 
 
The focal and non-focal event-based PM tasks identified by the multiprocess theory can be 
linked to the model of attentional control of action (Norman & Shallice, 1986). Namely focal 
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event-based PM tasks, which rely on automatic (spontaneous) retrieval of PM, could be argued 
to be underpinned by a contention scheduling mechanism alone; whereas the non-focal PM 
tasks involving monitoring processes, which are non-automatic, could be reasoned to involve 
supervisory attentional system (SAS). Furthermore, monitoring processes have been also 
reported to draw on SAS/executive resources and SAS has been argued to be especially crucial 
for PM tasks which rely strongly on monitoring (Buggess & Sallice, 1997). In line with this 
reasoning Altgassen et al. (2014) found that that non-focal event-based PM tasks involve more 
attentional and WM resources in comparison to focal tasks. This is a plausible finding 
considering that the SAS has been proposed to be a candidate for the CE component of the WM 
model and similarly to the CE, it controls attention (Baddeley, 1986). 
 
The argued involvement of SAS in non-focal PM tasks (due to its reliance on monitoring 
processes) is relevant to dyslexia and could indicate a non-focal PM deficit in dyslexia. In an 
alternative interpretation of results of a study conducted to investigate the DAD hypothesis, 
Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) stated that individuals with dyslexia have a problem with 
allocation of attention. Moreover, individuals with dyslexia have been argued to have SAS 
deficits (e.g. Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007; Varvara et al., 2014). Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007) 
used SAS to explain the executive dysfunction found in dyslexia related to task novelty. 
Namely, they argued that the SAS is responsible for controlling non-automatic actions which 
are not well-learned or simple in nature. This description of a task resembles more a non-focal 
PM task compared to a focal PM task as non-focal PM tasks have been argued to rely on non-
automatic monitoring. Furthermore, non-automatic tasks involving SAS require additional 
attentional and processing resources in order to control attention and thus non-focal tasks could 
be argue to be more difficult than focal tasks. Thus, on the basis of SAS deficits and difficulties 
with complex tasks reported in dyslexia, one could argue that individuals with dyslexia may 
demonstrate deficits in non-focal PM tasks. 
 
More generally, the multiprocess theory has claimed that if ones WM resources are stretched, 
one is more likely to rely on spontaneous retrieval processes (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). On 
the contrary, if one has WM resources available, this has been argued to result in the individual 
taking the monitoring approach to PM task performance. Considering that WM problems have 
been claimed to be the central characteristic of dyslexia (McLoughlin et al., 1994), one can 
argue that individuals with dyslexia are likely to rely on spontaneous retrieval processes even in 
non-focal PM tasks which have been argued to rely on monitoring. Thus the non-focal event-
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based PM performance of individuals with dyslexia could be affected negatively as monitoring 
processes have been suggested to improve PM performance (Smith, 2003). 
 
3.1.1.1.2. The dynamic multiprocess framework and dyslexia 
 
The dynamic multiprocess framework (Scullin et al., 2013) claimed that individuals will 
selectively engage in monitoring processes in event-based PM tasks when explicitly told to 
expect PM cues i.e. in a context in which a PM cue is expected. Thus, it can be reasoned that 
individuals with dyslexia may engage in cue monitoring behaviour in all event-based PM tasks 
if PM cues are expected. This could indicate PM problems in dyslexia in both, focal and non-
focal PM tasks on the basis of the cognitive capacity related issues reported in dyslexia (e.g. 
Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). 
 
3.1.2. Event-based prospective memory, executive functioning, and dyslexia 
 
It was found that participants with high frontal lobe functioning were better at event-based PM 
tasks compared to these with low frontal functioning (McDaniel et al., 1995). Furthermore, a 
study conducted by Smith (2003, Experiment 3) investigating event-based PM found that 
individuals with low WM spans were less likely to respond correctly to event-based PM tasks 
compared to individuals with high WM spans. This suggests worse event-based PM 
performance in dyslexia compared to controls, as researchers reported WM deficits in dyslexia 
(e.g. Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). It was also argued that increased WM demands at the stage of 
retrieval of event-based PM intention have a negative impact on PM performance (Einstein et 
al., 1997). This is especially important in the cognitive resources debate in relation to 
individuals with dyslexia and when considering if they have a PM deficit. It has been claimed 
that some functions of the CE component of WM such as switching and inhibition (disengaging 
from one item in order to engage in another), have been found to extend the use of additional 
capacity by around 30% in comparison to control (Hari et al., 1999). Thus, one may argue that 
event-based PM tasks require additional cognitive resources apart from the capacity needed for 
performance of the ongoing or PM tasks. It therefore may be possible that due to this additional 
capacity requirement in PM tasks, the performance on the PM component of the PM tasks 
would result in lower accuracy in dyslexia compared to controls, due to dyslexia WM deficits. 
 
Varvara et al. (2014) who found SAS/CE deficits in dyslexia argued that this was linked to 
visual attention deficit found in dyslexia and was in line with a deficit in automatic control of 
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visual attention (e.g. Facoetti et al., 2003; cited in Varvara et al., 2014) and a deficit in rapid 
focussing of visual attention (e.g. Brannan & Williams, 1987; cited in Varvara et al., 2014). 
These deficits in visual attention in dyslexia could play out in event-based PM tasks which 
involve rapid focusing attention of ongoing and PM stimuli. 
 
3.2. Executive functioning, prospective memory and dyslexia 
 
3.2.1. Supervisory attentional system, working memory link to prospective memory and 
dyslexia 
 
Varvara et al. (2014) argued that task complexity is responsible for poor task performance in 
dyslexia. Smith-Spark et al. (2003) explained that EF deficits argued in dyslexia and more 
specifically the domain general CE, results in significant drop of performance (compared to 
controls) if a task places a high demand on executive resources. Furthermore, Fawcett and 
Nicolson (1994) argued that complex skills which require fluency in component sub-skills, 
multi-modality skills involving the monitoring of various modalities/sources of information, 
skills which depend on time (and require fast speed of processing) and vigilance tasks which 
require concentration over time, are all vulnerable to disruption in individuals with dyslexia. 
Tasks involving these skills have been argued to create demands which prevent individuals with 
dyslexia from using CC to direct performance. These complex task conditions which are 
reported to result in performance deficits in dyslexia rely strongly on SAS/CE component of 
WM.  
 
Prospective memory tasks have also been suggested to depend strongly on WM (e.g. Einstein et 
al., 2000). Marsh et al. (2002) found that PM performance dropped when ongoing tasks 
involved more WM. Martin et al. (2003) found that EF predicted time- and event-based PM 
performance. Burgess and Shallice (1997) stated that PM tasks involve SAS and that this is  
especially the case in tasks involving monitoring, as these tasks are argued to involve more 
cognitive resources compared to tasks relying on spontaneous retrieval. Thus complex PM 
paradigms which involve WM or SAS/CE (i.e. non-focal event-based, time-based or PM 
paradigms involving cognitively demanding ongoing tasks) could be argued to result in a poorer 
PM performance for individual with dyslexia than for controls. Since Smith-Spark et al. (2003) 
and Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007) argued that when task complexity is high, the CE or SAS of 
dyslexic individuals is unable to allocate extra resources to the task in order to consciously 
compensate for their EF deficit. This results in individuals with dyslexia performing worse 
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compared to controls as their executive resources have been fully allocated to the task in hand. 
Thus, if a complex PM paradigm is used, one can expect a drop of performance visible either on 
the ongoing or the PM tasks in individuals with dyslexia compared to controls. Furthermore, 
one may argue that the switching of attention and inhibition of responses involved in event-
based, as well as in the time-based PM tasks could adversely impact upon PM performance in 
individuals with dyslexia. This is in line with the argument that the SAS or the CE component 
of WM is responsible for attention switching and inhibition of responses (e.g. Norman & 
Shallice, 1986).  
 
Moreover, one could argue that if a PM task involving monitoring (i.e. non-focal event-based or 
time-based PM) is combined with a cognitively demanding ongoing task, one could expect even 
more adverse effects on PM performance in individuals with dyslexia as these tasks would draw 
strongly on cognitive resources. This is hypothesised on the basis of WM/CE/SAS deficits in 
dyslexia (Smith-Spark et al., 2003; Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). Additionally, global deficits in 
higher-order cognitive processes (EF) in developmental dyslexia (Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007; 
Varvara et al., 2014) also support this hypothesis. Generally, it could be argued that the more 
complex the PM tasks, the greater the PM deficit will be as individuals with dyslexia would be 
less able to mask their performance deficits due to insufficient cognitive capacity (Nicolson & 
Fawcett, 1990). 
 
3.2.2. Inhibition, switching involvement in prospective memory and its relevance to 
dyslexia 
 
Another characteristic of PM tasks is that they require one to inhibit the performance on the 
ongoing task, in order to switch to the performance of PM task. This is an important aspect 
when considering possible PM deficits in dyslexia. Gonneaud et al. (2011) investigated the 
relationships between event- and time-based PM measures and a wide array of cognitive 
functions, including executive functions, processing speed, sustained attention, retrospective 
episodic memory, metamemory, and binding in healthy adults. This study found that regardless 
of whether the task used an event- or time-based PM paradigm, PM performance was dependent 
on inhibition abilities and processing speed. Furthermore, it was found that event-based PM was 
strongly reliant on binding and retrospective episodic memory and, to a lesser extent, on 
shifting, while time-based PM depended largely on inhibition.  
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Individuals with reading difficulties have been found to have problems with inhibition (e.g. 
Palladino et al., 2001; Swanson, 2006). In addition, Varvara et al. (2014) found that many tasks 
used in their research revealed poorer performance of dyslexics, due to deficits in inhibition 
which is one of the skills required for completion of these tasks e.g. their spoonerism task. 
Moreover, the SAS (which has been argued to be deficient in dyslexia) has been suggested to be 
responsible for interruption to the ongoing activity and shifting attention to the intended action 
at the appropriate time or when the PM cue appears (Einstein et al., 2005). Shifting abilities 
have been found to be a strong predictor of PM performance (Schnitzspahn et al., 2013). Hari 
and Renvall (2001) postulated that individuals with dyslexia have difficulty in switching 
between tasks, labelling this as sluggish attentional shifting. Dyslexics have been found to take 
longer to switch attention between a variety of tasks with Hari and Renvall (2001) arguing that 
they have difficulties disengaging from one stimulus in order to engage in another stimulus in 
sequentially presented tasks. Thus, this evidence could suggest that individuals with dyslexia 
may also have a general deficit in PM, as inhibition has been found to be linked to all types of 
PM in adults (e.g. Schnitzspan et al., 2013; Gonneaud et al., 2011).  
 
Other researchers (e.g. Reiter et al., 2005) found that individuals with dyslexia only show 
deficits in inhibition in more cognitively demanding tasks. This again could point to dyslexia 
related PM problems, but only in cognitively demanding PM tasks such as, non-focal event-
based or time-based PM tasks, as these involve monitoring or PM paradigms employing 
cognitively demanding ongoing tasks (e.g. involving WM updating). Brosnan et al. (2002) 
investigated EF in adults with dyslexia and found that when task demands were high, dyslexics 
were not able to effectively inhibit processing of similar shapes to find a target shape within a 
complex visual array shapes that are slightly different. This could be argued to mirror closely 
the principles used in event-based PM tasks, as one needs to inhibit processing the stimuli 
relevant to the ongoing tasks in order to find PM target cues placed within the array of the 
ongoing trial stimuli. Nonetheless, an event-based PM tasks could be argued to be easier and the 
stimuli could be argued to be more distinctive with the PM cues more obvious and jumping out 
at participants. Nevertheless, this piece of research shows that inhibition problems in adults with 
dyslexia could be relevant to all PM tasks. However, whilst all PM tasks have been said to 
involve inhibition, time-based PM tasks have been argued to involve inhibition to a greater 
extent (Gonneaud et al., 2011). 
 
Studies (Swanson, 2006; Palladino et al., 2001) showed that individuals with dyslexia have 
problems in inhibition of irrelevant information or distractors and maintenance of relevant 
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information in WM. This could indicate that individuals with dyslexia will have problems with 
inhibiting the irrelevant information related to ongoing task in order to perform the PM task. In 
addition, the deficit related to maintenance of relevant information in WM in dyslexia may be 
important in PM tasks which strongly involve WM (e.g. PM tasks involving WM updating 
ongoing tasks). Individuals with dyslexia may find it difficult to maintain the relevant 
information related to PM activity in WM in the presence of an ongoing activity which is highly 
competing for WM resources. This may stop individuals with dyslexia from recalling 
information relevant to the PM tasks or from self-initiating checking of the time. Furthermore, 
Borella et al. (2010) has explained that the inability to inhibit irrelevant information is linked to 
maintenance of irrelevant information in WM and that holding unnecessary information in WM 
results in WM overload. This may result in insufficient amount of WM resources left for the 
performance of the PM task in dyslexia. 
 
3.2.3. Processing speed, prospective memory and dyslexia 
  
Reiter et al. (2005) found that individuals with dyslexia have slower processing speed in 
inhibition tasks and this could indicate that individuals with dyslexia will have slower RTs in 
PM tasks, as these involve inhibition of the ongoing task in order to respond to the PM task. 
They also argued that individuals with dyslexia may need additional processing time in order to 
perform well on their EF tasks. Similar PM performance could be hypothesised in dyslexia as 
individuals with dyslexia may need additional time in PM tasks in order to perform well on 
them. Thus, if a time limit is applied to PM tasks, participants with dyslexia may respond less 
accurately. It is possible that individuals with dyslexia may feel the need to respond quicker 
than they would like to or can, and this could result in more errors in PM responses. On the 
other hand, if no time limit is applied, participants with dyslexia may take longer to respond 
correctly to the trials resulting in greater RTs. 
 
This argument is in line with the processing speed deficit in dyslexia, which was established as 
a part of the double deficit hypothesis (especially when processing visual stimuli; e.g. Wolf and 
Bowers, 1999). Namely, if there is a processing deficit related to visual stimuli in individuals 
with dyslexia, one may expect individuals with dyslexia to be slower at recognising and 
processing PM cues in event-based PM tasks and in the ongoing tasks within all PM tasks. 
Thus, slower processing speed could impact negatively on PM performance in dyslexics. 
Gonneaud et al. (2011) have shown that processing speed correlated with event- and time-based 
PM performance in healthy adults. Namely, slower processing of the stimuli resulted in worse 
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PM performance and fast processing of stimuli resulted in better PM. Therefore any deficits in 
processing speed reported in dyslexia could have a negative impact on their PM performance. 
Furthermore, the “sluggish attentional shifting” found in dyslexia (Hari & Renvall, 2001) could 
be also used to support the claim that PM deficits will be found in dyslexia. It could be argued 
that the “sluggish attentional shifting” between the ongoing and PM tasks would result in worse 
PM performance. Thus, slower processing speed could be indicative of PM problems in 
dyslexia. 
 
3.3. Time-based prospective memory and dyslexia 
 
Gonneaud et al. (2011) highlighted the strong reliance of time-based PM tasks on inhibition. 
Thus, it can be expected that individuals with dyslexia may especially experience difficulties 
with time-based PM tasks due to the inhibition difficulties reported in dyslexia (e.g. Swanson, 
2006). Furthermore, on the basis of the findings from Cockburn (1995), it could be predicted 
that time-based PM tasks, in which inhibition of the PM activity requires interruption of the 
ongoing activity, could be said to strongly engage participants’ attention and therefore are more 
likely to result in PM deficits in dyslexia, due to the limitations in attentional resources reported 
in dyslexia (e.g. Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990). Monitoring processes have been also argued to 
draw strongly on attentional resources and monitoring has been argued to be heavily involved in 
time-base PM tasks (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). In addition, Burges and Shallice suggested that 
monitoring relies strongly on the SAS. Considering SAS deficits in dyslexia, it is possible that 
individuals with dyslexia will have time-based PM problems. Moreover, individuals with 
dyslexia may not have enough resources for monitoring (in line with the CC hypothesis of 
Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990) in addition to the performance of the ongoing and PM tasks. 
 
Time-based PM tasks have been argued to be more difficult than event-based PM tasks as they 
involve more self-initiation of the monitoring processes (e.g. Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; Groot 
et al., 2002). Thus, it could be argued that time-based PM processes may result in greater PM 
deficits in dyslexia compared to event-based PM. In support of the hypothesised time-based PM 
deficits in dyslexia, one can consider the age related deficits found in time-based PM tasks (e.g. 
d’Ydewalle, Luwel & Brunfaut, 1999; Martin & Schumann-Hengsteler, 2001). Even though 
ageing and dyslexia are two very distinct areas of study, researchers in both of these areas 
argued for the presence of attentional deficits. Since time-based PM performance involving 
monitoring processes is dependent on attentional resources (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) and 
deficits in attentional resources have been found in older adults (e.g. Craik & Byrd, 1982) and in 
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individuals with dyslexia (e.g. Jeffries & Everatt, 2004; Smith-Spark et al., 2003), it is likely 
that individuals with dyslexia will also have poorer performances on time-based PM tasks. 
 
Khan et al. (2008) found that high cognitive load resulted in significantly lower PM 
performance when compared to PM performance in tasks with low cognitive load. Basso et al. 
(2010) showed that ongoing tasks involving higher WM in time-based PM paradigm impacted 
negatively on PM performance and that WM and PM share resources but only in tasks involving 
high demands. This was reasoned to occur due to dividing attentional resources between the 
ongoing task, monitoring time and self-initiating the PM response at the required times. Khan 
and colleagues also suggested that monitoring of time is dependent on the limited resource of 
attentional capacity. Considering these arguments and the evidence of performance deficits in 
cognitively complex tasks and tasks involving WM in dyslexia (e.g. Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007), 
it could be argued that time-based PM tasks involving high cognitive load / WM load are likely 
to result in time-based PM deficits in dyslexia.  
 
McFarland and Glisky (2009) suggested that frontal lobes support self-initiated processing that 
is required for PM tasks. Burgess et al. (2001) found that PM task performance involves frontal 
lobe activation and monitoring based on PFC (Burgess et al., 2001). Okuda (2007) also 
identified that parts of rostral prefrontal are more active during time-based PM tasks compared 
to event-based tasks. Moreover, dividing attention over ongoing and PM task demands, 
switching and inhibition has been found to be impaired in frontal lobe patients and thus frontal 
lobe was argued to mediate these processes (e.g. Fuster, 1997). This could indicate that time-
based PM tasks rely more on frontal lobe functioning and thus, individuals with dyslexia could 
be more likely to experience problems with time-base PM compared to event-based PM 
considering problems with frontal functioning in dyslexia (Swanson, 2006). This is in line with 
the reasoning that time-based PM tasks involve more monitoring processes as one needs to self-
initiate checking of time compared to event-based PM tasks, which rely less on self-initiated 
processes (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). Furthermore, Shimamura et al. (1991) reported that 
monitoring is controlled by prefrontal functioning. Moreover, McFarland and Glisky (2009) 
found that frontal lobe functioning predicted the quality of plans which their participants 
generated in order to assist PM performance, patterns of time monitoring and accuracy of time 
estimation. All of this could be argued to support the successful performance on time-based PM 
tasks. Thus, if individuals with dyslexia have problems making appropriate plans in order to 
perform the PM task or monitoring and estimating the time appropriately, due to frontal lobe 
functioning deficits, this may have a negative effect on their time-based PM performance. 
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One could also reason that time-based PM deficits could be found in dyslexia on the basis of the 
cerebellar deficit theory (Nicolson et al., 2001) as it linked time estimation deficits to dyslexia. 
Namely, it was argued that the cerebellum is responsible for time estimation and individuals 
with dyslexia were said to have a cerebellum deficit (Nicolson et al, 1995). This problem with 
time estimation in dyslexia could indicate time-based PM problems in dyslexia as time 
estimation is necessary in order to estimate the correct time for the initiation of checking the 
time, in order to perform the time-based PM tasks at the correct time. 
 
3.4. Summary 
 
In reviewing the literature on prospective memory and dyslexia, it appears that there is 
considerable evidence showing overlaps between the processes reported to underpin PM 
functioning and dyslexia deficits which points towards PM deficits in dyslexia, at least under 
certain conditions. These areas generally include a range of executive functions i.e. working 
memory (especially the CE component of WM; argued to play a similar function to the SAS), 
inhibition and task switching (e.g. Burgess & Shallice, 1997; Gonneaud et al., 2011; Hari & 
Renvall, 2001; Khan et al., 2008; Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990; Smith-Spark et al., 2003; Smith-
Spark & Fisk, 2007. Moreover, broadly speaking, EF processes as well as PM have both been 
associated with frontal cortical brain regions (e.g. Welsh, Pennington & Groisser, 1991; 
Burgess, Quayle & Frith, 2001).  
 
The synthesis of the two bodies of literature is helpful in understanding which task conditions 
are more likely to show PM deficits in individuals with dyslexia. Some of the theories of event-
based PM tasks in combination with dyslexia literature suggest event-based PM deficits, 
whereas on the basis of other theories the hypothesised event-based PM deficits in dyslexia are 
less clear. For instance, the PAM theory of PM (Smith, 2003) points towards event-based PM 
deficits in dyslexia whereas, in accordance with the spontaneous retrieval theory of PM (e.g. 
Einstein & McDaniel, 1996) one could argue that event-based PM deficits are less likely to 
occur in dyslexia. The multiprocess theory could indicate that PM deficits would be only found 
in dyslexia in non-focal event-based PM tasks but not in focal event-based PM paradigms. 
Nonetheless, in accordance with the PAM theory, it could be argued that focal PM tasks could 
still result in PM deficits in dyslexia. The synthesis of theories related to time-based PM and 
dyslexia could be said to suggest time-based PM deficits in dyslexia. Overall, it seems that 
cognitive capacity is the overarching factor playing a key function in the hypothesised PM 
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deficits in dyslexia. Namely, individuals with dyslexia seem to have problems with tasks which 
place high demands on their cognitive resources and at least some PM tasks are argued to draw 
strongly on cognitive resources. Therefore, if can be argued that more cognitively demanding 
the PM paradigms (e.g. involving non-focal PM, time-based PM or complex ongoing tasks) are 
more likely to reveal the hypothesised PM deficits in dyslexia. 
 
Having reviewed theories and processes related to both prospective memory and dyslexia there 
seem to be a plethora of evidence suggesting possible PM deficits in dyslexia at least under 
certain conditions. The empirical work carried out in this thesis sought to explore this 
hypothesis, using a variety of different methodological approaches. 
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Chapter 4: Self-report measures of PM 
 
Prospective memory can be investigated in a number of different ways, by means of tests 
conducted under laboratory conditions, naturalistic studies and self-rated questionnaires 
(Maylor, 1993).  Despite the majority of studies looking at PM using objective task measures, 
there is a growing body of research that has employed the use of self-reports of PM (e.g. Chan, 
Qing, Wu & Shum, 2010; Crawford, Smith, Maylor, Della Sala & Logie, 2003). There are a 
number of widely used and published questionnaires which probe into frequency of PM failures. 
These include the Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ; Smith, Della 
Sala, Logie & Maylor, 2000), the Prospective Memory Questionnaire (PMQ; Hannon, Adams, 
Harrington, Fries-Dias & Gibson, 1995), the Comprehensive Assessment of Prospective 
Memory (CAPM; Roche, Moody, Szabo, Fleming & Shum, 2007) and the Time Cued 
Prospective Memory Questionnaire (TCPMQ; Cuttler & Graf, 2009). These questionnaires vary 
in regards to the different aspects of memory that they measure. For instance, the PRMQ 
investigates four different types of prospective as well as retrospective memory (RM) i.e. short-
term, long-term, self-cued and environmentally-cued; whereas the PMQ not only investigates 
PM but also includes a subscale investigating the techniques people use to assist their memory 
e.g. the use of sticky notes as reminders. The CAPM questionnaire probes into basic and 
instrumental PM activities of daily living and is concerned with examining the reasons for PM 
failures, as well as the concerns that those failures may cause. The TCPMQ is focused on 
investigating time-cued PM, punctuality and memory aiding strategies. Initially, in this thesis, 
the PRMQ was used to investigate the frequency of self-reported PM failures. 
 
4.1. Study 1: The Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ; Smith, 
Maylor, Della Sala & Logie, 2003) 
 
4.1.1. Introduction 
 
Questionnaires are widely used to investigate many psychological phenomena and provide 
information that no-one but the respondent knows (Baldwin, 2000). One of the positive aspects 
of using self-reports relates to the fact that they include the motives, goals, thoughts and 
emotions of a person rather than isolating them from the studied phenomenon (Reis, 2012). 
Conversely, self-reports can be criticised for being subjective in nature, especially when 
concerned with memory (Sunderland, 1990). Another difficulty with self-reports is that they 
require participants to answer questions about events that occurred in the past and therefore can 
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be influenced by other factors e.g. beliefs or forgetting. This problem is referred to as 
retrospective bias (Reis, 2012). The retrospective bias occurs when past experiences are 
reconstructed inaccurately, as the influence of motivational and cognitive processes on memory 
can lower the accuracy of self-reports. There is a large variability with regards to the accuracy 
of self-reports when compared against objective criteria. A meta-analysis study conducted by 
Wentland and Smith (1993) revealed that the accuracy of surveys varied between 23 and 100% 
across a wide range of empirical studies testing, for example, language comprehension, memory 
and judgment. 
 
Despite these criticisms, self-reports have become increasingly popular as they provide 
invaluable insight into phenomena that are difficult to measure empirically. More recently 
questionnaires have been used to study self-reported memory functioning and its relation to 
objective measures of memory (e.g. Kliegel, Zimprich & Eschen, 2005; Pearman & Storandt, 
2004). The reliability of questionnaire data related to one’s memory is often compared to data 
gathered from a close relative or friend of the participant, in order to check self-reported 
memory abilities (e.g. Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald & Parkes, 1982; Smith-Spark, Fawcett, 
Nicolson & Fisk, 2004; Poliakoff & Smith-Spark, 2008). This, to some extent, corroborates the 
self-ratings of participants and extends the validity of the results.  
 
The PRMQ (Smith et al., 2000) is a measure that investigates the frequency of failures related to 
PM and RM. It includes all other types of memory including episodic, semantic and procedural. 
Both the PM and RM measures are further subdivided into questions that probe short-term and 
long-term types of memory. This division is based on retention intervals. The short-term 
memory items are related to situations where the memory needs to be stored for a brief period of 
time before the recall of intention occurs e.g. remembering to take rubbish to the bin when 
leaving the house. Long-term memory items, on the other hand, refer to situations where a 
particular memory needs to be held in mind for a much longer time e.g. remembering to pass on 
a message to someone you will see one week later. The short- and long-term categories of PM 
and RM memory divide even further, forming sub-divisions of self-cued and environmentally-
cued sub-types. These sub-division closely resembles the categorisation of time-based (self-
cued) and event-based (environmentally-cued) tasks in PM (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990), but is 
still relevant to RM (Smith et al., 2000). Cues embedded in the environment do not require 
internal retrieval processes in order to be remembered successfully, unlike self-generated cues 
(Einstein & McDaniel, 2005). The PRMQ comprises of 16 items which form 8 pairs, with each 
pair corresponding to one of the eight aspects. These aspects will now be outlined. Prospective 
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short-term self-cued items relate to memory intentions which need to be held in memory for 
short time intervals and rely on internal cuing. Prospective short-term environmentally-cued 
memory, on the other hand, relies on external reminders in the form of PM cues which need to 
be present in the environment. Similar principles apply to prospective long-term self-cued and 
prospective long-term environmentally-cued questions, but these two questions involve longer 
time intervals. There are also four retrospective scales which follow the same principles as the 
four PM scales described but these investigate memory for past events: retrospective short-term 
self-cued, retrospective short-term environmentally-cued, retrospective long-term self-cued and 
retrospective long-term environmentally-cued. The PRMQ has been used previously on a 
number of groups e.g. people with Alzheimer’s Disease (Smith et al., 2000), individuals with 
multiple sclerosis (West, McNerney & Krauss, 2007), binge drinkers (Heffernan & O’Neill, 
2012), smokers (Heffernan, O’Neill & Moss, 2010), people with schizophrenia (Chan, Wang, 
Ma, Hong, Yuan, Yu, Li, Shum & Gong, 2008) and patients with type II diabetes 
(Zahednezhada, Poursharifib & Babapourb, 2011).  
 
It is important to consider the reliability and validity of the PRMQ as a tool for measuring self-
reported PM abilities. Crawford, Smith, Maylor, Della-Sala and Logie (2003) stated that this 
tool is internally consistent and that the reliability of the PRMQ is very good (Cronbach's alpha 
for the total scale was 0.89: PM scale 0.84, RM scale 0.80). It has been proposed that the PRMQ 
has a potential advantage over other self-report scales, as it measures the constructs of 
prospective and retrospective memory systematically over a range of contexts (Crawford, 
Henry, Ward & Blake, 2006). Crawford et al. (2003) found the PRMQ total, prospective and 
retrospective scales to be highly reliable, arguing for a tripartite factor structure which includes 
general memory, prospective memory and retrospective memory. Research performed by 
Macan et al. (2010), Mantyla (2003), and Ronnlund, Mantyla and Nilsson (2008) reported that 
prospective and retrospective scores of the PRMQ are highly uncorrelated, with these findings 
further supporting the notion of a tripartite factor structure. In addition, Kiegel and Jager (2006) 
found that there was a significant difference between the PM and RM scores of PRMQ in the 
general population. Conversely, Uttl & Kibreab (2011) criticised the PRMQ for lacking 
divergent validity, as they argue that the prospective and retrospective subscales of the PRMQ 
are highly correlated and thus seem to measure similar constructs. This finding supports the idea 
that PRMQ is unidimensional (measuring memory in general, as one concept), as opposed to 
having a tripartite factor structure as stated by Crawford et al. (2003). 
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The general problem with self-reported measures of memory is that they do not always correlate 
highly with objective memory tests and clinical observations (Craik, Anderson, Kerr & Li, 
1995). This has been found to be the case for PRMQ. A study conducted by Uttl and Kibreab 
(2011) found that the self-report version of PRMQ did not significantly correlate with objective, 
binary (discrete measures of success and failure) or continuous (presentation of memory cues at 
regular intervals) event based PM laboratory tasks (Uttl, 2008). The authors of this study also 
reported that the PRMQ does not correlate with a naturalistic time cued PM task. They 
concluded that the PRMQ has low validity and claimed that the reason for this is that the PRMQ 
relies on a non-objective 5-point scale (from never to very often) which requires participants to 
personally interpret the labels of these scales. Rabbitt, Maylor, McInnes, Bent and Moore 
(1995) claimed that if a participant interprets the label in relation to peers they know, this may 
create a false self-report. Namely, if one thinks that one does not experience many PM failures 
compared to known peers, one may report them to occur rarely, when in fact they may be 
making frequent errors in comparison to the wider population. Contrary to the evidence that 
PRMQ does not predict actual PM performance, Kliegel and Jager (2006) found that objective 
PM performance was predicted by self-reported PRMQ scores. Their findings showed that the 
PM subscale was a significant predictor for time-based PM performance and approaching 
significance for event-based PM performance under laboratory conditions. This study also 
supported the previously argued multidimensionality of the PRMQ. Since the RM subscale of 
the PRMQ, as well as the PRMQ total did not predict objective PM ability (just the PM subscale 
did) and thus indicated that PM and RM are separate concepts. The lack of correlation between 
RM subscale and objective PM task performance found by Kiegel and Jäger (2006) is consistent 
with the evidence of Macan et al. (2010), Mantyla (2003), and Ronnlund, Mantyla and Nilsson 
(2008) and supports the claim that PRMQ is at least bi-dimensional as it involves prospective 
and retrospective dimensions.  
 
Therefore, the literature related to PRMQ reliability and its usefulness in predicting actual PM 
ability under laboratory controlled conditions is mixed. Nevertheless, there is more evidence 
supporting its validity and reliability (e.g. Crawford et al., 2003). There is considerably less 
research which investigates the predictability of naturalistic PM tasks based on self-reports of 
PM. In addition, when considering whether the PM component of PRMQ can predict the actual 
PM performance, a proxy-rating version of PRMQ in which close friends or relatives of the 
participant rate can provide a useful tool. The proxy-rating version of PRMQ was used in initial 
studies conducted by Smith et al. (2000) and Crawford et al. (2003), who claimed that the 
proxy-rating version of the PRMQ is potentially more useful in research than the self-rated 
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version. Since individuals’ beliefs about their own memory may not always resemble actual 
memory performance, as insight into their abilities may be limited (Herrmann, 1984), especially 
for those whose memory problems occurred as a consequence of brain injury (Crawford et. al., 
2006). Thus proxy ratings may be a more valid way of investigating PRMQ reliability. On the 
contrary, one’s beliefs about one’s own memory abilities can influence actual memory 
performance (Hannon et al., 1995). 
 
The PRMQ has been also used in an investigation correlating self-reported PM abilities and 
time management in the general population by Macan, Gibson and Cunningham (2010). Their 
study found that people who report that they manage time well and have a strategy for 
organisation and prioritisation, also reported successful prospective and retrospective memory. 
Such effective behaviours stand in contrast to these reported in the dyslexia literature where 
individuals with dyslexia report themselves to be disorganised (Smith-Spark et al., 2004), have 
planning difficulties (e.g. Levin, 1990; Torgeson, 1977; Gilroy & Miles, 1996), or organisation 
and timekeeping inabilities (e.g. Augur, 1985; McLoughlin, Fitzgibbon & Young, 1994; Miles, 
1982; Tallal, 1985; Turner, 1997). Therefore, based on Macan et al.’s (2010) study, which 
found a positive correlation between organisation and PM in the general population, it is 
possible that individuals with dyslexia who have difficulties with time management, 
organisation and planning may also show deficits in PM . 
 
To the best knowledge of the author, there are no studies that have used questionnaires to 
investigate PM in adults with developmental dyslexia. However, a study conducted by Smith-
Spark et al. (2004) investigating everyday cognitive failures in adults with developmental 
dyslexia, touched upon PM problems in dyslexia. This study, using the Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaires (CFQ; Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald & Parkes, 1982), found significant 
differences in everyday cognitive functioning between dyslexic adults and age and IQ-matched 
control participants. Smith, Della Sala, Logie and Maylor (2000) identified two CFQ items that 
address PM. Namely, item 16 “Do you find you forget appointments? and item 23 “Do you find 
you forget what you came to the shops to buy?”, draw on memory for future intentions. These 
two questions would seem to clearly investigate PM as they ask about the frequency of 
forgetting to perform intended actions that were to be carried out after a certain amount of time 
has elapsed. In addition, item 2 of the CFQ may be argued to also include a PM component. 
Even though item 2 “Do you find you forget why you went from one part of the house to the 
other?” has previously been classified as investigating distractibility (Smith-Spark et al., 2004), 
it can be argued to also include elements of prospective and retrospective memory. Specifically, 
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being able to recollect the intended activity when getting to other part of the house forms the 
PM component (Dobbs & Rule, 1987; Einstein & McDaniel, 1996); whereas remembering the 
contents of the intention is the retrospective part (Graf & Uttl, 2001). Smith-Spark et al. 
reported that the former two CFQ questions (16 and 23) resulted in highly significant 
differences between dyslexic and controls. It was found that individuals with dyslexia reported 
experiencing significantly more cognitive lapses related to PM when compared to age and IQ-
matched controls. On the basis of these two items, it can be concluded that adults with dyslexia 
perceived themselves to be significantly weaker, when it comes to PM. Furthermore, the results 
from Smith-Spark et al. (2004) were replicated recently by Leather, Hogh, Seiss and Everatt 
(2011). In order to explore PM difficulties in dyslexia further and more definitively, the PRMQ 
was used to investigate PM in individuals with dyslexia compared to age- and IQ-matched 
individuals without dyslexia. It was predicted that the results would be consistent with the 
findings in Smith-Spark et al.’s (2004) study of wider everyday cognitive performance, with 
individuals with dyslexia reporting deficits. 
 
The anecdotal and empirical evidence (e.g. Augur, 1985; Gilroy & Miles, 1996; Levin, 1990; 
McLoughlin, Fitzgibbon & Young, 1994; Miles, 1982; Tallal, 1985; Turner, 1997; Torgeson, 
1977) suggests that less effective PM will be reported by individuals with dyslexia compared to 
adults without dyslexia. On the basis of this literature it was hypothesised that individuals with 
developmental dyslexia would report more frequent occurrences of PM failures compared to 
age- and IQ-matched controls. The PRMQ was, therefore, used to investigate self-reported 
abilities of PM within dyslexic and non-dyslexic groups. However, to extend the validity of the 
PRMQ self-reported measure used within this study the PRMQ was also adapted to be 
administered also to close friends or relatives of participants taking part in this study to seek 
confirmation of these reports. It was thought that a proxy-rating version of PRMQ would be 
useful in the current investigation as it would provide a more balanced view in regards to the 
frequency of memory failures of participants. This was similar to the check performed by 
Smith-Spark et al. (2004) using two CFQs (one for participants, one for significant others), that 
were originally developed by Broadbent et al. (1982). In Smith-Spark et al’s. (2004) study the 
results from CFQ-for-others corroborated the results acquired from CFQ. Therefore, it was also 
hypothesised that the reports of close friends or relatives of dyslexic individuals would 
corroborate any self-reported deficit of prospective and retrospective memory in dyslexia. For 
the purpose of this thesis the focus was on the PM component of the PRMQ rather than on the 
RM component, as literature pointed towards PM problems in dyslexia (e.g. Smith-Spark et al., 
2004). 
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4.1.2 Method 
 
4.1.2.1. Participants 
 
4.1.2.1.1. General participant matching procedure 
 
In order to investigate whether there were any deficits in the cognitive skills of participants with 
developmental dyslexia it was important to compare their cognitive skills to the skills of 
individuals without developmental dyslexia through the use of a comparison group. This 
approach allowed a comparison between the two participant groups (participants with and 
without dyslexia) in relation to possible differences in PM. Goswami (2003) argued that these 
two participant groups need to be matched for chronological age and IQ in order to rule out the 
possibility of the results being affected by these differences.  For this reason a short-form IQ 
measure (Turner, 1997) was used. This was comprised of the Comprehension, Block Design, 
Similarities and Picture Completion sub-tests from the WAIS-IV (Wechsler, 2008), used 
previously by Smith-Spark et al. (2003; 2004) and Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007). This short-
form IQ measure (Turner, 1997) was used because none of its sub-tests are sensitive to the 
presence of dyslexia, thus providing a fair comparison of the intellectual abilities of the two 
groups. The calculation of abbreviated IQ measure was based on scaled scores and followed the 
principles stated by Turner (1997). All participants who scored below 90 on this short-form IQ 
measure were removed in order to minimise the possibility that the results could be explained 
by lower ranges of IQ (see, e.g. Fawcett and Nicolson, 1990; 2004). 
 
All of the dyslexic participants reported having dyslexia and were asked to provide dyslexia 
reports from educational psychologists (based at government-approved diagnostic centres) in 
order to verify the diagnosis of dyslexia. Likewise, the non-dyslexic individuals declared that 
they did not have a prior diagnosis of dyslexia. Nicolson and Fawcett (1997) found that self-
reports of being non-dyslexic are highly accurate. In addition to this each participant was 
assessed on two literacy screening measures. The Nonsense Passage Reading subtest from the 
Dyslexia Adult Screening Test (DAST; Fawcett & Nicolson, 1998) was used to estimate the 
fluency (based on time taken to read the passage) and accuracy of reading a mixture of real 
words and orthographically legal nonwords (nonsense words). The speed and accuracy of 
reading the nonsense passages are sensitive to the presence of dyslexia and show deficits even 
in dyslexics who are able to consciously compensate (Brachacki, Fawcett & Nicolson, 1994; 
Finucci, Guthrie, Childs, Abbey & Childs, 1976; Hatcher & Snowling, 2006).  
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In the Nonsense Passage Reading subtest, points are deducted for incorrectly pronounced or 
missed words. One bonus point is awarded for every 2 seconds below the time mark of 60 
seconds (for completing the passage) and 1 point is taken away for every 2 seconds over the 60 
seconds time limit. This procedure was followed in all of the studies carried out in the current 
thesis. In addition, participants without dyslexia who scored below 88 were removed from the 
sample as it is possible that these individuals could be dyslexic (in accordance with Nicolson & 
Fawcett’s 1997 norms). 
 
The second dyslexia screening task investigated spelling ability using the spelling component of 
the Wechsler (1993) Objective Reading Dimensions (WORD). The WORD spelling task 
comprised of 50 words which increased in the difficulty during the task. The first 20 words of 
the test were omitted as the participant group was comprised of adults. This test discontinues 
after 6 consecutive errors. Each participant was given the credit for the 20 omitted words plus 
the number of correctly spelled words. This formed the basis of spelling age for each of the 
participants. Control participants who did not reach the total of 42 points in this task were 
removed from the sample as they did not reach the adult spelling range (score equal to or more 
than 42).  
 
These two measures (Nonsense Passage Reading and WORD) assessing reading and spelling 
abilities provide a strong indicator of the presence of dyslexia and have been used extensively 
within the literature for similar purposes (e.g. Bacon, Parmentier & Barr, 2013; Smith-Spark et 
al., 2003; 2004; Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). Each study described in this thesis used the same 
criteria and t-tests were used in order to check if the two participant groups were matched for IQ 
and to differentiate the two participant groups on literacy measures. The descriptive statistics 
and t-tests comparing the two participant groups on literacy (after removing controls showing 
literacy characteristics not in the adult range) and short-form IQ measures are shown in each 
study separately as the groups of participants differed between some of the studies. Participants 
in each study within this thesis met the same stringent criteria for inclusion. 
 
4.1.2.1.2. Participants (Study 1) 
 
Data were collected from two groups of participants: university students (N = 54) with and 
without dyslexia. All of the participants were native English speakers and aged between 18 and 
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35 years. A total of 28 individuals with dyslexia and 26 without dyslexia were recruited. The 
descriptive statistics (mean, SD and range for age and gender split) are included in Table 1.  
 
Unrelated t-tests were used in order to check if the two participant groups were matched for IQ 
and to differentiate the two participant groups on literacy measures. The descriptive statistics 
and unrelated t-tests comparing the two participant groups on literacy and short-form IQ 
measures can be also seen in Table 1.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for gender and age and t-tests performed on literacy screening measures and short-form IQ. 
      Measure 
   
Gender 
 
 
 
Age (years) 
  
WORD 
Spelling 
Age 
 
  
WORD Spelling 
Raw Score 
  
DAST NWR 
Score 
  
WAIS-IV 
Short-form IQ 
 
Group 
 
  
Male 
 
Female 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
 
 
  
N<17 
years 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
 
 
 
Controls 
(N = 26) 
 
 
  
6 
 
20 
  
23.31 
 
4.63 
 
 
  
0 
  
44.77 
 
 
1.73 
  
92.35 
 
3.25 
  
107.34 
 
9.47 
 
 
 
Dyslexics 
(N = 28) 
 
  
5 
 
23 
  
23.82 
 
4.14 
 
 
  
19 
  
40.21 
 
 
3.76 
  
77.21 
 
11.48 
  
107.32 
 
7.63 
 
 
 
 
 
           
Independent samples t-test 
 
           
t 
 
 
df 
 
 
p 
  
t 
 
df 
 
p 
  
t 
 
df 
 
p 
 
 
 
           
5.77 
 
38.44 
 
< .001 
  
6.69 
 
31.60 
 
< .001 
  
.009 
 
52 
 
.993 
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Further to this, data were collected from close friends or relatives of participants with and 
without dyslexia. The group of close friends or relatives (N = 50) who rated the PM of 
participants were recruited through the participants themselves. The rate of non-return for the 
PRMQ-for-others was N = 4 (three from the dyslexic group and one from control group). 
 
4.1.2.1.3. Materials 
 
The Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ; Smith, Maylor, Della-Sala, 
Logie and Maylor, 2000) was used. This questionnaire consisted of 16-items allowing 
participants to rate the frequency of different types of memory errors, by means of 5-point 
scales: Very Often = 5, Quiet Often = 4, Sometimes = 3, Rarely = 2 and Never = 1. Half of 
these questions related to PM and the other half to RM. Each of these eight questions contained 
two items related to short-term self-cued type, short-term environmentally cued, long-term self-
cued and long-term environmentally cued. The instructions, order and scoring system employed 
were the same as in the original PRMQ (Smith et al., 2000).  
 
The wording of the introduction and questions of the PRMQ administered to the relative or 
close friend of a participant were changed appropriately. The introduction was similar to the 
original but stated that these questions were about the close friend or relative from which the 
questionnaire was received. To avoid any confusion, the name of the participant who was to be 
rated by close friend or relative was written next to the instructions paragraph where it 
explained that these questions were about a close friend or relative. The questions themselves 
were changed to emphasise that the questions were not about the respondents themselves but 
about their close friend or relative e.g. “Does your close friend or relative decide to do 
something in a few minutes’ time and then forgets to do it?” 
 
4.1.2.1.4. Design 
 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used, with participant group (dyslexic 
versus controls) as the independent variable and type of memory (prospective short-term self-
cued, prospective short-term environmentally-cued, prospective long-term self-cued, 
prospective long-term environmentally-cued, retrospective short-term self-cued, retrospective 
short-term environmentally-cued, retrospective long-term self-cued and retrospective long-term 
environmentally-cued) as the dependent variables. The dependent variables in this study were 
measured on the basis of the ratings expressing the frequencies of everyday memory failures, 
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with higher scores equating to more frequent errors. In addition, unrelated t-tests were used to 
test for differences in means of the dyslexic group and non-dyslexic group on total PRMQ, 
prospective and retrospective scores. The same multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
and unrelated t-tests were applied to the scores on the PRMQ-for-others. 
 
4.1.2.1.5. Procedure 
 
Informed consent was acquired from all participants prior to testing. Background information 
about participants (age, gender and dyslexia status) was collected before administration of the 
short-form IQ and literacy measures. After completion of these measures participants were 
asked to complete the PRMQ. The instructions provided to participants were the same as in the 
original PRMQ (Smith et al., 2000) and included a statement that the questions were about 
minor memory mistakes which everyone makes from time to time, but some of which happen 
more often than others. Participants were then asked  to indicate how often different memory 
failures happened to them by ticking the appropriate place on the scale and were instructed to 
answer all of the questions, even if they did not seem entirely applicable to their situation. All 
responses were treated confidentially. Participants were asked to fill in the questionnaires about 
themselves in a quiet area within the laboratory. 
 
Participants were also given a questionnaire (covering questions about the participant), to take 
with them and asked to give it to a close friend or relative for them to complete. The wording of 
the instructions of the PRMQ-for-others administered to a relative or close friend of a 
participant explained that the questions were about the close friend or relative from which they 
had received the questionnaire. Participants were asked to return the questionnaires from their 
friends or relatives in person or via the post (stamped addressed envelopes were provided). 
Participants were debriefed at the end of the study. 
 
4.1.2.2. Results 
 
4.1.2.2.1. The PRMQ 
 
Several members of the control group (N = 6) were removed from the data set and replaced due 
to showing literacy characteristics not in the adult range. There were also participants (N = 7, 3 
dyslexic and 4 control participants) who were removed from the study due to short-form IQ 
scores below 90. Individuals with dyslexia reported, on average, more memory errors, both 
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prospective and retrospective compared to controls. The means for the two participant groups 
and t-tests are present in Table 2. 
 
The results from the unrelated t-tests carried out on the total PRMQ, prospective and 
retrospective scores revealed significant differences between the groups in the frequency of 
prospective memory failures. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and unrelated t-tests for total PRMQ, Prospective and 
Retrospective scales.  
 
 
Scale 
Controls 
(N = 26) 
Dyslexics 
(N = 28) 
Unrelated t-test 
t df p 
Total PRMQ score 
 
37.77 
(SD = 8.32) 
51.11 
(SD = 11.60) 
4.82 52 
 
< .001 
Prospective score 
 
20.00 
(SD = 4.57) 
27.14 
(SD = 6.60) 
4.59 52 < .001 
Retrospective score 
 
17.77 
(SD = 4.45) 
23.96 
(SD = 5.52) 
4.52 52 < .001 
Note. Differences on all of the scales were statistically significant at the Bonferroni corrected 
alpha level of .017. 
 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted on the eight different subscales 
of the PRMQ The one-way MANOVA indicated that group membership had a significant 
multivariate effect on memory, F (8, 45) = 3.33, p = .005, Wilks’ Lambda = .63, partial η2 = 
.372. Power to detect the effect was .948. Follow-up univariate F-tests indicated that group 
membership significantly affected all of the memory types. The dyslexic individuals reported all 
types of memory failures to be significantly more frequent compared to controls. The F-
statistics for the follow-up univariate ANOVAs are displayed in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics and univariate ANOVA for the eight PRMQ subscales.  
 
 
Scale 
Controls 
(N = 26) 
Dyslexics 
(N = 28) 
 ANOVA  
F (1, 52) p ηp
2
 
Prospective short-term  
self-cued 
2.85 
(SD = .75) 
3.57 
(SD = .88) 
10.61 .002 .170 
Prospective short-term  
environmentally-cued 
 
2.54 
(SD = .71) 
3.52 
(SD = 1.03) 
16.94 < .001 .246 
Prospective long-term  
self-cued 
 
2.31 
(SD = .74) 
3.34 
(SD = .95) 
19.60 < .001 .274 
Prospective long-term  
environmentally-cued 
 
2.31 
(SD = .57) 
3.14 
(SD = 1.03) 
13.41 .001 .205 
Retrospective short-term  
self-cued 
 
2.73 
(SD = .79) 
3.66 
(SD = .85) 
17.25 < .001 .249 
Retrospective short-term  
environmentally-cued 
 
1.73 
(SD = .47) 
2.50 
(SD = .90) 
15.02 < .001 .224 
Retrospective long-term  
self-cued 
 
2.15 
(SD = .75) 
3.07 
(SD = .98) 
14.85 < .001 .222 
Retrospective long-term  
environmentally-cued 
2.27 
(SD = .72) 
2.75 
(SD = .80) 
5.34 .025 .093 
Note. Higher scores indicate poorer memory. 
 
 
4.1.2.2.2. The PRMQ for close friends or relatives (PRMQ-for-others) 
 
The results from the unrelated t-tests carried out on the total PRMQ-for-others and its 
prospective and retrospective components supported the results from total PRMQ and its 
prospective and retrospective scales. There were significant differences in the frequency of 
memory failures of participants with dyslexia and without dyslexia as reported by their close 
friends or relatives, even when Bonferroni corrected alpha levels of .017 were applied. Close 
friends or relatives of participants indicated that on average, participants with dyslexia made 
significantly more memory (prospective and retrospective) errors compared to participants 
without dyslexia. The means for the two samples and unrelated t-tests are present in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics and unrelated t-tests for total PRMQ-for-others and its 
Prospective and Retrospective scales.  
 
 
Scale 
Controls 
(N = 24) 
Dyslexics 
(N = 26) 
Unrelated t-test 
t df p 
Total PRMQ score 33.50 
(SD = 5.77) 
44.00 
(SD = 11.52) 
4.12 
 
37.43 < .001 
Prospective score 15.96 
(SD = 3.56) 
 
20.08 
(SD = 6.16) 
 
2.92 
 
40.58 .006 
Retrospective score 17.54 
(SD = 3.56) 
23.93 
(SD = 6.65) 
4.28 
 
38.90 < .001 
  Note. All of the scales were statistically significant at the Bonferroni corrected alpha level of 
.017. 
 
 
The same analysis was performed on the PRMQ-for-others data. The multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA) revealed a significant multivariate effect of group membership on 
memory, F (8, 41) = 2.71, p = .017, Wilks’ Lambda = .65, partial η2 = .346. Power to detect the 
effect was .880. Follow-up univariate F-tests indicated that group membership significantly 
affected all the subscales except the retrospective long-term self-cued and retrospective long-
term environmentally-cued memory types. The F-statistics for the follow-up univatiate ANOVA 
are displayed in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics and ANOVA for PRMQ-for-others, Prospective and 
Retrospective totals as well as for the eight subscales. 
 
 
Scale 
Controls 
(N = 24) 
Dyslexics 
(N = 26) 
 ANOVA  
F (1, 48) p ηp
2
 
Prospective short-term  
self-cued 
 
2.21 
(SD = .62) 
2.96 
(SD = .88) 
11.96 .001 .199 
Prospective short-term  
environmentally-cued 
 
2.42 
(SD = .75) 
3.04 
(SD = .92) 
6.85 .012 .125 
Prospective long-term  
self-cued 
 
2.08 
(SD = .60) 
2.94 
(SD = .88) 
16.07 < .001 .251 
Prospective long-term  
environmentally-cued 
 
2.06 
(SD = .47) 
3.02 
(SD = 1.09) 
15.71 < .001 .247 
Retrospective short-term  
self-cued 
 
2.31 
(SD = .64) 
3.12 
(SD = 1.07) 
9.64 .003 .167 
Retrospective short-term  
environmentally-cued 
 
1.63 
(SD = .56) 
2.06 
(SD = .62) 
6.68 .013 .122 
Retrospective long-term  
self-cued 
 
1.94 
(SD = .65) 
2.33 
(SD = .97) 
2.74 .104 .054 
Retrospective long-term  
environmentally-cued 
 
2.10 
(SD = .55) 
2.54 
(SD = .96) 
3.77 .058 .073 
Note. Higher scores indicate poorer memory. 
 
 
4.1.2.3. Discussion 
 
The results showed that individuals with dyslexia perceived themselves as being more prone to 
prospective and retrospective memory failures than age- and IQ-matched controls. This applied 
to all types of prospective and retrospective memory, regardless of whether it involved short or 
long time intervals between intention formation and intention execution, or whether it was self- 
or environmentally-cued. The results from the subscales of PRMQ-for-others revealed 
significant group differences on the short-term self- and environmentally-cued retrospective 
memory scales. That is, close friends or relatives of participants with dyslexia judged them to 
experience significantly more retrospective memory failures which involve short-term time 
interval that are either cued by the environment or internally. These findings supported the 
results from PRMQ. However, contrary to the self-ratings of participants, their close friends and 
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relatives reported that individuals with dyslexia do not display any abnormality when it comes 
to long-term environmentally- and self-cued retrospective memory. This may be because 
deficits in long-term retrospective memory are not as evident to outside observers in comparison 
to the short-term retrospective memory failures. It may be easier for a close friend or relative to 
verify more recent past events in the participant’s life than these occurring over longer time 
periods. 
 
In addition, the largest effect size (ηp
2
) in both questionnaires (the PRMQ and PRMQ-for-
others) was for the prospective long-term self-cued type of memory. Self-cued PM can be 
argued to be related to time-based PM as both of these rely on self-initiated remembering to 
perform the PM task. On the other hand, environmentally-cued PM is more relevant to event-
based PM as both of these types rely on external cues to act as a reminder to perform the PM 
tasks. Time-based PM tasks have been found to require more self-initiated monitoring than 
event-based tasks (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990). According to Koriat, Ben-Zur and Nussbaum 
(1990) time-based tasks are more difficult to perform as they require more internal monitoring 
processes. Thus, PM tasks which are self-cued can be considered to be more cognitively 
demanding in comparison to tasks which are environmentally-cued and involve less self-
initiated processes. In addition, holding PM intentions in memory becomes more difficult as the 
time intervals increase. The largest size effects found, using the PRMQ and PRMQ-for-others 
for the prospective long-term self-cued memory, support Nicolson and Fawcett’s (1990) theory 
(described in more detail in Chapter 2) which claims that the more difficult the task, the more 
evident the cognitive deficits will be in individuals with dyslexia. 
 
The retrospective memory scales of the PRMQ showed that dyslexic adults rated themselves as 
having significantly more retrospective memory failures (all types) compared to control 
participants. These findings are supported by earlier findings from a study conducted by 
McNamara and Wong (2003) looking at children with learning disabilities (LD) which included 
students with dyslexia. This study showed that children with LD performed poorly in their recall 
of everyday information. In McNamara and Wong’s dance episode task, which required 
students to recall information retrospectively after five weeks from the episode (a dance 
workshop), children with LD were able to recall 26% of the dance episode questions. This was 
poor compared to children without LD matched for chronological age who recalled 66% of the 
dance episode questions. The authors concluded that it is possible that students with LD were 
able to recall only 26% of the dance episode information due to a difficulty in accessing the 
relevant information from their long-term memory. It has been also proposed that this finding 
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could be caused by a memory processing problem experienced by students with LD.  Another 
task used in McNamara and Wong (2003) investigated retrospective recall of information 
related to procedural task involving library checkout procedures. In this task students with LD 
were also less able to recall information related to library checkout procedures retrospectively: 
49% for children with LD and 99% for children without LD. This investigation showed also that 
students with LD recalled significantly less procedural information compared to students 
without LD. It has been proposed by the authors of this study that students with LD may have 
retrieval problems which affect the ability to recall procedural information. Therefore, it may be 
possible that students with dyslexia reported themselves to have significantly more retrospective 
as well as PM problems due to a problem with retrieving retrospective information. Namely, 
dyslexic individuals could be inaccurate when self-reporting both retrospective and PM failures 
due to the memory retrieval deficiency proposed by McNamara and Wong (2003). The memory 
retrieval difficulties could also be used to explain the poor metacognitive awareness of 
individuals with dyslexia, as it may be difficult to be aware of the performance of ones own 
cognitive processes such as memory, if one has difficulties accessing information from memory 
about ones own performance in the past. 
 
It is also possible that individuals with dyslexia reported themselves as having significantly 
more memory problems due to low self-esteem. Humphrey (2002) found that many studies 
report children with dyslexia as having lower self-esteem and self-concept. In addition, 
Alexander-Passe (2006) found that sixth form college students with dyslexia reported lower 
self-esteem. A study conducted by Riddick, Sterling, Farmer and Morgan (1999) investigating 
dyslexia among university students using past and present educational histories provided by 
students found that individuals with dyslexia reported lower levels of self-esteem. Kleitman and 
Stankov (2007) have found self-confidence to correlate moderately (.41) with metacognitive 
processes in the general population. This study suggested that confidence is related to 
metacognitive awareness. It is therefore recommended that future studies include self-esteem 
measures to tease apart the possibility that either the low self-esteem reported by individuals 
with dyslexia or that the combination of low self-esteem and poor metacognitive awareness 
could have resulted in low self-ratings on the PRMQ scales. However, the combination of low 
self-esteem and poor metacognitive awareness cannot explain the differences found using the 
PRMQ-for-others. Similarly to the results from the PRMQ, the PRMQ-for-others total score, as 
well as PM and RM scores revealed that individuals with dyslexia are perceived, by relatives 
and close friends, as having significantly higher frequency of PM and RM failures.  
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The evidence obtained in this study is consistent with the results of Smith-Spark et al. (2004) 
which touched upon PM in adults with dyslexia. The two CFQ items investigating PM found 
that individuals with dyslexia self-rated their own PM lapses to be significantly more frequent 
than of IQ-matched controls. Those findings are in line with the current data collected by the 
means of PRMQ and PRMQ-for-others which found that individuals with dyslexia and their 
significant others, reported significantly more frequently PM failures compared to controls. This 
provides a first indicator of a PM deficit in the population of adults with developmental dyslexia 
and is an original contribution to the literature. There are no published studies that investigate 
the frequency of self-reported, everyday PM failures in the population of adults with 
developmental dyslexia age- and IQ-matched controls. 
 
The results obtained from the PRMQ and PRMQ-for-others are consistent with the argument 
that individuals with dyslexia are more disorganised (Smith-Spark et al., 2004) or have planning 
difficulties (e.g. Levin, 1990; Torgeson, 1977; Gilroy & Miles, 1996), organisation and time 
keeping inabilities (e.g. Augur, 1985; McLoughlin et al., 1994; Miles, 1982; Tallal, 1985; 
Turner, 1997). A study conducted by Macan et al. (2010) may support this further. They found a 
correlation between self-reported PM abilities and time management in the general population. 
Individuals who self-reported good time management skills also have strategies for organisation 
and prioritisation. Furthermore, they also indicated that their PM was good. Therefore, if one 
has a poor time management abilities, ones PM scores should reflect this with poorer 
performances.  As individuals with dyslexia rated themselves to be significantly worse on all 
PRMQ subscales within this current study, Macan et al. (2010) findings, suggest this group 
should exhibit problems with PM performance. 
 
4.2. Study 2: The Prospective Memory Questionnaire (PMQ; Hannon, Adams, 
Harrington, Fries-Dias & Gibson, 1995) 
 
4.2.1. Introduction 
 
An additional self-reported measure of the frequency of PM failures in everyday life was 
administered to adults with developmental dyslexia and controls, who were matched for age and 
IQ. The Prospective Memory Questionnaire (PMQ; Hannon et al, 1995) was used as a further 
self-reported measure of PM, in order to investigate the techniques individuals may use to assist 
their PM. In contrast to the PRMQ, the PMQ does not include any environmentally-cued PM 
items. Environmentally- cued PM relate to event-based PM, the investigation of which formed a 
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large part of this thesis. It was therefore seemed beneficial to use both questionnaires (PRMQ 
and PMQ) to complement each other, as the PRMQ includes items related to environmentally-
cued PM whereas the PMQ has a section looking at memory aiding techniques. Using both 
questionnaires would provide a fuller picture of the self-perceptions of PM processes in adults 
with dyslexia. 
 
An initial study involving the PMQ reported that this self-rating of PM is internally consistent 
(Hannon et al., 1995). The test-retest reliability was also reported to be high (.88). The authors 
of the PMQ found that PMQ has a weak, but significant correlation with short-term PM tasks 
and a non-significant correlation with long term PM tasks. This finding supports the statement 
of Herrmann (1984) which concluded that self-reports of memory usually produce low 
associations with actual performance. Nevertheless, the PMQ has been widely used as a 
measure of self-reported frequency of everyday PM failures on a range of populations e.g. to 
compare PM of smokers to non-smokers (Heffernan, Ling, Parrott, Buchanan, Scholey & 
Rodgers, 2005); recreational Ecstasy uses to Ecstasy-free controls (Heffernan, Jarvis, Rodgers, 
Scholey & Ling, 2001; Montgomery & Fisk, 2007) and excessive alcohol users to low-
dose/non-users of alcohol (Heffernan, Ling & Bartholomew, 2004). 
 
The techniques to assist memory subscale of the PMQ (PMQ TECH) investigates the use of 
memory aiding strategies. The aiding strategies include planning, making use of rehearsal and 
using reminders e.g. sticky notes. These items assess the frequency with which participants use 
different types of memory aiding strategies. The PMQ also consists of three other subscales. 
Namely, the long-term episodic subscale (PMQ LTE), the short-term habitual subscale (PMQ 
STM) and the internally cued subscale (PMQ IC). The latter three subscales investigate the 
frequency of PM failures. The long-term episodic memory subscale refers to memory intentions 
which need to be held in memory for an extended number of hours or days before they can be 
executed and occur rarely, e.g. forgetting to send a postcard for a birthday. The short-term 
habitual subscale refers to tasks which occur regularly and involve short time intervals between 
intention formation and its execution, e.g. forgetting to button some part of clothing when 
dressing. The internally cued subscale comprises questions related to tasks which rely solely on 
internal memory. This means that there are no external PM cues acting as a reminder to perform 
the intended PM activity e.g. one may forget what he or she wanted to say in the middle of a 
sentence. Items from this subscale are related to the time-based PM paradigm. 
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The PMQ was administered to adults with developmental dyslexia and controls to investigate 
PM and the use of memory aiding strategies. It was predicted that individuals with dyslexia 
would report more frequent use of memory aiding techniques compared to controls. This in turn 
would support the evidence from Study 1 (the PRMQ) as this would also suggest poorer self-
reported PM. That is, if participants with dyslexia report using memory aiding strategies more 
frequently, this could indicate an awareness of impairment of the relevant internal processes 
responsible for reminding oneself about the intended action. In addition, individuals with 
dyslexia were hypothesised to report more strategies for aiding PM based on Nicolson and 
Fawcett (1990) who claimed that individuals with dyslexia use coping strategies to compensate 
for their cognitive deficit. In this case, using more strategies for memory aiding would be a 
coping strategy helping individuals with dyslexia to compensate for and mask their PM deficit. 
 
4.2.2. Method 
 
4.2.2.1. Participants 
 
There were two groups of participants, adults with developmental dyslexia and controls 
matched for age and IQ. The selection criteria for participants were the same as in Study 1 
(PRMQ). Descriptive statistics regarding the gender and age of participants can be found in 
Table 6. The descriptive statistics and t-tests comparing the two participant groups with regards 
to IQ and the literacy measures can be seen in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics for gender and age and t-tests on literacy screening measures and short-form IQ. 
       
Measure 
   
Gender 
 
 
 
Age (years) 
  
WORD 
Spelling 
Age 
 
  
WORD Spelling 
Raw Score 
  
DAST NWR 
Score 
  
WAIS-IV 
Short-form IQ 
 
Group 
 
  
Male 
 
Female 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
 
 
  
N<17 years 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
Controls 
(N = 26) 
 
 
  
4 
 
22 
  
24.46 
 
5.31 
 
 
  
0 
  
45.12 
 
1.80 
  
93.00 
 
3.01 
  
107.27 
 
8.84 
Dyslexics 
(N = 25) 
 
  
7 
 
18 
  
24.44 
 
3.80 
 
 
  
12 
  
41.44 
 
3.72 
  
80.32 
 
11.39 
  
110.59 
 
9.18 
           
Independent samples t-test 
           
t 
 
 
df 
 
 
p 
  
t 
 
df 
 
p 
  
t 
 
df 
 
p 
           
4.47 
 
34.31 
 
< .001 
  
5.39 
 
27.21 
 
 
< .001 
 
  
1.31 
 
49 
 
.195 
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4.2.2.2. Materials 
 
The PMQ consists of 52 items spread across four timescales, over which participants gauged 
performance. The long-term episodic memory subscale, made up of 14 questions, referred to 
memory intentions which need to be held in memory for an extended number of hours or days, 
before they can be executed and do not occur frequently. The questions within this subscale 
include questions such as “I missed appointments I had scheduled”. The short-term habitual 
subscale, also consisted of 14 questions, and referred to tasks which occur regularly and involve 
short-time intervals between intention formation and its execution e.g. “I forgot to lock the door 
when leaving my apartment or house”. The internally cued subscale comprised of 10 questions 
regarding PM tasks which have no external cues acting as reminders e.g. “I was driving and 
temporarily forgot where I was going”. The techniques to assist memory subscale of PMQ 
(PMQ TECH) consisted of 14 questions that investigated the use of memory aiding strategies. 
These included questions about planning, making use of rehearsal and reminders e.g. “I write 
myself reminder notes”. The first three subscales investigated the frequency with which 
participants encountered PM failures in a week, month or year prior to testing (depending on the 
question). The fourth subscale investigated the frequency of use of memory aiding techniques 
and used the week as the unit of time. Visual analogue scales with descriptors (never, two, four 
or more times) were used, as in the original PMQ study (Hannon et al., 1995). A “not 
applicable” option was also provided for each question. The order in which the questions were 
presented and the scoring system followed the original PMQ (Hannon et al., 1995) format. The 
mean score for each subscale was calculated on the basis of average for all items. Higher scores 
indicated more PM failures. 
 
4.2.2.3. Design 
 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used, with participant group (dyslexic 
versus controls) as the independent variable and type of memory (long-term episodic, short-term 
habitual, internally cued and techniques to assist memory) as the dependent variables. The 
dependent variables in this study were measured on the basis of the ratings expressing 
frequencies of everyday memory failures (where higher scores indicated more frequent failures). 
In addition, an unrelated t-test was used to test for differences in means of the dyslexic sample 
and non-dyslexic sample on total PMQ scores. 
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4.2.2.4. Procedure 
 
Informed consent was acquired from all participants prior to testing. Participants were instructed 
to familiarise themselves with the instructions that showed two example responses. Participants 
were told that if they feel that the question did not apply to them they could circle the N/A 
option. The attention of participants was brought to changing temporal descriptors below each 
question (week, month or year). The remaining procedure was the same as specified in Study 1 
(PRMQ). Participants were debriefed at the end of the study. 
 
4.2.3. Results 
 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted using the long-term episodic, 
short-term habitual, internally cued and techniques to assist memory subscales of PMQ. The 
multivariate test (one-way MANOVA) indicated that group membership had a significant effect 
on self-reports of memory, F (4, 46) = 3.81, p = .009, Wilks’ Lambda = .751, partial η2 = .249. 
Power to detect the effect was .859. Follow-up univariate F-tests indicated that group 
membership significantly affected the long-term episodic and internally cued memory types. 
Dyslexic individuals reported these types of memory failures to be significantly more frequent 
compared to controls. The follow-up univariate F-tests also indicated that group membership 
significantly affected the frequency of use of techniques to assist memory. Individuals with 
dyslexia reported using significantly more of these techniques which aid memory significantly 
more frequently than controls. It was also found that group membership had no significant 
effect on the short-term habitual memory type. 
 
The results of the unrelated t-test carried out on the total PMQ scores revealed significant 
differences between the frequencies of memory failures. Individuals with dyslexia reported, on 
average, significantly more PM errors compared to controls. The means for the two samples, 
follow-up F-tests and t-test are present in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics, follow-up univariate ANOVAs and t-test for PMQ. 
 
 
Scale 
Controls 
(N = 26) 
Dyslexics 
(N = 25) 
 
ANOVA 
 
F (1, 49) 
 
p 
 
ηp
2 
Long-Term Episodic 
 
1.97 
(SD = .93) 
2.95 
(SD = 1.75) 
6.35 .015 .115 
Short-Term Habitual 
 
.46 
(SD = .49) 
.77 
(SD = 1.00) 
1.99 .165 .039 
Internally Cued 
 
2.56 
(SD = 1.26) 
4.18 
(SD = 2.10) 
11.31 .002 .187 
Techniques to Assist 
Memory 
 
2.89 
(SD = 1.41) 
3.98 
(SD = 1.78) 
5.91 .019 .108 
    
Unrelated t-test 
t  df p 
Total PMQ score 
 
1.96 
(SD = .77) 
2.99 
(SD = 1.15) 
3.73 41.71 .001 
Note. Higher scores indicate poorer memory, but in the Techniques to Assist Memory scale 
higher scores indicate more frequent use of techniques used to aid memory (reminders, rehearsal 
and planning). The Total PMQ score is an average from Long-Term Episodic, Short-Term 
Habitual and Internally Cued subscales. 
 
 
4.2.4. Discussion 
 
The results of this study support those of Study 1. Namely, individuals with dyslexia reported 
that they experienced significantly more everyday PM failures compared to controls matched 
for age and IQ. The subscales of the PMQ also revealed that the long-term episodic, the 
internally cued and the techniques to assist memory subscales of PMQ yielded significant 
differences between the two samples, whereas the short-term habitual subscale showed no 
differences. The internally cued subscale produced the largest effect size (ηp
2
) indicating that 
this type of PM, which relies on the participant to provide internal cuing in order to remember 
to perform the PM activity, is rated the most difficult by participants with dyslexia relative to 
controls. Individuals with dyslexia also reported a problem with PM in circumstances where the 
PM intention needed to be held in memory for longer periods of time e.g. doing something in 
one week’s time. In addition, the results revealed that individuals with dyslexia reported a PM 
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deficit in situations where the PM activity does not occur frequently e.g. once or rarely. 
However, there was no significant difference between the self-ratings of the two groups when it 
came to events that occur frequently e.g. every day. The findings are in line with the claims of 
Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007), who suggested that adults with dyslexia find it significantly more 
difficult to respond to novel action sequences. Smith-Spark and Fisk explained the difficulty 
with novel action responses in individuals with dyslexia was due to a SAS (Norman & Shallice, 
1986) deficit. The SAS is responsible for controlling non-automatic novel actions. Thus, 
habitual PM which occurs frequently is not controlled by SAS, as it is likely to be an automatic 
process (once schemas are set up). Conversely, the episodic PM is less likely to be well-learned 
and automatic, as it occurs rarely and therefore can be argued to draw on SAS. Thus, the results 
from the PMQ support the findings that individuals with dyslexia reported themselves to have 
problems with long-term episodic PM, but not with the short-term habitual PM. 
 
Martin et al. (2003) found that frontal/executive functions are related to PM performance in a 
range of PM paradigms. Furthermore, they found that EF predicted PM performance on 
complex standard tests of PM. Internally cued PM activities require one to self-initiate the 
retrieval of an intended action compared to externally cued PM tasks, which are triggered by 
PM cues embedded within the environment. In order to self-initiate the retrieval of an intended 
action, it is argued that one needs to engage more internal monitoring processes (Einstein & 
McDaniel, 1990). Koriat et al. (1990) stated that tasks which require more internal monitoring 
processes are more difficult to perform. Therefore, it can be claimed that the SAS may also be 
involved in the performance of internally cued PM activities relying on executive processes as 
the SAS is responsible for tasks which are not simple. Thus, the findings of Smith-Spark and 
Fisk (2007) suggesting the SAS/EF deficit in individuals with dyslexia are further supported by 
the results from the internally cued PM subscale of the PMQ, since individuals with dyslexia 
reported to have significantly more internally cued PM failures. Similar to EF deficits found in 
poor PM performance (Martin et al., 2003), Brosnan et al. (2002) and Reiter et al. (2005) found 
executive function deficits in organisation, planning, inhibition and sequencing in individuals 
with dyslexia. The self-reported deficits identified by the dyslexic group in the PMQ TECH 
subscale support the evidence of EF deficits in relation to planning that was found in research 
by Martin et al. (2003) and Brosnan et al. (2002).   
 
The discussion in Chapter 1 related to the automatic and self-initiated processes underpinning 
PM, is also relevant to the findings of the current study. Internally cued PM activities require 
one to self-initiate the retrieval of intended action compared to externally cued PM tasks, which 
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are triggered by PM cues embedded within the environment (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990). 
Therefore, internally cued PM activities, those most closely related to time-based PM, rely on 
self-cuing where self-initiated monitoring of the environment is triggered by the individual. 
However, externally cued PM tasks (event-based PM tasks with focal targets) rely on automatic 
processes, where an external PM cue acts as a reminder to perform the intended action 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). The internally cued PM tasks are more cognitively demanding 
than externally cued PM tasks, as one needs to use ones cognitive capacity to constantly 
monitor for the appropriate moment to perform the intended action. Thus, the self-reported 
deficit found in the current study in relation to internally cued PM in dyslexics, is in line with 
Nicolson and Fawcett’s (1990) conclusion that individuals with dyslexia are unable to mask 
their deficits in performance when tasks are more cognitively demanding. It can be argued that 
the deficit found in dyslexics, on the basis of the internally cued subscale of the PMQ, is also in 
line with the conscious compensation (CC) hypothesis of Nicolson and Fawcett. Since the 
results showed that individuals with dyslexia found this type of PM the most difficult (reflected 
in the greatest effect size) and thus, it can be claimed that individuals with dyslexia were less 
able to consciously compensate for their PM deficit, as task demands may have extended 
beyond their cognitive capacities. It is plausible to suggest that individuals with dyslexia show a 
larger deficit on cognitively demanding PM tasks and therefore reported having a perceived 
deficit of internally cued PM, as this type of PM is more cognitively demanding. Moreover, the 
fact that there was also a large effect size for the long-term episodic subscale and a small effect 
size for the short-term habitual subscale further supports this assumption related to cognitive 
load. Namely, it could be suggested that having to remember to perform a PM activity which 
occurs frequently it is less cognitively demanding compared to one that occurs rarely. 
 
The PMQ was also used in order to provide an insight into differences in the degree individuals 
with and without dyslexia believe that they externalise their cognition. The results from the 
“techniques to assist memory subscale” of the PMQ not only suggest that there is a potential 
problem with PM in individuals with dyslexia, but also indicates the use of coping strategies by 
dyslexics, in order to avoid everyday PM failures. Individuals with dyslexia reported using more 
memory aiding strategies such as making explicit plans, rehearsing PM activities to be 
performed in future, and using external reminders compared to controls. It may be the 
awareness of problem with PM that leads individuals with dyslexia to use more memory aiding 
strategies to avoid them. Nevertheless, it could be suggested that individuals with dyslexia seem 
to not use the memory aiding strategies (which they reported to use more frequently) efficiently 
as they still have reported more PM problems. Future research is recommended in order to gain 
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insight to the effectiveness of memory aiding stratifies in dyslexia and possible support 
mechanisms that could support individuals with dyslexia in the workplace. 
 
4.3. Summary 
 
In summary, the findings from this chapter, acquired by means of the PRMQ and a proxy-rating 
version of the PRMQ revealed a perceived deficit of PM in adults with developmental dyslexia 
compared to age and IQ-matched controls. The findings from the PMQ confirmed the PM 
deficit found using the PRMQ and indicated that internally-cued (time-based) and long-term 
episodic types of PM may be more problematic for individuals with dyslexia than short-term 
habitual type of PM. In addition, the PMQ showed that individuals with dyslexia rely more 
frequently on techniques to aid memory when remembering prospectively when compared to 
controls. This is in line with empirical evidence showing EF deficits in planning and organising. 
 
The results therefore indicated that PM deficits might be empirically observable in dyslexia and 
the next step is the investigation to see whether the self-reported differences in PM actually play 
out in actual deficits in performance. This was explored in Study 3, using a clinical measure of 
PM. 
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Chapter 5: Performance on a clinical measure of prospective memory 
 
5.1. Study 3: Memory for Intentions Screening Test (MIST) 
 
5.1.1. Introduction 
 
The next stage of the research investigation involved probing whether the self-reported 
differences in PM between adults with dyslexia and age- and IQ-matched controls would 
actually play out in objective measures of PM. A well-established clinical measure of PM, the 
Memory for Intentions Screening Test (MIST; Raskin, 2004) was therefore used as an initial, 
exploratory measure of actual PM performance. The MIST has been widely used to investigate 
PM in a range of populations such as individuals with HIV (Poquette, Moore, Gouaux, Morgan, 
Grant & Woods, 2013), people with schizophrenia (Woods, Twamley, Dawson, Narvaez & 
Jeste, 2007) and ecstasy users (Weinborn, Woods, Nulsen & Park, 2011). Given that the MIST 
is an established clinical measure supported by a substantial body of literature and is used 
extensively in the field of PM, it was deemed appropriate to use the MIST as a first step in the 
objective measurement of PM in adults with developmental dyslexia before creating bespoke 
computer-based PM tasks. While it should be noted that the MIST provides a relatively blunt 
measure of PM as it is aimed at clinical populations (e.g. Poquette et al., 2013), the MIST 
should nevertheless, indicate whether individuals with dyslexia have PM deficits and, if they do, 
point to the specific types of PM problems experienced by them. 
 
The MIST comprises of eight PM tasks (plus a naturalistic PM task with a 24-hour delay) and 
an ongoing task (a word search puzzle). The eight PM tasks form six scales. Two of the scales 
are related to the difference in time interval between intention formation and intention execution 
and include two different short-term time intervals (2- and 15-minutes). There are also two 
scales differentiating between time- and event-based PM cue. The type of response required 
from participants is investigated by two scales whether a verbal or action response is needed. 
The verbal type of response requires participants to verbally execute the PM intention whereas 
in an action response participants must initiate an action in order to execute the PM intention. 
The score from each of the eight PM tasks contributes to three scales of the MIST. For example, 
a PM task informing participants to self-address an envelope when the experimenter hands it to 
them (2 minutes after giving the instruction) is an event-based task, which requires an action 
response involving a 2-minute time interval. Another example could be a task where 
participants are asked to remind the experimenter to check his or her mail in 15 minutes. This 
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task would therefore contribute scores to the time-based, verbal response and 15-minutes 
interval scales. The MIST also contains an optional time-based naturalistic task which involves 
asking participants to initiate a PM activity 24 hours after the PM instruction was provided. The 
reliability (e.g. Raskin, 2009; Woods, Moran, Dawson, Carey, Grant et al., 2008) and construct 
validity (e.g. Raskin & Buckheit, 2001; Woods, Dawson, Weber, Gibson, Grant & Atkinson, 
2009) of the MIST has been supported within the literature. 
 
The MIST employs multiple different PM tasks which overlap with each other i.e. there are 
multiple intentions which need to be held in memory at the same time, while performing the 
ongoing task or PM tasks. This characteristic of MIST was used as an initial investigation into 
the effect of PM load on PM performance. Basso et al. (2010) found that PM load has a 
negative effect on PM performance. Basso and colleagues also argued that proficient PM 
performance depends on WM resources, in tasks involving high demands. This is in line with 
the literature which shows the negative effect of high WM load on PM performance, especially 
if the CE is affected (e.g. Einstein et al., 1997; Marsh & Hicks, 1998). Marsh et al. (2002) found 
that PM performance diminished when the ongoing task engaged more WM resources. Marsh 
and colleagues claimed that PM tasks are affected by WM load as they involve the coordination 
of both the ongoing task and the PM task and that this process involves executive control. With 
multiple intentions needing to be held in memory whilst the ongoing task is performed, the 
ongoing or PM tasks in MIST can be argued to involve WM. Working memory is responsible 
for actively holding multiple pieces of information and manipulation of these information 
(Crowder, 2013). Thus, it was hypothesised that performance on PM tasks which require 
participants to hold multiple PM intentions (high PM load) while being engaged in the ongoing 
task will result in worse performance compared to PM tasks which only involve holding one or 
two PM intentions at the time (low PM load). Furthermore, because individuals with dyslexia 
have been argued to have deficits in CE/WM (e.g. Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007), it was 
hypothesised that the high PM load will have a negative effect on the PM performance of 
individuals with dyslexia. 
 
It could be also argued that individuals with dyslexia will display difficulties with time-based 
PM, as they may not have enough WM resources available for monitoring the time in addition 
to performing the ongoing task whilst having to hold other PM intentions in memory. This 
reasoning is in line with Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) DAD/CC hypothesis, as it could be 
claimed that the insufficient WM resources could prevent individuals with dyslexia from 
consciously compensating for their PM deficit. However, Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) used a 
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dual-task paradigm where children were required to perform two tasks at once. The difference 
between the PM tasks and classic dual-task paradigm is that in PM tasks one needs to stop 
performing an ongoing task in order to engage in PM task whereas in classic dual-task paradigm 
one needs to perform both tasks simultaneously. The hypothesised problems with time-based 
PM are also in line with the results from Study 2 (PMQ) where individuals with dyslexia rated 
themselves as experiencing more frequent time-based PM failures in comparison to controls.  
 
Nevertheless, regardless of PM load and PM type, it was hypothesised that individuals with 
dyslexia will have a worse PM performance compared to age- and IQ-matched control 
participants, as all of the PM tasks used in the MIST involve inhibition of the ongoing task 
responses and task switching, which have been found to be deficient in dyslexia (e.g. Hari & 
Renvall, 2001; see Chapter 2). This is also in line with the results from Study 1 (PRMQ) which 
revealed event- and time-based self-reported PM deficits in dyslexia. 
 
5.1.2. Method 
 
5.1.2.1. Participants 
 
The same participants as in Study 2 were used in this study (see Study 2 participant section for 
participant characteristics). 
 
5.1.2.2. Materials 
 
This study utilised the version B from the MIST kit (MIST; Raskin, 2004) and included the 
optional time-based naturalistic task which involves a 24 hour delay. Each of the six scales 
(time-based, event-based, verbal, action, 2- and 15-minutes) is formed of four PM tasks that 
contribute scores to its total. Each PM task can be scored from 0 to 2 depending on performance 
where the score of 2 indicates correctly performed PM task. Therefore, the total score from each 
scale can range from 0 to 8. The maximum overall MIST score is 48. For the complete 
instructions regarding scoring please see Raskin (2009) and Woods et al. (2008). 
 
The MIST also provides standardised error coding instructions. There are five types of errors 
which can be coded for the eight PM tasks. These are: no response (when no PM response is 
made), task sublimation (when an action response is replaced with a verbal response or vice 
versa; or when any prior response is performed instead of the correct response; or when the 
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participant performs a novel response), loss of content (the participant indicated that they had to 
provide a response but cannot remember the content), loss of time (the participant performs the 
correct response but at the incorrect time i.e. more than or less than one minute from the 
appropriate execution time) and random error (incorrect responses which cannot be coded as 
previous errors). 
 
The word search puzzle (Form B) as well as a large digital clock included with the MIST 
comprehensive kit were used. A checklist which comprised of multiple choice recognition items 
was used to check whether PM failures were due to encoding (retrospective) or retrieval 
(prospective) failure. This checklist, administered on completion of the eight PM tasks, 
comprised of eight questions each with three possible answers e.g. “At any time during this test, 
were you supposed to: 1) tell me to make an appointment; 2) tell me when I can call you 
tomorrow; 3) tell me to call for a prescription”. 
 
The optional time-based naturalistic task involving a 24 hour delay was also administered to 
participants. The 24 hour delayed task required participants to leave a voicemail message for the 
experimenter reporting their name and the number of hours they had slept that night. This 
activity was to be performed exactly 24 hours after the instruction was given to participants. 
Therefore, a landline telephone number with an answering machine system was required. A 
university extension was used for this purpose. There was a standardised message on the 
answering machine with the option to leave a message after the tone. The scoring followed the 
original MIST guidelines where no points were given to participants who did not leave a 
voicemail, one point to those who left a voicemail but did not remember the correct content of 
the message (i.e. the number of hours slept) and two points for participants who left the 
voicemail message with the correct content within one hour of the required time either side (2 
hours’ time window). 
 
5.1.2.3. Design 
 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used, with participant group (dyslexic 
versus control) as the independent variable and types of memory (time-based, event-based, 2-
minutes, 15-minutes, action response and verbal response) as the dependent variables. The 
dependent variables in this study were scores obtained by participants on the basis of their 
performance on the PM tasks which formed the six PM scales.  
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Unrelated samples t-test analysis was applied to test for differences in means of the dyslexic 
sample and non-dyslexic sample on the total MIST score, the ongoing task total (word search 
puzzle), the retrospective recognition questionnaire total and the 24 hours delayed task. Higher 
raw scores on these measures indicated better PM performance. 
 
The sum of each of the five types of errors (no response, task sublimation, loss of content, loss 
of time and random error) made by each participant was analysed using one-way MANOVA in 
order to investigate whether there were any differences between the two participant groups.  
 
A further mixed measures ANOVA was conducted with participant group as the between-
subjects factor (levels of treatment: dyslexic and control participants) and memory load as the 
within-subjects factor (levels of treatment: low and high memory load). The low memory load 
consisted of the mean score for PM tasks six, seven and eight whereas the high memory load 
was taken from the mean scores for PM tasks one, two, three and four. The memory load 
clusters have been established on the basis of the information from the original MIST kit 
(Raskin, 2004) and were based on the number of instructions/tasks participants had to remember 
at once. The low memory load condition included PM tasks which required participants to hold 
one or two PM intentions in memory. The high memory load condition comprised of PM tasks 
where participants had to hold four or five different PM intentions in memory at the same time. 
 
5.1.2.4. Procedure 
 
Informed consent was acquired from all participants prior to testing. Background information 
about participants (age, gender and dyslexia status) were collected before administration of the 
short-form IQ and literacy measures. The MIST measure was administered at the end of the 
testing session after completion of the PMQ questionnaire. Participants were asked to sit at a 
desk with a large digital watch in a visible position. The experimenter sat on the other side of 
the desk but not directly facing the participant. Each participant heard the standardised MIST 
instructions and had an opportunity to ask any questions and clarify the instructions if needed. 
After this, the participant engaged in the word search puzzle (the ongoing task) for the duration 
of the test (30 minutes). While working on the word search puzzle, participants heard eight 
standardised PM instructions at different times during the testing session lasting for 30 minutes. 
When the required time or cue appeared, participants had to perform a certain action or provide 
a certain verbal response. For example, participants heard the instruction to tell the experimenter 
in two minutes time, the time that they could be called tomorrow. When the two minutes had 
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elapsed participants were required to stop the word search puzzle and tell the experimenter the 
suitable time to be called e.g. “you can call me tomorrow at 2pm”. 
 
After completing the eight MIST PM tasks participants were asked the questions from the 
multiple choice recognition checklist. They were asked to select the correct response from three 
possible answers. At the end, participants were given the instructions to perform the delayed 
PM task. The experimenter’s telephone number was given to participants verbally and each 
participant was asked to save the telephone number directly into their mobile phone contacts to 
avoid any paper notes which could act as reminders. For the complete description of the MIST 
administration procedures please see Raskin (2009) and Woods et al. (2008). Participants were 
debriefed at the end of the study. 
 
5.1.3. Results 
 
5.1.3.1. MIST scales 
 
An independent samples t-test carried out on the total MIST score (out of 48) revealed that 
participants with dyslexia (M = 42.20, SD = 6.71) did not differ significantly compared to 
controls (M = 44.58, SD = 4.20), t (49) = 1.52, p =.134.  
 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted using the six different scales of 
the MIST investigating 2- and 15-minutes time delay, time- and event-based types of PM, as 
well as PM memory involving verbal and action responses. The multivariate test (one-way 
MANOVA) indicated that group membership had a non-significant effect on memory, F (6, 44) 
= .915, p = .493, Wilks’ Lambda = .889, partial η2 = .111. Power to detect the effect was .322. 
 
Even though the MANOVA was not significant, the results of the follow-up univariate F-tests 
were included, as the MIST is a “blunt” measure that is designed to be used for clinical samples 
and this bluntness may be reflected in the low power (despite N in the typical range for studies 
of cognition in dyslexia). Therefore, the univariate results were unpacked further for exploratory 
purposes. The follow-up univariate F-tests indicated that group membership significantly 
affected PM tasks with time-based cues and PM tasks requiring verbal responses. Individuals 
with dyslexia scored significantly lower on the time-based PM tasks and PM tasks requiring 
verbal responses compared to controls. However, group membership had no significant 
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univariate effect on the 2- and 15-minute scales nor on the event cue and action response scales. 
The descriptive and F-statistics for the follow-up univariate ANOVAs are displayed in Table 8. 
 
 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics and follow-up univariate ANOVAs conducted on MIST 
measures. 
 
 
Scale 
Controls 
(N = 26) 
Dyslexics 
(N = 25) 
 
F (1, 49) 
ANOVA 
p 
 
ηp
2
 
2-Minute Time Delay 
score 
7.96 
(SD = .20 
7.64 
(SD = 1.08) 
2.25 .140 .044 
15-Minute Time Delay 
score 
 
6.92 
(SD = 1.26) 
6.32 
(SD = 1.82) 
1.90 .174 .037 
Time Cue score 
 
7.19 
(SD = 1.13) 
6.40 
(SD = 1.63) 
4.08 .049 .077 
Event Cue score 
 
7.69 
(SD = .74) 
7.68 
(SD = .95) 
.003 .959 < .001 
Verbal Response score 
 
7.65 
(SD = .63) 
7.16 
(SD = .99) 
4.58 .037 .086 
Action Response score 
 
7.23 
(SD = 1.03) 
7.00 
(SD = 1.47) 
.423 .518 .009 
 
 
5.1.3.2. Ongoing task 
 
An independent samples t-test performed on the ongoing task (word search puzzle) showed that 
there was no significant difference between participants with dyslexia (M = 32.80, SD = 6.16) 
and without dyslexia (M = 35.15, SD = 7.78), t (49) = 1.20, p =.238. 
 
5.1.3.3. Memory errors 
 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted using the frequency of the five 
types of PM errors (no response, task sublimation, loss of content, loss of time and random 
errors). The multivariate test (one-way MANOVA) indicated that group membership had a non-
significant effect on the number of PM errors, F (4, 46) = 2.35, p = .068, Wilks’ Lambda = .830, 
partial η2 = .170. Power to detect the effect was .634. 
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The univariate results of the error data were unpacked further for explanatory purposes, given 
that the F-value was close to significance. The follow-up univariate F-tests of the numbers of 
different types of errors revealed non-significant differences on no response, task sublimation 
and loss of content errors. There were no random errors reported by either of the participant 
groups. The results from loss of time error were close to significance (p = .051) and indicated 
that individuals with dyslexia made more PM errors when they performed the correct task, but 
at the incorrect time i.e. more than or less than 1min from the appropriate execution time. The 
descriptive and F-statistics for the follow-up univariate ANOVAs are displayed in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics and follow-up univariate ANOVAs conducted on PM errors. 
 
 
Scale 
Controls 
(N = 26) 
Dyslexics 
(N = 25) 
 
F (4, 46) 
ANOVA 
p 
 
ηp
2
 
 
Errors 
     
      No response 
 
.077 
(SD = .39) 
.360 
(SD = .76) 
2.84 .098 .055 
      Task sublimation 
 
.50 
(SD = .76) 
.40 
(SD = .58) 
.278 .601 .006 
      Loss of content 
 
.192 
(SD = .40) 
.320 
(SD = .56) 
.887 .351 .018 
      Loss of time 
 
.038 
(SD = .20) 
.320 
(SD = .69) 
3.99 .051 .075 
 
 
5.1.3.4. Memory Load 
 
To investigate further the effect of memory load (low and high) on the two participant groups, a 
mixed measures ANOVA was conducted. The results revealed a significant main effect of 
memory load F (1, 49) = 7.38, p = .009, ηp
2
 = .131. This main effect of memory load revealed 
that all participants had lower PM scores in PM tasks involving a high memory load condition, 
compared to the low memory load condition, which resulted in higher PM scores. There was 
also a significant main effect of participant group F (1, 49) = 4.09, p = .049, ηp
2
 = .077. The 
main effect of participant group showed that individuals with dyslexia had significantly lower 
PM scores compared to controls across the two memory load conditions. However, there was no 
significant interaction F (1, 49) = .154, p = .697, ηp
2
 = .003.  
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5.1.3.5. Retrospective recognition questionnaire 
 
An independent samples t-test was used to analyse the retrospective recognition questionnaire 
total scores (out of 8) for the two participant groups. The results showed that there was no 
significant difference between participants with dyslexia (M = 7.96, SD = .20) and without 
dyslexia (M = 7.96, SD = .20), t (49) = .028, p =.978. 
 
5.1.3.6. Naturalistic time-based delayed task (24 hours) 
 
The results from an independent samples t-test showed a significant effect of participant group 
on the semi-naturalistic PM task performance, t (49) = 2.20, p = .033, ηp
2
 = .090. The inspection 
of means indicated that individuals with dyslexia were more likely to forget to perform the PM 
activity 24 hours after leaving the laboratory (M = 1.35, SD =.94) compared to non-dyslexic 
participants (M = .76, SD = .97). 
 
5.1.4. Discussion 
 
5.1.4.1. MIST 
 
There was no significant difference in PM of individuals with dyslexia and non-dyslexic 
controls matched for age and IQ on the basis of MANOVA and the total MIST score t-test. 
Even though the MANOVA test revealed no significant difference, the follow-up univariate F-
tests were explored, as the MIST is a “blunt” measure that is designed for clinical samples (e.g. 
Poquette et al., 2013). The results from the follow-up univariate F-tests are in line with the 
literature indicating an overlap between PM and dyslexia (e.g. McLoughlin et al., 1994; Smith-
Spark et al., 2003; 2004; Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). The results of study 3 revealed significant 
differences between dyslexic and non-dyslexic individuals on PM tasks that involved time-
based PM cues and verbal responses. Adults with dyslexia showed significant deficits in 
remembering to perform these PM tasks. This supported that hypothesis that individuals with 
dyslexia are likely to display time-based PM problems. The findings also supported the findings 
in Study 2 (PMQ) pointing towards time-based PM problems in dyslexia. It could be argued that 
individuals with dyslexia were found to have difficulties with time-based PM, as time-based PM 
tasks require more self-initiated processes and monitoring time. This self -initiated process can 
be argued to be more demanding on WM in comparison to event-based PM tasks which rely 
more on automatic retrieval processes (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990). This reasoning is in line 
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with the literature arguing for WM problems in dyslexia (e.g. Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). 
Moreover, the event-based tasks cues used in MIST are directly related to the required response 
and therefore could naturally evoke the required response (e.g. “When I hand you an envelope, 
please self-address it”.). This confirms that these tasks were less cognitively demanding as they 
allowed spontaneous retrieval to occur due to ecologically relevant event-based PM cues which 
involved less self-initiated processes. 
 
The results from the analysis of memory errors indicated that individuals with dyslexia 
committed “loss of time” errors more times compared to controls (results approaching 
significance). This finding can be linked to the finding showing a time-based PM problem in 
individuals with dyslexia as self-initiation of time monitoring is required to gauge the required 
time for correct time-based PM task performance. The “loss of time” errors have been linked to 
difficulties with timing (Raskin, Woods, Poquette, McTaggart, Sethna, Williams & Tröster, 
2011). Thus, an alternative explanation of the results which suggest a time-based PM deficit in 
dyslexia could be related to a problem with time estimation. This possible explanation is 
supported by Nicolson et al. (1995) who argue that cerebellar deficits may account for poor 
performance of individuals with dyslexia in time perception tasks. Since one may rely on the 
“internal clock” to estimate time in order to initiate checking of the time (look at the clock – 
prompt of PM activity), in order to be able to perform the time-based PM tasks at the 
appropriate times. Thus, poor time estimation could lead individuals with dyslexia to perform 
the correct tasks, but at an incorrect time (later than one minute from the required time) or 
simply to fail to perform these time-based PM tasks.  
 
The follow-up univariate F-tests revealed a group difference with regards to PM tasks which 
required production of verbal responses. In these PM tasks individuals with dyslexia were 
significantly worse compared to controls. This result could be claimed to be consistent with the 
phonological difficulties found in dyslexia. For instance the phonological deficit hypothesis 
(Frith, 1985; Snowling, 1995) argues for a phonological processing deficit as well as encoding 
of verbal information difficulties in dyslexia. Similarly the double deficit theory of dyslexia 
(Wolf & Bowers, 1999) states that individuals with dyslexia have a slow naming speed. Also 
dyslexic individuals have been found to have problems with verbal fluency functions facilitating 
retrieval of information from memory (Felton & Wood, 1989; Griffiths, 1991; Kinsbourne, 
Rufo, Gamzu, Palmer & Berliner, 1991). Thus, the significant group difference acquired from 
the PM items of MIST in which participants were required to produce verbal responses is in line 
with the above studies. 
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The results from the mixed measures ANOVA conducted for initial investigation of the effect of 
memory load on the two participant groups, revealed that individuals with dyslexia were less 
able to remember prospectively compared to controls, regardless of the memory load condition. 
This finding supports the hypothesis that individuals with dyslexia have problems with PM and 
is in line with the self-reported PM deficits in dyslexia found in Study 1. This result also 
supports previous literature discussed in Chapter 3, which pointed towards PM difficulties in 
dyslexia (e.g. Smith-Spark et al., 2004). The main effect of PM load condition supported Basso 
et al. (2010) who found that PM load has a negative effect on PM performance. Nevertheless, 
there was no interaction between participant group and PM load condition and this was not in 
line with the literature regarding WM problems in dyslexia (e.g. Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007) 
which was used to argue that individuals with dyslexia would have PM problems in high PM 
load condition. This finding was also not in line with the reasoning that insufficient WM 
resources prevent individuals with dyslexia from consciously compensating for their PM deficit, 
as argued by Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) DAD/CC hypothesis. Nicolson and Fawcett found 
that individuals with dyslexia were impaired at more difficult tasks compared to easier tasks and 
thus, the lack of interaction between the PM load and participant group is not in line with these 
results. PM tasks requiring a greater number of PM actions to be held in memory during the 
retention interval did not result in greater PM decline in individuals with dyslexia compared to 
controls (and relative to items involving low PM load). Nevertheless, the CC hypothesis was 
established on the basis of a study employing children with dyslexia whereas, in the current 
investigation an adult sample was used. Therefore, it is possible that these adults with dyslexia 
are more able to consciously compensate compared to children and thus, the PM load 
manipulation was not cognitively demanding enough. Furthermore, as the high PM load 
conditions included a mixture of event-based and time-based PM tasks, which varied in task 
difficulty; it is difficult to make this assumption. 
 
5.1.4.2. Naturalistic time-based delayed task 
 
The results showed that individuals with dyslexia were significantly less able to remember 
prospectively on a naturalistic time-based task, involving a 24 hour time interval between 
intention formation and intention execution phases. These results are consistent with the 
argument that memory decay processes which also apply to PM (Tobias, 2009), are more 
prevalent in PM tasks involving longer time intervals. This in turn could result in worse PM 
performance, as longer time intervals may provide more opportunities to forget to perform the 
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PM activity or one may be more likely to forget to monitor the time when there are longer time 
intervals. Nevertheless, this by itself does not explain why dyslexic individuals performed 
worse on this task compared to controls. It could be reasoned that distractible attention 
(Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990) or difficulties with inhibition of distracters (Palladino et al., 2001) 
played a part in the PM deficit found in dyslexia in this experiment. Namely, one can suggest 
that in tasks involving longer time intervals it is possible that distractibility may have a negative 
effect on maintaining the PM intention in memory, with the dyslexic group being more likely to 
forget. 
 
There are several other theoretical possibilities that could account for these results. As this task 
took place in naturalistic everyday settings, it is more likely that there were many more 
distractions in the environment compared to a laboratory controlled setting. Therefore, one 
could be distracted from the PM intention and thus stop monitoring the time, leading to failure 
of PM. Another issue is that due to increased involvement in everyday life activities (compared 
to a laboratory setting) and difficulty with automatisation of some of the real life tasks, this 
could have resulted in a lack of available cognitive resources (e.g. WM capacity). Additionally, 
inhibition and task switching difficulties in dyslexia (e.g. Hari & Renvall, 2001) could be 
relevant in explaining the PM deficit found on the basis of this naturalistic task. That is to say, 
participants with dyslexia could have difficulties with inhibiting their current ongoing tasks in 
order to switch between the ongoing tasks and time monitoring activity/performance on the PM 
task. 
 
On the other hand one may argue that dyslexic individuals have difficulties with spontaneous 
retrieval processes. Namely, tasks involving long time intervals are more likely to rely on 
spontaneous retrieval processes (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). Since the PM task involving long 
time intervals may be too taxing for attentional resources to constantly monitor the environment 
for the appropriate time to perform the task (hold the PM intention in conscious awareness) and 
perform other daily tasks. Thus, individuals with dyslexia whose spontaneous retrieval 
processes fail would also fail to retrieve the PM intention at the appropriate time. The 
explanations of the naturalistic results provided briefly within this section will be expanded 
upon in the following chapters when considering other naturalistic and semi-naturalistic tasks. 
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5.1.5. Summary 
 
The results from the MIST indicated that individuals with dyslexia may have problems with PM 
even though the multivariate analysis of variance was not significant. The lack of statistically 
significant effects may be because the MIST has been designed for use with clinical samples 
and thus, is not sensitive enough for more subtle difficulties with PM. Nevertheless, the two-
way ANOVA results conducted on participant group and cognitive load indicated that 
individuals with dyslexia performed significantly worse on PM task regardless of PM task load. 
These results are in line with the data from questionnaires used in Studies 1 and 2, which 
showed that individuals with dyslexia perceive themselves as having PM problems. The MIST 
also indicated that there may be a problem with time-based PM in adults with developmental 
dyslexia. Individuals with dyslexia were found to have significantly worse performance 
compared to controls on the time-based PM task involving a 24 hour time interval between 
intention formation and execution.  
 
The next stage of this thesis which developed organically, was to investigate both event- and 
time-based PM under laboratory controlled conditions in order to have a closer look at the 
processes that may underlie PM deficits in dyslexia. Laboratory investigation was employed 
with the aim of seeing if a range of different PM tasks coupled with differential processes 
results in identifying any PM deficits in dyslexia. The next chapter (Chapter 6) probed into an 
event-based PM (focal and non-focal), followed by a chapter (Chapter 7), which investigated 
time-based PM. These investigations were accompanied by field experiments in order to see 
whether there are any group differences on the different PM types under real life conditions. 
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Chapter 6: Event-based prospective memory 
 
Einstein and McDaniel (1990) developed an experimental paradigm allowing the investigation 
of event-based PM. Einstein et al. (1995) used this basic event-based PM paradigm to 
investigate PM in adults. In this study participants had to answer general knowledge questions 
as the ongoing task (e.g. “How many hours will it take a person to walk 24 miles at the rate of 
three miles per hour?”). Participants were told before they started that when they saw a question 
with the word president in it they needed to press the F8 key. Then, before participants began 
the general knowledge questions task they were presented with a distractor task based on 
vocabulary. The PM cue was used six times in the ongoing activity and participants were 
required to respond to it by pressing the F8 key each time they saw it. PM performance was 
measured by the proportion of PM trials in which participants remembered to perform this PM 
task. Participants were generally able to remember well to perform the intended activity when 
encountering the PM cue (average 90% correct PM responses). 
 
The relationship between the ongoing task and the PM cue can differ. This can depend on the 
characteristics of the ongoing task and PM cue (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). Depending on the 
relationship between the ongoing task and PM cue, the PM cue may be characterised as being 
focal or non-focal (see Chapter 1). Study 4 investigated an event-based PM with focal PM cue 
whereas Study 5 employed a non-focal PM cue. 
 
6.1. Experimental investigations of cue focality 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, the focality of a PM cue depends on whether or not the processing of the 
PM cue is encouraged by the ongoing task, in which it is embedded (McDaniel & Einstein, 
2007). In a PM task with a focal PM target the ongoing task encourages the processing of the 
PM cue. In contrast, PM tasks with a non-focal PM cue involve an ongoing task which does not 
encourage the processing of the PM cue. For example, a focal cue occurs in everyday life 
situations when one receives and reads an email from a friend, to whom one previously intended 
to forward an email with some information. This acts as a prompt to forward the email. An 
everyday example of a non-focal PM cue can be demonstrated in a situation where one intended 
to renew a monthly ticket when next passing a ticket office. The ticket office in this situation 
acts as an event-based cue. To make the cue non-focal it would have to be located some distance 
from the platform. Thus, when walking in a stream of pedestrians and attending closely to the 
task of passing through the automated gate to enter the platform, the ticket office would act as a 
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non-focal cue. Under these circumstances the processing of the non-focal cue would not be 
encouraged by the activity engaged in (entering the platform). In this situation, if one was going 
to the ticket office to find out about the time of the next train, this ongoing activity would 
encourage the processing of the PM cue (the ticket office) which could act as a reminder about 
renewal of the monthly ticket. This would then be a focal PM cue. 
 
There have been a number of experimental studies which have used focal and non-focal PM 
cues (e.g. Einstein et al., 2005; see Chapter 1). Rendell, McDaniel, Forbes and Einstein (2007) 
showed that the age related deficit of PM was significantly smaller in the focal condition 
compared to the non-focal condition. In other words, older adults’ PM was significantly better 
in the focal condition compared to the non-focal. Interestingly, younger adults performed 
similarly well in the focal condition compared to the non-focal condition. There was no 
significant effect on the ongoing task caused by any type of PM task. This study demonstrated a 
reduction of age related differences when a focal PM cue is used relative to a non-focal PM cue 
and this also was not attributable to sacrificing the ongoing task performance. In addition, a 
second experiment manipulated the difficulty of the ongoing task and the results from this 
investigation indicated that when the ongoing task was made less challenging the age related 
difference found on the non-focal PM task were eliminated. 
 
Other studies have also shown considerable age related deficits in PM tasks employing non-
focal PM cues (e.g. Maylor 1993, 1996; Park, Hertzog, Kidder, Morrell & Mayhorn 1997) and 
no such deficits in PM tasks employing focal cues (e.g. Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; Einstein et 
al., 1995). McDaniel, Einstein and Rendell (2008) argued that these results show that PM 
retrieval based on focal PM cues can be automatic. This interpretation is in line with the 
multiprocess theory of PM. According to the multiprocess theory a focal PM cue is more likely 
to lead to automatic spontaneous retrieval processes and a non-focal PM cue is more likely to 
involve monitoring processes which employ strategic attentional resources needed for 
monitoring for the cue (see Einstein & McDaniel, 2005; Einstein et al., 2005; McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2000; 2007, for empirical support). This is in line with the results from PM tasks 
employing focal and non-focal PM cues in older adults. Namely, older adults showed no 
problems in the focal PM cue conditions as these rely on spontaneous retrieval processes which 
are preserved in older adults (e.g. Craik, 1986). McDaniel, Einstein and Rendell (2008) argued 
that the age related deficit shown in PM tasks with non-focal PM cues occurs because non-focal 
tasks rely on monitoring processes. These monitoring processes draw on attentional resources 
which are claimed to decline with age (e.g. Craik & Byrd, 1982). McDaniel and Einstein (2000) 
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claimed that the non-focal condition, which results in a more robust deficit in PM performance, 
is based on resource challenges in older adults. 
 
This claim can be the foundation for the experimental work included in this chapter (Studies 4 
and 5). Namely, that the attention related deficits (visual-spatial attention, auditory attention; 
Varvara et al., 2014) found in individuals with developmental dyslexia (described in Chapter 2) 
may result in more robust PM deficits in non-focal PM tasks. Since the age related deficits of 
PM were more robust in the non-focal condition, due to a decline in attentional resources, it can 
be argued that individuals with dyslexia will also display more profound problems in non-focal 
PM tasks, as attentional resources have been found to be deficient in individuals with dyslexia. 
 
Nevertheless, Schnitzspahn et al. (2013) found that inhibition and shifting was a significant 
predictor of event-based PM performance. They argued that the influence of shifting on PM 
supports the PAM theory (Smith 2003), in that shifting between the processes needed for the 
performance of an ongoing task and processes required for monitoring the environment are 
needed for successful PM performance. This point of view opposes the spontaneous retrieval 
theory of PM (e.g. Einstein & McDaniel, 1996) which stated that event-based PM tasks can rely 
on spontaneous retrieval processes, as they are argued to not require active monitoring processes 
and are automatic. This could indicate that regardless of whether the task employs focal or non-
focal PM, individuals with dyslexia will have difficulties on these tasks, as individuals with 
dyslexia have been reported to have problems with inhibition and shifting (e.g. Varvara et al., 
2014). 
 
It was thus hypothesised that individuals with dyslexia would show poorer event-based PM 
performance compared to controls. It was also suggested that this deficit may be even more 
robust in the PM task with a non-focal PM cue compared to the task with a focal PM cue. The 
non-focal condition does not encourage the processing of the target PM cue and thus, is more 
cognitively demanding. The hypothesised PM deficits in individuals with dyslexia can be based 
on the claims that SAS, WM and higher-order cognitive processes are deficient in dyslexia (e.g. 
Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007; Varvara et al., 2014), since the SAS, WM and higher-order 
processes are required to perform PM tasks (see Chapter 1). Moreover, WM abilities have been 
found to greatly influence PM performance (Smith et al., 2011). Also, allocation of attention is 
necessary for switching between the ongoing and PM task. These processes have been found to 
be deficient in dyslexia and thus are likely to result in PM deficits. This evidence (described in 
more detail in Chapter 1), as well as the results from Studies 1 and 2 provide the foundation for 
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the hypothesised PM deficits in dyslexia. In addition, it can be argued that group differences 
may also express themselves in terms of cost and/or accuracy to the ongoing trials. Namely, 
differences in RTs and accuracy levels between Blocks 1 (ongoing task only) and 2 (ongoing 
plus PM) may be greater in participants with dyslexia compared to controls. 
 
According to the multiprocess theory of PM (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) no significant cost to 
the ongoing task should be found in the focal condition whereas, on the non-focal condition 
there should be a significant cost effect. Studies such as Einsterin et al. (2005) and Sculllin et al. 
(2010) support this claim (see section 1.4.4.). Thus, it is possible that in the focal condition of 
the current investigation, there will be no significant differences in RTs to ongoing trials from 
the baseline (Block 1) and PM condition (Block 2). Contrary to the multiprocess view, Smith 
(2003), in her PAM theory, argued that monitoring is always required in event-based PM tasks 
and this will result in a cost to the ongoing task. She found that cost was visible in slower RTs 
to ongoing trials associated with having to perform the PM activity, when compared to baseline 
condition which only involved ongoing task (see Chapter 1). Thus, on the basis of PAM theory, 
it could be hypothesised that significant cost to the ongoing task will be visible in both focal and 
non-focal PM tasks. 
 
6.1.1. Study 4: Focal prospective memory target 
 
6.1.1.1. Introduction 
 
This study employed an experimental task to investigate event-based PM, using a focal PM cue. 
Participants were asked to first perform a baseline block (Block 1), which required them to 
perform an ongoing task only. In the ongoing task participants were shown six drawings and 
their task was to judge whether the majority of these pictures represented living or non-living 
objects. After the completion of the baseline block participants were given the instructions 
regarding the PM task which was embedded in the experimental block (Block 2). In between 
Blocks 1 and 2 there was a filler task, which lasted for 20 minutes. This provided a 20 minute 
time delay between intention formation and execution. Whilst experimental block (Block 2) 
consisted of the same ongoing task, it also incorporated an additional PM task which required 
participants to respond differently every time they saw a PM cue (picture of an eye or glasses). 
Figure 1 represents the order of instructions and blocks used in the focal and non-focal PM 
experiments. 
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Figure 1: A diagram representing the order of instructions and blocks in event-based PM 
experiments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ongoing task in this PM design encouraged processing of the features of the focal PM cue. 
Since the key feature of the ongoing task involved the recognition of drawings based on 
semantic features, the PM cues were also recognisable on the basis of semantic features. Both 
the ongoing task and the PM task involved judging whether or not items belonged to different 
semantic categories. The ongoing task required judgements whether there were more pictures 
representing living vs. non-living objects. The PM task required responses to items related to 
seeing/vision. Thus both the ongoing and PM task involved the same type of processing (i.e. 
semantic). This task fulfilled the requirement of a focal task as there was an overlap between the 
information related to the ongoing task and the features of encoded PM cue (Gordon et al., 
2011). In addition, the PM cues themselves were shown to participants during the instructions 
phase (20 minutes before the PM task was performed). It can thus be assumed that this task was 
even more likely to rely on spontaneous processes of retrieval. Since showing the exact PM 
cues to participants is more likely to result in spontaneous retrieval processes, as PM cues 
previously encountered by participants could be argued to provide stronger triggering of the 
intended action compared to PM cues which are only described to participants, and where no 
actual PM cues are shown. 
 
On the basis of the results from Studies 1 and 2 as well as the literature suggesting dyslexia 
difficulties relevant to PM functioning (e.g. SAS/WM, Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007; see Chapter 
3), it was hypothesised that individuals with dyslexia would display significantly lower 
Instruction 1 
(Ongoing) 
Baseline block 
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Instruction 2 
(Ongoing + 
PM) 
20 min  
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accuracy on PM trials compared to age- and IQ-matched control participants without dyslexia. 
In addition, there may be a visible cost on the ongoing task performance, due to having to 
perform a PM task. This cost could be especially visible in individuals with dyslexia. This study 
also employed eye-tracker technology. The primary reason for employing eye-tracking was to 
eliminate the possibility that participants failed to respond to the event-based PM cue because 
they did not notice it. If it was the case that participants did not notice the PM cue, this alone 
could create differences in PM performance. Thus, it would be difficult to investigate whether 
there are differences in PM in the two participant samples as an alternative explanation could be 
provided. Namely, it could be argued that it is not a PM problem per se but rather a problem 
related to noticing processes. The secondary aim of using the eye-tracker was to provide more 
insight into monitoring processes in the two participant groups. 
 
6.1.1.2. Method 
 
6.1.1.2.1. Participants 
 
Fifty university students were tested, of whom 26 had dyslexia and 24 did not. All of the 
participants were native English speakers and between 18 and 35 years old. The descriptive 
statistics (mean, SD and range for age and gender split) are included in Table 10. 
 
Consistent with the studies reported earlier in this thesis participants from the two participant 
groups (dyslexics and controls) were matched for age and IQ (see Study 1). An unrelated t-tests 
were used in order to check if the two participant groups were matched for IQ and to 
differentiate the two participant groups on the literacy measures (see Table 10).
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics for gender and age and t-tests performed on literacy screening measures and short-form IQ. 
       
 Measure  
 
 
  
  
Gender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age (years) 
  
WORD 
Spelling 
Age 
 
  
WORD Spelling 
Raw Score 
  
DAST NWR 
Score 
  
WAIS-IV 
Short-form IQ 
 
 
 
Group 
 
  
Male 
 
Female 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
 
 
  
N<17 
years 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
 
 
 
Controls  
(N = 24) 
 
  
  
5 
 
19 
  
23.42 
 
4.82 
 
 
  
0 
  
44.83 
 
1.81 
  
92.67 
 
3.17 
  
107.35 
 
9.74 
 
 
 
Dyslexics  
(N = 26) 
 
  
5 
 
21 
  
23.69 
 
3.86 
 
 
  
17 
  
40.38 
 
3.83 
  
77.65 
 
11.75 
  
107.29 
 
7.90 
 
 
 
           
Independent samples t-test 
           
  t 
 
 
df 
 
 
p 
  
t 
 
df 
 
p 
  
t 
 
df 
 
p 
 
 
 
 
           
5.32 
 
 
36.27 
 
< .001 
  
6.27 
 
28.91 
 
< .001 
  
.059 
 
48 
 
.953 
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6.1.1.2.2. Materials 
 
The experiment was designed using the Experiment Builder software for Windows (EyeLink 
II/CL v.4.10; SR Research). Participants sat 57cm away from a 19” computer screen (Dell 
190SFP) with their head stabilised by a chin-rest. The eye-tracker (EyeLink 1000 Desktop 
Mount) was connected to a desktop PC and employed 9-point calibration and validation with 
less than 1 degree angular error for each point. This is a standard default procedure and has been 
used in previous studies (e.g. Abegg, Manoach & Barton, 2011). Participants responded to the 
task using the Microsoft Sidewinder Plug & Play USB Gamepad (X04-97602). 
 
A total of 69 pictures were selected from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) picture set. 
These pictures were black and white line drawings representing living/natural and non-
living/manmade objects and were 256 x 256 pixels in size. Out of these 69 pictures, 17 pictures 
were used as practice trials. The remaining 52 pictures were used in the experimental blocks (26 
in each block). In each of the blocks there were 13 pictures representing the living/natural 
category (e.g. a picture of a hand or an apple) and 13 pictures representing the non-living/man-
made category (a picture of an iron or fork). Different pictures were used for practice trials 
block one and two in order to avoid any possible interference effects between them. The 
pictures were selected on the basis of non-significant differences between the living and the 
non-living pictures in mean ratings of image agreement, picture familiarity and complexity 
provided by Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980). In addition, the two stimuli groups were 
matched for the actual area of the objects in the 256 x 256 image files and the number of black 
pixels used in each drawing. This provided additional control in order to avoid any interference 
that could be caused by the characteristics of the stimuli e.g. size of the objects or saturation of 
pictures (due to having more black pixels). It is possible that these characteristics of stimuli 
could provide cues with regards to correct responses as some objects could be easier to identify. 
Stimuli were matched across the two blocks. In addition, the living and non-living types of 
drawings were also matched across the two blocks. No significant differences between those 
clusters of stimuli were present. The lists of stimuli can be seen in Appendix 1. The results of 
the ANOVA tests carried out on the stimuli in order to match them are presented in Appendix 2. 
 
 
6.1.1.2.3. Design 
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Participants who scored less than 75% in Block 1 were removed from the analysis. This was to 
avoid the inclusion of data where a participant did not engage well with the task or potentially 
did not understand the instructions.  
 
The design of this experiment consisted of two blocks, each made up of 80 trials. The first block 
was preceded by 12 practice trials. Block 1 (the baseline block) consisted only of ongoing trials 
where participants had to decide whether there were more living or non–living drawings. Block 
2, in addition to the ongoing trials also had 8 PM trials where participants were expected to 
break out from the ongoing activity to perform a PM action i.e. press the “A” button on the key 
pad to indicate the presence of a picture that belonged to the seeing/vision semantic category (a 
picture of an eye or spectacles). The ratio of PM trials to the ongoing trials was ten per cent i.e. 
there were eight PM trials and seventy-two ongoing trials. The ratio is consistent with West, 
Carlson and Cohen’s (2007) study, which also used an eye-tracker to investigate PM. 
 
The response buttons (left and right) were counterbalanced. Fifty per cent of participants had to 
respond with the left shoulder button of the key pad when the majority of the six pictures 
belonged to the living category and with the right shoulder button when the majority of the six 
pictures belonged to the non-living category. The remaining fifty per cent of participants had to 
respond in the opposite manner (right for living and left for non-living). This ratio applied to the 
dyslexic and non-dyslexic groups separately. This counterbalancing of response buttons was 
performed in order to exclude any possible advantage in reaction time (RT) of one hand over the 
other over the experiment as a whole. 
 
There was a fixed sequence in which pictures were shown to participants in the two blocks. PM 
cues appeared in Block 2 semi-randomly between every 8
th
 and 12
th
 trial. For instance, if the PM 
cue first appeared on the 9
th
 trial, it would then appear on the 21
st
 trial thereafter and then on the 
30
th
 trial.  
 
The pictures appeared on a black computer screen in two parallel horizontal rows (three pictures 
in each row) with 0.5cm space between each other. The order of the pictures on the screen was 
randomly assigned based on a random number allocation rule in both of the blocks as follows. 
Each trial consisted of either 5 living pictures and 1 non-living or 4 living and 2 non-living and 
the opposite ways around i.e. 5-1, 1-5, 4-2 and 2-4. Equal numbers of the different ratios of 
stimuli types were applied in each block. The order of presentation of the different split types 
was randomised. In addition, the PM cues were placed in random positions of a 3 x 2 grid made 
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by the pictures so that they did not always appear in the same position as this would make the 
task predictable. Furthermore, there were equal numbers of the four different types of splits (5-
1, 1-5, 4-2 and 2-4) that contained PM cues in Block 2. The order of appearance of these trials 
consisting of different splits was also randomised. 
 
There was no time limit for providing a response to each trial. After each response was made, a 
fixation point appeared on the screen. A stable fixation within one degree from this point (as 
measured by the eye-tracker software) was required in order for the experimenter to be able to 
move on to the next trial by pressing a spacebar on the control computer. The time gap between 
the end of the baseline block and the start of the experimental block was approximately 20 
minutes with no greater differences than +/- 1 minute. 
 
6.1.1.2.3.1. Data analysis 
 
Please note that a data trimming procedure was followed in order to investigate whether any 
differences would emerge. There were no major differences in the results after the data 
trimming process took place and hence these results together with the explanation of data 
trimming procedure are available in Appendices 3 (focal) and 4 (non-focal). Non-trimmed data 
are therefore presented in the analyses that follow. 
 
6.1.1.2.3.1.1. Prospective memory trials 
 
The independent samples t-tests were used to compare the means of dyslexics and controls on 
accuracy and RT data acquired from the PM trials. 
 
6.1.1.2.3.1.2. Ongoing trials  
 
A 2 x 2 mixed measures ANOVA was conducted in order to investigate differences in accuracy 
and RT between dyslexics and controls on the ongoing trials from Block 1 and Block 2. In 
addition, it was used to investigate whether there was any cost on the ongoing task performance 
associated with having to perform PM tasks in Block 2 (compared to Block 1 where no PM 
trials were present). This test employed participant group (dyslexics and vs. controls) as the 
between-subject factor and the type of block (Block 1 vs. Block 2) as the within-subjects factor. 
This is a standard method used to investigate PM cost to the performance on the ongoing trials 
e.g. Breneiser (2008, 2009), Einstein et al. (2005). 
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6.1.1.2.3.1.3. Task importance 
 
A chi-square test was used to ensure that neither of the participant groups was more likely to 
place greater importance on the ongoing or PM component of Block 2. 
 
6.1.1.2.3.1.4. Eye-tracker data 
 
The data gathered through the use of eye-tracker was analysed using a number of statistical 
tests. Two measurements were taken into consideration for this analysis. The first one being the 
number of fixations (which comprised of the total number of eye fixations) either on ongoing 
task stimuli or on PM stimuli. This was determined on the basis of interest areas set to the exact 
size of the each picture stimuli (256 x 256 pixels in size). The total number included 
consecutive fixations within an interest area and refixations on the interest area (fixations 
initiated from outside the region). The second measure was the mean dwell time (ms) for all 
individual fixations within a particular area.  
 
6.1.1.2.3.1.4.1. Prospective memory trials 
 
In order to check if PM failures were due to failures to notice PM cues, the data were coded 
using a binary coding system. This involved assigning either a score of one or zero to each of 
the eight PM cues for each participant separately. A score of zero was given to PM cues when 
no eye fixations were recorded within the interest area of that particular PM cue. A score of one 
was assigned to PM cues where at least one eye fixation was recorded. This allowed calculating 
the total number of PM cues on which each participant had no eye fixations. 
 
Individual PM accuracy scores (%) were recalculated after removing the PM trials where no PM 
responses were made and participants did not fixate their eyes on PM cues of these trials. These 
recalculated PM accuracy scores were reanalysed using independent t-test comparison between 
dyslexics and controls. This was performed in order to check if a failure to notice the PM cue 
(as measured by lack of fixations on PM cues) affected the accuracy of PM responses in both 
participant groups. 
 
An independent samples t-test was used in order to compare controls and dyslexics with regards 
to the percentage of the total numbers of PM trials to which participants responded incorrectly 
 151 
 
as well as correctly without fixating on the PM cues. This analysis was performed in order to 
provide an insight into visual fixation patterns and monitoring processes. 
 
An independent samples t-test was also used to compare dyslexics and controls in relation to the 
total numbers of eye fixations and mean dwell times (ms) on the PM cues. 
 
6.1.1.2.3.1.4.2. Ongoing task trials 
 
Similarly to the analysis performed on the accuracy and RT data acquired from ongoing trials, a 
2 x 2 mixed measures ANOVA was used in order to investigate group differences in the total 
numbers of fixations and mean dwell times (ms) on the ongoing stimuli in Blocks 1 and 2. This 
test employed participant group (dyslexics and vs. controls) as the between-subject factor and 
the type of block (Block 1 vs. Block 2) as the within-subjects factor. 
 
6.1.1.2.4. Procedure 
 
Informed consent was acquired from all participants prior to testing. Background information 
about participants age, gender and dyslexia status, were collected before administration of the 
short-form IQ and literacy measures. After completion of these measures participants were 
asked to sit in front of the eye-tracker with their head mounted on a chin-rest. The calibration 
using 9 points was conducted and validated for each participant before Block 1 and Block 2. 
During this process participants were asked to follow a dot on the screen which moved into 
different positions.  
 
After calibration and validation participants saw instructions displayed on the screen. These 
instructions were recorded by a native English speaker and played out loud to every participant. 
The first instruction informed participants that they would see a series of displays on which six 
drawings would be presented and that all of those drawings could be classed as either living 
(natural) or non-living (man-made). Participants were then told that they would need to make a 
decision as to whether the majority of the six pictures presented on the screen belonged to the 
living or non-living category. If the majority of the six pictures shown on the screen belonged to 
the living category, participants had to press the left shoulder button. When the majority of the 
six pictures belonged to the non-living category participants had to press the right shoulder 
button. The response buttons (left and right) were counterbalanced for dyslexic and non-
dyslexic participants i.e. the right shoulder button for the living category and the left for non-
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living. Participants were asked to make their decisions as quickly and as accurately as possible. 
There were twelve practice trials with feedback after each trial for the participants to learn how 
to respond to the task. The experimenter was present during the practice trials to further clarify 
the instructions if they were not understood and to answer any questions. After the practice 
trials, participants were shown an instruction screen showing all of the 26 pictures that were 
used in Block 1 grouped into two categories (living and non-living). This was performed in 
order to clarify which of the objects belonged to the living category and which to the non-living 
category and to remove any possible ambiguity. After this instruction participants engaged with 
Block 1, which consisted of eighty trials where feedback was not provided. At the end of Block 
1, participants were instructed that in twenty minutes time they would need to do a similar task 
but with one additional task to be performed. The additional task involved pressing the “A” 
button on the key pad every time a picture related to the semantic category of vision/seeing 
appeared on the screen. Participants were shown the two target drawings associated with 
vision/seeing at that point, one of an eye and the other of a pair of spectacles. It was explained 
that the “A” button responses are required instead of the living versus non-living responses in 
trials that contained those pictures. No further reminders of the PM task were presented 
thereafter. 
 
Participants were then taken away from the eye-tracker computer and seated at another desk in a 
different part of the room where they engaged with distractor tasks (WM span tasks). After 
twenty minutes the participants were asked to again sit in front of the eye-tracker computer, 
where they continued with the focal event-based PM experiment. Participants were shown an 
instruction screen that presented all of the living and non-living stimuli pictures used in Block 2 
(excluding the PM targets) before the task began. At the end of Block 2 which also consisted of 
eighty trials with no feedback, participants were asked whether they remembered the instruction 
to respond differently to the picture of an eye or glasses. Participants who stated that they did 
remember this instruction were asked whether they had placed more importance on responding 
correctly to the ongoing task (living versus non-living) or the PM task (vision/seeing) task. 
 
6.1.2.3. Results 
 
6.1.2.3.1. Excluded participants 
 
Six members of the control group were removed from the data set and replaced due to them 
showing literacy characteristics that were not within the normal adult range. Also, seven 
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participants (five controls and three dyslexics) whose IQ was below 90 were removed from the 
analysis. There were two participants with dyslexia and one participant without dyslexia who 
did not respond to the PM cues at all, therefore the means of RT data for PM trials were 
calculated without these participants. One control participant did not reach the 75% accuracy 
benchmark in Block 1 and therefore was removed from the analysis. The number of participants 
reported in the Participants section is the number who took part after removing those who did 
not meet the above criteria. 
 
6.1.2.3.2. Prospective memory trials 
 
6.1.2.3.2.1. Accuracy 
 
An independent samples t-test performed on the PM accuracy data (%) showed that there was 
no significant difference between participants with dyslexia (M = 81.25, SD = 30.26) and 
without dyslexia (M = 83.33, SD = 27.25), t (48) = .255, p =.800. 
 
6.1.2.3.2.1.1. Corrected accuracy 
 
The reanalysis of PM accuracy (%) involved removing PM trials in which participants did not 
respond to PM cues and did not fixate their eyes on them. The participant groups comparison 
performed using independent samples t-test showed no significant differences between 
dyslexics (M = 83.03, SD = 30.59) and controls (M = 86.09, SD = 27.12), t (48) = .372, p = 
.712. 
 
 
 
6.1.2.3.2.2. Reaction time 
 
The RT (ms) data from correct PM trials analysed using unrelated t-test showed that participants 
with dyslexia were significantly slower (M = 1652.84, SD = 679.32) compared to controls (M = 
1260.89, SD = 361.94) when responding to the PM trials, t (35.40) = 2.48, p =.018. 
 
6.1.2.3.3. Ongoing trials accuracy and reaction time 
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The results in Table 11 show descriptive statistics for accuracy and RT data for correct ongoing 
responses in each block. 
 
 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics for accuracy and RT data of ongoing trials in Blocks 1 and 2 of 
focal PM paradigm. 
 
 Accuracy (%)  RT (ms) 
 Controls  Dyslexics  Controls  Dyslexics 
 
Type of Trial 
M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Ongoing  
(Block 1) 
95.05  5.62  96.73 3.18  1804.80 435.23  2552.25 972.64 
Ongoing  
(Block 2) 
95.54 8.71  97.70 2.19  1885.92 353.21  2696.92 951.96 
 
 
Two mixed measures ANOVAs were performed in order to compare the performance of 
individuals with and without dyslexia on the ongoing trials in Blocks 1 and 2 (excluding PM 
trials). This allowed also to investigate the cost of having to perform the PM task on the 
ongoing trials performance of Block 2.  
 
The accuracy (%) analysis showed non-significant effects of both participant group, F (1, 48) = 
2.13, p = .151, ηp
2
 = .042. and block type, F (1, 48) = .835, p = .365, ηp
2
 = .017. There was also 
no significant interaction between the two factors, F (1, 48) = .090, p = .766, ηp
2
 = .002.  
 
The results from the RT data showed a significant main effect of group, F (1, 48) = 14.661, p < 
.001, ηp
2
 = .234. Inspection of the means indicated that dyslexics took generally significantly 
longer to respond to the ongoing trials. The effect of block type was close to significance, F (1, 
48) = 3.91, p = .054, ηp
2
 = .075. Inspection of the means suggested that overall participants took 
longer to respond to the ongoing trials of Block 2 compared to Block 1. There was no 
significant interaction between participant group and type of block in terms of RT, F (1, 48) = 
.315, p = .577, ηp
2
 = .007. 
 
6.1.2.3.4. Task importance 
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At the end of the experiment all participants were asked to indicate whether they placed more 
importance on the ongoing or the PM components of Block 2. A Chi-square test of the 
significance of the difference in proportions was used to analyse the data. There was no 
association between participant group and the component on which more importance was 
placed, Χ2 = .000, df = 1, p = 1.00. The frequency counts for both participant groups are 
displayed in Table 12. 
 
Table 12: Frequency counts representing importance placed on the different tasks by dyslexics 
and controls in the focal task. 
 
 Participant group 
Type of task Controls  Dyslexics 
PM 12  13 
Ongoing 12  13 
 
 
6.1.2.3.5. Eye-tracker data 
 
6.1.2.3.5.1. Noticing failure analysis 
 
Dyslexics (M = 2.88, SD = 5.37) did not differ significantly compared to controls (M = 3.65, SD 
= 6.88) in terms of the percentage of total PM cues on which they did not fixate their eyes and 
to which they did not respond correctly, t (48) = .438, p = .663. However, controls (M = 9.38, 
SD = 11.80) differed compared to dyslexics (M = 3.37, SD = 8.33)  in terms of the percentage of 
total PM cues on which they have not fixated their eyes but still responded to them correctly, t 
(41.05) = 2.06, p = .045. Even though this difference was not significant when a Bonferroni 
corrected alpha level of .025 was applied, it still indicated that there was a difference in eye 
fixation patterns between the two participant groups with controls fixating eyes their less on the 
PM cues in trials to which correct PM responses were provided compared to dyslexics who 
tended to fixate their eyes on these PM cues more. 
 
6.1.2.3.5.2. Number of fixations and dwell time 
 
6.1.2.3.5.2.1. Prospective memory stimuli 
 
Group differences regarding the total number of fixations and mean dwell time (ms) on PM 
stimuli were analysed using independent samples t-test. The results showed that dyslexics (M = 
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25.69, SD = 9.11) fixated significantly more on PM cues compared to controls (M = 18.88, SD 
= 5.90), t (43.20) = 3.17, p = .003. The mean dwell time data revealed that dyslexics (M = 
396.38, SD = 143.12) dwelled longer on PM cues compared to controls (M = 288.83, SD = 
91.73), t (48) = 3.13, p = .003. In both cases, a Bonferroni corrected alpha level of .025 was 
applied. 
 
6.1.2.3.5.2.2. Ongoing stimuli 
 
The results in Table 13 show the descriptive statistics for number of fixations and mean dwell 
time data for ongoing stimuli responses in Block 1 and Block 2. 
 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics for the number of eye fixations and dwell times for ongoing 
stimuli in Blocks 1 and 2. 
 
 
Means 
 
Number of fixations 
  
Mean dwell time (ms) 
 
 
 
Controls 
  
Dyslexics 
  
Controls 
  
Dyslexics 
 
Type of Trial 
 
M 
 
SD 
  
M 
 
SD 
  
M 
 
SD 
  
M 
 
SD 
Ongoing  
(Block 1) 
 
502.75 144.37  700.46 242.30  385.13 114.46  583.85 257.19 
Ongoing  
(Block 2) 
494.13 118.62  679.50 234.93  378.34 85.12  573.23 245.30 
 
 
A mixed measures ANOVA was used in order to compare the number of eye fixations made by 
dyslexics and controls on the ongoing stimuli in Blocks 1 and 2 (determined by interest areas 
related to the ongoing stimuli). The results showed a significant main effect of participant 
group, F (1, 48) = 13.05, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .214. After the inspection of means, it could be stated 
that dyslexics fixated their eyes on the ongoing stimuli in Blocks 1 and 2 significantly more 
than controls. The effect of block type was not significant, F (1, 48) = .932, p = .339, ηp
2
 = .019. 
There was no significant interaction between participant group and block type, F (1, 48) = .162, 
p = .689, ηp
2
 = .003.  
 
The results from a mixed measures ANOVA conducted on mean dwell time (ms) data revealed 
a significant main effect of participant group, F (1, 48) = 13.65, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .221. Inspection 
of the means indicated that dyslexics dwelled significantly longer on the ongoing stimuli in 
 157 
 
Blocks 1 and 2 compared to controls. The effect of block type was not significant, F (1, 48) = 
.401, p = .529, ηp
2
 = .008. This indicated that both participant groups did not differ significantly 
in the length of dwell time on the ongoing stimuli in Block 1 compared to Block 2. There was 
no significant interaction between participant group and block type, F (1, 48) = .019, p = .890, 
ηp
2
 < .001. 
 
 
6.1.2.4. Discussion 
 
The PM accuracy data from this experiment did not indicate that participants with dyslexia have 
a deficit with PM and, thus, the results did not support the hypothesis. The effect of block type 
found in the ongoing task RT data was approaching significance (.054). This could indicate that 
there was a cost related to performing the PM task which revealed itself in the RTs to the 
ongoing trials irrespective of participant group. As the results approached significance this does 
not provide robust support for the multiprocess view of PM (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000), 
which states that PM tasks employing focal PM cues rely on automatic spontaneous retrieval 
processes (see Einstein et al., 2005, for empirical support) and thus, would predict that there 
should be no cost related to performing PM task visible on the ongoing trials. 
 
Individuals with dyslexia had significantly slower RTs compared to individuals without 
dyslexia when responding to PM cues and ongoing trials. This is in line with the double-deficit 
hypothesis of dyslexia (e.g. Wolf and Bowers, 1999; see Chapter 2 for more details) which 
states that there is a processing speed deficit in individuals with dyslexia. Also, the results 
revealed that individuals with dyslexia focally fixated on the stimuli significantly more 
compared to controls. This could mean that individuals with dyslexia tried to compensate for 
their attentional deficit by monitoring the screen significantly more compared to controls, and 
this could have resulted in there being no PM deficit found. Since larger number of eye-
fixations could be indicative of a greater allocation of attentional resources by individuals with 
dyslexia in order to compensate for an attentional deficit. However, this is debatable, as PM 
tasks with focal cues strongly encourage spontaneous retrieval processes which rely on the PM 
cue for the retrieval of the PM intention (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). This type of retrieval has 
been argued to be automatic (McDaniel, Einstein & Rendell, 2008) and thus, it is less likely for 
participants to rely on conscious monitoring under focal task conditions. Thus, if this is the case, 
why were there more eye fixations recorded in the dyslexic group? It may be possible that 
individuals with dyslexia relied more on monitoring processes compared to controls, who relied 
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more on spontaneous retrieval resulting in fewer eye fixations. This could be a form of coping 
strategy employed by individuals with dyslexia in order to avoid PM failure. This type of 
strategy is in line with the proposed by Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) conscious compensation 
(CC) used by individuals with dyslexia. 
 
Moreover, Marsh, Cook and Hicks (2006) suggested that each participant decides, before 
starting the task the level of attentional resources to allocate on the basis of the perceived 
difficulty of the task. Thus, it is also possible that individuals with dyslexia perceived this task 
as more difficult than controls. As a result, they may have decided to allocate more attentional 
resources, by employing monitoring processes as a coping strategy in order to perform well on 
this task and mask a PM deficit. Nevertheless, if participants with dyslexia relied more on 
monitoring processes, then one could argue that individuals with dyslexia should have a poorer 
performance on either the PM or ongoing task (or both tasks), as they have been reported to 
struggle in cognitively demanding tasks (e.g. Nicolson and Fawcett, 1990; for a discussion see 
Chapter 2), but no interaction effects were found. Performing an ongoing task and monitoring 
for PM cues could be argued to be cognitively demanding. According to Marsh, Hicks & Cook 
(2005) if both tasks (ongoing and PM) use the same domain (e.g. semantic as it was the case in 
this experiment) the cognitive resources available for this type of processing have to be shared 
and this will result in a poorer  performance showing either on the ongoing, PM or both tasks. In 
addition, if one was employing monitoring processes to perform this PM task, it would add to 
the cognitive demand and would require additional attentional resources and WM capacity. 
Both of these types of capacities have been found to be deficient in dyslexia (e.g. Smith-Spark, 
Fisk, Fawcett & Nicolson, 2003; Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007; Varvara et al., 2014; see Chapter 
2).  
 
Nevertheless, the results of this study did not show that there were any performance related 
differences between dyslexics and controls on either the PM or ongoing tasks. Thus, it is 
possible that individuals with dyslexia generally took significantly longer to perform the 
ongoing and PM tasks, in order to compensate for the capacity related deficit. It might be 
argued that if there was a time limit to perform the ongoing task, PM failures could become 
visible in individuals with dyslexia. This seems to be a more plausible explanation of the results 
in contrast to previously suggested problem with processing speed of the stimuli. Since 
individuals with dyslexia had slower processing speed, they should have similar numbers of eye 
fixations in comparison to control participants, but show longer dwell times. Supposing that it 
takes longer for participants with dyslexia to process the stimuli cognitively, they would not 
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necessarily need to fixate their eyes significantly more times compared to controls, but could 
just fixate them in a specific point and dwell on it while cognitive processing takes place. 
However, this was not the case. Individuals with dyslexia were found to have significantly more 
eye fixations as well as longer mean dwell times. Thus, it is possible that participants with 
dyslexia generally took longer to respond to the tasks, not only due to slower processing speed 
but that they also tried to consciously compensate for their PM deficits (this is in line with CC 
hypothesis; Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990). Namely, a greater amount of monitoring was performed 
by dyslexic individuals to compensate for PM deficit resulting in similar to controls PM 
performance. Since greater monitoring of the stimuli provides greater chances of PM intention 
retrieval as the embedded in the ongoing task PM cue is more likely to be recognised as 
associated with the intended action. 
 
6.1.2. Study 5: Non-focal prospective memory target 
 
6.1.2.1. Introduction 
 
Despite no deficits being found on a focal task, it was decided to explore event-based PM 
further using non-focal PM design in order to create conditions where it is more difficult for 
individuals with dyslexia to use conscious compensation (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990). It was 
thought that this might reveal PM deficits in dyslexia. Therefore, a non-focal event-based PM 
design was used in order to see whether limiting the use of conscious compensation would 
result in a PM deficit being revealed. In line with the multiprocess view (McDaniel & Einstein, 
2000) non-focal PM tasks are more difficult as they require more monitoring processes in 
comparison to focal PM tasks, which can rely on spontaneous retrieval processes (see Chapter 
1). Thus, the non-focal type of event-based PM task should make the use of conscious 
compensation for individuals with dyslexia more difficult. The inability to consciously 
compensate for the cognitive deficits present in dyslexia (e.g. attention, SAS, WM or EF; 
Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007; Varvara et al., 2014; see Chapters 2) might thus reveal PM deficits. 
In addition, if individuals with dyslexia employ conscious compensation, it is likely that this 
would be to a lesser extent when compared to the focal design, as cognitive resources would be 
more occupied by the non-focal task, than in the focal task. This is due to the non-focal task 
encouraging less processing of the PM cue and thus, employing more monitoring processes in 
order to successfully complete the task i.e. switch from the ongoing task to the PM task when 
encountering the PM cue. These monitoring processes have been reported to draw on cognitive 
resources such as resource-demanding attentional processes, which are allocated by the 
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executive attentional systems e.g. SAS (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). The SAS and attention 
(visou-spatial and auditory) processes have been found to be deficient in dyslexia (e.g. Smith-
Spark & Fisk, 2007; Varvara et al., 2014). Other researchers reasoned that individuals with 
dyslexia may have fewer attentional resources to bring to bear (e.g. Facoetti et al., 2000; Hari & 
Renvall, 2001). Therefore, conscious compensation processes may be necessary for individuals 
with dyslexia in order to perform at similar levels to controls. This may be especially important 
in a non-focal PM task as greater attentional resources for monitoring are needed. If conscious 
compensation processes are prevented due to insufficient or deficient attentional resources, 
performance on the task could be impaired. 
 
The current study therefore employed an experimental task investigating event-based PM with a 
non-focal PM cue. This experiment’s design mirrored very closely the focal experiment but 
employed a non-focal PM cue instead of a focal one. Thus, the processing of the ongoing task 
did not trigger or encourage processing of the features relevant to the PM task. The key feature 
of the ongoing task involved the semantic recognition of drawings (the same task as in the focal 
condition - judging whether there are more pictures representing living vs. non-living objects), 
but the PM task was based on the perceptual characteristics of the pictures. Namely, participants 
had to look for the pictures which had an outer line in the shape of a circle (see Appendix 5 for 
the stimuli). The order of instructions and blocks was the same as in the focal experiment and is 
represented in Figure 1. This task fulfilled the requirement of a non-focal task as there was no 
overlap between the information related to the ongoing task and the features of the PM cue that 
had been encoded (Gordon et al., 2011). In addition, the exact PM cues were not shown to 
participants during the instructions phase (which occurred 20 minutes before the PM task was 
presented) and thus it can be assumed that this task encouraged the use of monitoring processes 
even more. It was hypothesised that individuals with dyslexia would display significantly lower 
accuracy on PM trials in this non-focal event-based PM task compared to age- and IQ-matched 
control participants without dyslexia. It was also hypothesised that a cost to the ongoing task 
performance would be visible for all participants and that this would be even greater in 
individuals with dyslexia compared to controls. 
 
6.1.2.2. Method 
 
6.1.2.2.1. Participants 
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The same selection criteria were used as in the focal experiment. A total of 43 university 
students between 18 and 35 years old took part in this non-focal design. Twenty-two of those 
participants were individuals with dyslexia and twenty-one without dyslexia. The two 
participant groups were matched for their age and IQ. Participants’ literacy skills were assessed 
using literacy measures (for more details about the general participant matching procedure, 
please see Participants section of Chapter 4). The descriptive statistics and unrelated t-tests 
comparing the two participant groups on literacy and short-form IQ measures are displayed in 
Table 14.
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 Table 14: Descriptive statistics for gender and age and t-tests on literacy screening measures and short-form IQ for the non-focal experiment. 
       
Measure 
   
Gender 
 
 
 
Age (years) 
  
WORD 
Spelling 
Age 
  
WORD Spelling 
Raw Score 
  
DAST NWR 
Score 
  
WAIS-IV 
Short-form IQ 
 
Group 
 
  
Male 
 
Female 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
 
 
  
N< 17 years 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Controls 
(N = 22) 
 
 
  
4 
 
18 
  
24.86 
 
5.34 
 
 
  
0 
  
45.23 
 
1.80 
  
93.41 
 
2.79 
  
109.08 
 
8.19 
 
Dyslexics 
(N = 21) 
 
  
7 
 
14 
  
24.95 
 
3.91 
 
 
  
10 
  
41.29 
 
3.84 
  
79.52 
 
11.80 
  
110.85 
 
9.40 
           
Independent samples t-test 
           
t 
 
df 
 
p 
  
t 
 
df 
 
p 
  
t 
 
df 
 
p 
           
4.28 
 
 
28.09 
 
< .001 
  
5.26 
 
22.13 
 
< .001 
  
.660 
 
41 
 
.513 
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6.1.2.2.2. Materials 
 
The materials used for this experiment were the same as in the focal experiment except that 
different stimuli were used. The same selection criteria were used for selecting the stimuli from 
Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) pool of drawings. The only difference in the selection 
procedure of stimuli for the non-focal experiment was that in Block 2 there was one round 
object (where the outer line of the drawing was in a shape of a circle) which belonged to the 
living category (drawing of an orange) and one that belonged to the non-living category 
(drawing of a button). These two pictures can be seen in Appendix 5. The remaining 24 
drawings (12 from the living category and 12 from the non-living) did not represent any round 
objects or did not have any outer lines of the drawings in the shape of a circle. Please see the 
Materials section for the focal experiment for further details about the materials used. The tests 
performed to match stimuli can be seen in Appendix 2. 
 
6.1.2.2.3. Design 
 
See section 6.1.1.2.3. 
 
6.1.2.2.4. Procedure 
 
Exactly the same procedure was followed as in the focal experiment except that there was a 
different type of PM cue. Namely, a non-focal type of PM was used and participants were told 
to look for a round object (a picture which had an outer line in the form of circle) and press the 
“B” button when they saw it. Participants were shown examples of such objects, but the actual 
PM cues were not shown to participants before the task. 
 
6.1.2.3. Results 
 
6.1.2.3.1. Excluded participants 
 
Two members of the control group were removed from the data set and replaced due to showing 
literacy characteristics that were not in the adult range. Also, three participants whose IQ was 
below 90 were removed from the analysis. The information provided in the Participants section 
does not include these participants.  
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6.1.2.3.2. Prospective memory trials 
 
6.1.2.3.2.1. Accuracy 
 
The results from the unrelated t-test performed on the PM accuracy data (%) revealed that there 
was a non-significant difference between participants with dyslexia (M = 71.43, SD = 28.82) 
and without dyslexia (M = 77.84, SD = 24.68), t (41) = .785, p =.437. 
 
6.1.2.3.2.1.1. Corrected accuracy 
 
The reanalysis of the PM accuracy (%) in which PM trials with no responses to PM trials in 
which participants did not fixate their eyes PM cues showed no significant differences between 
dyslexics (M = 78.02, SD = 29.20) and controls (M = 81.82, SD = 25.63), t (41) = .454, p =  
.652. 
 
6.1.2.3.2.2. Reaction time 
 
The independent samples t-test performed on the RT (ms) data from correct PM responses 
showed that there were non-significant differences between participants with dyslexia (M = 
1362.98, SD = 679.32) and participants without dyslexia (M = 1085.80, SD = 426.86), t (41) = 
1.69, p =.100. 
 
6.1.2.3.3. Ongoing trials accuracy and reaction time 
 
The results in Table 15 show descriptive statistics for accuracy and RT data for correct ongoing 
responses in each block. 
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Table 15: Descriptive statistics for accuracy and RT data of ongoing trials in Blocks 1 and 2 of 
non-focal PM paradigm. 
 
 Accuracy (%)  RT (ms) 
 Controls  Dyslexics  Controls  Dyslexics 
 
Type of Trial 
M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Ongoing  
(Block 1) 
 
96.59 3.25  96.07 4.17  1469.40 454.15  2113.64 897.80 
Ongoing  
(Block 2) 
95.77 3.85  95.50 6.50  1586.67 403.17  2323.68 937.98 
 
 
A 2 x 2 mixed measures ANOVA was used to compare the accuracy (%) of individuals with 
and without dyslexia on the ongoing trials in Blocks 1 and 2. It showed a non-significant effect 
of both participant group, F (1, 41) = .129, p = .722, ηp
2
 = .003. and block type, F (1, 41) = 
.641, p = .428, ηp
2
 = .015. There was also a non-significant interaction between the two factors, 
F (1, 41) = .021, p = .885, ηp
2
 = .001.  
 
The same analysis conducted on the RT data showed a significant main effect of participant 
group, F (1, 41) = 10.70, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .207. Inspection of the means indicated that participants 
with dyslexia were significantly slower when correctly responding to ongoing trials across 
Blocks 1 and 2 compared to controls. There was also a significant main effect of block type, F 
(1, 41) = 10.88, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .210. Inspection of means indicated that overall both participant 
groups were significantly slower when correctly responding to the ongoing trials in Block 2 
compared to Block 1. There was no significant interaction between the two factors, F (1, 41) = 
.874, p = .355, ηp
2
 = .021. 
 
6.1.2.3.4. Task importance 
 
As in Study 4, a Chi-square test of the significance of the difference in proportions was used 
and showed that participants with or without dyslexia were not significantly more likely to place 
more importance on the ongoing or PM trials of Block 2, Χ2 = .024, df = 1, p = .876. The 
frequency counts for both participant groups are displayed in Table 16. 
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Table 16: Frequency counts representing importance placed on the different tasks by dyslexics 
and controls in the non-focal design. 
 
 Participant group 
Type of task Controls  Dyslexics 
PM 11  10 
Ongoing 11  11 
 
 
6.1.2.3.5. Eye-tracker data 
 
6.1.2.3.5.1. Noticing failure analysis 
 
Participants with dyslexia (M = 8.33, SD = 10.70) did not differ significantly compared to 
controls (M = 5.68, SD = 7.45) in terms of the percentage of total PM cues on which they have 
not fixated their eyes and to which they did not respond correctly, t (41) = .947, p = .349. There 
were also no significant differences between participants with dyslexia (M = 14.29, SD = 21.39) 
and controls (M = 11.93, SD = 15.18)  in terms of the percentage of total PM cues on which they 
have not fixated their eyes but still responded to them correctly, t (41) = .418, p =  .678. 
 
6.1.2.3.5.2. Number of fixations and dwell time 
 
6.1.2.3.5.2.1. Prospective memory stimuli 
 
An unrelated t-test showed that dyslexics (M = 23.43, SD = 8.12) fixated their eyes on PM cues 
significantly more compared to controls (M = 18.23, SD = 6.82), t (41) = 2.28, p = .028. There 
were non-significant differences between individuals with dyslexia (M = 300.91, SD = 122.68) 
and controls (M = 254.88, SD = 96.27) in them of mean dwell time (ms) on PM cues, t (41) = 
1.37, p = .177. Nevertheless, inspection of means indicated that there were some differences in 
mean dwell times of dyslexics and controls. Dyslexic participants dwelled more than controls 
and this was in line with the previous experiment (focal). 
 
6.1.2.3.5.2.2. Ongoing stimuli 
 
The results in Table 17 show descriptive statistics for number of fixations and mean dwell time 
data for ongoing stimuli responses in Block 1 and Block 2. 
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Table 17: Descriptive statistics for the number of eye fixations and dwell times for ongoing 
stimuli in Blocks 1 and 2 of the non-focal design. 
 
 
Means 
 
Number of fixations 
  
Mean dwell time (ms) 
 
 
 
Controls 
  
Dyslexics 
  
Controls 
  
Dyslexics 
 
Type of Trial 
 
M 
 
SD 
  
M 
 
SD 
  
M 
 
SD 
  
M 
 
SD 
Ongoing  
(Block 1) 
 
395.36 138.29  609.14 238.93  297.95 94.09  472.97 235.75 
Ongoing  
(Block 2) 
402.45 137.95  625.24 250.63  300.71 84.27  499.95 240.50 
 
 
A mixed measures ANOVA was used in order to compare the number of eye fixations made by 
dyslexics and controls on the ongoing stimuli in Blocks 1 and 2. The results showed a 
significant main effect of participant group, F (1, 41) = 14.03, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .225. It could be 
noted after the inspection of means that individuals with dyslexia fixated their eyes on the 
ongoing stimuli in Blocks 1 and 2 significantly more compared to controls. The effect of block 
type was not significant, F (1, 41) = .573, p = .453, ηp
2
 = .014 which showed that both 
participant groups did not differ significantly in the numbers of eye fixations on the ongoing 
stimuli in Block 1 compared to Block 2. There was no significant interaction between 
participant group and block type, F (1, 41) = .086, p = .770, ηp
2
 = .002.  
 
The mixed measures ANOVA conducted on mean dwell time (ms) data revealed a significant 
main effect of participant group, F (1, 41) = 12.48, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .233. The inspection of means 
showed that dyslexics dwelled significantly longer on the ongoing stimuli in Blocks 1 and 2 
together compared to controls. The effect of block type was not significant, F (1, 41) = 1.49, p = 
.229, ηp
2
 = .035 which indicated that both participant groups did not differed significantly in the 
length of dwell time on the ongoing stimuli in Block 1 compared to Block 2. There was no 
significant interaction between participant group and block type, F (1, 41) = .988, p = .326, ηp
2
 
= .024. 
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6.1.2.4. Discussion 
 
The results from this event-based PM experiment employing a non-focal PM cue did not show 
any difference in performance accuracy on the PM task between participants with dyslexia and 
age- and IQ-matched controls without dyslexia. Thus, the group hypothesis was not supported.  
 
The RT data showed that participants with dyslexia were significantly slower at responding to 
the ongoing trials (in Block 1 and Block 2). This is in line with the double-deficit hypothesis of 
dyslexia (e.g. Wolf and Bowers, 1999; see Chapter 2) which states that there is a processing 
speed deficit in individuals with dyslexia. Also, all participants were significantly slower when 
responding to the ongoing trials of Block 2 compared to the ongoing trials of Block 1. This 
shows that there was a cost visible in the RT data reflecting the fact that participants have to 
perform the additional non-focal PM task. This is in line with the multiprocess theory of PM 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 2000), which states that PM tasks with non-focal PM cues are more 
likely to rely on monitoring processes which are not automatic and draw on attentional 
resources, leading to a slowing of responses on the ongoing task (see Einstein et al., 2005, for 
empirical support). 
 
It was also found that participants with dyslexia had significantly more eye fixations and longer 
dwell times on the ongoing stimuli compared to controls. Similarly to the focal experiment, this 
could be interpreted as indicating that the cost related to performing the PM task was even 
greater in participants with dyslexia. It may be also suggested that because participants with 
dyslexia monitored more, this has resulted in a PM performance similar to controls, as 
monitoring has been claimed to improve PM performance (Smith, 2003). This argument is 
related to the CC hypothesis in dyslexia (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990). Namely, it is possible that 
in line with the CC hypothesis, individuals with dyslexia consciously compensated in this 
experiment by employing more monitoring processes. This could in turn result in non-
significant differences between the two groups in terms of accuracy of performance, as 
participants with dyslexia were able to consciously compensate for their cognitive deficits (e.g. 
attention/SAS/WM/EF; Hari & Renvall, 2001; Varvara et al., 2014; see Chapter 2). If 
individuals with dyslexia did not have enough executive resources available to perform this 
task, monitoring the screen more compared to controls should have resulted in worse accuracy 
on PM or ongoing trials because monitoring processes are capacity consuming (Einstein et al., 
2005). However, no accuracy related deficit was found in individuals with dyslexia compared to 
controls. Thus, it is possible that the non-focal task failed to prevent conscious compensation 
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enough to reveal a PM deficit in dyslexia. The only difference that was found was related to 
RTs, with dyslexic individuals having greater RTs compared to controls. Therefore, it can be 
argued that if there was a time limit in each of the trials, adding a time pressure to performance, 
or if the task was more cognitively demanding (using more resources), it is possible that 
individuals with dyslexia would not be able to employ conscious compensation processes to 
compensate for any PM deficit e.g. Nicolson and Fawcett (1994). 
  
No direct comparison between the focal and non-focal tasks can be made, as different samples 
were used. It could be that the non-focal task as well as the focal task were simply not 
cognitively demanding enough for the PM deficit to show in individuals with dyslexia. This is 
in line with the general line of argument presented by Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) who stated 
that cognitive deficits in dyslexia are visible on more difficult tasks. It is also possible that there 
is no event-based PM deficit in dyslexia. 
 
6.1.3. General discussion (cue focality) 
 
The results did not reveal event-based PM problems in dyslexia under focal and non-focal task 
conditions. There were also no significant group differences in the accuracy of performance on 
the ongoing trials. A cost to the ongoing task performance was found in both tasks (focal and 
non-focal). Overall, participants were slower at responding to the ongoing trials in the PM block 
compared to the baseline block. It was also found that participants with dyslexia focally fixated 
more on all types of stimuli relative to controls. 
 
The relationship between the ongoing task and the PM cue can differ. According to the 
multiprocess view (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000), the demands and the nature of the ongoing 
task have an effect on the degree of processing of the PM cue. Moreover, the relationship 
between the characteristics of the ongoing task and the PM cue are important in determining 
which processes will support PM. According to the multiprocess theory, a focal PM cue is more 
likely to lead to automatic spontaneous retrieval processes and a non-focal PM cue is more 
likely to involve monitoring processes which employ the strategic attentional resources needed 
for monitoring for the cue (see Einstein et al., 2005, for empirical support). Studies (e.g. Marsh 
et al., 2003) have shown that PM tasks with focal PM cues result in a better PM performance 
than tasks with non-focal PM cues. On the contrary, a study conducted by Rendell et al. (2007) 
showed that younger adults performed similarly well in their focal condition compared to their 
non-focal condition. The samples of controls used in the current experiments were young adults 
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and the results from the focal and non-focal experiments (described in this chapter) tend to 
support the findings of Rendell et al. (2007). There were only small differences in the PM 
accuracy figures between the focal and non-focal conditions of individuals without dyslexia 
(83% in the focal PM task versus 78% in the non-focal PM task; see Appendix 6 for 
juxtaposition of tables displaying means from focal and non-focal experiments). Nevertheless, 
the differences in the PM accuracy figures could be caused by other factors such as the choice 
of stimuli used within these experiments. Although the stimuli were matched on the basis of 
image agreement, picture familiarity, complexity, area of the objects in the image files and the 
number of black pixels used in each drawing across the blocks and across the types of different 
stimuli, some drawings used may be deemed as more attention grabbing than others. In 
particular, the drawing of an eye used as a PM cue in the focal experiment could be argued to be 
more attention grabbing than the drawings employed in the non-focal experiment which used a 
drawing of a button and orange as the PM cue. This could potentially create confounding 
problems resulting in the focal task being generally easier as it could have relied more on 
spontaneous retrieval due to a highly salient PM cue. Whereas the PM cue in the non-focal 
experiment may have been less salient. According to multiprocess theory of PM (McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2000) salient PM cues are more likely to result in automatic retrieval of the PM 
intention compared to less salient PM cues which were argued to rely more on monitoring 
processes. Thus, the drawing of glasses used in the focal design as the second PM cue could be 
argued to be less salient and thus could result in monitoring processes being employed for the 
completion of this task. Smith et al. (2007) argued that PM tasks with salient PM cues should 
not result in cost to the ongoing task performance. Thus, if one would deem the drawing of the 
glasses used as a PM cue in the focal design as not salient, this could result in a cost to the 
ongoing task, as monitoring processes would have to be employed for successful PM 
performance. This may explain the cost to the ongoing task found in the focal design. 
 
Rendell et al. (2007) revealed an age related PM deficit which was significantly smaller in the 
focal condition compared to the non-focal condition. This finding showed that the PM of older 
adults was significantly better in the focal condition compared to the non-focal condition. Also, 
this reduction of age related differences in PM tasks employing a focal PM cue relative to a 
non-focal PM cue was not attributable to a sacrifice of performance on the ongoing task. The 
reduction of PM performance related to aging has been claimed to occur due to a decline of 
attentional resources in older adults (McDaniel et al., 2008). In line with this thinking it was 
hypothesised that individuals with dyslexia should show a PM deficit compared to controls and 
that this deficit should be more profound in the non-focal condition compared to the focal 
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condition. Even though the current investigation employed young adults and not older adults, 
individuals with dyslexia have also been found to have attention related deficits (e.g. Hari & 
Renvall, 2001; see Chapter 2). Such task-related difference was reflected in the results of the 
current investigation. There were no differences found in the accuracy of PM between 
individuals with and without dyslexia in the non-focal experiment. Nevertheless, the 
comparison of PM accuracy between the focal and non-focal designs revealed that the dyslexic 
individuals showed a larger reduction in accuracy from the focal to non-focal task (10%) 
relative to controls (5%).
1
 This shows that the results point in the same direction as hypothesised 
on the basis of the Rendell’s et al. (2007) study. However, despite being twice the magnitude, 
the difference is too small to be interpreted as having any significance. Also, focality was not a 
within-subjects factor and therefore this difference could not be investigated any further. 
 
It is possible that the event-based PM tasks used in Studies 4 and 5 were not cognitively 
demanding enough for the PM deficit to show in individuals with dyslexia or it may be that 
there is no PM deficit in event-based PM tasks. This is in line with the findings from the MIST 
(Study 3) which did not indicate PM difficulties in adults with dyslexia on event-based PM 
tasks but instead suggested deficits on time-based PM tasks. In Study 2 (PMQ) the participants 
themselves have also recognised that the most frequent PM failures (most significant difference 
between the two groups indicating largest PM deficit) are related to internally cued PM tasks. 
Time-based PM tasks depend strongly on internal cueing whereas event-based PM tasks involve 
external cues acting as a reminder (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990). Thus, these findings from the 
PMQ also indicated a greater time-based PM difficulty in individuals with dyslexia. This is also 
consistent with the argument that the task needs to be cognitively demanding for individuals 
with dyslexia to show a PM deficit. Time-based PM tasks have been argued to require more 
self-initiated monitoring compared to event-based PM tasks, which rely more on automatic 
retrieval processes (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990). The self-initiated monitoring is more 
cognitively demanding than automatic spontaneous retrieval processes (Einstein et al., 2005). 
Thus, it is possible that the ongoing tasks that were used in Studies 4 and 5 were not cognitively 
demanding enough to unmask any PM deficits in adults with dyslexia (Nicolson & Fawcett, 
1990; already described in Chapter 2). 
 
                                                     
1
 Nevertheless, this is not a within-subject factor and therefore a firm conclusion cannot be drawn from 
this. The overlap in participants between focal and non-focal experiments (N=27) was insufficient to 
conduct a three-way ANOVA. Please see Appendix 6 for the juxtaposition of the focal and non-focal 
means tables. 
 172 
 
Smith (2000, 2001; cited in Smith, 2008) found that having an event-based PM intention has a 
negative impact on the RT of the ongoing task. Smith argued that holding an event-based PM 
intention while being engaged in the ongoing task resulted in slower overall RTs in a lexical 
decision task when compared to not having to hold this PM intention. This supports the findings 
from Studies 4 and 5 where the RTs of all participants on the ongoing trials were generally 
slower in the PM block compared to the baseline block. Thus, it could be argued that these 
results supported the PAM theory (Smith, 2003) which argues that monitoring processes are 
employed in all event-based PM tasks and this may result in a cost to the ongoing task 
performance, as costs were visible in both the focal and non-focal tasks. Nevertheless, the data
2
 
revealed greater RTs in Block 2 compared to Block 1 under the non-focal condition. The 
difference between the RTs in Blocks 2 and 1 in the non-focal condition was significant (.002) 
whereas, in the focal condition it was approaching significance (.054). This is in line with 
Scullin et al. (2010) who argued that performing a PM task with a non-focal cue is more likely 
to result in costs to the ongoing task compared to PM task with focal cue. In addition, this 
finding supports the multiprocess view that non-focal PM tasks are more difficult and require 
monitoring processes compared to focal PM tasks, which are easier and rely on spontaneous 
retrieval processes. Nevertheless, the multiprocess framework of PM also highlights other 
variables which might be important in deciding whether individuals rely on spontaneous 
retrieval or monitoring processes to perform a PM task. For instance, the importance of the PM 
task, the number of different PM cues and the time interval between intention formation and 
execution can play a part in deciding which processes underpin PM performance (Einstein et al., 
2005; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). Further research could explore these factors in dyslexia but, 
based on the results of studies 4 and 5, dyslexics would not seem to have an event-based PM 
deficit (although it is obviously difficult to make conclusions based on null results). 
 
6.2. Naturalistic and semi-naturalistic measures of event-based prospective memory 
 
The rationale for carrying semi-naturalistic and naturalistic designs in the current thesis was to 
see how dyslexia-related PM problems might play out in more naturalistic settings and in 
everyday life. Semi-naturalistic and naturalistic paradigms to study PM are described in section 
1.3.2. A number of semi-naturalistic and naturalistic investigations of event-based PM have 
been carried out previously to study PM. For instance, Masumoto et al. (2011) used a 
                                                     
2
 Please note that the trimmed data presented in Appendixes 3 and 4 did not show this effect of cost on the 
RT of ongoing trials. Breneires (2009) argues that the reason for this is that the data trimming procedure 
eliminates the cost of performing PM task visible in the performance on the ongoing trials. 
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naturalistic event-based PM task (among other tasks) in which two groups of older participants 
(in their 60s and 70s) had to call the experimenter after every breakfast, lunch and dinner for 
seven days. Dobbs and Rule (1987) employed a naturalistic and semi-naturalistic paradigms to 
investigate event-based PM and aging effects. They recruited five groups of participants ranging 
in age from 30 to 70+ years old. In the naturalistic task participants were required to note the 
exact date and time when they filled out the questionnaire that was given to them to complete at 
home. In the semi-naturalistic PM task participants needed to request a red pen when the 
experimenter asked them to draw a circle and a cube on a sheet of paper provided to them later 
on during the testing session (approximately after 20 minutes). 
 
Another example of a semi-naturalistic task is the PM task used by Schmitter-Edgecombe et al. 
(2009) in which participants were required to remember to ask the examiner, eight times over 
the course of an hour, for a pill bottle in order to give pain medication to a friend. Participants 
were required to remember to do this after completion of task-liking rating scales. There were 
eight task-liking scales which were administered to participants one at the time after each of the 
eight ongoing tasks used in this paradigm. Therefore, there were eight occasions during which 
participants needed to ask the experimenter for the pill bottle. This task resembled a semi-
naturalistic design as the PM tasks which closely mimicked everyday remembering but was 
administered in laboratory settings. This study found that individuals with mild cognitive 
impairment were significantly poorer at remembering prospectively compared to healthy control 
participants (older adults, age 50 or older). 
  
It was hypothesised that individuals with dyslexia would be less able to remember prospectively 
compared to individuals without dyslexia. This was based on the data from the questionnaires 
used in the initial studies (Studies 1 and 2) as well as from anecdotal and empirical evidence 
about adults with dyslexia discussed in Chapter 2 (e.g. Augur, 1985; Varvara et al., 2014). The 
naturalistic and semi-naturalistic investigations conducted in this research involved varying 
periods of time over which the PM had to be maintained. It was expected that longer time 
intervals would result in lower abilities to remember prospectively due to memory decay 
processes and that these would be worse for dyslexics than non-dyslexics. 
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6.2.1. Study 6: Semi-naturalistic design (40 minutes time interval) 
 
6.2.1.1. Introduction 
 
This event-based semi-naturalistic task required a response to a PM cue (“The End” appearing 
on the computer screen) 40 minutes after the start of the laboratory testing. The cue appeared at 
the end of an event-based PM task (Study 4) which as a whole lasted 40 minutes. This task was 
an event-based PM task as it included a reminder about the PM activity in the form of a cue in 
the environment which in this case was “The End” screen. The semi-naturalistic task used was 
based on naturalistic principles but took place in a laboratory setting. It was expected that 
individuals with dyslexia would be less able to remember prospectively compared to age- and 
IQ-matched controls. This was established on the basis of the results from Study 1 and literature 
(e.g. Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007; Einstein et al., 1997) described in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 which 
pointed towards PM problems in dyslexia. 
 
6.2.1.2. Method 
 
6.2.1.2.1. Participants 
 
There were two groups of participants, 26 adults with developmental dyslexia and 24 controls 
matched for age and IQ. This study was attached to Study 4 and therefore the same participants 
were used. Please see the Participants section of Study 4 for information about the participants. 
 
6.2.1.2.2. Materials 
 
The Eye-Tracker (SR Research EyeLink) experiment builder software was used to record 
responses as this task was embedded in Study 4 which used the eye-tracker. Also, instructions 
written in the form of a laboratory notice on A4 paper were used. The instructions informed 
participants to press the “A” when they saw  “The End” screen in order to save the data from the 
experiment. 
 
6.2.1.2.3. Design 
 
A score of one was given to participants who remembered to perform the PM task and a score 
of zero to those who did not.  
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A 2 x 2 Chi-square design was employed. The predictor variable in this study was the 
participant group (dyslexic vs. non-dyslexic) and the criterion variable was the response to the 
semi-naturalistic PM task (whether the participant remembered to press the keyboard or not). 
 
6.2.1.2.4. Procedure 
 
Informed consent was acquired from all participants prior to testing. In this study participants 
were informed at the beginning of the experimental session to press the “A” button on a keypad 
at the end of Study 4’s computer task. The participants were instructed that the results of the 
experimental task would not be saved if they did not press the “A” button at the end. The 
experimenter directed the attention of each participant to the instructions present in front of the 
participant in the form of a laboratory notice and reiterated those verbally. The notice stated that 
the “A” button needed to be pressed when participants saw “The End” screen. The writing “The 
End” appeared at the end of the experimental task in the centre of the screen and acted as the 
PM cue to trigger the intention of pressing the “A” button. Participants were debriefed at the 
end of the study. 
 
6.2.1.3. Results 
 
A Chi-square test of the significance of the difference in proportions was used to analyse the 
data. There was no significant difference between the observed and expected frequency of 
adults with dyslexia and without dyslexia in their PM task responses, Χ2 = .855, df = 1, p = 
.355. Dyslexics or controls were not significantly more likely to forget to respond to the PM 
cue. The frequency counts are presented in Table 18. 
 
 
Table 18: Frequency counts representing participants with and without dyslexia who 
remembered and did not remember to perform the 40 minutes event-based PM task. 
 
 Participant group 
 Controls  Dyslexics 
Did not remember 8  12 
Remembered 16  14 
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6.2.1.4. Discussion 
 
The results of a semi-naturalistic design investigating event-based PM memory with a delay of 
40 minutes between intention formation and possibility of execution did not yield statistically 
significant differences between dyslexics and controls. This may be because the task was still 
carried out in the laboratory and therefore had lower ecological validity compared to the 
naturalistic task. Nevertheless, the direction of the results suggested greater proportion of 
individuals with dyslexia did not remember to perform the PM task.  
 
Even though it is difficult to compare the semi-naturalistic event-based study to the 
experimental work on event-based PM, the PM deficit found in the semi-naturalistic task 
involving a delay of 40 minutes supports the results from Studies 4 and 5. Studies 4 and 5 
involved 20 minutes time intervals between intention formation and execution. It is possible that 
the semi-naturalistic task did not produce significant differences between individuals with 
dyslexia and controls as the time delay was too short, similarly to the event-based PM 
experiments (Studies 4 and 5). In addition, the results from the PMQ (Study 2) as well as MIST 
(Study 3) also pointed towards a lack of PM deficits in dyslexia on items involving shorter time 
intervals. Namely, the Short-Term Habitual scale of PMQ was the only scale on which 
participants with dyslexia did not report having problems compared to controls. Similarly in 
MIST, the 2-minute and 15-minute time delay measures did not indicate a deficit in  the 
dyslexia group.  
 
It is also possible that the difference between the dyslexic and control participants was not 
significant in the semi-naturalistic as it was conducted in the laboratory (similarly to the 
experimental work) and participants were aware of the phenomenon of being studied. 
Kvavilashvili (1987) stated that PM is not easy to investigate as participants are aware of the 
phenomenon that is being studied and this may compromise ecological validity and make the 
results uninterpretable. On the other hand, it could be argued that the data from the naturalistic 
investigation involving a longer delay (one week) would provide more ecologically valid 
results. 
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6.2.2. Study 7: Naturalistic design (one week time interval) 
 
6.2.2.1. Introduction 
 
In this task participants needed to respond to a text message sent to them one week after the 
laboratory-based session reported in Study 4 by placing a missed call to the experimenter. The 
text message acted as a PM cue, making this activity an event-based PM task. It was expected 
that this task would result in PM deficits in dyslexia, as indicated by the questionnaire data 
(PRMQ and PMQ). The results from the PMQ (Study 2) indicated that participants perceived 
themselves to have problems with Long-Term Episodic PM and not with Short-Term Habitual 
PM type. Thus, together with the literature described in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 (e.g. Swanson, 
2006; Hari and Renvall, 2001), it could be argued that individuals with dyslexia would have 
deficits in PM investigated though a naturalistic task involving a long time interval between 
intention formation and its execution. 
 
6.2.2.2. Method 
 
6.2.2.2.1. Participants 
 
There were two groups of participants, adults with developmental dyslexia and controls 
matched for age and IQ. The selection and participant group matching criteria were the same as 
in previous studies and are described in section 4.1.2.1.1. Descriptive statistics regarding the 
gender and age of participants as well as t-tests comparing the two participant samples on the 
literacy and short-form IQ measures can be seen in Table 19.
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Table 19: Descriptive statistics for gender and age and t-tests on literacy screening measures and short-form IQ. 
       
Measure 
   
Gender 
 
 
 
Age (years) 
  
WORD 
Spelling 
Age 
  
WORD Spelling 
Raw Score 
  
DAST NWR 
Score 
  
WAIS-IV 
Short-form IQ 
 
Group 
 
  
Male 
 
Female 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
 
 
  
N<17 
years 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Controls 
(N = 25) 
 
 
  
6 
 
19 
  
23.40 
 
4.70 
 
 
  
0 
  
44.88 
 
1.67 
  
92.20 
 
3.23 
  
107.18 
 
9.64 
 
Dyslexics 
(N = 26) 
 
  
5 
 
21 
  
23.69 
 
3.86 
 
 
  
17 
  
40.38 
 
3.83 
  
77.65 
 
11.75 
  
107.23 
 
7.90 
           
Independent samples t-test 
 
           
t 
 
 
df 
 
 
p 
  
t 
 
df 
 
p 
  
t 
 
df 
 
p 
           
5.47 
 
 
34.44 
 
< .001 
  
6.08 
 
28.89 
 
< .001 
  
.019 
 
49 
 
.985 
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6.2.2.2.2. Materials 
 
Instruction sheets were provided, along with an explanation of what was required in this 
naturalistic study. In addition, these included questions about mobile phone usage (see 
Appendix 8). A mobile phone with a new phone number and an email address was set up and 
dedicated for the sole use of this study. They were used to send and receive follow up emails, 
texts and calls (see Appendix 9). 
 
6.2.2.2.3. Design 
 
A 2 x 2 Chi-square design was employed. The predictor variable in this study was the 
participant group (dyslexic vs. controls) and the criterion variable was the response to the 
naturalistic PM task (whether the participant remembered to respond correctly by placing a 
missed call to the experimenter or not). 
 
6.2.2.2.4. Procedure 
 
Informed consent was acquired from all participants prior to testing. This task was administered 
at the end of the focal experiment. The experimenter explained to participants that this task was 
designed to test their memory for future intentions. Participants were informed that they would 
receive a text message (SMS) one week after the experiment. This text message contained their 
initials and participant number. The task involved remembering to call back the experimenter 
once the text message was received. Participants were requested to ring as soon as possible 
(preferably within 5 minutes) and to reply by calling the same telephone number from which the 
text message was received. In order to avoid any additional costs for the participants, they were 
told to wait for the phone to ring once and then end the call. Participants were asked not to make 
any reminders about the task e.g. calendar entries etc. This request was made in order for the 
task to rely purely on PM rather than on external reminders (important given the results of the 
PMQ). 
 
After the instructions were provided the participants’ understanding of the task requirements 
was checked. All participants reported that they understood what was required of them and 
explained the instructions to the experimenter. Participants were also asked whether their 
phones were pay monthly or pay-as-you-go phones in order to rule out all participants who may 
not be able to respond to the text message because of insufficient funds on their mobile phone 
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accounts. If a participant reported to have a phone on a pay-as-you-go tariff, he or she was 
asked whether there were long periods of time when they had no money on their own account to 
make phone calls, but nobody reported this to be the case. These questions ensured (as far as 
possible) that all of the participants were able to respond to the text message when they received 
it. Additional questions were asked with regards to their competency in using mobile phone for 
calls, text messages and returning a call to a text message sender and all of the participants 
reported being competent in doing those tasks. All individuals taking part in this study were also 
asked about their mobile phone checking habit and all of the participants reported being 
frequent checkers of their mobile phones (on average, both groups of participants reported 
checking their mobile phones more than ten times a day). Verbal information was given to 
participants with regards to follow up emails. Namely, participants were told that they would 
receive an email with questions about the study they had just done and they were asked to 
answer them and send back to the experimenter via email. Each participant received a follow up 
email one week after the text message to which they had to respond. 
 
After being texted, all participants were sent a follow-up email checking whether the text 
message was received and asking them to confirm whether they had remembered the 
instructions for this task as well as how important the task was for them. Also participants were 
asked about reasons for responding later than five minutes to make sure that it was not the case 
that someone remembered about responding to this task but had no possibility of responding 
e.g. they were already on the phone or in an area with no reception and nobody reported this to 
be the case. Finally, participants were asked to reflect back and estimate how many times they 
thought about this task within the week time interval. Participants were debriefed at the end of 
the study. 
 
6.2.2.3. Results 
 
Three participants (one control and two dyslexics) who took longer than two hours to respond to 
the text message were considered as having forgotten about the PM task.  
 
The results of Chi-square test revealed that there was a significant association between 
participant group and response to a one week delayed PM task, Χ2 = 4.25, df = 1, p = .039. 
Adults with dyslexia were more likely to not remember about the PM activity, than to remember 
it, whilst individuals without dyslexia were more likely to remember about the PM task and less 
likely not to remember it. Figure 2 represents frequency counts for the two participant groups. 
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Figure 2: The association between participant group and performance on the one week 
naturalistic PM task. 
 
 
 
The background data, acquired through the follow-up email, revealed a number of interesting 
findings. There were 23 dyslexic participants and 23 control participants who returned these 
questionnaires sent via email. First of all, the question from the follow-up email, asking 
participants to state whether they had remembered the instruction to respond to the text message 
by placing a missed call supported the findings from the Chi-square test carried out on the 
objective naturalistic measure. Namely, Fisher’s exact test3 revealed a significant association 
between participant group and self-reported remembering of the instruction, p = .023. The 
observed frequencies for this Fisher’s exact test are displayed in Table 20. This test revealed 
that individuals with dyslexia reported not remembering the instruction requesting them to 
respond to the text message significantly more commonly than controls, who more frequently 
reported remembering this instruction.  
                                                     
3
 The Fisher’s exact probability test was used as there were two categories in each of the two variables 
and two of the expected frequencies fell below 5, violating the rules of Chi-square. 
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Table 20: Observed frequencies representing self-reported remembering of the naturalistic PM 
instruction gained through follow-up email. 
 
 Participant group 
Type of task Controls  Dyslexics 
Remembered 22  16 
Did not remember 1  8 
 
 
An independent samples t-test revealed that individuals with dyslexia (M = 7.61, SD = 2.86) did 
not report themselves to differ significantly in the amount of importance placed on the PM task 
compared to controls (M = 7.83, SD = 2.04), when asked after the task was completed, t (44) = 
.297, p = .768. 
 
An unrelated t-test comparison showed that individuals with dyslexia (M = 5.39, SD = 2.02) did 
not report themselves to differ significantly in the number of times they thought about the PM 
task compared to controls (M = 6.35, SD = 1.64), t (44) = 1.76, p = .085. 
 
6.2.2.4. Discussion 
 
In this naturalistic design participants were less aware of the phenomenon studied as this 
investigation took place one week after the laboratory session under real life conditions and in 
an environment natural to the participant e.g. their own home. There were significant 
differences found between dyslexics and controls in this naturalistic design. Dyslexic 
participants were significantly more likely to forget to perform the PM task and controls were 
more likely to remember it. It may be claimed that there were more chances of forgetting the 
PM task in this naturalistic task compared to the semi-naturalistic PM task. Since having to 
remember about the PM task over one week creates more opportunities for memory decay 
processes to take place, compared a task where the PM intention needs to be held in memory for 
40 minutes. This reasoning is in line with memory decay theory which proposed that memory 
fades with time (Thorndike, 1914). Tobias (2009) argued that the accessibilities of PM 
intentions decay at the same rate as retrospective memories. Furthermore, it could be argued that 
if participants are more likely to forget about the PM activity, they are also more likely to forget 
what was being studied when they received a text message from an unknown number with their 
initials and participant number. The prevailing question however is why individuals with 
dyslexia seem to display a greater decay of PM over longer time intervals compared to controls. 
It is possible that this is due to failure in the retrospective component. 
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Another explanation supporting the findings that individuals with dyslexia have problems with 
event-based PM in naturalistic settings involving longer time intervals, could be based on the 
claim of Jorm (1983). According to Jorm (1983) individuals with dyslexia make less use of 
rehearsal processes. Rehearsal has been described as a control process (Atkinson & Shiffrin 
1968, 1971), as it relies on a successful use of rehearsal of the formed intention (e.g. 
periodically rehearsing the “to-be-remembered” intention or rehearsing the “to-be-remembered” 
task to oneself to memorise this intention). Thus, the reduced use of the rehearsal processes is a 
possible explanation for PM failures found in the current investigation. Furthermore, this 
explanation is in line with the phonological deficits in dyslexia (Snowling, 2000) which could 
result in reduced rehearsal. The claim related to reduced rehearsal could be also related to 
attentional monitoring (e.g. Smith & Bayen, 2004). Namely, if an individual rehearses the PM 
activity often, it could be stated that they also monitor more often for the PM cue. Thus, if 
individuals with dyslexia did not rehearse the PM intention as much as controls, this could lead 
to worse PM performance as it could be argued that they monitored less. However, Study 2 
(PMQ) of the current investigation revealed that individuals with dyslexia reported using even 
more PM aiding strategies such as rehearsal compared to controls. This on the other hand, could 
demonstrate a coping strategy aiming to compensate for the PM deficit. Nevertheless, the 
findings from the background data (from the follow-up email) did not reveal significant group 
differences in the self-reported numbers of PM intention rehearsals. Namely, participants with 
dyslexia did not differ significantly in the number of times they thought about the PM intention 
over the one week time interval. It can be argued that thinking about the task involves an 
element of rehearsal. On the contrary to the results of Study 2 where individuals with dyslexia 
indicated to use more rehearsal processes, the inspection of the means from the follow up email 
could indicate that on average individuals with dyslexia rehearsed the PM intention fever times 
than controls. This reasoning would support the claim of Jorm (1983) that individuals with 
dyslexia make less use of rehearsal processes. However, it is unknown whether participants 
used different amounts of rehearsal straight after the instruction about the naturalistic task was 
given to them (whilst still in the laboratory) and whether all of the participants did not, as 
instructed, use any reminders; as this could have impacted on the results. There is also a 
possibility that the reporting of the amount of times that each participant thought about the task 
was inaccurate, as this was based on self-reports that were provided retrospectively rather than 
being recorded at the time and participants may have forgotten rehearsing it. 
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The results of this naturalistic study are consistent with the literature regarding dyslexia and PM 
covered in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. Namely, individuals with dyslexia would seem to have problems 
with timekeeping, organisation (e.g. Augur, 1985; McLoughlin, Fitzgibbon & Young, 1994; 
Miles, 1982; Tallal, 1985; Turner, 1997) and planning (e.g. Levin, 1990; Torgeson, 1977; 
Gilroy & Miles, 1996). Organisation, timekeeping and planning are related to PM as there are 
overlaps between these processes and PM (Macan et al., 2010); e.g. missing an appointment 
could be seen as a problem with timekeeping, organisation or planning, but also with PM. 
 
6.2.3. General discussion (naturalistic measures) 
 
The results from the naturalistic and semi-naturalistic event-based studies conducted as a part of 
this chapter suggested that whether there is or there is not a difference between the two 
participant groups, may depend on the length of the time interval between intention formation 
and the possibility of its execution. This is in line with the results from the Prospective and 
Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ; Smith, Della Sala, Logie & Maylor, 2000) used 
in Study 1 and prospective memory questionnaire (PMQ; Hannon, Adams, Harrington, Fries-
Dias & Gibson, 1995) used in Study 2. In Studies 1 and 2 participants with dyslexia reported 
themselves to have a significantly poorer long-term PM compared to participants without 
dyslexia. These results were also confirmed by close friends and relatives in Study 1. In 
addition, long-term, self-cued or internally-cued types of PM tended to have the largest effect 
sizes.  
 
Another explanation is that the findings from the semi-naturalistic investigation produced non-
significant group differences because it was conducted in laboratory settings compared to the 
naturalistic study which produced significant group differences. This argument can be supported 
by Kvavilashvili (1987) who highlighted the impact of participant awareness about the studied 
phenomenon. Namely, participants were more likely to be aware of the studied phenomenon 
while in the laboratory compared to everyday life naturalistic conditions. In addition, there are 
many other day to day activities which draw on ones cognitive resources and this can also be an 
additional factor impacting on PM performance difference between these tasks. All of this 
together with the length of the time interval may have impacted on the results of this event-
based investigation of PM. 
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6.3. Summary 
 
The experimental work showed a cost to the ongoing task performance in PM blocks in both 
experiments (focal and non-focal). All participants were slower when responding to the ongoing 
trials in the PM blocks compared to the baseline blocks. This was interpreted in line with the 
literature (e.g. Smith, 2000; 2001, cited in Smith, 2008) as having to hold the PM intention in 
memory. The discrepancy between the RTs of Block 1 and 2 was more significant in the non-
focal condition (.002) compared to the focal condition (.054). It was argued that these results 
were more in line with the PAM theory (Smith, 2003) rather than with the multiprocess theory 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) However, different samples were used in both experiments and no 
direct comparisons could be made. The number of eye-fixations was generally significantly 
greater in adults with dyslexia indicating a possible coping strategy used for compensation of 
the PM deficit. 
 
There were no event-based PM deficits in dyslexia found using experimental paradigms 
involving 20 minute time intervals between intention formation and execution. There were also 
no group differences in the accuracy of responses to the ongoing tasks. The data from the semi-
naturalistic showed no significant group differences in the 40 minutes time interval employed in 
the semi-naturalistic event-based task. These results indicated that there were no event-based 
PM deficits in dyslexia when shorter-time intervals were used. However, it was argued that if 
more cognitively demanding tasks are used in the experimental work, event-based PM deficits 
may reveal itself in individuals with dyslexia (on the basis of the literature) indicating to 
problems with more cognitively demanding tasks (e.g. Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990), attention 
allocation (e.g. Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007) and attentional resources (e.g. Hari & Renvall, 
2001).  
 
The only dyslexia-related problem with event-based PM found in this chapter was in the 
naturalistic task involving one week delay. It was argued that this could be related to the 
prolonged length of time-interval used in this task and insufficient use of memory rehearsal 
processes by individuals with dyslexia. It is possible that the smaller number of memory 
rehearsals could result in worse PM memory in dyslexia especially in a task involving one week 
time delay as it created greater opportunities for memory decay processes taking place. 
 
The next stage of this thesis was to investigate time-based PM in dyslexia using experimental 
and everyday life conditions. This was to investigate if there are PM deficits in dyslexia when 
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time-based PM tasks are employed. In addition, a manipulation of cognitive load was employed 
by adding cognitively demanding secondary ongoing tasks (visuo-spatially-loaded and 
phonologically-loaded). This explored cognitive load to see if PM tasks with higher cognitive 
load resulted in a drop of performance on PM tasks in dyslexia. This design was decided upon, 
following the reasoning presented in this chapter that the ongoing tasks employed in the event-
based PM tasks were not cognitively demanding enough to result in a PM deficit in dyslexia. 
This claim was based on past research arguing that complex tasks result in task performance 
deficits in dyslexia when compared to controls (e.g. Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990; Smith-Spark & 
Fisk, 2007). 
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Chapter 7: Time-based prospective memory 
 
7.1. Study 8: Experimental manipulation of cognitive load 
 
7.1.1. Introduction 
 
Time-based PM comprises of an activity which one intends to perform at a certain time in the 
future (Kliegel et al., 2001). Time-based tasks typically involve performing a PM activity at a 
specified clock time or after a certain amount of time elapses (e.g. 3 minutes). Examples of 
time-based PM tasks from everyday life involve remembering to pick up a child from school at 
3pm or to return a call to a friend in half an hour. Under laboratory controlled conditions time-
based PM tasks, like event-based PM tasks, need to be embedded in an ongoing activity 
(Einstein & McDaniel, 1990). This ongoing activity is performed in order to mirror real life 
conditions where breaking out from one activity (e.g. writing an essay) needs to be performed in 
order to engage in the intended activity (e.g. turn off the cooker after a certain amount of time; 
Einstein & McDaniel, 1996).  
 
Time-based PM tasks involve monitoring processes as one needs to monitor for the appropriate 
time to perform the intended activity at the correct time (Einstein et al., 1995). However, there 
are no overt external PM cues reminding participants about PM activity or time monitoring 
behaviour (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). Time monitoring is usually measured by observations 
of head turns by participants to check a clock or by recording key presses to reveal a clock on a 
screen. It is important that the checking of the clock involves an overt behaviour thus the clock 
needs to be obscured from immediate vision when carrying out the ongoing task (Harris & 
Wilkins, 1982; Einstein et al., 1995). This type of time checking involved in time-based PM 
tasks resembles the monitoring model suggested by Harris (1984; Harris & Wilkins, 1982). 
Harris proposed that individuals only check periodically for the right conditions to execute the 
intended action as opposed to continuous monitoring which would be too demanding on ones 
attentional resources. The periodic checking for the right conditions to perform PM task follow 
the Test-Wait-Test-Exit (TWTE; Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960) procedure where the Test is 
the checking for the appropriate moment to perform the PM activity. Thus, a participant 
performing a time-based PM task involving checking of time would check the time initially at 
test an early point to avoid being too late to perform the task. Once they have learned it is too 
early to perform the PM task, they would continue with the ongoing task (the “wait” period) 
until the next time check and so on “test” until the correct time has elapsed for the PM intention 
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to be performed. Once the PM activity has been performed participants would stop monitoring 
(“exit”) the environment for the correct time or continue to do so if there is another PM task. 
Research (e.g. Einstein et al., 1995) has shown that this time checking is strategic and increases 
in frequency closer to the time of the appointed PM activity.  
 
A classic example of a time-based PM experiment is the Ceci and Bronfenbrenner (1985) study 
which investigated PM in 10 and 14 year old children. The time-based PM task was to take 
cupcakes out of the oven 30 minutes after being instructed to do so. While waiting for the 
cupcakes to be ready, children were engaged in a popular video game in an adjoining room. In 
this room there was a clock which allowed children to monitor the time. The authors were 
interested to see if the children remembered about the PM activity (i.e. to take out cupcakes 
from the oven after 30 minutes) and in the frequency and schedule of time monitoring activity. 
This study had an additional factor, namely the familiarity of the settings that the task was 
taking place. This factor was manipulated by Ceci and Bronfenbrenner where some children 
undertook this PM task in their own home (a familiar setting) and other children in laboratory 
settings (an unfamiliar setting). The results of this study showed that the unfamiliar laboratory 
setting led to higher PM performance (only one child forgot to take out the cupcakes from the 
oven) compared to performing the task at own home (42% of children either forgot to perform 
the PM activity or were late).  Children also tended to check the time more in the laboratory 
settings compared to home settings. This supports the claim that monitoring processes improve 
PM performance (Smith, 2003) as children in the Ceci and Bronfenbrenner study monitored the 
time more in the laboratory and their PM performance was also better in the laboratory. 
 
More recent studies (e.g. Einstein et al., 1995, 2005; Einstein & McDaniel, 1990) used a similar 
approach to study time-based PM under laboratory controlled conditions. For example, a study 
conducted by Einstein et al. (1995) required participants to press the F8 key every five minutes 
(six times as there were six five-minute segments to their experiment) whilst participants were 
engaged in a general-knowledge quiz (the ongoing task).  
 
One of the key features of time-based PM tasks is the extent to which self-initiated processes 
are involved in PM retrieval. Craik (1986) proposed a framework of memory where he 
suggested that memory tasks can be ordered by the extent to which they require self-initiated 
processes in memory retrieval. Based on this theory memory retrieval is more dependent on 
processes initiated by the individual when there are fewer memory cues. For instance, in a task 
which has little in the way of memory cues, one is more likely to use strategies helping one to 
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retrieve the information such as generating possible cues. Time-based PM tasks do not include 
any external cues which can aid the PM retrieval and thus require participants to initiate the 
retrieval themselves as no environmental event indicates the correct time for the performance of 
the intended action. Thus, according to McDaniel and Einstein (2007) at least laboratory based 
time-based PM is strongly self-initiated. Namely, one needs to actively monitor time for the 
appropriate moment to perform the intended action and this is based on self-initiated mental 
processes (d’Ydewalle, Bouckaert & Brunfaut, 2001). Thus, it can be argued that time-based 
PM tasks generally involve more self-initiated monitoring compared to event-based PM tasks 
relying more on automatic processes (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990).  
 
The claim that time-based PM tasks involve generally more self-initiated monitoring processes 
compared to event-based PM task was supported by PM studies investigating PM performance 
differences on time- and event-based tasks in different age groups (d’Ydewalle et al., 2001; 
Einstein et al., 1995; Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; Park, Hertzog, Kidder, Morrell & Mayhorn, 
1997). Namely, these studies indicated that time-based tasks showed age related deficits more 
consistently in comparison to event-based PM tasks. In addition, older adults have been found 
to perform significantly fewer time checks when performing time-based PM tasks (Einstein et 
al., 1995; Park et al., 1997). Einstein et al. (1995) argued that this occurred because of a 
problem with time estimation or a deficit in attentional resources in older adults.  
 
On the contrary, a meta-analysis performed by Henry, MacLeod, Phillips and Crawford (2004) 
found that there was no significant difference between time- and event-based PM tasks in terms 
of age related deficits. This meta-analysis only used experiments conducted under laboratory 
controlled conditions, but these employed a number of different paradigms, tasks and stimuli. 
According to Phillips, Henry and Martin (2008) establishing the extent of age related deficits in 
PM tasks is not simply a matter of the type of PM (event- or time-based), but rather the extent to 
which tasks rely on strategic monitoring, the complexity of the task and memory load. Thus, it 
may be the extent to which tasks rely on strategic monitoring processes which is responsible for 
these differences in age related deficits between time- and event-based PM paradigms reported 
in different studies.  
 
The findings of the meta-analysis conducted by Henry et al. (2004) are in line with the 
multiprocess view of PM (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) and the claims of Craik’s (1986) pivotal 
framework. This framework of memory stated that the fewer the cues are provided within a 
memory task the more the retrieval is dependent on processes initiated by the individual. On the 
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basis of this it could be argued that focal event-based PM would be the type of PM task to rely 
least on self-initiated processes as there are clear PM cues and processing is supported by the 
ongoing task. The non-focal event-based PM cues would involve more self-initiated retrieval as 
the PM cues are not so obvious (as they are not supported by the processing of the ongoing 
task). Moreover, the time-based PM tasks would be the most reliant on self-initiated cues as 
environmental event cues are removed and the participant needs to monitor time by pressing a 
button (with the clock usually not visible in laboratory paradigms). This is also supported by the 
multiprocess view of PM which states that non-focal event-based PM tasks require more 
strategic monitoring compared to focal event-based PM tasks. Namely, strategic monitoring is 
self-initiated. The meta-analysis conducted by Henry et al. (2004) indicated that time-based PM 
tasks require similar amounts of strategic monitoring as non-focal event-based PM tasks. This is 
related to the extent to which a retrieval of a PM intention is self-initiated. Time-based tasks 
require similar self-initiated processes as the non-focal event-based PM tasks. Since in both 
types of task one needs to actively engage in monitoring of the environment for subtle cues to 
perform the intended activity (either monitor for non-focal cues or an appropriate time). 
 
A low cognitive load in the ongoing task has been found to reduce age related deficits (e.g. 
Maylor, 1995). A study conducted by Martin and Schumann-Hengsteler (2001) investigated 
time-based PM in young and older adults. The authors manipulated the cognitive load of the 
ongoing activity. The study included three conditions with variations of the cognitive load of the 
ongoing task (low, medium and high). The PM task remained the same in all three conditions. 
The results of this study showed that PM performance was influenced by the cognitive load of 
the ongoing task. The authors of this study argued that PM performance is dependent on central 
processing capacities e.g. the CE (Martin & Schumann-Hengsteler, 2001). This study has also 
indicated that older adults had a very large deficit in PM in the high cognitive load condition. 
The finding showing a dramatic decrease in PM performance in older adults was interpreted to 
occur due to demands on cognition exceeding the resources available. The authors of this study 
argued that the extent of age related deficits in PM task is dependent on the extent to which a 
PM task makes demands on the processing resources of WM. These PM task demands are not 
only related to the PM activity but also to the overall task situation (including ongoing tasks). 
Martin and Schumann-Hengsteler concluded that limited WM resources are the underlying 
factor for inter-individual differences in PM tasks. 
 
Even though dyslexics cannot be directly compared to older adults, they may have a similar 
underlying problem with attentional resources and WM. Based on the findings from previous 
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studies it could be suggested that the PM deficit of individuals with dyslexia may be more 
subtle than in older adults, thus cognitively demanding tasks drawing heavily on attentional 
resources should reveal a PM deficit in individuals with dyslexia. This reasoning is in line with 
the CC hypothesis (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1994) which claimed that individuals with dyslexia can 
mask automatisation deficits in easier tasks, but not on more difficult tasks. In addition, 
attentional resources needed for time-based PM performance, in order to monitor the time, will 
have to be shared with the cognitively demanding ongoing tasks. McDaniel and Einstein (2000) 
stated that engaging or attention demanding ongoing tasks are likely to result in a demand for 
strategic monitoring resources. Strategic monitoring is based on self-initiated processes. A task 
which is reliant on self-initiated processing is more likely to be influenced negatively by 
manipulations of cognitive load as was found by Martin and Schumann-Hengsteler (2001). 
Thus, tasks employing ongoing activities involving high cognitive load could result in the 
strategic monitoring resources being insufficient for monitoring processes related to PM 
intention. Namely, if the ongoing task is engaging and demanding, the strategic monitoring 
resources could be used extensively and thus not enough monitoring resources could be left 
over for monitoring of time in order to perform the intended activity at the correct time. This 
could lead to worse PM performance in dyslexia in cognitively demanding PM tasks as 
individuals with dyslexia have been found to have deficits in WM (e.g. Smith-Spark et al., 
2003; Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). This reasoning is compatible with strategy deficits found in 
dyslexia (e.g. Torgeson, 1977; Levin, 1990). Namely, if individuals with dyslexia employ less 
efficient monitoring strategies, this could result in PM deficits as strategic monitoring has been 
argued to improve PM performance (Smith, 2003). 
 
Considering that time-based PM tasks involve high levels of self-initiated processes and the data 
from the PMQ questionnaire (Study 2) and MIST (Study 3) indicated a time-based PM problem 
in dyslexia, the primary aim of this investigation was to examine whether there were time-based 
PM memory problems in dyslexia using a classical laboratory paradigm. In addition, the 
predicted deficit was based partly on the age related deficit found in time-based PM tasks (e.g. 
d’Ydewalle, Luwel & Brunfaut, 1999; Martin & Schumann-Hengsteler, 2001). Namely, that 
time-based PM performance relies on monitoring processes which require attentional resources 
that are claimed to decline with age (e.g. Craik & Byrd, 1982). Therefore, time-based PM tasks 
might produce a PM deficit in individuals with developmental dyslexia because individuals with 
dyslexia also have been reported to have CE impairments (e.g. Jeffries & Everatt, 2004; Smith-
Spark et al., 2003; see Chapter 2 for discussion) and the CE is argued to be responsible for 
controlling the attentional system e.g. Baddeley (1986). The monitoring processes required for 
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time-based PM tasks rely on attentional resources (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) and deficits in 
attentional resources have been found in both populations (older adults and individuals with 
dyslexia). 
 
An experimental condition was created in order to investigate whether there were PM deficits in 
dyslexia in time-based PM paradigm. This condition (referred to as low cognitive load condition 
in this experiment) used a classical time-based experimental paradigm. In this task participants 
had to decide whether there were more pictures of living or dead well-known individuals as the 
ongoing task, and press the “A” button every three minutes from the start of the task as the time-
based PM task. 
 
The second main aim of this experiment was to investigate the effects of higher cognitive/WM 
load on PM performance in individuals with dyslexia compared to age- and IQ-matched 
controls. Considering problems with attention and WM in dyslexia (e.g. Smith-Spark & Fisk, 
2007) it is plausible to hypothesise a PM deficit in individuals with dyslexia compared to 
controls, especially in tasks involving greater cognitive/WM load. For this reason a 
manipulation of cognitive/WM load was introduced.  
 
The manipulation of cognitive/WM load involved one condition with low load and two versions 
of the high load condition, a phonologically-loaded and visuo-spatially-loaded. The low and 
high load conditions both employed primary ongoing tasks which involved deciding whether 
there were more living or dead celebrities shown on the screen. The PM task required a PM 
response to be provided every three minutes. Each of the two versions of the high ongoing task 
load condition employed an additional secondary ongoing task. One of the high ongoing task 
load conditions involved phonologically-based additional ongoing task and the other employed 
an additional visuo-spatial ongoing task. The two versions of the additional secondary ongoing 
task were used in order to investigate whether PM differences (if found) are evident on both 
non-phonologically and phonologically loaded ongoing tasks. The primary ongoing and PM 
tasks in both versions of the high ongoing task load condition were the same as in the low load 
condition. Both the phonologically-loaded and visuo-spatially-loaded secondary ongoing tasks 
used in the high ongoing task load conditions involved memory updating based on a similar 
principle to the letter updating task (Morris & Jones, 1990; also see Smith-Spark et al., 2003). 
The Morris and Jones letter updating task required participants to recall the six most recent 
consonants from lists of six, eight, ten and twelve items. Participants did not know how many 
items to expect. Thus, participants needed to first remember the six consonants which appeared 
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and then needed to drop the least recent consonant and replace it with a new consonant every 
time a new item exceeding the primary six consonants appeared (in trials in which there were 
more than six items). The last six consonants had to be recalled in the order in which they 
appeared. 
 
A very similar procedure to the one used by Morris and Jones was followed in the two versions 
of the high ongoing task load condition of the current study. In the phonologically-based 
additional ongoing task participants had to recall the last four correct answers to the primary 
ongoing task. The visuo-spatially-based secondary ongoing task involved recalling the last four 
positions of a red frame surrounding one of the pictures of well-known people in each trial. The 
visuo-spatial memory updating ongoing task created a demand on spatial memory as 
participants had to remember the locations of the pictures and recall them on a grid when 
prompted. The difficulty of both of these memory updating tasks was that participants did not 
know when to expect memory recall screens as this could be after four, five, six, seven or eight 
ongoing trials. Therefore, participants had to constantly update their memory to be able to 
correctly perform this task in addition to deciding whether there were more living or dead well-
known people presented on the screen. In addition to this participants had to monitor the time in 
order to perform a PM-related activity every three minutes. 
 
The high cognitive/WM load conditions involving additional memory updating ongoing tasks 
were hypothesised to result in greater decline in PM performance in individuals with 
developmental dyslexia compared to controls. This was hypothesised considering that PM 
performance is dependent on WM abilities (e.g. Smith et al., 2011) and WM has been found to 
be deficient in dyslexia. For instance Smith-Spark et al. (2003) compared the visuo-spatial WM 
of adults with developmental dyslexia to age- and IQ-matched adults without dyslexia and 
found that individuals with dyslexia had a significantly worse performance on dynamic spatial 
memory task under high memory updating load. The dynamic spatial memory task involved the 
recall of the location and order of the stimuli. In a different study Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007) 
demonstrated that adults with dyslexia had significantly lower complex span scores. The 
complex span task required participants to store and process the stimuli and thus suggested a 
domain-general CE impairment in dyslexia which was not restricted to phonological material. 
Following the reasoning presented by Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007) that there is a domain-
general CE deficit in dyslexia it was hypothesised that PM performance of individuals with 
dyslexia would be impaired in both versions of the high ongoing task load conditions (i.e. 
involving phonologically-loaded and visou-spatially-loaded ongoing activities). It could be 
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argued that the cognitive load created by the phonologically-based and visuo-spatially-based 
tasks would draw on domain-general CE resources, which are limited or deficient in dyslexia 
and that this would result in lower PM performance. This could be argued to be due to not 
enough cognitive resources left over to monitor the time and perform the primary ongoing and 
PM tasks. Such findings would support the claim of Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007) that there is a 
domain-general CE deficit in dyslexia.  
 
Nevertheless, if group differences were found in the phonologically-loaded high cognitive load 
condition, it could indicate phonological difficulties in dyslexia e.g. as stated by the 
phonological deficit hypothesis (Snowling, 1995). It could be argued that not only significant 
group differences on the phonologically-based secondary ongoing task would be indicative of 
this, but also group differences on the primary ongoing or PM tasks. Since, the phonologically-
based processing demands of the ongoing activity could interfere with PM or primary ongoing 
task performance in individuals with dyslexia. Namely, if there are phonological deficits in 
dyslexia, more attention would need to be allocated to the phonologically-based task in order to 
have a comparable to normal performance on this task. This in turn could lead to fewer 
cognitive resources being available to monitor the time and perform the PM and primary 
ongoing tasks.  
 
On the basis of the results from Studies 2 (PMQ) and 3 (MIST) as well as the literature (e.g. 
Jeffries & Everatt, 2004), it was hypothesised that individuals with dyslexia would have a time-
based PM deficit when compared to controls. Considering WM defects in dyslexia (e.g. Smith-
Spark & Fisk, 2007) and that PM performance is dependent on WM abilities (e.g. Smith et al., 
2011), it was also hypothesised that greater cognitive/WM load created by the means of ongoing 
task would result in greater PM deficits in dyslexics. It was assumed that regardless of the 
domain in which the load was created it would have a negative impact on task performance of 
adults with dyslexia. 
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7.1.2. Method 
 
7.1.2.1. Participants 
 
Data were collected from two groups of university students (total N = 49): adults with dyslexia 
and adults without dyslexia. All of the participants were native English speakers and aged 
between 18 and 35 years old. A total of 24 individuals with dyslexia and 25 without dyslexia 
were recruited. Similarly to previous studies conducted in this thesis participants with and 
without dyslexia were matched for age and IQ. The two participants groups were also 
differentiated on literacy measures. For more details about this please see section 4.1.2.1.1. The 
descriptive statistics and unrelated t-tests comparing the two participant groups are included in 
Table 21.
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Table 21: Descriptive statistics for gender and age and t-tests performed on literacy screening measures and short-form IQ.
       
Measure 
   
Gender 
 
 
 
Age (years) 
  
WORD 
Spelling 
Age 
 
  
WORD Spelling 
Raw Score 
  
DAST NWR 
Score 
  
WAIS-IV 
Short-form IQ 
 
Group 
 
  
Male 
 
Female 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
 
 
  
N<17 
years 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
Controls 
(N = 25) 
 
 
  
6 
 
19 
  
23.44 
 
4.51 
 
 
  
0 
  
45.36 
 
1.78 
  
93.20 
 
2.96 
  
110.24 
 
10.41 
Dyslexics 
(N = 24) 
 
  
6 
 
18 
  
24.67 
 
5.16 
 
 
  
12 
  
40.88 
 
3.66 
  
78.88 
 
9.81 
  
110.59 
 
9.71 
           
Independent samples t-test 
 
           
t 
 
df 
 
p 
  
t 
 
df 
 
p 
  
t 
 
df 
 
p 
           
5.42 
 
32.95 
 
< .001 
  
6.86 
 
27.00 
 
< .001 
  
.121 
 
47 
 
.904 
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7.1.2.2. Materials 
 
Three experimental conditions were created using E-Prime 2.0 Professional for Windows 
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Sharpsburg, PA). The first experimental condition involved 
an ongoing task and a PM activity. The ongoing task was to judge whether there was more 
living or dead famous individuals presented on the screen. The PM task involved pressing a 
button every 3 minutes. The second and third experimental conditions, in addition to the 
ongoing and PM tasks, involved a secondary ongoing task involving WM. One condition 
involved a phonologically-loaded WM ongoing task and the other conditions involved a visuo-
spatially-loaded WM ongoing task. Participants were allowed to check how much time passed 
since the start of the task. 
 
Participants sat in front of a 19” computer screen (Hanns.G HX191D) connected to a RM 8030 
PC. A 15” RM laptop was placed behind participants on a filing cabinet forming a part of the 
usual furnishing of the room. Participants responded to the task using a purpose-built push 
button box which had eight buttons. This push button box had eight buttons positioned in three 
rows with three buttons in the top two rows and two in the bottom row. The top two rows 
mimicked the two by three grid in which the stimuli were presented. These buttons were only 
used for the purpose of the visuo-spatial additional ongoing task (see below). The bottom row 
included two labelled buttons. The two labels were LIVING and DEAD and were colour coded 
(living - green; dead - red). The same colour coding was used in the instruction screens. This 
push button box was connected to both the PC on which the ongoing task was run and to the 
laptop (placed behind participants) on which PM responses had to be made. This allowed the 
clocks of the two computers to be synchronised. This was achieved by pressing a side button 
positioned at the top of the push button box which started the running of the two tasks (ongoing 
and PM) at the same time. Responses on the laptop placed behind participants were recorded 
using the laptop’s keyboard. 
 
The stimuli (24 celebrities; 12 living and 12 dead) were chosen on the basis of responses 
provided by a panel consisting of 26 native English speakers (all of whom were university 
students and British Citizens; 21 females, five males) between the ages of 18 and 35 years old 
(mean age = 21.96 years, SD = 4.75). The characteristics of the panel with regards to age, 
gender and occupation matched closely the characteristics of the participant group for this 
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experiment. Each person from the panel was asked to provide five very well-known living and 
five very well-known dead celebrities that would be the most recognised by people in the 
United Kingdom. The data from the panel was collected by the means of an online survey 
designed using the Qualtrics Research Suite (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). The most frequently 
occurring names within each list of celebrities (living and dead) were selected to form the 
stimuli. Twenty-four greyscale images of well-known celebrities which are well recognised by 
people living in United Kingdom were used (for names, see Appendix 7). These pictures were 
256 x 256 pixels in size and half of them showed living celebrities where the other half were 
deceased. There were 12 practise trials which employed the same stimuli as were used for the 
purpose of experimental conditions. All experimental conditions used the same stimuli. 
 
Instruction screens were used for the primary and secondary ongoing tasks and for the different 
PM tasks. The instructions for the primary ongoing tasks revealed to participants all of the 
famous faces used throughout the task. The phonologically-loaded ongoing task also employed 
a memory recall screen consisting of four rows each with two empty squares. The top row was 
labelled “least recent” and the bottom row was labelled “most recent”. The squares were 
highlighted in green when selected. The visuo-spatially-loaded ongoing task also employed a 
memory recall screen consisting of two rows each with three empty squares. The layout of the 
squares in the memory recall screen resembled the layout of grid in which the famous faces 
were shown in the primary ongoing task. This task employed the additional six buttons of the 
push button box also representing the same (two by three) layout of the ongoing task 
presentations. 
 
7.1.2.3. Design 
 
This experiment comprised of three conditions which manipulated cognitive/WM load. There 
was one condition which involved low cognitive load and two versions of a task with higher 
cognitive load (phonologically-loaded and visuo-spatially-loaded). In the low participants 
performed simple ongoing and PM tasks. Each of the two conditions representing higher 
cognitive load employed an additional ongoing task which increased the involvement of 
cognitive/WM resources. One involved a phonologically-loaded memory updating additional 
ongoing task and the other involved an additional visual-spatial memory updating ongoing task. 
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All three conditions involved primary ongoing and PM tasks. The responses to the primary 
ongoing task had to be provided on the PC placed in front of participants and four PM tasks to 
which responses had to be made on the laptop placed behind participants. The ongoing task 
presented on the PC consisted of ongoing trials where participants had to decide whether there 
were more living or dead celebrities within each trial. Each trial consisted of six pictures 
presented on a black computer screen in two parallel horizontal rows (three pictures in each 
row) with a 0.5cm space between each other. The order of the pictures on the screen was 
randomly assigned based on a random number allocation rule. Each trial consisted of either five 
pictures of living celebrities and one dead or four living and two dead and the opposite ways 
around (i.e. five-one, one-five, four-two and two-four). These splits were equated across all 
trials. The presentation of trials was randomised and there was a 30 second time limit to provide 
a response to each trial. If a response was provided before the 30 seconds had passed the task 
moved on to the next trials. The task also moved on to the next trial when there was no response 
provided within 30 seconds. The tasks in all three conditions were programmed to stop after 14 
minutes. The stimuli lists were looped so that if a participant got through all trials before 14 
minutes had elapsed, the list would start again from the beginning (in random order). This 
primary ongoing task involved a total of 212 trials in the low cognitive load condition and 150 
in the two versions of the task involving high cognitive load. The smaller number of ongoing 
trials in the two tasks involving high cognitive load was due to the additional phonologically-
/visuo-spatially-loaded trials of the secondary ongoing tasks. There were 12 practise trials with 
feedback in all three conditions. Each of the two versions of the high ongoing task load 
condition embedded two additional memory recall practise trials in the practise run. 
 
All three conditions involved a time-based PM task which included four PM activities where 
participants had to press an “A” key on the keyboard of the laptop placed behind them every 
three minutes i.e. at 3 minutes, 6 minutes, 9 minutes and 12 minutes from the start of the 
experiment. This task involved breaking out from the ongoing activity which was performed on 
the PC in front and turning around to perform the PM action i.e. press the “A” key at the 
appropriate time. Participants were not allowed to have their personal watches visible, but were 
able to check how much time had elapsed since the start of the experiment by pressing the space 
bar of the laptop placed behind them. There were no restrictions on how many times 
participants could check the time. This task was programmed to stop at the same time as the 
ongoing task (after 14 minutes excluding the practice trials and instructions). 
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The high load condition with the phonologically-loaded additional ongoing task involved the 
same primary ongoing and PM tasks as were employed in the low load condition. There was an 
additional (secondary) phonologically-based memory updating task which was embedded in the 
primary ongoing task. This secondary ongoing task involved remembering and providing the 
last four correct answers when prompted (e.g. living, dead, living, living). The answers had to 
be recalled in the same order in which they were initially provided. This task engaged memory 
updating processes as the memory recall screens appeared on the computer screen pseudo-
randomly, after four, five, six, seven or eight ongoing trials. There were 25 memory recall 
screens where the last four answers had to be provided and these were time limited to 40 
seconds per memory recall screen. 
 
The high load condition involving visuo-spatially-loaded additional ongoing task used the same 
primary ongoing and PM tasks as were employed in the low load condition. The visuo-spatial 
memory updating task was embedded in the primary ongoing task. This additional ongoing task 
involved remembering and recalling the locations of the last four pictures of the primary 
ongoing task which were surrounded by red frames. In each trial of the primary ongoing task 
one from the six pictures of celebrities was surrounded by a red frame. The location of this 
frame changed randomly so that in each trial a picture in a different position had a red frame 
around it. The pictures surrounded by red frames had to be recalled in the same order as they 
appeared. To enable participants to record these responses there were six buttons on the push 
button box which resembled the two by three grid in which the pictures were presented in the 
trials. An empty grid was visible during the recall screen and the button presses highlighted the 
corresponding empty box in the grid. 
 
Each time a response was made to the PM tasks in all conditions, the screen of the laptop 
(normally black) flashed green for 600ms. Prospective memory responses were scored where 
each correct response to the PM task was given a score of two. A score of zero was given for 
responses which were provided earlier than 10 seconds from the time of each PM activity or 
after 10 seconds from that time (+/-10 seconds) creating a 20 seconds time window during 
which a PM response could be given. The same time window for correct time-based PM 
responses was used by Mioni and Stablum (2014). A score of one was given to incorrect content 
of PM responses which were still performed at correct times (e.g. pressing “B” button instead of 
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“A” or providing the incorrect year). The scoring procedure used within this task was similar to 
that employed in the MIST (Raskin, 2004). 
 
The administration of the three time-based PM conditions was counterbalanced over two testing 
sessions conducted on different days. Each session comprised either of one or two experimental 
tasks with other screening and short-form IQ measures placed in between the tasks in order to 
minimalise task interference. 
 
7.1.2.3.1. Data analysis 
 
The PM accuracy, ongoing accuracy and ongoing RT data acquired from the ongoing task load 
manipulation were analysed using a 2 x 3 mixed measures ANOVAs with the between-subjects 
factor of participant group (individuals with and without dyslexia) and the within-subjects factor 
of cognitive load (low, high phonologically-loaded and high visuo-spatially-loaded). 
 
The additional ongoing tasks involving memory updating were analysed using a mixed 
measures 2 x 2 ANOVA with the between-subjects factor of participant group (individuals with 
and without dyslexia) and the within-subjects factor of task type i.e. phonologically-based and 
visuo-spatially-based. This analysis was performed in order to investigate if there were any 
dyslexia related deficits visible on the secondary ongoing tasks of the high cognitive load 
condition. 
 
7.1.2.3.1.1. Time checks 
 
Individuals with dyslexia have been reported to have strategy deficits (e.g. Torgeson, 1977; 
Levin, 1990) and this could lead to PM differences. Namely, if individuals with dyslexia 
employ less efficient monitoring strategies, this could result in PM deficits as strategic 
monitoring has been argued to improve PM performance (Smith, 2003). In order to ensure that 
there were no significant group differences in time monitoring strategies, a 2 x 3 x 6 mixed 
measures ANOVA was performed with participant group (dyslexics and controls) as the 
between-subjects factor and cognitive load of ongoing tasks (low, high phonologically-loaded 
and high visuo-spatially-loaded) and time checks in every sextile (time checks performed in the 
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1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, 5
th
 and 6
th
 30 seconds before each PM response was required) as the within-
subjects factors. 
 
7.1.2.4. Procedure 
 
Informed consent was acquired from all participants prior to testing. Background information 
about participants (age, gender and dyslexia status) was collected before the administration of 
the short-form IQ and literacy measures. Two of the scales used for the short-form IQ together 
with two of the experimental conditions were administered in the first experimental session and 
the remaining two in the second (the order was fully counterbalanced). For the experimental 
tasks participants were asked to sit in front of a computer with a laptop placed directly behind 
them on a small filing cabinet. Participants saw instructions displayed on the screen which 
explained what was required of them for the ongoing task. Those instructions asked participants 
to decide as quickly and as accurately as possible whether the majority of the six well-known 
individuals were living or dead. Participants were instructed to use the two buttons labelled 
DEAD (a button positioned on the left hand side of the push button box) and LIVING (a button 
positioned on the right hand side) in order to respond to this task. In the high phonologically-
loaded and high visuo-spatially-loaded conditions participants where given the instructions 
about the additional, ongoing tasks (procedure for these tasks is described in the latter part of 
this section).  
 
After the instruction for the ongoing task participants saw a final instruction screen including 24 
pictures used within the task dividing the photographs of celebrities into two columns. There 
were 12 photographs of dead celebrities presented in a column positioned on the left hand side 
of the screen and 12 photographs of living celebrities presented in a column on the right hand 
side of the screen to match the sides of the response buttons (DEAD on the left and LIVING on 
the right side of the push button box). Prior to the start of the practice trials participants 
confirmed that they were familiar with the celebrities and aware which celebrities are living and 
which dead. After this participants engaged in 12 practice trials (including memory checks in 
high phonologically-based and high visuo-spatially-based conditions) where feedback was 
provided after each trial so that participants could learn how to respond to the task. The 
experimenter was present during the practice trials to further clarify instructions if not 
understood and to answer any possible questions.  
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After the practice trials, participants were shown an instruction screen explaining that the actual 
experimental condition would involve the same ongoing task to be performed on the PC placed 
in front of them, but that an additional PM task needed to be performed on a laptop placed 
behind them. Participants were informed that they would need to press the “A” key on the 
keyboard of the laptop placed behind them every three minutes in each of the three conditions. 
 
Participants were also instructed that they could check how much time had elapsed since the 
start of the experiment by pressing the space bar on the laptop placed behind them. Participants 
were specifically told that the timer would start at 00:00 to avoid any possible confusion. After 
this instruction the experimenter synchronised the two computers and started the tasks. The 
experiment ran for 14 minutes and participants were allowed to check the timer as many times 
as they liked. Each time a participant logged the PM response the screen of the laptop (normally 
black) flashed green for 600ms. 
 
In the additional phonologically-based ongoing task the instructions asked participants to use 
the buttons labelled DEAD and LIVING on the push button box to record the sequence of the 
last four correct responses (starting from the least recent and finishing with the most recent 
answer). The memory recall screen consisted of eight boxes in two vertical lines, four on the left 
hand side of the screen and the other four on the right hand side of the screen. At the top of each 
column there was a label stating DEAD above the column on the left hand side and LIVING 
above the column on the right hand side. The locations of the descriptors on the screen matched 
the locations of the labels on the push button box. The boxes on the screen were highlighted in 
green as each participant attempted to record the last four responses that they had made. 
Participants did not know when to expect memory recall screens as this could be after four, five, 
six, seven or eight ongoing trials. 
 
The additional ongoing task used in the high visuo-spatially-loaded condition included similar 
instructions as the additional ongoing task used in the phonologically-loaded condition. The 
difference in this task was that participants were instructed to use the six buttons (in two rows) 
on the push button box to indicate the positions of the last four pictures which appeared with a 
red frame around it starting from least recent and finishing with the most recent position. The 
memory recall screen consisted of six boxes (i.e. a 2 x 3 grid) and the boxes on the screen 
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highlighted in green as each response was made. Participants were debriefed at the end of the 
study. 
 
7.1.3. Results 
 
7.1.3.1. Excluded Participants 
 
For inclusion, participants were expected to achieve an accuracy of at least 75% correct 
responses on the ongoing task of the low load condition which served the function of a baseline 
condition used for comparisons with higher cognitive load conditions. The 75% exclusion 
criterion was only applied to the simple PM design in order to avoid the potential elimination of 
possible cost effect caused by higher cognitive load (manipulated by the ongoing tasks). This in 
turn could minimalize or even eliminate possible group effects of load on PM or ongoing tasks 
performance. A similar procedure was performed in the event-based experiments where the 
exclusion criteria were only used for the baseline conditions. This procedure is in line with 
Breneiser’s (2009) argument that data trimming eliminates the cost of performing PM task 
visible in the performance on the ongoing trials. All participants achieved at least 75% accuracy 
on the ongoing task of low load condition (the lowest accuracy was 77%). This suggested that 
all participants understood the instructions and engaged well with the tasks in general. 
 
Six members of the control group were removed from the data set and replaced due to showing 
literacy characteristics not in the normal adult range. Also, five participants (two individuals 
with dyslexia and three controls) whose IQ was below 90 were also replaced. One participant 
with dyslexia withdrew from the experiment. The number of participants reported in the 
Participants is the number tested after removing those who did not meet the selection criteria or 
withdrew. 
 
7.1.3.2. Prospective memory accuracy 
 
The results in Table 22 show descriptive statistics for the PM accuracy data acquired from low, 
high phonologically-loaded and high visuo-spatially-loaded conditions. 
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Table 22: Descriptive statistics for PM accuracy data in low, high phonologically-loaded and 
high visuo-spatially-loaded conditions. 
 
 
Means 
Prospective memory accuracy 
(max. score = 8) 
 
 
 
Controls 
  
Dyslexics 
 
Condition 
 
M 
 
SD 
  
M 
 
SD 
 
Low 
 
4.64 
 
2.22 
  
3.75 
 
2.38 
 
High phonologically-loaded 
 
4.80 
 
2.52 
  
3.42 
 
2.08 
 
High visuo-spatially-loaded 
 
4.80 
 
2.45 
  
2.79 
 
2.59 
 
The PM accuracy data from the low, high phonologically-loaded and high visuo-spatially-
loaded conditions were subjected to a 2 x 3 ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of 
participant group, F (1, 47) = 8.27, p = .006, ηp
2
 = .150. An inspection of means indicated that 
individuals with dyslexia had lower PM accuracy overall than controls. The effect of cognitive 
load, F (2, 94) = .544, p = .582, ηp
2
 = .011 was not significant. There was also no significant 
interaction between participant group and cognitive load, F (2, 94) = .970, p = .383, ηp
2
 = .020.  
 
7.1.3.3. Ongoing trials 
 
7.1.3.3.1. Reaction time 
 
Mean reaction times to the ongoing trials in low, high phonologically-loaded and high visuo-
spatially-loaded conditions are displayed in Table 24. 
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Table 24: Descriptive statistics for reaction time data from ongoing tasks of low, high 
phonologically-loaded and high visuo-spatially-loaded conditions. 
 
 
Means 
 
Ongoing task mean reaction times (ms) 
 
 
 
Controls 
  
Dyslexics 
 
Condition 
 
M 
 
SD 
  
M 
 
SD 
 
Low 
 
3151.31 
 
913.94 
  
3860.79 
 
1097.90 
 
High phonologically-loaded 
 
4188.83 
 
1372.271 
  
5102.96 
 
1926.76 
 
High visuo-spatially-loaded 
 
5134.36 
 
1766.82 
  
6358.71 
 
2083.83 
 
 
The 2 x 3 mixed measures ANOVA conducted on the RT data from ongoing trials of the three 
cognitive load conditions showed a significant main effect of participant group, F (1, 47) = 5.68, 
p = .021, ηp
2
 = .108. These results showed that there were significant differences in RT between 
dyslexics and controls regardless of cognitive load condition. There was also a main effect of 
cognitive load, F (2, 94) = 73.16, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .609 which indicated that participants 
regardless of group membership differed in their RTs to the different cognitive load conditions. 
Post hoc Bonferroni comparisons showed that participants’ RTs differed significantly between 
low and high phonologically-loaded (p < .001), high phonologically-loaded and high visuo-
spatially-loaded (p < .001), and between low and high visuo-spatially-loaded (p < .001) 
conditions. The interaction between the two factors was not significant, F (2, 94) = .979, p = 
.379, ηp
2
 = .020. 
 
7.1.3.3.2. Accuracy  
 
Table 23 includes descriptive statistics for accuracy (%) data acquired from ongoing trials of 
low, high phonologically-loaded and high visuo-spatially-loaded conditions. This analysis 
included only the primary ongoing tasks in which participants needed to decide whether there 
were more living of dead celebrities presented in each array. The data from the additional 
ongoing tasks (phonologically- and visuo-spatially-based) were analysed separately. 
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Table 23: Descriptive statistics for accuracy of ongoing trials in low, high phonologically-based 
and high visuo-spatially-based conditions. 
 
 
Means 
 
Ongoing task accuracy (%) 
 
 
 
Controls 
  
Dyslexics 
 
Condition 
 
M 
 
SD 
  
M 
 
SD 
 
Low 
 
96.79 
 
4.29 
  
95.70 
 
5.38 
 
High phonologically-loaded 
 
96.33 
 
3.91 
  
93.15 
 
6.38 
 
High visuo-spatially-loaded 
 
94.38 
 
5.78 
  
94.89 
 
4.93 
 
 
The 2 x 3 mixed measures ANOVA conducted on the accuracy data from the ongoing trials of 
low, high phonologically-loaded and high visuo-spatially-loaded conditions showed no 
significant effect of participant group, F (1, 47) = .942, p = .337, ηp
2
 = .020. There was a 
significant main effect of cognitive load, F (2, 94) = 4.19, p = .018, ηp
2
 = .082 which indicated 
that participants differed in their ongoing tasks accuracy in the different cognitive load 
conditions. Post hoc Bonferroni comparisons indicated that participants’ accuracy only differed 
significantly between the low and high phonologically-loaded conditions (p = .002). There were 
no significant differences between high phonologically-loaded and high visuo-spatially-loaded 
conditions (p = 1.00) nor between low load and high visuo-spatially-loaded conditions (p = 
.068). There was a significant interaction between participant group and cognitive load, F (2, 
94) = 4.42, p = .015, ηp
2
 = .086. Figure 3 shows the interaction between the two factors. Post 
hoc unrelated t-tests conducted on the ongoing task data acquired from the low cognitive load 
condition showed no significant differences between dyslexics and controls, t (47) = .785, p = 
.437. There was a significant group difference in the high phonologically-loaded condition, t 
(37.86) = 2.10, p = .043. Inspection of means indicated that individuals with dyslexia were less 
accurate on the primary ongoing task trials compared to controls. There was no significant 
group difference in the high visuo-spatially-loaded condition, t (47) = .331, p = .742. 
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Figure 3: Group x condition interaction plot for mean ongoing task accuracy. 
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7.1.3.4. Updating memory tasks (phonologically- and visuo-spatially-based tasks) 
 
Table 25 displays the descriptive statistics for the two versions of the memory updating 
secondary ongoing tasks used in high phonologically-loaded and high visuo-spatially-loaded 
conditions. 
 
Table 25: Descriptive statistics for secondary ongoing tasks used in high phonologically-loaded 
and high visuo-spatially-loaded conditions. 
 
 
Means 
 
Accuracy of memory updating tasks (%) 
 
 
 
Controls 
  
Dyslexics 
 
Condition 
 
M 
 
SD 
  
M 
 
SD 
 
High phonologically-loaded 
 
76.11 
 
12.25 
  
71.75 
 
10.34 
 
High visuo-spatially-loaded 
 
57.02 
 
23.99 
  
56.93 
 
22.33 
 
 
The results from a mixed measures 2 x 2 ANOVA conducted on memory span accuracies (%) 
acquired from the additional ongoing tasks used in the high phonologically-loaded and high 
visuo-spatially-loaded conditions showed that there was no significant effect of participant 
group, F (1, 47) = .225, p = .616, ηp
2
 = .005, but there was a significant effect of task type, F 
(47) = 37.30, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .442. The means revealed that the participants performed worse on 
the visuo-spatially-based memory updating task compared to the phonologically-based version. 
There was no significant interaction between the two factors, F (1, 47) = 594, p = .445, ηp
2
 = 
.012. 
 
7.1.3.5. Time checks 
 
Table 26 shows the descriptive statistics from the total time checks made by both groups of 
participants in the low, high phonologically-loaded and high visuo-spatially-loaded conditions. 
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Table 26: Descriptive statistics from the total number of time checks in low, high 
phonologically-loaded and high visuo-spatially-loaded conditions. 
 
 
Means 
 
Number of time checks 
 
 
 
Controls 
  
Dyslexics 
 
Condition 
 
M 
 
SD 
  
M 
 
SD 
 
Low 
 
10.64 
 
3.49 
  
8.75 
 
3.53 
 
High phonologically-loaded 
 
11.76 
 
4.41 
  
10.04 
 
5.28 
 
High visuo-spatially-loaded 
 
11.60 
 
3.76 
  
8.96 
 
6.34 
 
A 2 x 3 x 6 mixed measures ANOVA was performed on the time check data across the three 
cognitive load conditions. There was no significant effect of participant group, F (1, 47) = 3.70, 
p = .060, ηp
2
 = .073. However, it is worth noting that this effect was approaching significance 
and that participants with dyslexia (M = 9.25), on average, performed fewer time checks 
compared to controls (M = 11.34). The effect of cognitive load, F (2, 94) = 1.21, p = .301, ηp
2
 = 
.025 was not significant showing that regardless of group participants time checks did not differ 
significantly in the different cognitive load conditions. There was a main effect of sextile, F (5, 
235) = 57.65, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .551. Post hoc Bonferroni comparisons indicated that the majority 
of the sextiles differed significantly from one another. The sextiles which differed between each 
other at the p < .001 level were:  1st and 2nd, 1st and 3rd, 1st and 4th, 1st and 6th, 2nd and 3rd, 2nd and 
4
th
, 2
nd
 and 5
th
, 2
nd
 and 6
th
, 3
rd
 and 5
th
, 3
rd
 and 6
th
, 4
th
 and 6
th
, and 5
th
 and 6
th
. The difference 
between 4
th
 and 5
th
 sextiles was also significant (p = .027). There were also two non-significant 
comparisons, these were between the 1
st
 and 5
th 
(p = 1.00), and 3rd and 4th (p = .271) sextiles. 
The mean time checks were slightly higher in the initial sextile and dropped to their lowest 
mean in the second sextile. After the second sextile the means of time checks rose gradually up 
until the last sextile (6
th
) where they reached the highest mean value. Figures 4, 5 and 6 
represent the time checks patterns in the three ongoing task load conditions. 
 
The two-way interaction between group and load was not significant, F (2, 94) =0.94, p = .911, 
ηp
2
 = .002. There was no significant two-way interaction between sextile and participant group, 
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F (2, 47) = .476, p = .794, ηp
2
 = .010. The two-way interaction between load and sextile was 
also not significant, F (5, 235) = .685, p = .739, ηp
2
 = .014. The three-way interaction between 
group, load and time checks was not significant, F (5, 235) = 1.75, p = .067, ηp
2
 = .036. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Time monitoring pattern of individuals with and without dyslexia in low cognitive 
load condition. 
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Figure 5: Time monitoring pattern of individuals with and without dyslexia in high 
phonologically-loaded condition. 
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Figure 6: Time monitoring pattern of individuals with and without dyslexia in high visuo-
spatially-loaded condition. 
 
 
 
 
7.1.4. Discussion 
 
The main significant finding from this analysis was that individuals with dyslexia were 
significantly less accurate on time-based PM tasks regardless of the cognitive/WM load as 
manipulated by the ongoing task modification. This supported the hypothesis that individuals 
with dyslexia have an overall deficit in time-based PM regardless of ongoing task load. There 
were no significant differences in accuracy between participant groups on the primary (all three 
conditions) and secondary (phonologically- and visuo-spatially-based) ongoing tasks. Even 
though there were no significant differences between the two participant groups in terms of time 
monitoring frequency and patterns, it should be noted that individuals with dyslexia performed 
fewer time checks compared to controls (effect of group approaching significance, p = .060). 
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Nevertheless, there was no interaction between participant group and cognitive load indicating 
that load did not significantly mediate group differences found in the PM accuracy data. The 
data also revealed that individuals with dyslexia had significantly slower RT in the primary 
ongoing task when compared to controls. There was also a significant interaction between 
participant group and load condition which indicated that load mediated the slower RT in 
individuals with dyslexia especially in the phonologically-loaded condition. This could be 
related to the phonological problem in dyslexia (e.g. Snowling, 1995). However, the general 
pattern of slower RT’s was already found in the event-based experiments conducted in Studies 4 
and 5 and is in line with the processing speed deficit argued by the double deficit hypothesis 
(e.g. Wolf & Bowers, 1999).  
 
The PM deficit found in adults with dyslexia in the analysis of time-based PM involving the 
manipulation of cognitive load by changes to ongoing tasks is consistent with the findings from 
Studies 1 (PRMQ), 2 (PMQ) and 3 (MIST), indicating a time-based PM deficit in adults with 
dyslexia. In Study 1 individuals with dyslexia reported that their time-based PM failures 
occurred more frequently than controls, whereas in Study 2 they reported having significantly 
more internally cued PM failures. McDaniel and Einstein (2007) stated that time-based PM 
tasks conducted using laboratory paradigms are self-initiated. Thus, the time-based PM tasks 
employed within this current manipulation relied on internal cueing, with participants needing 
to initiate monitoring of the clock (time) in order to perform the intended activity. This process 
involves self-initiation of time-checking behaviour which in turn enables one to respond to the 
time-based PM task at the appropriate moment (d’Ydewalle et al., 2001). Furthermore, 
researchers (e.g. Harris & Wilkins, 1982; Einstein et al., 1995) found that smaller numbers of 
time checks generally result in worse PM performance in time-based PM tasks. Therefore, the 
results from the current time-based experiment could be explained on the basis of this 
reasoning, as participants with dyslexia generally spent less time monitoring the time compared 
to controls. This was the case across the three experimental conditions and their PM 
performance was significantly worse. Namely, it is possible that failure to self-initiate time-
checking behaviour resulted in worse PM performance in dyslexics.  
 
The argument that failure of self-initiation of time-checking behaviour leads to worse PM 
performance is also in line with the ageing literature which showed that older adults have been 
found to perform significantly fewer time checks (compared to younger adults) when 
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performing time-based PM tasks (Einstein et al., 1995; Park et al., 1997), due to a problem with 
attentional resources. Moreover, McDaniel and Einstein (2007) suggested that it is the inability 
to monitor time that results in worse PM performance in older adults. Thus, the fewer time 
checks performed by individuals with dyslexia would seem to have a negative effect on their 
PM accuracy and this could be related to SAS deficits reported in dyslexia (e.g. Smith-Spark & 
Fisk, 2007), as the SAS has been argued to be responsible for allocation of attentional resources. 
Furthermore, self-initiated monitoring in the intention execution stage of time-based tasks has 
been shown to be controlled by prefrontal function/PFC (Burgess et al., 2001, Shallice & 
Burgess, 1991, Shimamura et al., 1991). Monitoring processes which are more heavily involved 
in time-based PM have been argued to rely strongly on SAS (Burgess and Shallice, 1997). 
Therefore, the finding indicating time-based PM deficits in dyslexia, acquired from the ongoing 
task load manipulation, is in line with the general dyslexia literature relative to attentional 
allocation and SAS/CE impairment (e.g. Jeffries & Everatt, 2004; Smith-Spark et al., 2003; 
Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007; Varvara et al., 2014).  
 
Contrary to the evidence suggesting that the greater amount of time checks leads to a better 
time-based PM performance, Ceci and Bronfenbrenner (1985) argued that it is not the number 
of time checks itself that has this positive impact on the PM task performance, but their 
effective and strategic allocation. However, the results from current investigation did not 
support this argument as the time monitoring patterns of participants with dyslexia did not differ 
significantly compared to controls, but their PM responses were less accurate. Generally both 
participant groups monitored the time in a strategic way, with monitoring increasing towards the 
end of the three minute time intervals. 
 
There were no significant group differences in the performance of the additional memory 
updating, ongoing tasks. It is possible that having to remember the last four items (as was the 
case in the memory updating tasks) was not sufficiently taxing to reduce dyslexic performance 
on these tasks or the primary ongoing tasks. The lack of significant differences in performance 
found in the updating tasks of the current study is different to the findings from a study 
conducted by Smith-Spark et al. (2003), who found that overall individuals with dyslexia 
performed significantly worse than controls on a letter updating task. Nevertheless, Smith-Spark 
et al. (2003) used an updating task which required participants to recall the last six consonants, 
and the number of consonants which needed to be recalled could be argued to be greater than 
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the memory spans of some the participants. However, in the current study having to recall the 
last four items is most likely within the span abilities for all of the participants and thus could be 
argued to be not sufficiently taxing enough to result in performance differences. 
 
The significant main effect of task type, after the inspection of means, indicated that regardless 
of participant group the additional phonologically-based task was less difficult compared to the 
visuo-spatial task. The lack of effect of participant group indicated that both groups performed 
similarly well on the memory updating tasks taken together and this finding also supports the 
reasoning that these tasks were not sufficiently taxing to reduce dyslexic performance on the 
ongoing task. In addition, the lack of significant interaction between participant group and tasks 
type indicated that the differences in the accuracies from the different types of tasks (i.e. 
phonologically-based or visuo-spatial) were not mediated by the factor of participant group. 
This is not in line with the phonological deficit hypothesis (Snowling, 1995) which suggested 
phonologically-based deficits in dyslexia as the results did not indicate that individuals with 
dyslexia had significant deficits in phonologically-based task compared to controls. 
Furthermore, this finding could be argued to support domain-general CE deficit in dyslexia 
suggested by Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007). 
 
7.2. Naturalistic and semi-naturalistic measures of time-based prospective memory 
 
This section of the chapter includes both a semi-naturalistic and a naturalistic task involving a 
time-based PM paradigm. Similarly to the event-based PM investigation, the rationale for 
carrying out these studies was to investigate how dyslexia-related PM problems might play out 
in more naturalistic settings and everyday life. The time-based naturalistic and semi-naturalistic 
tasks administered to participants in this investigation resembled the event-based semi-
naturalistic and naturalistic tasks. Namely, the same time intervals as in the event-based tasks 
were used. The semi-naturalistic task involved a 40 minute interval between intention formation 
and intention execution, whereas the naturalistic task employed a one week time interval. 
 
There have been a number of time-based PM investigations employing semi-naturalistic and 
naturalistic settings. For instance, Rendell and Thomson (1993) aimed to compare the time-
based PM of young adults to that of older adults by employing a simulation of medication 
regimen. In their study eighty adult participants in five age groups were required to press a 
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button on a small box at specified times over two weeks. Over a one week period participants 
had to press the button once every day at the same prescribed time and in another week the 
button needed to be pressed four times a day. The researchers recorded the number and times of 
the button presses. The results of this study showed that older adults were better at remembering 
to press the button on time then the younger participants. Even when the older participants were 
late, they were still closer to the prescribed times compared to younger adults. Researchers such 
as Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel and Phillips (2007) or Salthouse (1984) argued that older adults 
perform better than younger adults in everyday life-like tasks as they are able to compensate for 
their cognitive declines in attention or executive control processes (e.g. planning, switching and 
inhibition). It was argued that older adults learn how to deal with those life situations involving 
PM. Namely, it could be reasoned that older adults make a better use of memory aiding 
strategies. 
 
Many of the naturalistic time-based PM studies such as the study conducted by Rendell and 
Thomson (1993) had one underlying limitation. Namely, because these studies often allowed 
participants to use memory aids or did not prohibit their use, the tasks used within these studies 
can be argued to be event-based PM tasks. Since participants were able to use external 
reminders such as clock alarms or calendar entries acting as PM cues reminding participants to 
perform the intended activities. The use of external reminders could also make the task easier 
and, moreover, it could even turn the PM task into a different kind of task, no longer involving 
PM at all. For example, if one uses an electronic reminder with an alarm sound and a 
description of what is required to be done at the specified time, such a task does not require one 
to hold an intention in memory as the electronic reminder could be said to hold the intention for 
the participant instead (comparable to external cognition; Scaife and Rogers, 1996). Thus, this 
would result in not having to remember prospectively, but rather rely solely on the reminder 
itself to remind participants about the intention to perform the action. Nevertheless, participants 
would still need to remember what they were intending to perform (the retrospective 
component) once they encountered the PM cue. In such a way individuals with PM problems 
(or more broadly with cognitive problems) could use this coping strategy to off load their 
memory load. Nevertheless, this would not allow the investigation of true PM abilities in 
naturalistic settings, but would rather explore the use of coping strategies such as memory 
aiding strategies. This is especially relevant to the current investigation as Study 2 showed that 
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individuals with dyslexia reported that they relied significantly more on memory aiding 
strategies compared to controls. 
 
There have been some studies which tried to address this issue. For example, Kvavilashvili and 
Fisher (2007) required participants to call the experimenter on the telephone at a particular time 
in six days and explicitly asked participants not to use memory aids. This time-based naturalistic 
PM study also compared the PM of young and older adults and found that older adults were 
better at prospective remembering in everyday settings. Another study which prohibited the use 
of memory aids was conducted by Rendell and Craik (2000). In this study participants had to 
recite the intended action into a recorder at certain times. This study also found that older adults 
outperformed younger adults. In addition in both of these studies (Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 2007 
and Rendell & Craik, 2000) participants were asked whether they used memory aids to 
complete these tasks. Participants indicated in both of these studies that they did not use 
memory aids. However, this is based on self-reports which may be confounded by participant 
bias and the social desirability of responses. 
 
Everyday tasks have been argued to differ strongly from laboratory based tasks in that they are 
more complex, open-ended and less structured (Altgassen, Koban & Kliegel, 2012). Everyday 
PM tasks often can be constituted by multiple sub-goals which need to be fulfilled in order for 
the final goal (the PM activity) to be achieved. Thus, one often needs to plan how to incorporate 
PM activities into ones daily schedule of all of the tasks that need to be performed. A plan is 
necessary in order to perform PM activities at the appropriate times regardless of whether one is 
occupied by other ongoing daily tasks. Bargh and Gollwitzer (1994) compared acting on 
implementation of intentions to acting out of habit and stated that both need a good plan for a 
successful completion.  
 
The need for good planning abilities for successful PM completion points to a hypothesis that 
individuals with dyslexia will have a problem with their PM, since individuals with dyslexia 
have been found to have problems with planning (e.g. Gilroy & Miles, 1996; Levin, 1990; 
Weyandt, Rice, Linterman, Mitzlaff & Emert, 1998). Therefore, it could be predicted that 
individuals with dyslexia will have problems with everyday PM tasks which draw strongly on 
planning abilities. In addition, the literature related to EF and CE/SAS (discussed in Chapters 2 
and 3) suggested a global problem in PM of individuals with dyslexia e.g. SAS/CE (Smith-
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Spark & Fisk, 2007; Varvara et al., 2014), inhibition (e.g. Pallodino et al., 2001) and set shifting 
(e.g. Narhi et al., 1997). Since the executive control of attentional processes is required for 
directing the attention needed for successful PM task completion (Einstein et al., 2005). 
Namely, one needs to shift attention from the ongoing activity to the PM activity at the 
appropriate time. Thus, it was hypothesised that in both Study 9 and 10 participants with 
dyslexia will have significantly worse PM performance compared to age- and IQ-matched 
control participants. 
 
7.2.1. Study 9: Semi-naturalistic task involving a delay of 40 minutes 
 
This study was conducted under semi-naturalistic conditions, administered while participants 
were still in the laboratory. In this task participants were instructed to remind the experimenter 
to press the “B” button on the keyboard in order to save the data 40 minutes after the 
instruction. This task resembled closely the event-based tasks involving a delay of 40 minutes 
which required participants to remind the experimenter to press the “A” button when they saw 
the “The End” screen in order to save the data from the experiment. The use of semi-naturalistic 
design ensured that the participants did not use external memory aids to help them with 
remembering to perform the intended action. However, the use of this type of setting limited the 
length of time interval between the intention formation and intention execution to a duration 
acceptable to participants for a lab-based study. 
 
7.2.1.1. Method 
 
7.2.1.1.1. Participants 
 
The same participants as in Study 8 were employed for this task. Please see the Participants 
section of Study 8 for information about the participants and section 4.1.2.1.1. of Study 1 for 
group matching procedure. 
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7.2.1.1.2. Materials 
 
A data collection grid was used to enable the researcher to record the time and content of 
responses. 
 
7.2.1.1.3. Design 
 
This task was performed during the first testing session. This study employed a scoring system 
similar to that of the MIST (Raskin, 2004). Thus, a score of zero was given to participants who 
forgot to remind the experimenter to press the “B” button within five minutes of the designated 
time (+/- 5 minutes). A score of one was given to participants who remembered that they had to 
remind the experimenter about something but could not recall the content of this action i.e. to 
press the “B” button. A score of two was given to participants who remembered to remind the 
experimenter to press the “B” button in order to save the data within five minutes of the 
designated time. 
 
A 2 x 3 Chi-square design was employed to analyse the data. The predictor variable in this 
study was the participant group (dyslexic vs. controls) and the criterion variable was the 
response to the semi-naturalistic PM task (no response, content lost and correct response).  
 
7.2.1.1.4. Procedure 
 
Informed consent was acquired from all participants prior to testing. In this study participants 
were instructed verbally at the beginning of the experimental session to remind the experimenter 
to press the “B” button on a keypad in 40 minutes in order to save the data. After this instruction 
participants were engaged in other tasks. Namely, participants performed two of the three 
experimental conditions which were presented in a counterbalanced order. A naturally occurring 
break between these tasks occurred approximately after the 35
th
 minute from the start of the 
study. The experimenter monitored the time in order to enable all participants to see the clock 
on the desktop computer in front of them if they wished to check it in order to perform the semi-
naturalistic PM task. In order to achieve this the experimenter waited approximately until the 
45
th
 minute from the start of the experiment in order to allow participants to remind the 
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experimenter to save the data 40 minutes from the start (+/- 5 minutes). During this break the 
experimenter asked participants what they thought of the last task and to prepare for the next 
task. Participants were debriefed at the end of the study. 
 
7.2.1.2. Results 
 
There were three participants with dyslexia who performed the PM task outside of the 10 
minutes time window (+/- 5 minutes from the designated time) and thus were given a score of 
zero.  
 
The results from Pearson Chi-square revealed that there was a significant association between 
participant group and response to the time-based semi-naturalistic PM task, Χ2 = 11.89, df = 2, 
p = .003. Adults with dyslexia were more likely to not remember about the PM activity, than to 
remember it, whilst individuals without dyslexia were more likely to remember about the PM 
task and less likely not to remember. Figure 7 represents frequency counts for the two 
participant groups. 
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Figure 7: The association between participant group and performance on the time-based semi-
naturalistic PM task. 
 
 
 
7.2.1.3. Discussion 
 
The results from this study showed that individuals with dyslexia were more likely to forget to 
perform the PM task after 40 minutes compared to age- and IQ-matched controls. The findings 
from this everyday semi-naturalistic task supported the hypothesis that individuals with dyslexia 
have a PM deficit in comparison to controls. One possible explanation of these results could be 
related to problems with planning in dyslexia (e.g. Weyandt et al., 1998). Everyday PM tasks 
have been argued to require good plans to be made for the completion of all of the multiple sub-
goals leading into successful PM performance (Altgassen et al., 2012). In addition, Altgassen 
and colleagues stated that planning is necessary in order to be able to perform the PM activity at 
the correct time whilst maintaining all the other daily ongoing tasks. Thus, there is a possibility 
that the results of this study indicated that a problem with planning abilities could underlie the 
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everyday PM failure found in individuals with dyslexia. Nevertheless, this was not investigated 
directly in the current thesis and could be proposed for a future study idea.  
 
The results of this study are also in line with the literature showing problems in dyslexia related 
to EF and allocation of attention e.g. shifting (Hari & Renvall, 2001), SAS (Varvara et al., 
2014) and CE (Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007; see Chapter 2 for more details). Since individuals 
with dyslexia were engaged in an everyday ongoing activity while they had to switch to the 
performance of the PM task. Thus, if individuals with dyslexia have problems with switching 
attention to the performance of the PM task at the appropriate time, this could be argued to be 
due to problems with attentional processes overseen by the CE component of WM and is based 
on executive resources. 
 
7.2.2. Study 10: Naturalistic task involving a one week delay 
 
This time-based investigation was carried out under naturalistic settings which permitted the use 
of a longer time interval between intention formation and its execution. In this study participants 
were asked to send a text message with their name at a prescribed time one week after the 
instruction. This task was designed in order to match the event-based naturalistic task where 
participants had to respond to a text message sent to them one week after leaving the laboratory. 
Participants were requested to not use any external reminders such as calendar entries or sticky 
notes. However, it was impossible to ensure that participants did not use external memory aids 
even though they were instructed not to do so. This procedure was in line with other researchers 
who also asked participants to not use any external reminders (e.g. Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 
2007; Rendell & Craik, 2000). The longer time intervals used within this study are more likely 
to result in lower PM performance compared to shorter time intervals due to memory decay 
processes. It was hypothesised that individuals with dyslexia would be significantly less able to 
remember to perform the time-based PM task involving one week interval compared to age- and 
IQ-matched controls. 
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7.2.2.1. Method 
 
7.2.2.1.1. Participants 
 
There were two groups of participants, adults with developmental dyslexia and controls 
matched for age and IQ. Please see participants section of Study 8 for information about the 
participants. 
 
7.2.2.1.2. Materials 
 
Instruction sheets with an explanation of what was required in this naturalistic study as well as 
questions about mobile phone usage were used (see Appendix 10). A mobile phone with a new 
SIM card was used by the researcher for the purpose of this study. This mobile phone number 
was not used for any other purposes. 
 
7.2.2.1.3. Design 
 
This study was attached to the second testing session. Similarly to that used in Studies 3 and 9, 
this study employed a scoring system. A score of two was given to participants who 
remembered to send the text message to the experimenter one week after the instruction was 
given. A score of one was given to participants who remembered to send the text message one 
week from the instruction but the text message did not contain the participant’s name and 
surname. A score of zero was given to participants who forgot to send the text message one 
week after the instruction (+/- 2 hours).  
 
A 2 x 3 Chi-square design was employed to analyse the data. The predictor variable in this 
study was the participant group (dyslexic vs. controls) and the criterion variable was the 
response to the naturalistic PM task (no response, content lost and correct response).  
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7.2.2.1.4. Procedure 
 
Informed consent was acquired from all participants prior to testing. Participants were instructed 
to send a text message (SMS) one week after the instruction was provided. This instruction was 
given after participants had completed the second testing session. Participants were explicitly 
shown the date, the day of the week and time at which they were required to text on the 
information sheet. Each participant was asked to include their name and surname in the text 
message. Participants were asked not to use any external reminders such as calendar entries, 
reminders or sticky notes. This instruction was given in order for the participant to rely purely 
on PM rather than on external reminders. Participants were also not allowed to write down the 
experimenter’s telephone number on a piece of paper as this could act as a reminder (a PM cue). 
Instead participants were asked to save the experimenter’s number directly into their mobile 
phone contacts.  
 
After the instructions were provided all participants reported that they understood what was 
required of them in this study and explained the instructions to the experimenter. Participants 
were also asked whether their phones were pay monthly or pay-as-you-go phones in order to 
rule out all participants who may not have been able to send the text message because of 
insufficient funds on their mobile phone accounts. If a participant stated that he or she had a 
phone on a pay-as-you-go tariff, he or she was asked whether there were long periods of time 
when they had no money on their own account to send a text message. These questions ensured 
that all of the participants were able to send the text message when they were required to do so. 
Additional questions were asked with regards to competency in using mobile phone for sending 
text messages. All of the participants reported that they were competent in doing this. 
Participants were debriefed at the end of the study. 
 
7.2.2.2. Results 
 
Twelve participants (seven with dyslexia and five without) who took longer than two hours to 
respond to the text message were considered as having forgotten about the PM task (and scored 
0). 
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The results from Pearson Chi-square revealed that there was no significant association between 
participant group and response to the one week PM task, Χ2 = 2.67, df = 2, p = .263. Adults 
with dyslexia did not differ significantly in their ability to remember and perform the PM 
activity compared to controls. Table 31 shows the frequency counts for the two participant 
groups. 
 
Table 31: Frequency counts representing frequency counts for the two participant groups. 
 Participant group 
 Controls  Dyslexics 
Did not remember 21  20 
Content lost 2  0 
Remembered 2  4 
 
 
7.2.2.3. Discussion 
 
The results of this study showed no significant differences between participants with dyslexia 
and age- and IQ-matched controls under everyday life naturalistic conditions involving one 
week time delay. Thus, these results did not support the hypothesis that time-based PM deficits 
occur in dyslexia over longer time intervals. It could be argued that these results were not in line 
with the literature suggesting problems with attentional control in individuals with dyslexia as 
no PM group differences were found. However, it is possible that the one week time interval 
used in this study was too long for all participants making it very difficult to remember the PM 
activity without the use of external memory aids. Indeed, the results showed that both of the 
participants groups performed at close to floor in this task. Thus, it is possible that because this 
task was too difficult for both groups of participants there was no group difference observed. 
Nevertheless, the frequency counts of the two participant groups showed marginally better PM 
in adults with dyslexia compared to controls. This marginal difference could indicate that 
participants with dyslexia were slightly better or more motivated than controls on this task. This 
possible slight advantage in PM of dyslexic individuals is in line with the ageing literature (e.g. 
Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel & Phillips, 2007; Salthouse, 1984) which argues that older adults 
performed better than younger adults in everyday life-like tasks as they were be able to 
compensate for their cognitive declines in attention or executive control processes (e.g. 
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planning, switching and inhibition). It was argued that older adults learned how to deal with 
those life situations involving PM. A similar argument might be made for people with dyslexia, 
based on the results. 
 
It is worth mentioning that in both time-based designs (semi-naturalistic and naturalistic) it was 
not certain whether participants used memory rehearsal as a memory aiding strategy acting as a 
coping strategy. It is possible that individuals with dyslexia engaged more in this type of 
strategy in order to cope with the task, despite being instructed not to. If this study was to be 
conducted again, participants should be asked if they used any type of memory aiding strategies 
(especially memory rehearsal) after completion of the task. 
  
Another explanation of the results from this naturalistic investigation could be suggested in 
relation to perceived task difficulty. Namely, it is possible that individuals with dyslexia, aware 
of their attentional problems, placed more importance on this task as they saw it as being more 
difficult. This is in line with the attentional allocation view suggested by Marsh, Cook and 
Hicks (2006) where participants allocate more importance to more difficult tasks. It is also 
possible that participants with dyslexia were more engaged in this study as it was about “them”, 
i.e. people with dyslexia. In addition, one could argue that the naturalistic PM task had a 
stronger emphasis placed on it compared to the semi-naturalistic task. Since the semi-
naturalistic task (Study 9) involved only a short verbal instruction compared to the naturalistic 
task (Study 10) which involved longer written instructions incorporating questions regarding 
mobile phone usage. This difference in the amount of time and attention placed on both of these 
tasks could have resulted in more importance being placed on the naturalistic task. It is also 
possible that this imbalance resulted in more memory rehearsal processes being performed by 
individuals with dyslexia in the naturalistic task. Individuals with dyslexia have reported using 
more memory aiding techniques in Study 2. Therefore, it is possible that because there was a 
larger emphasis placed on the naturalistic task and because participants with dyslexia saw it as 
more difficult, this resulted in more rehearsal strategies used by dyslexic individuals and in turn 
produced performance similar to controls. 
 
The difficulty with naturalistic designs such as the one used in the current study is that it is 
unknown whether participants were engaged in any other ongoing activities and whether these 
were affected in any way. Thus, it could be suggested that in future investigations participants 
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should be followed up soon after the time to perform the PM task passes in order to find out 
whether they were engaged in any other secondary activities, how demanding these activities 
were and whether having to remember this PM task had caused them any difficulties with the 
other scheduled daily tasks. Nevertheless, since the performance was low for all participants it 
may be also suggested that a shorter time interval between intention formation and its execution 
should be used if the study was to be carried out again. 
 
7.3. Summary 
 
The findings of this manipulation of load through additional ongoing tasks suggested a time-
based PM deficit in adults with developmental dyslexia. It was suggested that EF and SAS/CE 
problems in dyslexia could underpin the time-based PM deficit found in dyslexia. The amount 
of time monitoring was suggested to play some role in PM performance. Namely, a smaller 
number of time checks could be indicative of less cognitive resources available to perform PM 
tasks which in turn could be related to worse PM performance. The results from the cognitively 
demanding memory updating tasks did not show significant differences between dyslexics and 
controls regardless of the processing type that they involved (phonological or visuo-spatial). It 
was argued that this could be related to PM deficits. Namely, participants were engaged with 
these engaging ongoing tasks which resulted in comparable to normal performance found in 
these tasks. However, this could have resulted in worse PM performance due to the inability to 
inhibit responding to the ongoing trials and switch to the PM/time monitoring tasks. Individuals 
with dyslexia were also found to have generally slower RT of responses compared to controls 
which was argued to be in line with the processing speed deficit in dyslexia proposed by the 
double deficit hypothesis (e.g. Wolf & Bowers, 1999). 
 
The semi-naturalistic time-based PM task involving a delay of 40 minutes, showed that 
individuals with dyslexia have a PM deficit which was in line with the time-based PM problems 
suggested on the basis of the results from PMQ, MIST and the experimental work. However, 
this was not observed in the naturalistic time-based PM task involving a one week time delay. 
The lack of a PM deficit in this one week delayed task was argued to have occurred due to floor 
performance on this task by both participant samples. These results were argued to indicate that 
there is a greater problem in time-based PM in adults with dyslexia compared to event-based 
PM.  
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Chapter 8: Implications for theory including direction for future research, 
practical recommendations and a conclusion 
 
8.1. Summary of main findings 
 
Overall this thesis revealed that adults with developmental dyslexia have a deficit in PM. In 
looking at self-reports (see Chapter 4) individuals with dyslexia perceived themselves as having 
a problem with time- and event-based everyday PM activities (evidence from responses to 
PRMQ; Smith et al., 2000). These data were corroborated by ratings taken from close 
friends/relatives of the participants. The findings from the PMQ (Hannon et al., 1995) also 
supported the time-based PM deficit in dyslexia, found using the PRMQ and PRMQ-for-others. 
Compared to controls individuals with dyslexia reported having more difficulties with PM tasks 
involving long-term intervals where the PM activity occurs rarely. On the contrary, individuals 
with dyslexia did not self-report deficits in PM tasks involving short-term time intervals and 
occurring habitually. Participants with dyslexia also reported using techniques that assisted 
memory (e.g. reminders, rehearsal and planning) significantly more frequently compared to 
controls.  
 
The event-based PM in semi-naturalistic conditions involving a time interval of 40 minutes did 
not support the results from self-reported data (PRMQ and PRMQ-for-others), as there was no 
significant group difference. However, the naturalistic event-based PM task involving 
considerably longer time interval of one week was in line with the self-reported PM impairment 
in dyslexia, revealing significant group differences in day-to-day life settings. The results from 
the experimental work involving event-based PM (Studies 4 and 5) revealed no deficits in 
dyslexia. The findings from the experimental work do not support event-based PM deficits in 
individuals with dyslexia. However, it is possible that the ongoing task used in the focal and 
non-focal designs may not have been cognitively demanding enough to reveal a PM deficit in 
individuals with dyslexia. Nevertheless, the naturalistic evidence suggests that there may be a 
dyslexia related problem with event-based tasks involving considerably longer time intervals. 
As this is a new area of research and the finding is based on only one task, replication of this 
study would provide more robust evidence. 
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The results from the semi-naturalistic study involving time-based PM task with a delay of 40 
minutes, showed a PM deficit in adults with dyslexia confirming the findings from self-reports 
(PRMQ, PRMQ-for-others and PMQ). Further support for time-based PM deficits in dyslexia 
comes from the naturalistic time-based PM task which involved a longer time delay of 24 hours 
under every-day life conditions. Moreover, this finding is in line with the results from the 
naturalistic even-based PM task involving considerably longer time-intervals (24 hours and one 
week in comparison to 20 and 40 minutes). This may indicate that individuals with dyslexia 
may have PM deficits in tasks involving a longer time-intervals regardless of the type of PM 
(time- or event-based). However, there were no group differences in performance on the one 
week time-based task, but a floor effect was observed in this study which made the results 
inconclusive and further research is needed. The experimental work involving time-based PM 
supported the findings from the self-reports and every-day life measures showing a time-based 
PM problem in dyslexia. It was found that individuals with dyslexia were significantly less able 
to remember to perform the time-based PM tasks during the laboratory based design. There was 
no effect of load found in the manipulation of ongoing task load and no interaction between 
participant group and cognitive load. Overall, the findings indicate time-based deficits in 
individuals with dyslexia compared to controls, regardless of the length of time-interval. 
 
The results of the clinical measure of PM (the MIST; Raskin, 2004) also supported the pattern 
of time-based PM deficit in dyslexia involving short-time intervals (MIST involved 2 and 15 
minute short-time intervals only). The results from MIST memory load analysis suggested that 
high cognitive load negatively affected both the dyslexic and control groups. However, there 
was there was no interaction between memory load and participant group. The lack of 
interaction between participant group and memory load supports the results from time-based 
PM experiment manipulating the load of ongoing task, as it also found no interaction between 
participant group and load.  
 
In summary, the general pattern suggests more problems with time-based PM in dyslexia 
compared to event-based PM. This pattern was supported by the results from Studies 2 (PMQ), 
3 (MIST including the naturalistic measure), 8 (time-based experiment) and 9 (semi-naturalistic 
time-based design). Furthermore, experimental designs investigating event-based PM (Studies 4 
and 5) did not indicate event-based PM deficits in dyslexia. There was only one study which 
indicated an event-based PM problem in dyslexia and this was the naturalistic study involving 
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one week time delay (Study 7). Therefore, there appears to be more robust evidence to suggest 
time-based PM deficits in dyslexia. The results also suggest dyslexia related deficit in event- 
and time-based PM tasks involving considerably longer time-intervals (24 hours time-based and 
one week event-based tasks) whereas in tasks involving shorter time-intervals (3, 20 & 40 
minute) individuals with dyslexia only showed deficits in time-based PM tasks. 
 
8.2. Implications for theory 
 
The results from this thesis provided an original contribution to the literature. The dyslexia 
deficit found in PM has a number of theoretical implications. Firstly and most importantly, 
individuals with dyslexia have been found to have problems with PM. Researchers have shown 
that there are short-term memory/WM problems in dyslexia (e.g. Olson and Datta, 2002; Smith-
Spark et al., 2003; Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007; Varvara et al., 2014), but there has been no 
research up to date, which has demonstrated PM problems in dyslexia. 
 
Secondly, the findings from this thesis suggested that deficits in dyslexia are not limited to 
phonological skills as it has been argued previously by the phonological core deficit hypothesis 
of dyslexia (e.g. Frith, 1985; Ramus, 2003; Snowling, 2000; Stanovich, 1988; Vellutino, 1979; 
Vellutino et al., 2004). Furthermore, the findings from this thesis have also shown that deficits 
in dyslexia are not limited to childhood, but that these carry on into adulthood. There are also 
other implications for theory arising from the results acquired in this thesis (e.g. implications for 
event-based PM theory) and these are discussed in this chapter. 
 
8.2.1. Implications for event-based prospective memory 
 
8.2.1.1. Spontaneous retrieval vs. monitoring theories 
 
The spontaneous retrieval theory (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; Guynn et al., 2001; McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2000; McDaniel et al., 2004) argued that in event-based tasks the PM cue acting as a 
reminder about the PM activity, can trigger the PM response automatically and thus it was 
claimed that monitoring is not needed in event-based PM tasks. On the contrary monitoring 
theories (i.e. PAM theory; Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004) argued that event-based PM 
tasks continuously engage non-automatic monitoring processes. The PAM theory (Smith, 2003) 
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argued that monitoring is involved in all event-based PM tasks on the basis of cost visible on 
ongoing trials of a PM paradigm. The results from the two event-based PM experiments 
conducted as a part of this thesis could be argued to support the claims of PAM (Smith, 2003) 
theory and more generally monitoring theories, as both of the tasks found cost to the ongoing 
tasks in the experimental blocks involving PM trials. In accordance with PAM theory, it could 
be argued that the retrieval of PM intention in event-based PM tasks is a non-automatic process 
and it employs preparatory attentional processes (monitoring) for successful completion. Thus, 
the spontaneous retrieval theory of event-based PM (e.g. Einstein & McDaniel, 1996) was not 
supported by the results from this thesis.  
 
8.2.1.2. Multiprocess theory 
 
The multiprocess theory proposed that the focality of the PM cue determines the degree to 
which monitoring is needed for PM retrieval (Scullin et al., 2010). This theory argued that non-
focal PM tasks are more likely to require monitoring processes compared to focal tasks. As a 
result of this, it has been reasoned that non-focal tasks are more likely to result in a cost to the 
ongoing tasks compared to focal tasks (e.g. Einstein et al., 2005). Thus, it could be argued that 
the RT data from the focal and non-focal PM experiments conducted in this thesis supported the 
multiprocess view in that no significant effect of cost was found in the focal design and a 
significant main effect of cost was found in the non-focal design. These results are in line with 
other studies (e.g. Einstein et al., 2005; Scullin et al., 2010) which found significant task 
interference (cost to the ongoing task) in the non-focal conditions and its absence in focal 
conditions. Therefore, it could be argued that the focal design used within this thesis involved 
fewer monitoring processes and thus relied more on automatic processes in comparison to the 
non-focal design. However, it should be noted that the effect of block type in the focal design 
was approaching significance (p = .054) and there was a main effect of block type in the non-
focal design (p = .002). Therefore, it could be reasoned that both the focal and non-focal designs 
used in this thesis showed a cost to the ongoing tasks which was related to the performance of 
the PM tasks. This on the other hand could be argued to support the PAM theory (Smith, 2003) 
in that all event-based PM tasks involve preparatory attentional monitoring processes, which 
require cognitive resources. Thus one may argue that the multiprocess theory was not supported 
by the results from the event-based PM experiments conducted as a part of this thesis. Namely, 
that both types of event-based PM (focal and non-focal) rely on monitoring processes. This later 
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statement seems to be a more plausible implication for event-based PM theory, but the levels of 
monitoring employed in both types of tasks may vary. Namely, the significant main effect found 
in the non-focal design and the approaching significance effect in the focal design could reflect 
the reasoning that non-focal designs rely more on monitoring processes and thus result in 
greater cost to the ongoing trials compared to focal designs. However, this is not to say that one 
type involves monitoring and the other does not as suggested by the multiprocess theory. 
 
Nevertheless, a potential confounding problem reported in the general discussion of the event-
based chapter (section 6.1.3.) could suggest that there was a possibility for the need for 
monitoring in the focal design used in this thesis. Namely, one could argue that one of the PM 
cues (glasses) employed in the focal design was less salient compared to the other PM cues 
employed in the focal and non-focal designs, which could have resulted in the need for 
monitoring also in the focal design. According to multiprocess theory of PM (McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2000), salient PM cues are more likely to result in automatic retrieval of the PM 
intention compared to less salient PM cues which were argued to rely more on monitoring 
processes. Thus, it is possible that the less salient PM cue employed in the focal design required 
monitoring processes to be employed for successful retrieval of PM intention and thus it is 
difficult to form firm conclusions on the basis of these results. However, this comparison of the 
PM cues is highly speculative and thus further investigation of cue saliency in relation to 
dyslexia is recommended. 
 
8.2.1.2.1. The dynamic multiprocess framework 
 
On the contrary to the afore mentioned lack of support for the multiprocess theory showed by 
the event-based PM experiments employed in this thesis, this work could be argued to support 
the dynamic multiprocess framework proposed by Scullin et al. (2013). This framework 
proposed that if participants are explicitly instructed to expect PM cues, they will selectively 
engage in monitoring processes in event-based PM tasks. This could be argued to explain why 
there was cost to the ongoing trials in the experimental blocks of focal and non-focal PM tasks 
which included PM trials. Namely, it could be reasoned that participants chose to engage in  
monitoring processes in the experimental blocks as they were instructed that these blocks will 
include PM cues. On the other hand, it would also explain the shorter RTs in the baseline blocks 
(in comparison to the experimental blocks) which involved no PM cues as participant were not 
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informed to expect PM cues and did not monitor for PM cues as a result of this. Thus, the 
dynamic multiprocess framework was supported by the findings from the event-based PM 
experiments conducted as a part of this thesis. 
 
8.2.2. Implications for time-based prospective memory 
 
8.2.2.1. Self-initiated monitoring in time-based prospective memory 
 
Researchers (e.g. d’Ydewalle et al., 2001; Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; Groot et al., 2002) have 
suggested that time-based PM tasks generally involve more self-initiated monitoring and are 
more difficult compared to event-based PM tasks. McFarland and Glisky (2009) have suggested 
that time-based PM tasks may require more self-initiated monitoring processes as one needs to 
monitor time in the absence of external cues which can act as a trigger for the retrieval of the 
PM intention. It could be advocated that the dyslexia-related PM deficit found in the time-based 
PM experiment and the lack of the deficit found in event-based PM tasks supported the claim 
that time-based PM tasks are more difficult and involve more self-initiated monitoring 
compared to event-based PM tasks. This statement could be made on the basis of the literature 
proposing dyslexia related performance deficits in complex tasks (e.g. Nicolson & Fawcett, 
1990; Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). Thus, one could argue that time-based PM deficits found in 
dyslexia on the basis of the experimental work occurred as these tasks were complex enough to 
prevent individuals with dyslexia from utilising conscious compensation (CC) processes which 
normally mask their tasks performance deficits. On the other hand, it could be argued that the 
event-based PM tasks were not complex enough to prevent CC in dyslexia and thus resulted in 
comparable to controls PM performance. This may be related to a greater difficulty of time-
based over event-based tasks as time-based tasks were argued to involve more self-initiation of 
the monitoring processes (e.g. Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; Groot et al., 2002). Time-based PM 
tasks may be more capacity consuming then event-based PM tasks due to the involvement of 
self-initiation of the monitoring processes and thus may leave fewer resources for conscious 
compensation processes in dyslexia. Thus, it could be concluded that the results supported the 
claims that time-based PM tasks are more difficult and involve more self-initiated monitoring 
compared to event-based PM tasks. Furthermore, self-initiated monitoring has been argued to be 
controlled by prefrontal functioning (McFarland & Glisky, 2009) and individuals with dyslexia 
have been found to have deficits in frontal functioning (Swanson, 2006). 
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Similarly the semi-naturalistic work supports the literature suggesting that time-based PM tasks 
are more difficult as they involve more self-initiation when compared to event-based tasks (e.g. 
d’Ydewalle et al., 2001). Namely, the results from the semi-naturalistic studies involving 40 
minute delays showed a dyslexia-related PM deficit in time-based PM but not in event-based 
PM. This may be because participants needed to rely more strongly on self-initiation in the 
time-based PM task as it did not include any external cues to aid PM retrieval whereas, the 
event-based task involved a PM cue which acted as a reminder of the intended activity. Thus, 
the event-based tasks did not involve self-initiation of the PM intention. This reasoning is in line 
with Craik’s (1986) framework of memory which stated that memory tasks can be ordered by 
the extent to which they require self-initiated processes in memory retrieval. In the time-based 
PM task participants needed to actively search for the clock in order to check if it was the right 
time to perform the PM activity. However, in the event-based task “the end” screen was easily 
visible as participants had their heads in a chin-rest (locked in position) with “the end” screen 
directly in their line of vision. Therefore, participants did not need to search for the event-based 
cue. In the time-based task the only clock available to participants was a clock in the right 
bottom corner of a desktop computer windows screen (as it usually appears in any Windows 
desktop). This clock was less visible and distinct than the event-based PM cue. Thus, in line 
with the literature (e.g. Einstein et al, 1995), it could be argued that the time-based semi-
naturalistic task relied on self-initiated processes whereas the event-based task on spontaneous 
retrieval processes. This could explain the deficits found in the dyslexic group on the time-based 
semi-naturalistic task (but not on the event-based task), as self-initiation requires cognitive 
resources and thus is more demanding than spontaneous memory retrieval. Further investigation 
is required to fully test this explanation. 
 
8.2.2.2. Executive functioning involvement in time-based prospective memory tasks 
 
Gonneaud et al. (2011) argued for a strong reliance of time-based PM tasks on inhibition. The 
current results from time-based PM tasks could be argued to support this claim, as individuals 
with dyslexia who were reported to have inhibition deficits (e.g. Swanson, 2006) were found to 
have a time-based PM deficit. In addition, SAS has been also claimed to be responsible for 
inhibition processes (e.g. Norman & Shallice, 1986) and individuals with dyslexia have been 
claimed to have SAS deficits (e.g. Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). This adds further to the argument 
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that time-based PM tasks rely strongly on inhibition as only time-based PM paradigm resulted 
in dyslexia related PM deficit. The SAS has been proposed to be a candidate for the CE 
component of WM (Baddeley, 1986). Basso et al. (2010) showed that ongoing tasks involving 
higher WM impacted negatively on time-based PM performance. The deficit in time-based PM 
found in dyslexia could be suggested to support the involvement of WM in time-based PM. 
Basso and colleagues also stated that WM resources are shared with time-based PM resources in 
tasks involving high demands. Individuals with dyslexia have been reported to have WM 
deficits and insufficient cognitive resources in complex tasks (e.g. Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990; 
Smith-Spark, 2007) and thus, it could be proposed that the shortage of WM resources shared 
with time-based PM resources resulted in time-based PM deficits in dyslexia. This could be 
suggested to support the involvement of WM processes in PM, especially in the more complex 
time-based PM paradigms. 
 
8.2.3. Implications for dyslexia 
 
8.2.3.1. Attention in dyslexia 
 
Individuals with dyslexia have been argued to have problems with attentional resources (e.g. 
Fawcett & Nicolson, 1992; Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). The time-based PM deficit and the lack 
of the event-based PM deficit found in dyslexia could be argued to support this claim. The 
monitoring processes, reasoned to draw on attentional resources, were argued to make time-
based PM tasks more difficult compared to event-based tasks and result in worse PM 
performance (e.g. Einstein et al., 1995) and greater age-related PM deficits (e.g. Craik & Byrd, 
1982). Thus, it could be argued that the deficit found in dyslexia in time-based but not in event-
based tasks could be indicative of the greater involvement of attentional resources in time-based 
PM, considering that individuals with dyslexia have problems with attentional resources. It is 
possible that this is due to the strong requirement in time-based PM tasks to self-initiate the 
monitoring of the time in order to perform successfully the time-based PM task, whereas in 
event-based PM tasks the PM intention can be triggered by the PM cue. Furthermore, in line 
with this argument that the dyslexia deficit found in time-based PM tasks supports the problems 
with attentional resources in dyslexia is the finding suggesting a failure to self-initiate time-
checking behaviour by individuals with dyslexia as found by the smaller number of time checks 
in the time-based PM experiment. Namely, it is possible that the smaller number of time checks 
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in dyslexia compared to controls occurred due to the lack of sufficient attentional resources to 
check the time with sufficient frequency to succeed at the time-based PM task. This is in line 
with the reasoning presented in the aging literature (e.g. Park et al., 1997) which argued that 
fewer time checks in older adults results in worse time-based PM performance due to 
insufficient attentional resources. 
 
It is also possible that the results from the time-based PM experiment, which found a PM deficit 
in dyslexia, support the claim that individuals with dyslexia have distractible attention (e.g. 
Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990; Smith-Spark et al., 2004). That is to say, the attention of participants 
with dyslexia could have been distracted by the ongoing tasks which could have resulted in 
worse PM performance and fewer time checks than controls. Thus, it could be reasoned that the 
attention directed towards the intention to perform the PM activity at a particular time was 
distracted by the absorbing and cognitively demanding ongoing tasks, drawing the participant’s 
attention and taking it away from the PM intention.  
 
It is also possible that individuals with dyslexia could find themselves side-tracked with 
absorbing activities in their everyday life conditions (e.g. Augur, 1985) which would have taken 
their attention away from self-initiated time monitoring processes required for the PM activity 
and subsequently from performing the time-based PM tasks. Smith-Spark et al. (2004) found 
that individuals with dyslexia reported themselves to be more distractible and over-focusing 
than controls, which results in relevant peripheral information being missed. The eye-tracker 
data acquired from the event-based experiments conducted as a part of this thesis supported this 
argument, finding that individuals with dyslexia may be over focusing as more eye-fixations 
were found. In addition, it was found that controls were less likely to fixate on the PM cues 
whilst still performing the PM tasks correctly in comparison to the dyslexic group who appeared 
to have to allocate more attention on focusing on the PM cues in order to perform the PM task 
successfully. Whilst this could be a sign of over focusing, further investigation is needed to 
establish this. Significant others of individuals with dyslexia in the study conducted by Smith-
Spark et al. (2004) rated individuals with dyslexia to be more absentminded compared to 
controls. These claims may support the argument that individuals with dyslexia could get side-
tracked and absorbed with activities resulting in PM deficits in everyday life conditions, 
especially in tasks involving longer time intervals. Nevertheless, memory decay processes are 
more likely to take place in tasks involving considerably longer time intervals (Tobias, 2009). 
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8.2.3.2. Executive functions in dyslexia 
 
It is also possible that the problems found in dyslexia related to insufficient amount of time 
checks and the deficits in time-based PM are related to problems with SAS reported in dyslexia 
(e.g. Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). It is therefore possible that the deficit found could indicate that 
individuals with dyslexia have problems with allocation of attentional resources to monitor the 
time and subsequently perform the time-based PM tasks. The SAS argued to be related to EF 
(Hayes et al., 1996) is responsible for allocation of attentional resources (Norman & Shallice, 
1986) and thus it is conceivable that the time-based PM deficits found in dyslexia support the 
deficit in SAS in dyslexia. This argument is also in line with Cockburn (1995) who argued that 
environmentally cued PM tasks (i.e. event-based) require less attentional control than time-
based PM tasks. Since event-based PM tasks can elicit responses when the PM cue is 
recognised and without the need to search for the PM cue. Therefore, if time-based PM tasks, 
which resulted in deficits in dyslexia, require more attentional control and individuals with 
dyslexia have been reported to have problems with SAS which mediates attentional control, it 
could be reasoned that this finding supports problems with SAS in dyslexia. 
 
The SAS has been also argued to be responsible for inhibition of values of behavioural schemas 
(Norman & Shallice, 1986). Gonneaud et al. (2011) in their study investigating the relationships 
between event- and time-based PM measures and a wide range of cognitive functions (related to 
frontal lobe functioning) highlighted the strong reliance of time-based PM tasks on inhibition. 
Furthermore, McFarland and Glisky (2009) argued that time monitoring involves the continual 
interruption of ongoing activities. Individuals with dyslexia have been reported to have 
problems with inhibition (e.g. Palladino et al., 2001; Varvara et al., 2014) and thus it is possible 
that the time-based PM deficits found in this thesis are underpinned by deficits in inhibition. It 
could be reasoned that individuals with dyslexia found it difficult to inhibit responses to the 
ongoing tasks in order to switch to the PM activity. Indeed, individuals with dyslexia have been 
also reported to have difficulties with task switching (“sluggish attentional shifting” - Hari & 
Renvall, 2001; Narhi et al., 1997) in addition to inhibition problems. Time-based tasks require 
participants to direct attention away from the ongoing task in order to monitor the time or to 
perform the PM task. This process involves shifting of attentional resources and it could be 
argued to be maintained by executive attentional system such as the Norman and Shallice’s 
(1986; Shallice, 1988) SAS, as it is responsible for directing attentional resources. Literature 
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suggests that individuals with dyslexia have SAS deficits (e.g. Fawcett & Nicolson, 1992; 
Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007) and the finding showing a time-based PM deficits on the laboratory 
based task could be argued to support this deficit. Therefore, the time-based PM deficit found in 
dyslexia could be argued to support problems with inhibition and shifting abilities in dyslexia 
reported in the literature (e.g. Palladino et al., 2001; Hari & Renvall, 2001). 
 
Cockburn (1995) argued that some time-based PM tasks may require interruption of the ongoing 
task whilst others may complement the ongoing task. Cockburn undertook a case study on J.B., 
who had frontal lobe damage which resulted in impairments in planning, initiation and 
inhibition of ongoing behaviour. Cockburn found that J.B. was able to perform PM tasks 
involving inhibition that were compatible with continuation of the ongoing activity (e.g. 
interrupting the ongoing tasks to change pens). Her PM difficulties were argued to be related to 
PM tasks not compatible with the continuation of ongoing activity (see Chapter 1 for more 
details). It was explained that this was related to the strength of activation of target context 
which needed to override the level of activation generated by the ongoing tasks, in order for J.B. 
to break out from the ongoing activity (in tasks which required self-initiated interruption). In 
line with Cockburn’s findings, time-based PM tasks which involve interruption of an ongoing 
activity, where the PM task is not compatible with continuation of the ongoing activity, require 
the highest levels of self-initiation. The author argued that J.B.’s PM deficits were related to 
problems with initiation which in turn is associated with difficulties in attentional control. 
Namely, J.B. was believed to show PM deficits which resembled deficiencies in Norman and 
Shallice’s (1986) SAS. Shallice (1982) argued that deficient working of the SAS can explain 
problems with the formation, initiation and modification of plans, as it is responsible for 
prioritisation and control of action schemas which compete for attentional resources. Moreover, 
Shallice suggested that problems with SAS could result in action schemas being selected on the 
basis of contention scheduling, which selects schemas that are strongly triggered by the 
environment. Therefore, behaviour of an individual whose SAS is not functional was argued to 
be easy to predict. Namely, if an environmental situation (e.g. task) provides strong triggering 
of a schema, it was argued that it will not be possible to prevent the schema from being selected. 
This explanation could be applied to the data from the time-based PM tasks involving 
cognitively demanding ongoing tasks as individuals with dyslexia have been argued previously 
to have problems with SAS (e.g. Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). It could be argued that individuals 
with dyslexia were unable to break out from performance of the ongoing tasks which involved 
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the additional updating tasks as those provided stronger triggering than the PM tasks. This in 
turn could have resulted in the difficulty in preventing the action schema related to performing 
the ongoing tasks from being selected, resulting in PM deficits and fewer time checks in 
dyslexia. This again could support the claim that there is a SAS deficit in dyslexia (e.g. Smith-
Spark & Fisk, 2007). 
 
In line with this reasoning individuals with dyslexia would not have a worse performance on the 
ongoing tasks which are overriding the activation of the other tasks (i.e. time checking and PM 
tasks). This was the case in the time-based experiment where participants with dyslexia did not 
differ significantly in their accuracy of performance on the primary and secondary (updating) 
ongoing tasks, but made fewer time checks and had a poorer performance on the PM task 
compared to controls. On the contrary, the ongoing tasks used in event-based experiments could 
be argued to provide triggering which was similar or weaker than the triggering provided by the 
event-based PM activities (focal PM tasks in particular). Thus, the ongoing tasks may not be 
overriding the triggering of the PM tasks. This could be argued to be related to the difficulty of 
the ongoing tasks used in the time- and event-based PM experiments, as the ongoing tasks used 
in the event-based experiments were generally easier than the ones used in the time-based PM 
experiments. Namely, difficult ongoing tasks may be argued to require more attention in 
comparison to the easier ongoing tasks. This could explain why individuals with dyslexia 
demonstrated a deficit in the time-based PM task but not in the event-based experiments. This 
reasoning is in agreement with literature suggesting problems with inhibition of attention 
drawing tasks in dyslexia (e.g. Palladino et al., 2001) as well as with the findings suggesting 
performance deficits in cognitively demanding tasks (e.g. Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990). 
 
The problems with the SAS in dyslexia are also related to WM, as the SAS has been previously 
linked with the CE component of WM model (Baddeley, 1986). Individuals with dyslexia have 
been reported to have CE impairments (e.g. Jeffries & Everatt, 2004; Smith-Spark et al., 2003; 
Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007; see Chapter 2 for discussion). The CE is responsible for controlling 
the attentional system and therefore a deficit of CE in individuals with dyslexia could be also 
argued to be related to problems with self-initiated attention allocation and ultimately with time-
based PM deficits. A study conducted by Marsh and Hicks (1998) found that tasks which are 
cognitively taxing on the CE component of WM reduced PM performance. Thus, PM problems 
in dyslexia found in the time-based experiment, where the two experimental conditions involved 
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additional ongoing tasks employing CE, could be explained by CE deficits in dyslexia. 
Furthermore, Martin and Schumann-Hengsteler (2001) argued that limited WM resources are 
the underlying factor for inter-individual differences in PM tasks found in older adults. This 
argument was based on their study which showed that the extent of the age related deficit in PM 
task is dependent on the extent to which a PM task makes demands on the processing resources 
of the WM. They found a significantly greater age related deficit in tasks with high overall 
cognitive demand. A similar underlying factor may therefore account for group differences in 
the cognitive load manipulation of the ongoing task performed in this thesis, as the time-based 
PM tasks involving overall higher cognitive load could be argued to result in PM deficits seen 
in dyslexic sample. Thus, one could argue that the time-based PM deficit found in dyslexia 
supports problems in WM reported in dyslexia (e.g. Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). 
 
The results from the event-based task involving a longer time interval (one week) as well as 
from the time-based tasks could suggest more involvement of conscious cognition i.e. planning 
or active monitoring of time which are argued to be executive functions (Miyake et al., 2000). 
Planning has been argued to be a one of the deficits associated with dyslexia (e.g. McLaughlin 
et al., 2002; Weyandt et al., 1998). Smith-Spark et al. (2004) found that individuals with 
dyslexia reported themselves to have planning and organisation difficulties. Further support for 
deficits in executive function of planning has been found by Reiter et al. (2005) and thus it is 
possible that these PM deficits found in this thesis support the deficit in planning and more 
generally the deficit in EF reported in dyslexia.  
 
8.2.3.3. Cerebellar deficit theory 
 
Researchers reported problems with time estimation perception in dyslexia (e.g. Augur, 1985; 
McLoughlin et al., 1994; 2002; Gilroy & Miles, 1996). Ivry and Keele (1989; cited in Nicolson 
& Fawcett, 2010) linked time estimation deficits to the cerebellum, as patients with cerebellar 
lesions showed specific deficits in time estimation. Nicolson et al. (1995) argued that 
individuals with dyslexia showed the same time deficits and suggested that this may be 
underpinned by cerebellum deficits. In order to be able to perform time-based PM tasks (at the 
appropriate time) one needs to rely on an “internal clock” to estimate time in order to initiate 
checking of the time (i.e. look at the clock) which acts as a prompt for the PM activity needed 
for successful time-based PM performance. Thus, poor time estimation could lead individuals 
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with dyslexia to poor time-based PM task performance and one could argue that the finding 
showing less time checks and poorer time-based PM performance in dyslexia compared to 
controls, supports the cerebellar deficit theory (e.g. Nicolson et al., 2001). Thus, it could be 
argued that the problem with time estimation claimed by the cerebellar deficit theory leads to 
problems with time checking i.e. either checking the time too late or too early or not checking 
the time frequently enough in order to perform the time-based PM task successfully. 
 
The result from MIST (Study 3) could be argued to be in line with this reasoning, as individuals 
with dyslexia committed more loss of time errors. Therefore, it could be reasoned that 
individuals with dyslexia are poorer at time estimation, as they have been found to provide the 
correct response but at the incorrect time. Misjudging the time passed since last checking the 
clock could have led individuals with dyslexia to make more loss of time errors and 
subsequently result in poorer time-based PM performance. Furthermore, these arguments are in 
line with the frontal lobe functioning deficits found in dyslexia (e.g. Brosnan et al., 2002) as 
frontal lobe functioning was found to predict the accuracy of time estimation in the context of 
PM task performance (McFarland & Glisky, 2009). 
 
8.2.3.4. Processing speed 
 
On the basis of no group differences in performance on the additional ongoing tasks involving 
phonologically-based and visuo-spatially-based updating tasks, it could be argued that the group 
of individuals with dyslexia did not portray deficits solely with phonological skills, as was 
argued by the phonological deficit hypothesis (e.g. Vellutino & Scanlon, 1987) or the double 
deficit hypothesis (e.g. Wolf & Bowers, 2000). However, it is possible that the phonologically-
based updating tasks did not tap into phonological skills strongly enough to reveal the dyslexia-
related deficit. Nevertheless, the double deficit hypothesis has also argued for a processing 
speed deficit in dyslexia. All of the experimental tasks conducted in this thesis revealed that 
participants with dyslexia had slower RTs compared to controls. The general pattern of slower 
RT’s found in the experimental work is in line with the processing speed deficit argued by the 
double deficit hypothesis (e.g. Wolf & Bowers, 1999). These results also support the 
information processing speed deficit in dyslexia (Fawcett & Nicolson, 1994; 1995a; 1995b) and 
the large body of dyslexia research which has identified a deficit in the speed of processing of 
visual stimuli (e.g. Denckla & Rudel, 1976; Wagner et al., 1993; McBride-Chang & Manis, 
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1996; Wolf & Bowers, 1999). It is possible that the slower RTs indicate a more general 
processing problem which may be linked to EF problems which have been found in dyslexia 
(e.g. Brosnan et al., 2002; Booth et al., 2010; Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). This reasoning is in 
line with the sluggish attentional shifting in individuals with dyslexia as argued by Hari and 
Renvall (2001). In their review of research related to processing speed of rapid stimulus 
sequence tasks they found that individuals with dyslexia were slower when switching attention 
between a variety of tasks. They claimed that the reason for individuals with dyslexia being 
slower when disengaging from one item to engage in the next item was related to sluggish 
attentional shifting. Thus, the findings revealing slower RTs in dyslexia could be argued to be 
compatible with this explanation related to deficient switching of attention. Norman and 
Shallice’s (1986) SAS is responsible for attention allocation and thus this deficit in switching of 
attention is also related to deficits in functioning of SAS in dyslexia (as discusses previously). 
In addition, slower processing speed in individuals with dyslexia has been argued to be 
representative of automatisation deficits in dyslexia (Nicolson & Fawcett, 2008). Therefore, it 
could be argued that the slower RTs found in dyslexia in this thesis not only support the 
processing speed deficits reported in dyslexia, but also support the automaticity/cerebellum 
deficit hypotheses as well as broader cognitive deficits in dyslexia (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990; 
Nicolson et al., 2001). This is similar to what was argued by other researchers (e.g. Smith-Spark 
& Fisk, 2007; Varvara et al., 2014) who proposed that dyslexia is underpinned by broader 
higher-order cognition deficits. These broader cognitive deficits could in turn underpin the 
worse PM performance in dyslexia when compared to age- and IQ-matched controls. 
 
8.2.3.5. Implications for dyslexia theory more broadly 
 
The results of this thesis suggest that deficits in developmental dyslexia are not limited to 
phonological skills as has been argued by the phonological core deficit hypothesis of dyslexia 
(e.g. Frith, 1985; Ramus, 2003; Snowling, 2000; Stanovich, 1988; Vellutino, 1979; Vellutino et 
al., 2004), since this thesis showed that adults with developmental dyslexia have deficits in PM 
tasks. A similar point of view has been presented by other researchers (e.g. Smith-Spark et al., 
2003; Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007; Swanson, 2006; Varvara et al., 2014). Nevertheless, it could 
be argued that language is still involved in encoding instructions and intentions to act upon 
these instructions. However, the results from the retrospective recognition questionnaire that 
was used as a part of MIST showed that participants understood PM instructions. Moreover, 
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participants with dyslexia maintained a good level of accuracy on the ongoing tasks which 
demonstrated that participants understood what was required of them. Therefore, it could be 
argued that the phonological processes required for encoding of instructions and intentions were 
not responsible for PM deficits in dyslexia. This supported the claim that individuals with 
dyslexia have deficits which are not limited to phonological skills i.e. PM or CE/EF deficits 
which manifest themselves on PM tasks.  
 
It could be argued that the results which support SAS, inhibition, switching, planning and CE 
deficits in dyslexia, discussed in this section, point towards a more general problem with EF in 
individuals with dyslexia. This has been argued previously by other researchers (e.g. Smith-
Spark & Fisk, 2007; Varvara et al., 2014) and could be supported by the results from this thesis 
as it was demonstrated that the results from this thesis support the deficits in different executive 
functions reported previously in dyslexia (e.g. inhibition, switching and WM). 
 
Previous research has shown short-term memory/WM problems in adults with developmental 
dyslexia (e.g. Olson and Datta, 2002; Smith-Spark et al., 2003; Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007; 
Varvara et al., 2014). The findings from the research carried out within this thesis contributed an 
original aspect to the dyslexia literature in that it showed that the problems with memory 
reported in dyslexia previously expand beyond short-term memory/WM problems, to future 
thinking in the form of PM. This is a very important finding which broadens the theoretical 
foundation of dyslexia and can be translated into practical implications for individuals with 
dyslexia. 
 
8.3. Future research direction 
 
The findings from this thesis indicated that there are time-based PM deficits in dyslexia. 
Nevertheless, more research is recommended in order to further investigate the conditions and 
processes which are responsible for these PM deficits. This section considers some propositions 
for future research in order to extend further the implications for literature discussed in previous 
section (section 8.2.). 
 
It is suggested that future research investigates whether there are any PM deficits in adults with 
developmental dyslexia in event-based experiments with complex ongoing tasks drawing on 
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attentional and executive resources. It is possible that when a cognitively demanding ongoing 
task is used in an event-based PM experiment, it may reveal a PM deficit in adults with 
dyslexia. For example, a similar ongoing task may be used as in the ongoing task load 
manipulation of the time-based PM. Moreover, it may be suggested to employ a similar 
paradigm to the one used by Einstein et al. (1995) or Martin et al. (2003) who embedded both 
time- and event-based PM tasks in one ongoing activity. Martin et al. (2003) used a multitask 
PM paradigm (MTPM) involving a mixture of six time- and event-based PM activities, which 
required planning during the intention formation phase and was argued to rely highly on 
prefrontal functioning. 
 
A paradigm in which both time- and event-based PM tasks are embedded in one ongoing 
activity that draws strongly on a cognitive resources/relies strongly on EF, would enable further 
investigation of underlying processes that may be responsible for PM deficits in dyslexia. 
Einstein et al. (1995) argued that the reason behind finding greater age related deficits in time-
based PM tasks compared to event-based PM tasks is related to the greater involvement of self-
initiation in time-based tasks. Time-based PM tasks have been argued to involve the highest 
levels of self-initiation, due to the need for self-initiation of monitoring processes (e.g. Einstein 
& McDaniel, 1990; Groot et al., 2002) and self-initiation of an interruption of an ongoing task 
(Cockburn, 1995). Thus, if time-based PM problems in dyslexia are still found in a task with 
both time- and event-based PM tasks that are embedded in one complex ongoing activity, this 
could lend more support to the rationale presented in the previous section (section 8.2.), that the 
PM deficit in dyslexia is underpinned by problems with self-initiation and EF. McFarland and 
Glisky (2009) showed that self-initiated monitoring is controlled by prefrontal functioning and 
individuals with dyslexia have been found to have deficits in frontal functioning (Swanson, 
2006). Thus, if there are more self-initiated processes required by time-based PM tasks, 
individuals with dyslexia should also reveal time-based PM deficits in tasks that directly 
compare time- and event-based PM (with the same complex ongoing activity). This should be 
especially profound in a PM paradigm with a complex ongoing task as individuals with dyslexia 
have been reported to perform worse on complex tasks due to the inability to consciously 
compensate for their performance deficits (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990). Thus, such an extension 
of the current findings may be able to extend the claims made within this thesis in regards to 
problems with EF or cognitive capacity in dyslexia, as argued by Nicolson and Fawcett (1990), 
Smith-Spark and Fisk (2007) or Varvara et al. (2014). Moreover, self-initiation of monitoring 
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and inhibition/switching processes (reasoned to be involved more in time-based PM than in 
event-based PM) could be also argued to be related to SAS which enables selection of the 
desired response by activation or inhibition of values of behavioural schemas (Norman & 
Shallice, 1986). Thus, if individuals with dyslexia are found to have deficits on time-based PM 
tasks in a paradigm allowing for the direct comparison of time- and event-based PM, one could 
argue that it is the deficit in SAS in dyslexia that is underpinning the poor performance. Thus, a 
paradigm allowing a direct comparison of time- and event-based PM embedded in a complex 
ongoing activity would establish whether factors such as SAS, inhibition, switching, cognitive 
capacity or EF deficits determine PM performance in dyslexia. Based on the literature 
suggesting deficits in these processes/models in dyslexia, this more in depth investigation of the 
two types of PM would also facilitate an investigation to find if these processes/models (self-
initiation, SAS, involvement of EF/cognitive resources) are more relevant to time-based PM in 
comparison to event-based PM. 
 
In order to investigate further exactly which executive functions underlie PM deficits in 
dyslexia, it is recommended to include measures of EF. These could be used in order to 
investigate which EF would predict PM performance in dyslexia. In particular, it could be 
suggested to measure inhibition and task switching abilities. It is important to investigate EF 
abilities in relation to PM performance in dyslexia as there is a large body of literature 
suggesting EF deficits in dyslexia (e.g. Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007; Varvara et al., 2014) and EF 
has been found to predict PM performance (Martin et al., 2003).  
 
Furthermore, an experimental design could be developed to enable investigation of PM 
performance when the ongoing task is well within ones EF abilities and just beyond them. A 
prior measurement of EF abilities would have to be performed in order to achieve this. For 
example, a similar updating task to that used in the ongoing task load manipulation (time-based 
experiment) could be used in order to establish the EF abilities. Namely, if one is able to 
correctly recall up to six locations of red frames surrounding pictures they would be considered 
to have a span of six. This span could be then used to design two versions of PM tasks which 
could incorporate similar ongoing tasks, but one version would require this participant to recall 
the last four locations (i.e. within span) and the other last eight (beyond span). In this way the 
first condition would present a task which would be well within this participant’s EF abilities 
whereas the second condition would represent a task that goes beyond his or her EF abilities. 
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This titration procedure would have to be performed individually for each participant. This 
would allow researchers to see whether EF abilities have an effect on PM performance. Also, in 
this way, the Nicolson and Fawcett’s (1990) automaticity theory could be put to the test. 
Nicolson and Fawcett stated that when participants with dyslexia are given a task that is within 
their abilities, they will be able to mask the deficit in automatisation. However, when the task 
goes beyond their abilities, a clear deficit will be revealed. This titration procedure would allow 
to test directly the DAD hypothesis in PM performance and dyslexia. 
 
Moreover, it would be also very interesting to investigate both types of PM in children with 
developmental dyslexia also including the manipulation of task complexity and measurements 
of EF under different conditions (experimental, semi-naturalistic and naturalistic). This would 
allow to investigate whether deficits in PM are present in children with dyslexia as well as 
provide an insight into the development of PM. Namely, it would allow to see if there are 
differences in the development of PM in children with and without dyslexia as this area is still 
unexplored. 
 
It could be also investigated whether a manipulation of task complexity might reveal a PM 
deficit in adults with developmental dyslexia when more everyday life-like PM measures are 
used. For example, the ongoing task used in the MIST could be made more complex by adding 
an additional ongoing task. The ongoing task (the word search puzzle) could be replaced by 
another task such as the one used by Martin and Schumann-Hengsteler (2001). They used the 
Mastermind game involving logical deduction (see e.g. Best, 1990; Laughlin, Lange & 
Adamopoulos, 1982). The use of this game allowed the authors to manipulate the difficulty of 
the ongoing task by increasing the amount of information and varying the complexity of 
feedback rules. Another possibility is to adopt the Rendell and Craik's (2000) Virtual Week 
measure of PM and try to vary the cognitive demands of the ongoing task which would allow an 
everyday PM investigation with varying task complexities. 
 
Also if this thesis was to be carried out again, the stimuli employed in the event-based 
experiments could be selected accounting for ratings of picture saliency or in line with Scullin et 
al. (2010; experiments 2a and 2b) where the researchers identified cues which were fairly 
equivalent in terms of the monitoring difficulty. Once this is established, the focal PM tasks 
could involve highly salient PM cues which were argued to be more likely to result in automatic 
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retrieval of PM intention in comparison to non-salient PM cues, which could be employed in the 
non-focal PM experiment, as these have been argued to be more likely to rely on monitoring. 
This could be combined with more cognitively demanding ongoing task as suggested 
previously. This would then test the spontaneous retrieval versus monitoring theories of PM 
further and could reveal an event-based PM deficit in dyslexia in the non-focal design, as 
hypothesised in Chapter 6. Future research should investigate PM cue saliency in relation to 
dyslexia. 
 
In addition, if the thesis was to be replicated, a 24 hour delayed naturalistic event-based task 
would have been administered to accompany the 24 hour time-based PM task which forms a 
part of the MIST scale. This would enable a direct comparison between the two types of PM in 
every-day life in naturalistic settings. The event-based naturalistic task involving 24 hours delay 
was not used in the current thesis, as Raskin’s (2004) standardised test (MIST) was used for an 
initial exploration of the range of PM in dyslexia (and no diversion from the standardised 
measure was advisable at this stage). 
 
A further probe into PM in dyslexia could include a PM design which would enable 
experimenters to pinpoint the exact phase or phases of PM where the deficits related to dyslexia 
are the most prominent. Martin et al. (2003) used a task which allowed them to focus on 
intention formation and intention execution stages in a demanding task setting. They employed 
the MTPM task involving a mixture of time- and event-based PM activities, which required 
planning during the intention formation phase and was argued to rely largely on prefrontal 
functioning. A similar task could be used to investigate the PM deficits found in dyslexia as 
these could be related to failures at the intention initiation or execution stages, but may also be 
well at the intention formation stage. It would be interesting to manipulate cognitive load at the 
intention formation stage or similarly to Martin et al. (2003), employ a task drawing strongly on 
executive resources at the intention formation stage in order to see if this would have a diverse 
effect on PM performance in dyslexia. This could be also be performed by either increasing the 
cognitive load by having to perform an additional ongoing task while encoding the intention or 
by increasing cognitive load by a larger number of intentions to be encoded at once. On the 
other hand, the increased load at intention initiation stage could take form of a cognitively 
demanding ongoing task whereas increase of cognitive load at the intention execution stage 
could involve dividing attention at this stage. This proposition would enable further research to 
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specify the exact stage of PM tasks where high cognitive load has a negative effect on PM 
performance. Furthermore studies (e.g. Guynn & McDaniel, 2007; McDaniel et al., 2004, 
Experiments 2 and 3) suggested that dividing attention in tasks, which rely on spontaneous 
retrieval does not reduce PM performance. Event-based PM tasks have been argued to rely on 
spontaneous retrieval (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996). Thus, one could argue that if no negative 
effect on event-based PM performance is found when ongoing tasks involving dividing of 
attention during intention of initiation stage is employed, this could support the spontaneous 
retrieval theory of event-based PM tasks (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996). 
 
The stages of PM (i.e. intention formation, initiation and execution) could be also investigated 
in more naturalistic settings. It would be interesting to investigate the influence of environment 
in the different stages of PM. Both event- and time-based PM tasks can be triggered by 
environmental cues such as clocks or an objects reminding one about the PM activity. The 
saliency of PM cues (e.g. clock) is related to the strength of formed associations at the intention 
formation stage. On this basis, the environment can interact with the formed intentions (if the 
formed associations are strong enough) in order to initiate the PM retrieval. Thus the 
environment and the context in which the task is to be performed is important in PM tasks and 
therefore, worth investigating further. Namely, it may be easier if the context triggers the PM 
task compared to when it does not. By using the same setting for both tasks, i.e. asking 
participants to form a PM intention and to perform the PM task in the kitchen of a house, may 
result in better PM performance, in comparison to asking participants to perform the PM task in 
a different room or setting than the place where the intention was formed. 
 
The role of distractors in PM would be another area which could be investigated further in 
relation to dyslexia. Considering that individuals with dyslexia have been reported to be 
vulnerable to distractors (e.g. Palladino et al., 2001), it would be interesting to investigate 
whether providing distractors would hinder the PM performance of individuals with dyslexia 
more than controls. 
 
Motivation for performance on PM tasks would be especially interesting to investigate. It could 
be argued to be an important factor when investigating PM in dyslexia, as one may reason that 
individuals with dyslexia may be more motivated to complete PM tasks for two reasons. 
Namely, individuals with dyslexia may be more motivated in general in order to achieve their 
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goals due to their performance deficits hindering their achievements on different tasks. This in 
turn could play out in PM tasks as individuals with dyslexia may be more motivated to complete 
them. Another possibility is that individuals with dyslexia could be more motivated as this 
research is about dyslexia and they may be even taking part in research to find out more about 
dyslexia in a first place. In comparison, there is also the possibility that individuals without 
dyslexia may not be as interested in taking part in dyslexia research as individuals with 
dyslexia, especially if they are doing it as a part of their university course requirement (i.e. for 
participation points). Thus, there is a possible bias in terms of individuals with dyslexia having a 
higher level of motivation for taking part in dyslexia research. This in turn could result in better 
performance of individuals with dyslexia than it would have been in their everyday lives. One 
solution to this problem would be to offer a prize to be won for a randomly selected person who 
has completed the PM tasks successfully. This could ensure that control participants maintain 
motivated also. Further research in this direction is recommended to see if motivation has an 
effect on PM performance in dyslexia. 
 
Another idea for further research is related to the results from Study 2 (PMQ), which indicated 
that individuals with dyslexia use memory aiding techniques. Namely, it would be interesting to 
establish if individuals actually rely on memory aiding techniques more than controls, as stated 
in the self-report questionnaire study and if these techniques are used effectively. In addition, 
the use of memory aiding strategies in real life conditions could be examined using naturalistic 
investigation methods to see if they improve PM performance in individuals with dyslexia. In 
such a study, participants would have to be asked after the study if they had used any memory 
aiding techniques. This study could investigate which memory techniques would benefit 
individuals with dyslexia the most. Moreover, further applied research investigating how best to 
support people with dyslexia in the workplace is needed. 
 
8.4. The bigger picture: Implications for everyday life in adults with dyslexia 
 
The results from this thesis suggested that the adverse effects of dyslexia are not restricted to an 
early age or even to educational surroundings (reading and writing) or a particular specific 
processing domain (i.e. phonological or visuo-spatial), but persist throughout the life span, and 
under certain conditions affect the ability to carry out intentions in the future. 
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In order to support individuals with dyslexia, it could be suggested that adults with dyslexia 
would benefit from using electronic calendars with the option of an alarm reminder. Even 
though individuals with dyslexia reported to use more memory aiding techniques than controls 
(Study 2), it would be important to ensure that these are used effectively and that participants 
with dyslexia engage with these techniques e.g. a reminder on a mobile telephone is only useful 
if the individuals has the telephone with them. Effective use and engagement with memory 
aiding techniques would act as a reminder which would negate the need for self-initiation of PM 
activity and ultimately result in better PM in dyslexia. Memory aiding technologies would play 
a role of external cognition (Scaife & Rogers, 1996) which would help individuals with dyslexia 
manage their daily activities involving PM. In addition, it is recommended that the awareness of 
the adverse effects of cognitive overload on PM should be raised in the dyslexic population. 
Individuals with dyslexia could be advised on the best coping strategies and technological 
advances to help them remember prospectively. This could be supported by practitioners 
responsible for assessments of needs of individuals with dyslexia studying at universities. They 
could be making recommendations for Student Finance England with regards to the needs of 
dyslexic individuals for the purposes of the Disabled Students’ Allowances (Disabled Students’ 
Allowances, 2014). 
 
Raising employers’ awareness of the PM deficit of adults with developmental dyslexia in 
cognitively demanding situations could be used to support individuals with dyslexia in the work 
place. The Equality Act 2010 (Equality Act 2010, 2010) requires reasonable adjustments or 
support at work for individuals with dyslexia which could include helping individuals with 
dyslexia understand their PM difficulties and the development of some coping strategies. 
Introducing coping strategies to help individuals with dyslexia with their PM problems could 
make their everyday lives easier and help them succeed in their chosen career. Therefore 
employers and occupation health professionals need to be aware and understand that individuals 
with dyslexia may have time-based PM deficits. They need to be trained on how to best support 
people with dyslexia and be made aware of the types of support available (e.g. in the form of 
memory aids or bespoke solutions). For instance, in addition to setting a meeting at a future date 
through email, employers could implement meeting bookings via calendar software (e.g. 
Outlook calendar) which has the ability to place a reminder on the employee’s computer 
desktop screen several times prior to this meeting e.g. 1 hour and 10 minutes. This reminder 
could also be synchronised with employee’s mobile telephones and other devices. 
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Problems with PM can play out at work in many ways. Some ways in which PM failures can 
play out in a work place has already been outlined in an anecdotal vignette in Bartlett and 
Moody (2000). The authors of this book have a lot of experience working with adults with 
dyslexia on a daily basis. The vignette entitled “A good day at the office?” describes a day spent 
at the office by Mr Smith. In this one page description shadowing Mr Smith’s day there are 
three PM failures experienced by Mr Smith i.e. Mr Smith forgets to take some important papers 
from home and then he also forgets to send someone vital information and then he finally 
misses a meeting that he intended to go to. In addition, Bartlett and Moody (2000) state that 
adults with dyslexia are notorious for missing appointments and failing to meet deadlines. Even 
though Bartlett and Moody (2000) did not explicitly name these anecdotal problems observed in 
individuals with dyslexia as PM problems, those clearly resemble PM difficulties and provide a 
good demonstration of how PM problems could play out in the work place. On the basis of the 
current thesis, individuals with dyslexia may find particularly difficult to cope with situations 
involving time-based PM tasks. For example, individuals with dyslexia may forget to ring back 
a customer that they could not reach earlier (telephone engaged or not answered) or miss work 
meetings. The more serious PM failures could result in disciplinary action taken against the 
employee. This in turn, could result in failure in his or her career and even risk to the general 
well-being of individuals with dyslexia. Even the more mundane PM failures could result in 
lack of progression at work. 
 
Thus, employers should be encouraged to make every effort to support individuals with dyslexia 
by putting checks in place in order to account for PM deficits in individuals with dyslexia. 
Scheduling and timetables with reminders could be used to support these PM difficulties in 
dyslexia to ensure that time-based PM tasks are converted to event-based tasks whenever 
possible to enhance work place effectiveness and support career progression. 
 
8.5. Overall conclusion 
 
To conclude, adults with dyslexia overall showed an awareness regarding their own deficits in 
PM (established using self-reports). The PM deficits in adults with dyslexia seem to also play 
out in everyday life. It can be also argued on a number of tasks (naturalistic, MIST and 
experimental) that dyslexia-related PM deficits are generally more related to time-based PM 
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than event-based PM. These have been linked to EF/SAS deficits in dyslexia. In addition, on the 
basis of the range of tasks used in this thesis, it is possible that PM tasks involving greater time 
intervals between intention formation and execution are more likely to result in PM deficits in 
dyslexia.  
 
The event-based experiments did not show any PM deficits in adults with developmental 
dyslexia. However, it is uncertain whether these deficits are present in dyslexia or whether they 
were not revealed due to task complexity in the event-based experiments not being sufficiently 
demanding. It is possible that a PM deficit might reveal itself in event-based experiments under 
greater cognitive task demands (e.g. greater ongoing tasks demands). Thus, an event-based 
experimental investigation of PM involving high cognitive load is recommended in order to 
examine its effect on developmental dyslexia in adulthood.  
 
The current thesis explored PM in adults, as PM failures have more of a profound impact on 
lives of adults compared to children, since children often rely on care givers with regards to the 
tasks that they need to remember to perform in the future. Thus, as a first point of reference it 
was appropriate to employ adults with developmental dyslexia to investigate how dyslexia can 
impact on PM in everyday life. Further research involving children with developmental dyslexia 
is recommended in order to examine if there are different trajectories to development of PM in 
people with dyslexia compared to these who do not have dyslexia as this area has not been 
explored thus far. 
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Appendices: 
 
Appendix 1: Stimuli list for focal (Study 4) and non-focal (Study 5) experiments 
 
FOCAL 
BLOCK 1 BLOCK 2 
LIVING NON-LIVING LIVING NON-LIVING 
Nose Belt Pear Bowl 
Apple Frying Pan Banana Glass 
Lips Scissors Cherry Button 
Tomato Refrigerator Lemon Ironing Board 
Toe Plug Orange Garbage Can 
Foot Rugby Ball (Football) Arm Fork 
Finger Comb Potato Doorknob 
Leaf Broom Leg Toaster 
Hand Vest Ear Glasses 
Grapes Lightbulb Carrot Tie 
Cat Umbrella Eye Saltcellar (Saltshaker) 
Horse Shirt Corn Iron 
Celery Television Squirrel Telephone 
NON-FOCAL 
BLOCK 1 BLOCK 2 
LIVING NON-LIVING LIVING NON-LIVING 
Pear Key Lips Refrigerator 
Lemon Belt Finger Plug 
Cherry Frying Pan Banana Ladder 
Apple Scissors Nose Envelope 
Tomato Pliers Orange Sock 
Toe Rugby Ball (Football) Arm Button 
Foot Comb Thumb Ironing Board 
Potato Broom Leaf Screwdriver 
Carrot Umbrella Leg Light Switch 
Hand Shirt Ear Fork 
Grapes Baseball bat Corn Toaster 
Cat Glass Squirrel Television 
Celery Telephone Horse Iron 
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Appendix 2: Stimuli Matching using one-way ANOVA 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Focal  Non-focal 
Living B1 vs. B2  Non-Living B1 vs. B2  All B1 vs. B2  Living B1 vs. B2  Non-Living B1 vs. B2  All B1 vs. B2 
F (1, 24) p  F (1, 24) p  F (1, 50) p  F (1, 24) p  F (1, 24) p  F (1, 50) p 
Image 
Agreement 
1.284 .268  1.022 .322  2.355 .131  .586 .452  .097 .758  .601 .442 
Familiarity 
Ratings 
2.576 .122  .023 .880  1.335 .253  2.410 .134  .006 .939  1.116 .296 
Visual 
Complexity 
.254 .619  .386 .540  .017 .895  .119 .733  .042 .839  .165 .686 
Black 
Pixels (%) 
.152 .700  .187 .669  .002 .966  .848 .328  .082 .777  .880 .353 
Area of 
Drawing 
.276 .604  .488 .492  .721 .400  3.236 .085  1.132 .298  < .001 .987 
Note: B = Block; All = living + non-living 
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Appendix 3: Trimmed data analysis - event-based: Focal design  
 
3.1. Data trimming procedure 
 
The accuracy and RT data were analysed after trimming. The trimming followed similar 
principles to those used in other peer review published investigations looking at prospective 
memory. Namely, the first six trials from both Block 1 and Block 2 were removed (regardless of 
whether the responses to these trials were correct of incorrect). This was performed similarly to 
Smith, Persyn, and Butler (2011). Two trials (again regardless whether these were correct or 
incorrect) appearing straight after each of the 8 PM cues were removed in Block 2 (e.g. Loft, 
Pearcy & Remington, 2011; Smith, Hunt, McVay & McConnell, 2007). Breneiser (2009) stated 
that removal of the two trials occurring after PM cue is needed as the appearance of PM cue 
could interrupt processing of the onging task. This in turn could produce ongoing trials which 
are not characteristic of a participant’s true performance. Consistent with, Cohen, Judas, and 
Gollwitzer (2008) all of the ongoing trial latencies (correct only) which were less than 300ms or 
more than three standard deviations from the cell mean were disregarded. 
 
3.2. Trimmed accuracy and RT data 
 
The accuracy and RT data were trimmed for this analysis. This data trimming process 
performed on the ongoing responses removed 18.55% of the total correct ongoing responses 
across the two blocks (16.98% of all of the responses provided in the experiment including PM 
trials). All of the results acquired from the data after they were trimmed are presented in Table 
32. The same tests were used to analyse the trimmed data as were previously performed on the 
non-trimmed data. Namely, Table 32 includes means, one-way ANOVA on PM trials and 
mixed measures ANOVA looking at the cost of performing PM task on the ongoing trials in 
Block 2 compared to Block 1. 
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Table 32: Means and mixed measures ANOVA using accuracy and RT data. 
 
 
Means 
 
Accuracy (%) 
  
RT (ms) 
 
 
 
Controls 
  
Dyslexics 
  
Controls 
  
Dyslexics 
 
 
Type of Trial 
 
M 
 
SD 
  
M 
 
SD 
  
M 
 
SD 
  
M 
 
SD 
Ongoing  
(Block 1) 
 
95.52 5.68  97.31 3.15  1758.49 419.51  2469.14 958.00 
Ongoing  
(Block 2) 
 
96.29 7.81  97.47 2.85  1802.46 348.73  2507.44 926.16 
PM 
(Block 2) 
 
83.33 27.25  81.25 30.26  1300.46 327.33  1681.78 670.76 
 
Mixed 
measures 
ANOVA 
Ongoing trials 
(Block 1 and 
Block 2) 
 
 
Accuracy (%) 
  
 
RT (ms) 
  
F (1, 48) 
 
p 
 
ηp
2
 
  
F (1, 48) 
 
p 
 
ηp
2
 
Group 1.405 .242 .028  12.631 .001 .208 
Block .365 .549 .008  .546 .463 .011 
Group * Block 
interaction 
.157 .693 .003  .003 .960 < .001 
 
 
The results from one-way ANOVA remained the same as no PM trials were removed. The 
results from the mixed measures ANOVA performed on the trimmed data were similar to the 
results acquired from the non-trimmed data. There was a significant main effect of participant 
group in the RT data. However, the analysis performed on the trimmed RT data did not produce 
an effect of block approaching significance as it was observed in the non-trimmed data 
(nonetheless, they are both non-significant). 
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Appendix 4: Trimmed data analysis - event-based Non-focal experiment  
 
4.1. Data trimming procedure 
 
The same data trimming procedure as used in the focal experiment was applied to this analysis. 
Data trimming process performed on the ongoing responses removed 18.87% of the total correct 
ongoing responses across the two blocks (18.12% of all of the responses provided in the 
experiment including PM trials). All of the results acquired from the data after they were 
trimmed are presented in Table 33. The same tests were used to analyse the trimmed data as 
were performed on the non-trimmed data. Table 33 includes means, one-way ANOVA on the 
two tasks (ongoing and PM) across the two blocks and mixed measures ANOVA looking at the 
cost of performing PM task on the ongoing trials in Block 2 compared to Block 1. 
 
4.2. Trimmed accuracy and RT data 
 
Table 33: Means and mixed measures ANOVA using accuracy and RT data. 
 
 
Means 
 
Accuracy (%) 
  
RT (ms) 
 
 
 
Controls 
  
Dyslexics 
  
Controls 
  
Dyslexics 
Type of Trial M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Ongoing  
(Block 1) 
 
96.75 3.21  96.27 4.15  1428.30 486.97  2007.29 852.21 
Ongoing  
(Block 2) 
 
96.12 3.09  95.16 7.59  1492.79 398.40  2215.78 973.14 
PM 
(Block 2) 
 
77.84 24.68  71.43 28.82  1137.51 359.95  1431.13 568.44 
Mixed measures 
ANOVA 
Ongoing trials 
(Block 1 and Block 2) 
 
 
Accuracy (%) 
  
 
RT (ms) 
  
F (1, 41) 
 
p 
 
ηp
2
 
  
F (1, 41) 
 
p 
 
ηp
2
 
Group  .427 .517 .010  10.211 .003 .199 
Block  .773 .384 .019  5.130 .029 .111 
Group * Block 
interaction 
.058 .811 .001  1.052 .311 .025 
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The results from the one-way ANOVA remained the same as no PM trials were removed. The 
results from the mixed measures ANOVA performed on the trimmed data were similar to the 
results acquired from the non-trimmed data. There were significant main effects of participant 
group and block type in the RT data, but the interaction between the two was not significant. 
The two effects and their interaction were not significant for the accuracy data. 
 
Appendix 5: Stimuli used as PM targets in non-focal experiment 
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Appendix 6: Juxtaposition of tables displaying means from focal and non-focal 
experiments based on non-trimmed data 
 
 
FOCAL Accuracy (%)  Reaction time (ms) 
 Controls  Dyslexics  Controls  Dyslexics 
 
Type of Trial 
M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Ongoing  
(Block 1) 
 
95.05  5.62  96.73 3.18  1804.80 435.23  2552.25 972.64 
Ongoing + PM  
(Block 2) 
 
94.32  8.41  96.06 3.75  1829.13 327.90  2607.30 906.07 
Ongoing  
(Block 2) 
 
95.54 8.71  97.70 2.19  1885.92 353.21  2696.92 951.96 
PM 
(Block 2) 
 
83.33  27.25  81.25 30.26  1260.89 361.94  1652.84 679.32 
NON-FOCAL Accuracy (%)  Reaction time (ms) 
 
  
Controls  Dyslexics  Controls  Dyslexics 
 
Type of Trial 
M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Ongoing  
(Block 1) 
 
96.59  3.25  96.07 4.17  1469.40 454.15  2113.64 897.80 
Ongoing + PM  
(Block 2) 
 
93.98  4.15  93.10 6.84  1548.59 387.08  2257.29 902.46 
Ongoing  
(Block 2) 
 
95.77 3.85  95.50 6.50  1586.67 403.17  2323.68 937.98 
PM 
(Block 2) 
 
77.84  24.68  71.43 28.82  1137.51 359.95  1431.13 568.44 
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Appendix 7: Stimuli list used in Time-based experiments. 
 
LIVING DEAD 
Barrack Obama Albert Einstein 
Beyonce Amy Winehouse 
Brad Pitt Bob Marley 
David Beckham Elvis Presley 
George Clooney Freddie Mercury 
Johnny Depp Heath Ledger 
Justin Beiber John Lennon 
Kate Middleton Kurt Cobain 
Madona  Marilyn Monroe 
Rhianna Michael Jackson 
Simon Cowell Princess Diana 
The Queen Whitney Huston 
Barrack Obama Albert Einstein 
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Appendix 8: Naturalistic Study Instructions (event-based) 
 
You will receive a text message (SMS) one week after today. In this message only your initials 
and participant number will appear. You are requested to remember to call the experimenter as 
soon as possible (preferably within 5 minutes) using the number from which the text message 
was sent. When placing the call, please wait for the phone to ring once and then end the call. 
Please note that the researcher will not answer the call so it will not cost you any money.  
 
Please do NOT use external reminders such as sticky notes or calendar entries to remind you to 
return the call. 
 
Once you have read through these instructions, please explain to the experimenter what you are 
asked to do. 
 
Do you fully understand the instructions to respond as soon as possible (preferably within 5 
min) to text messages sent by the experimenter, by dialing the number that the text message 
with your initials and participant number was received from and ending the call when you hear 
the phone ring once? 
 
Yes / No 
 
 
 
Mobile Phone Usage 
 
You are asked a few questions with regards to your mobile phone. The reason for this is to 
prevent a situation where you cannot respond to the text messages sent by the researcher due to 
insufficient funds on your phone (e.g. where your outgoing calls are bared). 
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1. Do you own a mobile phone? If yes, what is your mobile phone number that you use the 
most? ………………………….. 
 
2. Is this phone a Contract phone or a Pay as You Go phone? 
 
Contract / Pay as You Go 
 
3. Do you give consent to the experimenter to contact you on this number? 
Yes/No 
 
4. If your phone is a Pay as You Go, are there long periods of time that you have no 
money on your phone to make phone calls? 
 
Yes / No 
 
5. How competent are you in using your mobile phone to make missed calls (in which you 
end the call after the phone you are dialling rings once)? 
 
(1 being not at all and 10 being extremely competent) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
6. How competent are you in using mobile your phone to receive text messages (SMS)? 
 
(1 being not at all and 10 being extremely competent) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
7. How competent are you in using your mobile phone to make a voice call to the sender 
of a text message (SMS) that you receive? 
 292 
 
 
 
 
(1 being not at all and 10 being extremely competent) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
8. Please provide an estimate of how often you check your mobile phone? (if you have 
more than one mobile  phone numbers, provide an estimate for the number you have 
given to the researcher) 
 
More than 10 times a day 
Between 5 and 10 times a day 
Between 2 and 4 times a day 
Once a day 
Once every few days 
Once a week  
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Appendix 9: Follow up email 
 
1. Did you receive the text message (SMS) from the experimenter one week after the 
experiment? 
 
Yes / No  (Bold the answer) 
 
 
2. Did you remember the instruction requesting you to respond to the text message (SMS) 
by using the number from the text message; waiting for the phone to ring once and end 
the call? 
 
Yes / No 
 
 
3. How much importance did you place on the activity of responding to the text message 
by calling the sender’s number? 
 
(1 being none and 10 being extremely important) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
4. If you responded to the text message later than 5 minutes after receiving it, what was 
the reason for this? 
 
I had forgotten to do it / 
I was busy / 
I have not checked my mobile phone for quite a while / 
I was on the phone or received many other more important text messages that needed to be 
responded to / 
Other, please state…..… 
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5. In the time interval between leaving my experiment and receiving my text message 
(SMS), please estimate how many times you thought about responding to this email by 
placing a missed call to the experimenter? 
 
More than 20 times 
Between 15 and 20 times 
Between 10 and 14 times 
Between 5 and 9 times 
Between 3 and 4 times 
Two times 
Once 
I did not think about it at all until I received the text message 
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Appendix 10: Naturalistic Study Instructions (time-based) 
 
You are asked to send a text message with your name and surname to the researcher in one 
week from now. Please send the text message on ……….…………….at 
……………(preferably within 5 minutes from that time).  
 
Please do NOT use external reminders such as sticky notes or calendar entries to remind you to 
send the text message to the researcher. 
 
The number to text is 07748825127. Please save the phone number in your phone, but not as a 
reminder note. 
 
Once you have read through these instructions, please explain to the experimenter what you are 
asked to do. 
 
Questions 
 
1. Do you fully understand the instructions to send a text message with your name and 
surname to the experimenter in one week from now? 
 
Yes / No 
 
2. Please indicate on the scale below how motivated you are to send the text message 
(SMS) to the researcher. 
 
(1 being not motivated at all and 10 extremely motivated) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
3. How likely do you think it is that you will remember to send the text message to the 
researcher?  
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(1 being not likely at all and 10 extremely likely) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Mobile Phone Usage 
 
You are asked a few questions with regards to your mobile phone. The reason for this is to 
prevent a situation where you cannot send the text messages due to insufficient funds on your 
phone (e.g. where your outgoing messages are bared). 
 
9. Do you own a mobile phone? If yes, what is your mobile phone number that you use the 
most? ………………………….. 
 
10. Is this phone a Contract phone or a Pay as You Go phone? 
 
Contract / Pay as You Go 
 
11. If your phone is a Pay as You Go, are there long periods of time that you have no 
money on your phone to make phone calls? 
 
Yes / No 
 
12. How competent are you in using mobile your phone to send text messages (SMS)? 
 
(1 being not at all and 10 being extremely competent) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
 
